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John Shuford  Joanie Eppinga  Steven Baum

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Call for Papers and Submission Guidelines

The 2011 Journal of Hate Studies will be publishing papers from the 2011 International Conference on Hate Studies, to be held April 6-9, 2011. Please consider submitting a paper to present to the conference. We hope to see you there.

The second International Conference on Hate Studies builds upon the successful 2004 initial conference. This conference will convene leading academics from multiple disciplines from around the world, law enforcement personnel, journalists, educators, representatives from governmental and non-governmental organizations, human rights experts, community organizers, activists, and others to discuss hatred from multiple perspectives. The lessons learned and plans which emerge will help educators, researchers, law enforcement, advocates, and others better analyze and combat hatred in its various manifestations.

Our theme this year is Interdisciplinary Approaches to Understanding the Nature of Hate, Crafting Models for Combating Hatred, and Implications for Practice. We are looking to explore this theme through the four main areas of education, research, practice, and advocacy. Papers from different theoretical or disciplinary lenses are invited such as those from history, communications, psychology, social psychology, evolutionary psychology, anthropology, sociology, criminal justice, law, biology, business, economics, theology, religious studies, political science, literature, philosophy, education, and more.

Submissions are typically expected to be between 5000-10,000 words. Submissions should include one hard copy and an electronic copy in MS Word format. Please do not submit PDF files. Submissions should be presented in APA format and contain endnotes rather than footnotes.

Address submissions and questions to the Gonzaga University Institute for Hate Studies, AD Box 43, 502 E. Boone Avenue, Spokane WA 99258-0043; email address: againsthate@gonzaga.edu; phone: (509) 313-3665
Preface

INTRODUCTION

The Institute for Hate Studies at Gonzaga University is pleased to offer Volume 8 of the *Journal of Hate Studies*, the theme of which is “The Other Among Us.” It is a timely topic, no doubt, as nativism, racism, and extremism boil over in America’s immigration debate. This volume considers those issues as well as a wider range of perspectives on engagement and disengagement with “the other” in our society, culture, and lives.

Imbedded in this volume’s theme are myriad questions. Who is the “other” among us, and what does it mean to be an “other” or to be “othered”? Why does the “other” become so, and how exactly does “other-ing” unfold and play out? What is the distance between what we owe and how we treat the “other” among us? What, if we can receive the message, does the “other” have to say—or offer—to us?

One of the most powerful explorations of these and other questions in recent popular culture comes from Alfonso Cuarón’s *Children of Men* (2006). That film, based on P.D. James’ 1992 novel, portrays a world in which humanity has resigned its highest ideals, lost its sense of meaning, and all but given up hope. The film is set in the United Kingdom circa 2027 amidst economic collapse, environmental devastation, and global conflict. Our homeostasis (if humanity is thought of as a single living entity) has been so corrupted that civilization and the human race are slowly but surely dying. People have become infertile, and with the last human offspring born nearly two decades earlier, our species is unlikely to survive the century’s end. With our biological nadir comes the existential question—*for what do we live, and why do we go on at all, if there is no future, no apparent hope, no posterity?*

If ever the answer were “to live peaceably, with compassion and love for others, in whatever time we are given,” one might hope that humanity would realize that the time had come when faced with its own extinction. Yet in the world of *Children of Men*, humanity has either failed to answer the existential question or, worse yet, failed to try. Quotidian life in Western society of the 21st century is alienated and dystopian. Cities are hectic, crowded, polluted, repressive police states. All around, warfare motivated by habit, grudge, and desire (for control, or liberation, or mere survival) rages on. Rather than wait for the squalid last days, some simply take Quies-tus, a suicide tablet (“You Decide When”).

From the island nation in which *Children of Men* is set, isolationist hatred radiates out to whatever remains of the world beyond. Millions of
global migrants (or “Fugees”) who seek refuge, asylum, or respite from suffering in the remaining civil societies are the targets of persecution. Fugees are routinely rounded up and sent off to detention camps, even executed. Anti-Fugee paranoia, stoked by advertisement and propaganda, is omnipresent so that anyone even suspected of being a Fugee faces blame, hostility, and hatred. Yet, as the story unfolds, a Fugee who is “othered” in multiple dimensions bears, literally, the hope of humanity and the promise of posterity: a newborn child. Might history be reversed and humanity be restored?

One need not look far into the world of *Children of Men* to see reflections in the mainstreaming of nativist anxiety over race, immigration, and social change in our times. In mid-July 2010, two female employees of the Utah Department of Workforce Services distributed an anonymous “illegal immigrant” list to state officials and media outlets. The list included the names (most of which are of Hispanic origin), addresses, social security numbers, phone numbers, dates of birth, workplaces, and other personal information for some 1,300 Utah residents whom state employees suspected of being undocumented immigrants. The names of the residents’ children were also included, as were the due dates for those pregnant women whose names appeared on the list. Accompanying the list was a letter that demanded immediate deportation of those named persons.

Around the same time, a group identifying itself as the “North Iowa Tea Party” paid for a local billboard that visually and rhetorically situated Barack Obama (“Democratic Socialism”) between Adolf Hitler (“National Socialism”) and Vladimir Lenin (“Marxist Socialism”). Meanwhile, “Birther” allegations against President Obama arose once again, now as backed by Louisiana Senator David Vitter. The NAACP passed a resolution that condemns the “racist, extremist” elements of the Tea Party, and suspicions of a strategic alignment between “Birthers,” the Tea Party, and the GOP have grown in public opinion and political commentary circles. Also stirring from the political right are calls to end “birthright citizenship” for the U.S.-born children of undocumented and unauthorized immigrants. Such change that would require overturning established constitutional law and narrowing the “territorial personhood” protections found in the 14th Amendment.

Most prominently, as this volume goes to print, Federal Judge Susan Bolton issued a preliminary injunction against several provisions found in S.B. 1070, the popular name for Arizona’s effort to implement a state-level immigration regulatory scheme. S.B. 1070 amends existing laws and includes a large number of new laws (such as the creation of a state-level trespassing violation for unlawful presence) which are widely regarded as the toughest set of immigration reforms and legislation in decades. The
U.S. Department of Justice argued that several aspects of S.B. 1070 violate the Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause, conflict with foreign policy, and are preempted by federal law (because, in relevant part, the preemption doctrine holds that federal law impliedly preempts state law when the latter conflicts with a federal regulatory scheme). Opponents also point out that some aspects of S.B. 1070 might be unconstitutional as applied if their enforcement leads to or relies upon racial profiling.

S.B. 1070 is premised on theories of states’ rights, concurrent jurisdiction, and concurrent enforcement; Arizona contends that states have authority to enforce immigration law and make laws (consistent with federal law) to punish and prevent “illegal immigration.” Arizona alleges that S.B. 1070 is necessary because inadequate border security and enforcement have left the state vulnerable to human trafficking, drug trafficking, and other gang activity, as well as less-specific problems. Nine other states (Alabama, Florida, Michigan, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and Virginia) and the Northern Mariana Islands filed an amicus brief in support of Arizona’s law. Opinion polls show that about 60% of Americans surveyed nationwide, and over 70% of Arizonans, support it as well.

Still, for those who wish for peace, the recovery of our highest ideals, and the re-humanization of ideological and political opposites, there is reason for hope. Evangelical Christian leaders are increasingly joining Roman Catholic, mainline Protestant, Muslim, Jewish, and other religious group leaders who oppose S.B. 1070 and support comprehensive immigration reform on grounds of scriptural authority, ethical principle, and basic compassion. As we look to the future, we see that the United States in 2050 will be a nation without a racial majority population. Roughly 80% of America’s population growth over the next four decades will come from foreign-born persons and their U.S.-born children and grandchildren.

Might we yet reverse our recent history and restore our humanity? Might we yet reclaim or perhaps discover anew our higher selves in relation to each other?

ABOUT THIS VOLUME

We hope you will find this volume to be a relevant and meaningful addition to your personal and professional libraries. Featured are several academic articles, two interviews, a film review, and an annotated bibliography that deal with historic contexts and contemporary concerns, ranging from Holocaust survival and denial, to genocide and post-genocide responses, hate and bias-crime, white supremacist and nativism, and the influence and experience of “othering” and “otherness” in identify forma-
Brief summaries of each contribution and their respective contributors follow.

Neil Chakraborti is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Criminology at the University of Leicester. He has published numerous books and articles on hate crime. His article for this issue of the Journal of Hate Studies, “Crimes Against the Other: Conceptual, Operational, and Empirical Challenges for Hate Studies,” was written after he attended a meeting of the American Society of Criminology, where he was struck by how widely accepted the notion of hate crimes has become. Chakraborti notes that “hate crime cuts through numerous themes central to social scientific enquiry,” and that this article draws from the emerging data and knowledge to outline some of the main conceptual, operational, and empirical difficulties being addressed by researchers and policy-makers. Chakraborti is British, but the issues he confronts are international in scope, and he suggests that they must be addressed from international and interdisciplinary perspectives that will increase our understanding. In this article, Chakraborti explores the nature of the problems and questions within the field, as well as how we can used them to guide dialogue about hate crime. He assesses the progress made within the field of hate crimes and suggests that criminologists must “scrutinize its practical application to ensure that the core values at the heart of the hate crime movement are not diluted or subverted.”

Those values, which largely are focused on helping and finding justice for real victims as well as eliminating hate crime, are also embraced by Drs. Barbara Perry and Randy Blazak, professors at the University of Ontario Institute of Technology and Portland State University, respectively. Their article, “Places for Races: The White Supremacist Movement Imagines U.S. Geography,” warns that we must be aware that white supremacists have chosen particular geographical areas to claim and defend, and that hate crimes often are perpetrated out of a desire to defend the borders. The authors explain, “What we offer here is an exploration of the spatial imagination among the white supremacist movement, an analysis that sees racially motivated violence and other related activities as, in part, contestations over space and the interpretation of those spaces.” They outline the history and the thinking behind the desire of many supremacists to orchestrate separate geographical spaces for different races, and various plans that have been proposed to make that desire a reality. Finally, they note that “the fear of losing America to immigrants and others encourages a defensive posturing and a need to erect walls, symbolic and otherwise. To understand hate crimes, an understanding of how people define their space as ‘theirs’ is key.” The perception of people of different races as “other” is behind the desire of Supremacists to be separate.

The notion of relegating some people to a particular and inferior status
is also addressed by Orly Rahimiyan, a Ph.D. scholar at Ben Gurion University of the Negev. Rahimiyan posits that too often one group defines the identity of another group living among them. In her paper, “My Homeland, My Diaspora: Iranian Jewish Identity in Modern Times,” Rahimiyan asks who decides whether a particular group belongs in or has a claim to a particular area. She focuses specifically on the self-identity perceptions of Iranian Jews under the Iranian Islamic Republic. She asks whether Iranian Jews are first Iranians and incidentally Jewish, or whether it is the other way around. Further, she refutes common misperceptions about the relationships between Iranian Jews and their government and culture. Finally, she attempts to assess the “otherness” of Iranian Jews, asking, “Are they the ‘other’ upon which Muslim Iranians construct their Iranian identity?” Rahimiyan concludes that, despite the internal and external tensions that are present in being an Iranian Jew, people who classify themselves as such are able to combine the concepts and embrace both identities; though they have an attachment to Israel, they consider themselves true Iranians rather than something “other.”

Jordan Blair Woods, a graduate of Harvard and UCLA who is pursuing his doctorate at Cambridge, England, also addresses the notion of the “other” in his article, “The Internet’s Promise to Improve Bias-Crime Reporting: The Case for Including Bias Crimes on Official Crime-Reporting Websites.” Woods suggests that some victims of hate crime may be reluctant to report those crimes due to various facets of being “othered,” including cultural and language barriers, a fear of further victimization at the hands of law enforcement, and fear of deportation. Woods makes a compelling argument that people should be able to report bias crimes via the internet rather than only in person, as is currently the case. Such a development would allow those who feel separated from the mainstream culture an equal forum to voice their experiences.

A particularly egregious form of “othering” is demonstrated by those who claim that the Holocaust never took place, those who allege that the Holocaust “story” was dreamed up by Zionists in an attempt to win influence, sympathy, and money from those who are “taken in” by their tale of woe. In alignment with a desire to set the record straight, John Drobnicki, a librarian at The Queens Borough Public Library, in Jamaica, New York, has compiled a sixth bibliography of works about and by Holocaust deniers. The bibliography, which supplements five previous such biographies compiled by Drobnicki, covers books, articles, DVDs, videos, and websites. It is broken down by geographical area, by medium, and by intent. The bibliography is a welcome tool in the struggle to refute those who repudiate the historical horror that was the Holocaust.

Another tool in repudiating Holocaust denial is the interview with a
survivor. The Journal’s editor, Joanie Eppinga, traveled to Terre Haute, Indiana to interview Eva Mozes-Kor, who was, along with her sister Miriam, one of the “Mengele twins” at Auschwitz. Despite being treated as something entirely alien and subhuman in the camp, Mozes-Kor has emerged with a spiritual message of grace: Forgive your worst enemy, and it will set you free.

Similar sentiments are expressed by Carl Wilkens, witness to the Rwanda genocide, in his interview with Jerri Shepard, Associate Professor in the School of Education at Gonzaga University and former director of the Institute for Action Against Hate. Though the things he witnessed were abhorrent, Wilkens argues that witnesses and perpetrators alike must be rehumanized, and that we must learn to emphasize our common humanity rather than our differences. He suggests that service is an excellent tool for making a person a colleague rather than something “other.”

According to “The Changing Face of England,” a review by Jan Polek, solutions for the tensions raised by changing demographics are lacking in All White in Barking, a film by Marc Isaacs about the effects of immigration on a small English town. Polek notes that the documentary has a fascinating premise, and that Barking may well serve as a microcosm of what is happening in many places. However, she objects to certain technical elements and thinks that at 113 minutes the movie may lose viewers’ attention. Though “it has its hopeful moments,” Polek writes, she suggests that the film leaves the viewer with the sense that acceptance of the “other” is not going to happen anytime soon in Barking—or perhaps anywhere.

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The Institute for Hate Studies advances the interdisciplinary field of Hate Studies and disseminates new theories, models, and discoveries about hate—including how to understand, prevent and combat it in its various locations and manifestations. The Institute provides a cross-disciplinary framework for theory, research, education, leadership, policy, and practice, which it seeks to advance throughout North America and worldwide. In addition to the Journal of Hate Studies, the Institute organizes cross-disciplinary academic courses, provides student research awards, hosts public events, and offers other scholarly resources.

In April 2011, the Institute will host the second International Conference on Hate Studies. Our theme is “Interdisciplinary Approaches to Understanding the Nature of Hate, Crafting Models for Combating Hatred, and Implications for Practice.” We will explore this theme through four main areas: education, research, practice, and advocacy. The conference, which builds upon the successful initial conference of 2004, will convene
leading academics in multiple disciplines from around the world, as well as educators, human rights and civil rights experts, journalists, law enforcement personnel, representatives from governmental and non-governmental organizations, conflict resolvers, community organizers, and activists. We look forward to seeing you in Spokane!

Finally, this is the first volume of the Journal with which I am involved. As such, I want to acknowledge the many contributions and tireless leadership of James Mohr, the Institute’s immediate previous director. As Jim moves to chair the Institute’s board of directors, he joins other previous directors, including James Beebe, George Critchlow, and Jerri Shepard, who sit on our board. The ongoing involvement of our founders and prior directors strengthens both the Institute and the field of Hate Studies. For this, I am most grateful.

John Shuford
Director
Institute for Hate Studies
Crimes Against the “Other”:
Conceptual, Operational, and Empirical
Challenges for Hate Studies

Neil Chakraborti
University of Leicester

I. INTRODUCTION

At the most recent annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology (ASC), I was struck by the sheer quantity—if not necessarily the quality—of papers centered on hate crime and the extent to which the subject appears to have become “mainstreamed” within American scholarship and policy. As a hate crime scholar from the United Kingdom, this was a novel experience for me and evidence of how far we in the UK have lagged behind other nations with respect to developing and promoting hate crime discourse within criminology and related disciplines. Although the concept of “hate” in the context of both actions and speech is firmly enshrined across most jurisdictions with which the UK shares political and legal traditions, it is only within the past ten years that the term “hate crime” has come to assume particular relevance to criminologists and policy-makers in my country. Unlike in the U.S., for example, where contemporary hate crime discourse can be traced back to the convergence of a series of progressive social movements from the 1960s and beyond, the prioritization of hate crime in the UK has gained pace much more recently in the aftermath of a number of high-profile incidents that took place toward the end of the last and the start of the current century, most notably the murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993 and the subsequent publication of the Macpherson report in 1999.1

Given its comparatively recent adoption within the policy domain, it is perhaps not altogether surprising that hate crime is, as Iganski (2008) suggests, a nascent area of scholarship for British criminology. As such, the ideas of scholars from other countries—and in particular those writing from a North American (Jacobs & Potter, 1998; Perry, 2001, 2003a) and an Australian perspective (Mason, 2005, 2007)—have acted as a catalyst for further academic enquiry within the UK (see, for instance, Iganski, 2002, 2008; Hall, 2005a; Chakraborti & Garland, 2009). That said, the types of offenses commonly grouped under the hate crime banner have in fact been researched and debated extensively within the UK, some more so than others. Hate crime cuts through numerous themes central to social scientific enquiry, whether they be “race,” ethnicity, gender, sexuality, or simply
“otherness” *per se*, and while relatively few attempts have been made by British scholars to examine these themes through the conceptual lens of hate, their empirical and theoretical contributions have invariably influenced the development of hate crime scholarship within that country.

The present article draws from this emerging body of knowledge to outline some of the key conceptual, operational, and empirical challenges now facing researchers and policy-makers. Though written from the perspective of a British hate crime scholar, the issues raised are international in nature: Indeed, in much the same way that expressions of hate pose problems that cut across disciplines, across communities, and across borders, so too must responses be informed through international, intersectional, and interdisciplinary perspectives that serve to widen our understanding. Hate crime remains a contested and highly complex area of study and policy, and the deeper we delve to find solutions and answers, the more likely we are to stumble across further problems and questions. Identifying how best to resolve them is a difficult, ongoing task, but one that should form the basis of any progressive dialogue among hate crime scholars, policy makers, and practitioners. The nature of these problems and questions—and more importantly, the ways in which we can use them to shape contemporary hate crime discourse—is what this article seeks to explore.

I should note also that this article unashamedly steers clear of numbers and quantitative analysis. I made reference earlier, perhaps a little unfairly, to what I and other hate crime scholars in attendance perceived to be a lack of quality in some of the papers presented at the last ASC conference, and this in part stemmed from what seemed like a preoccupation with examining numbers of hate incidents without any accompanying critical analysis of the meaning and broader context behind these numbers. Hate crimes, as is argued more fully below, are not merely incidents that can be counted, and for us to properly develop a qualitative understanding of hate crime perpetration and victimization, we need to reflect more carefully upon the processes that give rise to hatred and the ways in which we can construct effective responses. In a similar vein to Perry’s (2003b) musings on neglected areas of hate crime scholarship, this article welcomes the advances that we have made collectively in terms of developing our qualitative understanding, but focuses deliberately upon the various challenges confronting scholars and policy-makers in this field as we seek to push the “hate debate” forward.

II. DEFINING HATE CRIME

The nature of these types of challenges will be explored shortly. First,
however—and given that this article is written from a British perspective—it is important to briefly outline what the term *hate crime* has come to mean in the context of British scholarship. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the suggestions of American scholars have been especially influential, and writers such as Sheffield (1995), Jenness (2002), Petrosino (2003), and Gerstenfeld (2004) have each helped to convey that the term has a deeper sense beyond its literal interpretation of referring to crimes motivated by hatred. As is now widely accepted, hate crimes are not simply crimes in which the offender *hates* the victim, nor indeed do such crimes need to be motivated by hatred at all in order to be classified as hate crime. It is perhaps Barbara Perry’s (2001, p. 10) definition that is regarded by British scholars as offering the most comprehensive account of a hate crime:

Hate crime . . . involves acts of violence and intimidation, usually directed towards already stigmatized and marginalized groups. As such, it is a mechanism of power and oppression, intended to reaffirm the precarious hierarchies that characterize a given social order. It attempts to re-create simultaneously the threatened (real or imagined) hegemony of the perpetrator’s group and the “appropriate” subordinate identity of the victim’s group. It is a means of marking both the Self and the Other in such a way as to re-establish their “proper” relative positions, as given and reproduced by broader ideologies and patterns of social and political inequality.

This framework offered by Perry makes reference to the relationship between hierarchies and hate, and gives primacy to the notion of violent and intimidating behavior being somehow different when it involves an act of bigotry directed toward stigmatized and marginalized communities. Moreover, Perry’s conceptualization of hate crime recognizes that hate crime is not a static problem, but instead should be seen as a dynamic social process involving context, structure, and agency. In this regard, Perry takes her lead from the work of Bowling (1993, 1999), whose reference to the relevance of repeated or systematic victimization, historical context, and the social relationship between all the actors involved in the process of victimization is seen by Perry as being directly relevant to the way in which we should conceive of hate crime. Also key for Perry is the group identity of the victim, with hate crimes best being viewed as “message crimes” directed not only toward the victim, but also toward the wider community to which he or she belongs—as acts of violence or intimidation designed to spread fear and to reaffirm “the hegemony of the perpetrator’s and the ‘appropriate’ subordinate identity of the victim’s group” (Perry, 2001, p. 10).

While hate crime scholars have sought to grapple with what they see as the complexity associated with the term, official classifications have
tended to be significantly less intricate in their interpretations of hate crime. Within the UK, the key source of policy guidance on hate crime comes from the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), whose operational definition is enshrined within their guidelines for police forces in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland (ACPO, 2000, 2005, 2010). Importantly, this guidance distinguishes between hate incidents and hate crimes, requiring police forces to record all incidents, even if they lack the requisite elements to be classified as a notifiable offense later in the criminal justice process. In this context, ACPO takes its lead from the landmark Macpherson inquiry; the group’s attempts to address the deep-rooted institutional racism identified as being embedded within police culture by that inquiry resulted in the adoption of a more flexible interpretation of a racist incident. Under this interpretation, it is not the police officer, but the victim (or indeed any other person present) who decides whether an incident should be classed as racist; moreover, the incident need not be a crime for it to be recorded by the police, but can include any occurrence; nor must it have an evidential basis or an obvious causal link to be classed as racist: In the UK’s post-Macpherson environment, perception on the part of the victim is the key to an incident’s being defined as racist (for further discussion, see Hall, Grieve, & Savage, 2009).

Accordingly, the hate crime guidance issued by ACPO stipulates that any hate incident, whether a prima facie “crime” or not, should be recorded if it meets the threshold originally laid down by the Macpherson definition of a racist incident—namely, if it is perceived by the victim or any other person as being motivated by prejudice or hate—and not the stricter, evidential threshold required under criminal law for notifiable offenses. Moreover, this policy framework makes specific reference to prejudice, and not simply hate. In stating explicitly that hate crimes or incidents are not always concerned with hate but rather with prejudice, ACPO’s guidelines follow the logic presented by the academic definitions described above in suggesting that the presence of hate is not central to the commission of a hate crime.

Evidently, hate might appear to be a distinctly unhelpful term in many respects, as both academic and practitioner definitions tend to direct our attention toward certain forms of prejudice, a considerably more expansive notion than that of hate, covering many varieties of human emotion, of which hate may be only a small and extreme part (Hall, 2005a). This is a point of concern to some commentators, and one to which the article returns in due course. However, ACPO’s (2005) guidance does offer some assistance with regard to distinguishing between “acceptable” and “unacceptable” prejudice by alluding to particular grounds for prejudice or hatred: namely, “race,” sexual orientation, transgender status, faith, and disability. According to the UK’s official criminal justice system interpretation of hate
crime, therefore, it is not just any prejudice that can form the basis of a hate crime, but rather prejudice based upon those particular grounds specified by ACPO.4

III. The Development of Hate Crime Laws

In the context of the discussion that follows, it is worth also outlining very briefly the UK’s legal framework for hate crime, as it is quite different in some respects from the American approach. In the U.S., the concept of hate crime is firmly enshrined within the law through a series of federal- and state-level hate crime acts, and these have been bolstered most recently through the expansion of federal hate crime law to cover crimes committed on the grounds of gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, and disability. As Lawrence (2009) points out, virtually every state in the U.S. criminalizes hate crime, with some laws giving primacy to the animus exhibited by the perpetrator of a crime against a member of a perceived or actual protected group and others focusing on the perpetrator’s selection of the victim. There is no comparative set of laws as such in the UK that gives as explicit an acknowledgement of the term hate crime, and this is reflective of hate crime’s different origins within the two countries and of the more established status of hate crime within the popular lexicon of American society.

That said, however, within the UK we do now have a number of laws that adhere to the principle that crimes motivated by hatred or prejudice toward particular features of the victim’s identity should be treated differently from “ordinary” crimes. Within this context, an especially significant piece of legislation is the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, and in particular sections 28-32. These are the provisions relating to racially aggravated offenses, which in essence amount to a “penalty enhancement statute” (Lawrence, 1999, p. 92) enabling higher sentences to be awarded for crimes that are racially aggravated. The original Crime and Disorder Act provisions have also been amended by section 39 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which extends the principle of penalty enhancement to include religiously aggravated offenses; similarly, section 146 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 empowers courts to impose increased sentences for offenses motivated by hostility toward the victim’s sexual orientation, or his or her mental or physical disability.

Hate has also been criminalized through the various strands of incitement legislation. Protection against the incitement of racial hatred can be found within section 17 of the Public Order Act 1986, which prohibits the use of words, whether oral or written, or behavior deemed “threatening, abusive or insulting,” and puts in place both a subjective standard of guilt
(where there is intention to stir up racial hatred) and an alternative objective threshold (where “having regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred up thereby”). More recently, the Public Order Act has been amended through section 29 of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, which governs the incitement of hatred toward people on the basis of their faith. While similar in many respects to the equivalent racial hatred laws, the incitement to religious hatred provisions have a higher legal threshold in that they can be used only in cases involving threatening (and not abusive or insulting) words or behavior, and where the prosecution can prove that the perpetrator intended to stir up religious hatred (i.e. a subjective standard of guilt). The protective coverage of incitement laws—or anti-vilification laws, to borrow a term used by Australian hate crime scholars (Gelber & Stone, 2007)—has also been extended to the incitement of hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation under section 74 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, which criminalizes the stirring up of hatred against LGBT communities under a threshold similar to that specified in the Racial and Religious Hatred Act.

Notwithstanding the various concerns associated with the effectiveness, legitimacy, and interpretation of these pieces of legislation (see, inter alia, Chakraborti & Garland, 2009), this necessarily brief overview of the current legal framework illustrates the way in which the concept of hate crime has, within a relatively short space of time, been given an established legal footing within the UK. Nevertheless, while there is some degree of consistency in the message conveyed to criminal justice agencies, sentencers, and the general public through this emergent hate crime agenda, there is also a series of inconsistencies associated with the application of hate crime that have raised questions over its future viability. It is to a consideration of these inconsistencies that the paper now turns.

IV. Conceptual Challenges

Despite improvements in policy and practice associated with the rise of the hate crime agenda, commentators remain divided on the application of the hate crime label. One especially contested and well-documented aspect of hate crime relates to its conceptual ambiguity. As discussed already, police forces across the UK are obliged to record hate incidents, and not just crimes, meaning that much of what falls under the remit of hate crime may not be crimes per se, but incidents perceived by the victim as being motivated by hate or prejudice. Therefore, hate crimes may not necessarily be crimes, and may not necessarily be motivated by hatred. Most academic and practitioner definitions are consistent in recognizing hate crime as conduct motivated by prejudice on particular grounds or directed
against particular groups of people. Prejudice is a much more expansive notion than hate, covering all manner of behaviors, some acceptable, some unacceptable, and this clearly has implications for those framing hate crime laws who are required to make difficult moral judgments about the types of prejudices to be punished or tolerated and the groups of peoples to be protected or unprotected (Hall, 2005a).

It is not simply the decision over which forms of prejudice to legislate against that presents cause for concern, but also the strength of the causal relationship between the prejudice and the offense. Famously, Jacobs and Potter (1998, pp. 22-28) present arguably the most forceful illustration of this point by categorizing hate crimes into four broad types, some of which, they argue, are more contestable than others. For instance, they see no problem with describing offenses that are carried out by highly prejudiced perpetrators, and whose prejudice has a strong causal bearing on their offending behavior, as hate crimes: These are crimes that might immediately spring to mind if one were conceiving of “hate” in its literal sense, such as organized extremist hatred or acts of violence clearly motivated by hatred of a particular group identity. Limiting the scope of hate crime to offenses such as these would be uncontroversial, but of limited practical utility since these types of extreme cases would in most jurisdictions already be punishable under the highest possible sentencing tariff.

However, the other three “types” are more problematic for Jacobs and Potter (1998). Their second “type,” for instance, refers to offenses again committed by highly prejudiced offenders but whose offending behavior is not strongly or exclusively linked to their prejudice, and they argue that it would be wrong to automatically assume that all offenses under this category—namely, offenses committed by prejudiced offenders against minority groups—are hate offenses. Equally, offenses committed under their third grouping—by offenders who are not especially prejudiced individuals, but whose prejudice, perhaps subconsciously, bears a strong link to the offense—makes up the majority of officially designated hate crimes in the U.S. because it is often assumed (erroneously, in the eyes of Jacobs and Potter) that a crime committed by a member of one group against a member of another constitutes a hate crime irrespective of the strength of the prejudicial motivation. The hate crime label is even applied sometimes to what they refer to as situational offenses, their fourth “type”: offenses that are neither the product of highly prejudiced beliefs nor strongly linked to the offender’s prejudice, but that instead arise from “ad hoc disputes and flashing tempers” (1998, p. 26).

Jacobs and Potter’s (1998) critique underlines that hate crime is a conceptually ambiguous construct open to different interpretations, and it is this ambiguity—and its potential to create hierarchies of acceptable and unac-
ceptable prejudices and to penalize behavior motivated only in part by prejudice—that leaves it susceptible to criticism. However—and crucially in the context of mapping a way forward for scholarship and policy—the arguments of critics such as Jacobs and Potter do not lend themselves to a particularly straightforward alternative. For instance, one option could be to simply “do away with” the concept of hate crime, a seemingly logical stance to adopt were we to follow those arguments through to their conclusion. But in real terms, such a move would raise an even thornier set of questions. Would abandoning the concept of hate crime require governments to repeal existing sets of laws governing hate acts and speech? Would abandoning the concept of hate crime send out the right kind of message to the more vulnerable, marginalized members of society, or indeed to those who feel it is legitimate to express prejudice toward such groups? And would this lead to a regression in criminal justice policy, practice, and attitudes following the progress that has evolved with hate crime movement across most Western societies?

There are also problems associated with other options for the present conceptual framework. For example, some might favor a route where we stop short of abandoning the hate crime label, but instead take steps to restrict its application to a more literal interpretation—namely, crimes (not incidents) motivated by hate (not prejudice) toward a particular group identity. Undoubtedly, this would help to offset some of the ambiguity inherent in the concept as we presently know it: The hate crime label would be used solely in cases in which perpetrators truly hated their victim on the basis of their membership in a particular group or community and in which this hatred was the sole or predominant cause of the offending behavior. However, while conceiving of the concept in such a way would make hate crime more easily recognizable, as the label would apply exclusively to the more violent or extreme acts that one might ordinarily associate with crimes of hate, it would also result in hate crime scholars and policy-makers’ overlooking the subtler, but equally damaging expressions of prejudice experienced by victims of hate crime. As a number of writers have shown (Kelly, 1987; Bowling, 1999; Chakrabarti & Garland, 2004), if we are fully to understand the impact of hate victimization, we need to recognize the routine, everyday nature of many experiences of prejudice—experiences that in themselves may not appear especially serious, but that cumulatively, and when considered in the context of repeat victimization and broader patterns of “othering,” can have damaging and lasting effects upon the victim, the victim’s family, and the wider community. The cumulative “drip-drip” effect of this process might well be marginalized under a more restrictive conceptualization of hate crime.

If we feel that this more literal take on hate crime is too constraining,
another option might be to reconfigure the label in terms of what it might more accurately represent. Therefore, if hate crime is not really about hate as such but more about prejudice, bias, bigotry, or -isms, as most scholars seem to suggest, then perhaps reconfiguring it something along the lines of “prejudice crime” or “bias crime” might help to capture the essence of what these crimes really center on. British scholars such as Hall (2005a, 2005b) and Goodhall (2007) make reference to the seemingly curious state of affairs that exists presently, wherein we employ the word hate as a catchall term to describe behavior motivated by other factors and emotions; indeed, in some respects, the way in which the term bias crime is often used interchangeably with hate crime within much of the North American literature offers support for using this as a viable alternative (see, for instance, Perry, 2001; Lawrence, 2002; McDevitt, Levin, & Bennett, 2002; Bell, 2003).

That said, however, reclassifying these offenses in accordance with a different descriptor of the motivation that underpins them does not address the related conceptual issue of how one should decide which forms of prejudices or bias should count as warranting enhanced punishment. To take the current UK position as an example, official ACPO guidance earmarks hate crime as hate or prejudice motivated on particular grounds—race, faith, sexual orientation, transgender status, and disability. At one level, placing restrictions on the types of “unacceptable” prejudice that can constitute a hate crime is critical to its operational viability, but limiting its applicability to certain groups and not others is a process fraught with danger, as this requires difficult judgements to be made regarding who should be deserving of “special protection.” Consequently, the capacity for hate crime to create a hierarchy of victims, wherein some groups are seen as more important or worthy than others, is a problem that is central to debates over the conceptual basis of hate crime, and one that would remain just as contentious were we to reconfigure such offenses as prejudice or bias crime.

A final conceptual alternative that conceivably could get around this problem might be to restrict the applicability of hate crimes to those who some might argue are intended to be the primary beneficiaries of its conception, namely minority groups. Such a switch in focus would, in principle, offer a number of advantages. Conceiving of these offenses as forms of “minority group victimization” would arguably make the rationale behind hate crime laws more explicit and would divert the attention of scholars and prosecutors toward the bridging factor that links different types of victim (their shared minority status) and away from the ambiguities associated with offender motivation. Moreover, although the question of which minority groups are worthy of extra legislative protection is still open to debate under this framework, recognizing minorities as the intended beneficiaries of this protection would nevertheless make explicit the reasons for dis-
counting certain crimes that at face value might involve an element of hate—acts of terrorism, for instance—while including others that might not necessarily seem to be especially “hate-motivated.” Again though, this stance is not without its own problems. If we were to take this interpretation to its logical conclusion, then presumably—and wrongly—members of majority groups could not under any circumstances be protected by hate crime legislation, even if prosecutors could prove that they had been the victims of an attack based upon their group identity—their whiteness or their Christian beliefs, for example. However persuasive the rationale for prioritizing the protection of minority groups, formulating policies that differentiate between majority and minority group members, targeted and victimized for the same reasons and in the same manner, creates its own set of difficulties.

V. Operational Challenges

It is not just conceptually that hate crime has been contested. Commentators have raised questions about its operational viability, and in particular the way in which hate crime laws have been framed and enforced. As discussed above, the notion of hate crime has been given explicit recognition within the UK through the introduction of both penalty enhancement and anti-vilification legislation. These pieces of legislation have by no means been universally welcomed (see, for instance, Iganski, 2002; Cumber, 2008; Meer, 2008), but their introduction has given weight to the principle behind hate crime by encouraging criminal justice agencies and sentencers to regard hate crimes as qualitatively different from the same crimes motivated by different reasons, and by conveying a message to the public at large, and perhaps more specifically to extremists, that denounces hatred as not just unpalatable, but also criminal (see also Lawrence, 2002; McGhee, 2005).

The deterrent capacity of this message has been questioned by critics—Jacobs and Potter (1998), not surprisingly, among them—who have raised doubts over the justifications for hate crime laws. For Jacobs and Potter (pp. 67-68), the declaratory message of condemnation conveyed through such laws will have a negligible impact upon potential and actual hate crime offenders, who are unlikely to be any more responsive to this message than they are to the threats and condemnations enshrined within other laws that they might regularly contravene. Moreover, these laws can also have unforeseen consequences: For instance, Bowling and Phillips (2002) have referred to the unintended backlash against minority groups that the introduction of hate crime laws can create among those who believe that such groups receive preferential treatment, while similar observations have come from Dixon and Gadd (2006), whose research highlights the
possibility of those prosecuted under hate crime legislation’s concluding that they are less the perpetrators of a serious offense and more the victim of a legal system biased in favor of minorities.

The legal provisions governing hate crime can be especially problematic when we begin to take a closer look at the operation of the laws themselves. Let us take the example of the UK, where concerns have been raised by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) over the level of evidence required to justify the imposition of enhanced punishment. As the CPS (2008) acknowledges, proving that offenses are motivated by prejudice is a process fraught with difficulty, and one that requires either a clear statement of intent by the accused or background evidence of motive that often is not forthcoming. Consequently, and as they go on to observe, many hate crime cases result in No Further Action (NFA) and do not progress to the prosecution stage, either because of insufficient evidence or because the victim is unwilling to support a prosecution. Prosecution figures, therefore, do not in themselves offer a reliable indication of the extent of hate crime taking place in the UK, though comparable datasets from other European countries give us next to nothing to go on. Indeed, the 2007 statistics on hate crimes taking place in the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe) region reveal that relatively few hate crimes are recorded by other nations. In countries as large as Italy and Poland, for example, official figures present a total of only 148 and 125 hate crimes respectively for the entire year, while the annual totals for other countries are equally eye-catching: criminal proceedings initiated in as few as 170 hate crime cases in Russia; ten hate crime cases brought forward for prosecution in Denmark; no cases whatsoever in Iceland (ODIHR, 2008).

Nevertheless, CPS data on the number of prosecutions brought under the UK’s respective aggravated provisions do raise important questions, not so much for the legitimacy of hate crime laws as for the enforcement of hate crime laws. I would argue that these data are a reflection of how hate crime laws are being interpreted, and should not be seen as evidence per se to suggest that the provisions are difficult to enforce or unnecessary additions to the statute book. For instance, the stark difference between the number of racial and religiously aggravated prosecutions in 2009—145 as opposed to 27—is largely attributable to the way in which the CPS decides how an offense should be charged, as indicated in their guidance below, which uses antisemitism as an example (CPS, 2008, point 23):

The CPS determines whether an offence should be charged as racially or religiously aggravated. This will depend upon the circumstances of the case. If the evidence proves hostility towards the Jewish people,
charge will be racially aggravated. If the hostility is directed more specifically towards the Jewish faith, the charge will be religiously aggravated.

As shown by this tenuous distinction between hostility directed toward people and hostility directed toward faith, these grounds for determining whether offenses should be charged as racially or religiously aggravated are barely distinguishable. This can result in “race” and faith being conflated, which runs contrary to the original rationale behind the introduction of separate provisions on religious aggravation.

Equally, there is more than an element of inconsistency surrounding the way in which anti-vilification laws have developed in recent years. Again, taking the UK as an example, under the Public Order Act 1986, incitement to racial hatred provisions criminalize words, behavior, or materials that are threatening, abusive, or insulting and that are intended to stir up hatred, or where hatred is likely to be stirred up. However, the corresponding provisions on incitement to religious hatred are considerably more restrictive, criminalizing only threatening (not abusive or insulting) words, behavior, or materials, and requiring evidence of subjective intention to incite hatred. A similarly tight threshold has been laid down for incitement to hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation, meaning that there is a clear distinction between the broader framework of protection guarding against the incitement of racial hatred and the much narrower framework governing the incitement to hatred on the grounds of faith and sexual orientation.

This deliberate distinction was further underlined through the inclusion of explicit defense clauses for freedom of expression that accompanied the respective sets of provisions on incitement to hatred on the grounds of faith and sexual orientation. The inclusion of these clauses—designed primarily to counter accusations that the laws would unfairly penalize criticism of religion or sexual conduct—is reflective of the delicate balance legislators have tried to strike between criminalizing hate speech and adhering to the right to freedom of expression enshrined within Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. What this leaves us with is a series of disparities between different types of hate speech: There is no equivalent freedom of expression clause governing the incitement of racial hatred, and there are no incitement provisions whatsoever governing the incitement of disablism hatred.

Without question, this area of hate crime has proved to be particularly contentious; while most of us would in principle welcome the firmer legal footing for hate crime that has emerged in recent years, having laws in place is no guarantee of improved protection from hate unless the laws are properly framed and implemented. Certainly, the operation of hate crime laws in any given society will need to be monitored closely by scholars before
we can conclude with any certainty whether we have been blessed with an effective set of laws or have created an ineffective set of compromises.

VI. EMPIRICAL CHALLENGES

Hate crime poses a further set of challenges when it comes to advancing our empirical knowledge. Unquestionably, much good work has been done across different disciplines to develop our understanding, evidenced perhaps most vividly through the very welcome publication of Barbara Perry’s (2009) five-volume set *Hate Crimes*, a comprehensive collection of North American and international contributions from the fields of law, criminology, sociology, psychology, and public health. Similarly, in my country we have seen important work emerge from within British criminology that has helped to move the “hate debate” into fresh areas of empirical and theoretical enquiry. However, numerous issues remain un- or under-explored in this field and demand urgent attention from hate scholars from different countries and different disciplines. For example, what little research evidence there is on hate crimes against the disabled and trans communities suggests that these are growing problems that have been overlooked by criminal justice agencies and policy-makers despite those groups’ being recognized “beneficiaries” of most official discourses on hate crime (Whittle, Turner, & Al-Alami, 2007; Quarmby, 2008). Greater focus on these areas would enable scholars to explore their commonalities and differences with other, more familiar stands of hate crime in terms of perpetrator motivations and experiences of victimization.

In a similar vein, while we now know more about the experiences of BME (black and minority ethnic) and LGBT communities in a broad sense, crass generalizations are often made that result in the overlooking of specificities and intersectionalities of victimization within these broad-brush categories. Making generic assumptions about diverse communities at the expense of learning about the discrete experiences of those who are all too often subsumed through the labeling of such communities gives us insufficient information about who the victims of hate crime really are and the context behind their vulnerability. To truly understand the dynamics of difference requires us to look toward underresearched and potentially more complex lines of analysis, whether this be minority-on-minority or minority-on-majority violence, interfaith tensions, violence against lesbian women, or the experiences of those who occupy multiple positions of culturally defined inferiority. Equally, it could be argued that we know far too little about processes of cyberhate, not to mention the collective experiences of the homeless, the elderly, members of youth subcultures, and other
groups whose vulnerability extends beyond the boundaries of most hate crime policy and scholarly frameworks.

Questions also remain about the perpetrators of hate crime, and we have seen steps taken in recent years to challenge the popular stereotype of organized hate groups or committed extremists being responsible for the majority of offenses. But then who are hate offenders? Are they, as Iganski (2008) suggests, ordinary people like “us”—“normal” people acting on mainstream, “common-sense” bigotries that encourage them to blame the Other for problems blighting their own lives? This, for example, is the kind of explanation that may account for recent rises in levels of antisemitic hate crime across the West, where the “transfer of tensions” from the Middle East and an increase in anti-Zionist or anti-Israeli sentiment is said to have fueled antisemitic activity (Community Security Trust, 2009). Or might far-right organizations and hate groups be to blame after all, perhaps not directly as perpetrators, but because of the influence that their violent rhetoric can have on everyday individuals not committed to an extremist ideology? Moreover, when thinking about who hate crime perpetrators are, we may also need to question their relationship to the victim. Are perpetrators strangers to victims whom they target on the basis of their association with a particular group identity as opposed to any individual traits, or might they be more familiar to their victim either as an acquaintance, a friend, a family member, a carer, or a partner? This would certainly be true of disablist hate offenses; a number of recent cases in the UK have highlighted the vulnerability of people with learning difficulties to bullying, violence, sexual abuse, and even torture from those well-known to them. Or perhaps the victim may know the perpetrator at some level and yet still feel emotionally distant from him or her, thereby allowing us to conceive of hate crimes as stranger-danger crimes even when they are committed by people familiar with their target. As Gail Mason (2005, p. 844) rightly contends, there are no “one size fits all” solutions to these sorts of questions; rather, and as with research into victims of hate, we need to refrain from drawing neat, overly simplistic conclusions based on our assumptions and instead use these multiple realities as the basis of our empirical journeys.

Furthermore, and in light of the earlier challenges raised within this paper, future research should be geared toward analyzing the way in which hate crime victimization and perpetration are dealt with through the criminal justice system. This in itself opens up an array of empirical opportunities. For example, police responses could be monitored more extensively to explore the ways in which individual forces and ground-level officers operationalize the guidance offered at a senior strategic level in their responses to the different strands of hate crime. The increased awareness that has come through the introduction of regular and systematic police diversity
training over the past ten years or so is certainly a step in the right direction; that said, and as we have seen in the UK, the cultural difficulties surrounding the policing of diversity, and the evidence of residual and mutual mistrust among minority groups and police officers, makes it difficult to know whether the strategic prioritization of hate crime has fundamentally altered the way in which officers on the ground conceive of the process of victimization or engage with issues of diversity (Chakraborti, 2009).

Similarly, while the bulk of scholarly attention in this context has focused on policing in its narrow sense, we have much to learn about the ways in which hate crimes are punished, how laws are enforced, and how offending behavior and motivations are addressed. In this regard, the decision-making processes at play in the recording and prosecuting stages of the criminal justice response to hate crime could be subjected to more extensive investigation. So too could the effectiveness of measures introduced specifically to improve the situation for potential and actual hate crime victims, whether this be the deployment of third-party reporting mechanisms, community engagement strategies, or the practical application of victim support mechanisms: While the maturation of hate crime discourse over the past ten years or so may have led to a welcome growth of such initiatives, taking steps to ensure that they work effectively, and not merely tokenistically, should feature highly on the hate studies agenda. Alternatively, scholars might choose to focus their energies on examining the scope for using alternative modes of justice for dealing with hate crime perpetrators, as American writers have done for some time now in calling for further deployment of restorative interventions (Shenk, 2001). Indeed, researchers from different countries and disciplines are now increasingly exploring the use of non-punitive responses to hate crime offenders—and the limitations of solely punitive responses in repairing the harms suffered by victims and in challenging offender prejudices—and such moves are both laudable and highly necessary (see, inter alia, Walters & Hoyle, 2010; Gadd, 2009; Coates, Umbreit, & Vos, 2006).

VII. CONCLUSION

Hate crime is clearly a challenging subject with the capacity to divide opinion among scholars committed to challenging prejudice and “othering” in its various guises. Problematizing the notion of hate crime has been an important part of the academic agenda over recent years, but at the same time, it is important not to become preoccupied by its associated difficulties and to thereby lose sight of the positive developments that have taken place as a result of the hate crime movement. Certainly, it is no accident that the
emergence of hate crime discourse has coincided with real change in political and cultural attitudes toward prejudice perpetuated against a range of minority groups. While in the past there may have been something of a hierarchy of recognition among minority groups, with “race” and minority ethnic concerns arguably receiving the most attention, it would seem that this hierarchy has leveled out to the point where other identities are rightly attracting increased attention within policy and scholarly domains. Along with this wider recognition has come a more nuanced understanding of the way in which people can belong simultaneously to different communities, and can therefore have multiple identities and be prone to multiple forms of victimization (Garland, Spalek, & Chakraborti, 2006).

Just as importantly, while there are clear limits to the deterrent capacity of hate crime laws, we should not underestimate the symbolic role that such laws can play in societies in which the values, identities, and cultures of particular communities are under increased scrutiny. Hate crimes are often described within the academic literature as “message crimes” designed to convey a message from the perpetrator to the victim and to their wider community that the victim “doesn’t belong”; to extend the analogy, governments too can convey a message of solidarity to vulnerable communities through the criminalization of actions or expressions that violate the core values of a diverse society.

This more hopeful take on hate crime—which encourages scholars to weigh up its limitations against the not inconsiderable advances that have been made on behalf of potential and actual victims—does not mean that we should close our eyes to the problems associated with the concept. Rather, it requires criminologists to scrutinize its practical application to ensure that the core values at the heart of the hate crime movement are not diluted or subverted. In this respect, I agree with the sentiments of Barbara Perry (2010), who describes the present situation in the following terms:

My review of the post-9/11 scholarship on hate crime leads me to conclude that, while out of its infancy, the field has not yet matured into adulthood. There is still considerable ground to cover. I don’t see this necessarily as cause for despair so much as it is inspiring for those of us working in the field. It means that there are niches that we can carve out, contributions that are still to be made.

As the preceding discussion will ideally have made clear, these sentiments are certainly true; there are niches to carve and contributions still to be made, and the underlying impetus behind our efforts in this regard should be our ongoing battle against processes of “othering.” Despite the international prioritization of hate crime—and the associated series of academic publications, action plans, policy reviews, and guidance documents that
have accompanied this prioritization—we still live in societies characterized by disturbingly high levels of hate crime, and this is testimony both to the continued marginalization of the Other and to the failings of existing policy and enforcement mechanisms. We may have made some progress, but nonetheless the sheer extent and impact of hate crimes taking place should preclude our feeling complacent with regard to how far we have come. Indeed, while it is true to say that there is now much greater awareness than ever before about hate crime and its dynamics, the preceding discussion has hinted at just how much more there is to learn.

**Notes**

1. The Macpherson report—or the Stephen Lawrence inquiry report, as it sometimes referred to—is the report of a public inquiry, chaired by Sir William Macpherson, into the flawed police investigation into the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence in southeast London in 1993. The report produced over 70 recommendations designed to transform the policing of “race” and diversity within the UK and to improve levels of trust and confidence in the police among minority ethnic communities.

2. While unavailable at the time of writing, an updated guidance manual on hate crime is due to be published by ACPO in 2010/11.

3. Recommendation 12 of the Macpherson report defines a racist incident as “any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person” (Macpherson, 1999, para. 45.17).

4. While ACPO’s guidance is not directly applicable to Scotland, the Scottish Working Group on Hate Crime consultation document of 2003 indicates an almost identical line of thinking to that developed in ACPO’s guidance to police forces in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland.

5. LGBT is the abbreviation commonly used to collectively represent lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgendered people.

6. The freedom of expression clauses were inserted into the Public Order Act by the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 and the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 in sections 29J and 29JA respectively.

7. Help the Aged (2008) reports that, at any one time, over half a million older people are subject to elder abuse—which can take the form of physical, sexual, psychological, or financial abuse, neglect, or discriminatory treatment—with two-thirds of these acts of abuse committed at home by someone in a position of trust. The research of O’Keeffe, Hills, Doyle, McCreadie, Scholes, Constantine, et al. (2007) estimates that around 227,000 people aged 66 and over in the UK were neglected or abused in the year leading up to their study.

8. The murder of Sophie Lancaster served as a particularly acute reminder of the vulnerability of members of youth subcultures, with the judge at the trial of her murderers specifically referring to the case as a hate crime in which the victims had been singled out because of their “difference.” Sophie and her boyfriend, Robert Maltby, both committed Goths, were confronted by a gang of youths on August 10, 2007 as they were making their way home across a park in Bacup, Lancashire (the north of England). The attackers kicked and stamped upon Robert until he lay unconscious before turning on Sophie, leaving both in a coma. While Robert recovered sufficiently to be able to leave hospital two weeks later, Sophie died as a result of the brain injuries she suffered.

9. In the UK, the publication of the Macpherson report in 1999 gave impetus to the delivery of mandatory diversity training to police officers, while police training schemes
such as the Law Enforcement Officers Program (LEOP) run by the Office for Democratic Institutions for Human Rights has seen a similar prioritization emerge elsewhere in Europe.

10. Third-party reporting is the mechanism by which victims of hate crime can report their experiences to organizations other than the police service. Following the publication of the Macpherson report, these reporting schemes have been widely adopted in the UK as a way of encouraging higher rates of reporting from minority victims.

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Places for Races:  
The White Supremacist Movement Imagines 
U.S. Geography

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ABSTRACT

Increasingly, scholars are acknowledging that racial and other forms of 
animus assume a spatial dimension. Not only does intercultural hostility 
take different forms depending on location, but so, too, does the concom-
itant bias-motivated violence imply “places for races.” The very intent 
and motive of hate crimes are grounded in the perceived need of perpe-
trators to defend carefully crafted boundaries. While these boundaries are 
largely cultural, they may also take on a real, physical form, at least from 
the perpetrator’s perspective. Nowhere is this more evident than in the 
geographical imagination of the White Supremacist movement. This 
paper will trace the ways in which the movement idealizes the appropri-
geate geographical “places for races.”

It is no accident that scholarship on hate crime and related forms of 
violence use such terminology as “borders,” “boundaries,” “transgressions,” 
or “territory,” for example. Hate crimes are situationally located; they have 
a spatial element that is often overlooked, although just as often implied by 
the semantics noted above. Hate crime can be seen as one mechanism by 
which the appropriate “spaces for races” can be created and reinforced. It is 
a weapon often invoked when victims are perceived to threaten the racial-
ized boundaries that are meant to separate “us” from “them.” And all of 
this occurs within the institutional contexts of what is known to be the 
appropriate place of victim and victimizer. There is, as many black or 
Asian or Native or Hispanic people know, danger in nonconformity and in 
challenging borders. Racial violence becomes justifiable as a punishment 
for transgressions of institutionalized codes of conduct, for crossing the 
boundaries of race. Reactionary violence to such border crossings ensures 
that white people and people of color will inhabit their appropriate places in 
physical and cultural terms. The boundaries are preserved.

What we offer here is an exploration of the spatial imagination among
the white supremacist movement, an analysis that sees racially motivated violence and other related activities as, in part, contestations over space and the interpretation of those spaces. In short, writing specifically about the white supremacist movement, we seek to provide tentative answers to the conceptual questions posed by Razack (2002, p. 5):

What is being imagined or projected on to specific spaces and bodies, and what is being enacted there? Who do white citizens know themselves to be and how much does an identity of dominance rely upon keeping others firmly in place? How are people kept in their place? And, finally, how does place become race?

We approach these issues through several interrelated aspects of the geographical imagination of the white supremacist movement: their xenophobic ideology; their targeting of specific areas for the commission of hate crimes; their “concrete” mapping of the United States according to racial and ethnic “places for races”; the reification of the Pacific Northwest as the great white homeland; and the expansion of white supremacist “space” via cyberhate. Before addressing these issues directly, however, we begin with a brief discussion of how race becomes place generally, and the role that hate crime may play in that process.

I. Race, Place, and Violence

Throughout the history of the United States, whiteness has been conceived as the norm, thus supporting racialized boundaries that assume whiteness as the standard against which all others are judged. It divides white from non-white, “unraced” from “raced.” There is an ideological presumption of innate, biological differences between races that is then extrapolated to cultural and ethical differences. One’s biological race is understood to determine one’s “essence,” to the extent that physical characteristics are linked to all other elements of one’s identity. This construction of racial difference subsequently justifies the full array of practices associated with racial exclusion and marginalization. Since difference has been understood negatively in the United States, it has come to signify deficiency or deviance. Consequently, “nonwhite” is equivalent to difference and inferiority. “Nonwhite” is the antithesis of white, and must necessarily remain subordinate to white. Moreover,

Whiteness is generally (and paradoxically) defined more precisely by who is excluded than who is included. Whites are those who are not non-white, those who are not racially marked, those who are not clustered together to form a category or racial minority. (Blee, 2004, p. 52)
As this suggests, race also implies “insides” and “outsides,” places of belonging and not-belonging, such that certain people may be seen to be in or out of “their place.” Such race-based juxtapositions are central to legitimating and rationalizing the marginalization of the Other who stands outside the boundaries of whiteness: “The ability to create and enforce these boundaries is related to societal power, as different formations of power rely on territorial rules about ‘what is in or out of place’ for their existence” (Sumartojo, 2004, p. 89). Our “place” thus becomes racialized, thereby shaping our lived experiences and related life chances. The connection between race and place is much more than a symbolic metaphor. It has dramatic material consequences as well. Consider Razack’s assessment:

When police drop Aboriginal people outside the town limits leaving them to freeze to death, or stop young Black men on the streets or in malls, when the eyes of shop clerks follow bodies of colour, presuming them to be illicit, when workplaces remain relentlessly white in the better paid jobs and fully “coloured” at the lower levels, when affluent areas of the city are all white and poorer areas are mostly of colour, we experience the spatiality of the racial order in which we live. (2002, p. 6)

This talk about inside and outside, about border crossing and other spatial metaphors, implies the centrality of geographical understandings of racial formations. In short,

Geography is relevant to the social construction of race and ethnicity because identities are created not only by the labels that are borne but through the spaces and places within which they exist . . . geography, the spaces and places that we exist in and create simultaneously shapes and records the way life unfolds, including the lived experience of ethnicity and race. (Berry & Henderson, 2002, p. 6)

As the preceding implies, central to our understanding of the geography of race is one particular element of the spatial as it relates to racial construction: boundaries, or borders. Borders are especially important as markers of the distinct boundedness of racialized groups, setting the limits as to who belongs where. They symbolically (and often physically) determine and reinforce ethnic separation and segregation. Whiteness, in particular, is a closely guarded fortress that is, by and large,

defined by its boundaries . . . In determining whiteness, borders are more significant than internal commonality. Over time whiteness has been constructed, in the words of the legal theorist Cheryl Harris, as “an exclusive club whose membership was closely and grudgingly guarded.” (Blee, 2004, p. 52)
Significantly, boundaries signify both the social and the spatial margins of race. They can take the symbolic form of cultural difference, of legislative control, or of popular imaging. Yet they are likely to assume a spatial dimension, such as walls, fences, or railroad tracks. Native American reservation boundaries, for example, represent something in between. They are invisible geopolitical borders, which nonetheless assume—in the imaginations of both Native and nonNative—a very real presence and impediment between residents and nonresidents (Sumartojo, 2004).

Despite their importance in separating “us” from “them,” boundaries are not fixed. In both symbolic and material terms, they are permeable and subject to ongoing tendencies to transgression (Webster, 2003). Native Americans leave the reservation for job opportunities; black Americans move into predominantly white neighborhoods to gain access to better schools and other infrastructural supports; immigrants come to the United States to pursue the “American Dream”; people of color generally demand the right to inclusion and participation in the machineries of economics and politics. As such, they represent threats; they have violated the carefully crafted barriers intended to keep them in their respective boxes. It is in these contexts—at the “symbolic boundaries”—that racialized violence is likely to occur (Webster, 2003, p. 99). It thus becomes a territorial defense of cultural, often national “space.” It is a means to reassert the marginality of the other who dares to transgress:

Hate crimes are exclusionary acts motivated in part by offenders’ desires to assert power over a given space, whether it be a neighborhood or public street. The effect of such acts is to send a “message” to members of the targeted group that they are unwelcome. In addition, hate crimes and responses to them contribute to the meaning of a place, representing a struggle between the meanings informing offenders and those informing other groups. (Sumartojo, 2004, p. 105)

Barnor Hesse and his colleagues were among the first to address explicitly the spatiality of hate (Hesse, 1993; Hesse, Rai, Bennett, & McGilchrist, 1992). In a chapter featuring an “experiential analysis” of racial violence, Hesse et al. (1992) devote a section explicitly to the “geography of victimization.” What is especially intriguing here is their discussion of white territorialism as a precursor to racial violence specifically. In their analysis, white racial violence perpetrated against a threatening Other is conditioned by a “sense of proprietorial relation to social space,” such that perpetrators come to see themselves as “defending their space against change and transformation” (Hesse et al., 1992, p. 173) [emphasis in original].

More recently, Colin Flint (2004) has made an even more explicit
foray into the field with the publication of an innovative collection of essays specifically devoted to the geography of hatred and intolerance. Here contributors offer varied explorations of the ways in which organized and informal groups assert their territorial claims in efforts to purge their neighborhoods, cities, regions, or nation of the encroaching threats represented by people of color and gay men and lesbians in particular. In a way that resonates with the work we present here, the authors share the recognition that “imperatives of the territorial defense of places and spaces result in the adoption of exclusionary visions and practices” (Flint, 2004a, p. 9).

Our paper is intended to continue the dialogue begun by these scholars. As noted, we specifically seek to explore the ways in which the white supremacist movement imagines “races for places,” as well as the spatialized rhetoric and strategies in which this dynamic is manifest. Our work is inspired by the conversations within Flint’s anthology, engaging with it by providing insights into ways in which white supremacists imagine discrete locales for themselves, and for all of the threatening Others in our midst. We bridge the ideology-action binary that characterizes many of the pieces in that volume. What we offer is an assessment of how the ideologies of whiteness give rise to concrete racial projects and strategies for implementing those ideals: the closing of borders, regional segregation, and the Northwest Imperative. We close with a glimpse into the white supremacist occupation and exploitation of cyberspace.

II. Xenophobia: Races Out of Place

The starting point for much white supremacist thought and action is the perception that racial groups are discrete and unbreachable entities, and that they thus occupy discrete and unbreachable locations, both culturally and spatially. Thus,

perpetrators of hate crime draw from their own normative understanding or beliefs about what type of person is “out of place” in a given setting. If these rules are breached, their understanding of a place is challenged. Studies of hate crime have suggested that perpetrators of hate crime may identify with a place such that their sense of place makes them feel licensed to defend it from intrusion. (Sumartojo, 2004, p. 89)

Sumartojo (2004) inadvertently characterizes a substantial element of the motivation for hate group mobilization. In this case, however, it is not simply a local site that is in question, but rather the whole nation state that is the United States. This is most evident in the fervor of the country’s anti-immigrant rhetoric, which seeks to construct immigrants as dangerous “others” within. In fact, rhetors are fond of using the explicitly exclusion-
A recurring theme in the white supremacist counterculture is that the United States of America is a “white nation.” The image of the United States as a product of the revolutionary colonists with European backgrounds negates the role African slaves and native peoples played in the formation of the nation. Regardless, the thinking goes that the “founding fathers” of the nation were white males, and if the United States was created by and for whites in 1776, it should continue to be a white-controlled nation centuries later. From unaffiliated racists telling African-Americans to “go back to Africa,” to Christian Identity adherents who believe that the continental United States is the biblically prophesied “promised land,” the claim has been laid as to who has rights to the country.

Obviously, the history of the U.S. as a nation of immigrants strengthened by its racial and ethnic diversity is reflected in the national motto, *E pluribus unum* (“Out of many, one”). Yet this claim on the land is a central issue for white supremacists. According to the 2000 census, non-Hispanic whites are still an overwhelming majority of American citizens (75.1%), but regional differences and demographic changes can place the majority group in settings where majorities are not so clear. In Phoenix, Arizona, whites constituted 71.1% of the 2000 population; but in Detroit, Michigan, whites made up only 12.3% of the population (2000 Census). Nationally, the highest percentages of whites are in New England and the Great Plains states in the Midwest. Vermont was the whitest state in 2000 (96.8%), and Mississippi was the least white in the continental United States (61.4%—Hawaii was only 24.3% white). Coincidentally, the nation as a whole is becoming “less white.” Whites made up 80.3% of the 1990 census and 77.1% of the 2000 census.

Thus, immigration represents a challenge to the white race. Unlike the cases of the previous three waves of immigration, the current arrivals are not predominantly European, are not even predominantly white. On the contrary, they are much more likely to be fleeing the violence and poverty of the Third World. Thus, they are overwhelmingly Asians, and Hispanics from South and Central America. On the basis of race alone, these immigrants are not as readily assimilable as their predecessors. And this makes people such as racist leader and 1988 U.S. presidential candidate David Duke nervous:

> The darkening of our nation mimics histories of many other nations. The nations of the Caribbean, Central, and South America, are predictive examples of the fate that awaits us. The Third World awaits our children. It is in our streets, in our taxpayer subsidized housing projects, in our
jails, and in our mayor’s chairs . . . . Our children grow up in an alien society that our forefathers would not recognize. (Duke, 1996, p. 2)

The hegemonic bloc in the United States—white European males—are in a crisis of identity brought on by the increasing diversity engendered by the immigration patterns of the late twentieth century. Culturally, non-whites, the non-European immigrants who have breached the national shores, are constructed as major contributors to the breakdown of the United States’ unity and stability. Tarver (1994) provides an insightful analysis into the ways in which English-only initiatives present an Us vs. Them dichotomy, wherein immigrants carry with them customs, folkways, and language (a.k.a. “gibberish”) that make native-born English-speaking Americans “strangers in their own land” (Tarver, 1994, p. 214). In his National Association for the Advancement of White People (NAAWP) newsletter, David Duke warned that immigration will make white people a minority totally vulnerable to the political, social, and economic will of blacks, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Orientals. A social upheaval is now beginning to occur that will be the funeral dirge for the American we love. I shudder to contemplate the future under non-white occupation: rapes, murders, robberies multiplied a hundred-fold, illiteracy such as in Haiti, medicine such as in Mexico, and tyranny such as in Togoland. (cited in Langer, 1990, p. 94)

In an address to the online weekly radio show American Dissident Voices presented in 1995, William Pierce, the recently deceased leader of the National Alliance, likewise observed:

During the 50 years since the Second World War, American has been darkening, has been getting less and less White. Immigration from Europe was cut off after the war—except for Jews of course—and the floodgates from the non-White world were opened. Asians and mestizos have been pouring into the country, both legally and illegally. (para. 5)

The outcome of this “browning” or “darkening” of the country, according to Pierce and others like him, is “more and more non-Whites, more and more crime and filth and disorder” (Pierce, 1995, para. 20). Immigrants—with their dark skin, their odd ways, and their foreign cultures and languages—will hasten the demise of the true, white Christian identity. They will overrun the white race and overturn the existing relations of power.

In addition to the cultural threats posed by immigrants, hate activists argue, they also bring with them economic problems. From their perspective, immigrants—especially Third World immigrants—come to this coun-
try for two reasons: to sack the welfare system, and to take the jobs of Americans. Presumably, immigrants are getting rich off the United States’ welfare system, and it is catapulting them into the middle class over the heads of long-suffering, native-born Americans. In reality, statistics from the U.S. Bureau of Labor show very few welfare recipients moving into the middle income bracket.

Immigrants are in a double bind. On the one hand, they are berated for their presumed exploitation and plundering of the United States’ social safety net. On the other hand, should they turn instead to legitimate employment—as the vast majority do—they are then reviled for stealing “American” jobs. In an environment already strained by corporate downsizing, such rhetoric plays on the fears of an economically insecure public. Whether framed in economic, cultural, or criminal terms, the underlying message is that war must be declared on the invading force of immigrants, for they are the “enemies” of the American way of life. Presumably, they present a threat that can only be contained by extreme means.

Consequently, immigrant bashing is a popular activity in assigning blame for the nation’s economic problems. When stagnation is evident in the national economy and unemployment exceeds seven percent, a pervasive fear that one’s job is on the line often emerges. Anxiety triggers frustration and blame; resentment towards immigrants, documented and undocumented, becomes an ugly side of racism, nativism and xenophobia. (Ochoa, 1995, p. 227)

As hate groups would have it, the tide of immigration must be turned to minimize and reverse the flood of “mud-people” onto the United States’ shores. The boundaries between the defiled and deviled races and the pure white race must be reinforced. Hence, the necessity for racial segregation arises. Separate spaces become territorial markers and buffers against the “pollution” represented by the Other. They reflect “idealized racial typifications tied to notions of slumliness, physical and ideological pollution of the body politic, sanitation and health syndromes, lawlessness, addition, and prostitution” (Goldberg, 1993, p. 198). If these threats can be contained, constrained, hidden behind real or imaginary walls, then the white race is safe from infection.

III. Spatial Imaginings: Places for Races

The overlapping belief systems documented herein lead many hate groups to the sort of conclusion noted above: Through organized action, the white race must reverse the trends represented by the myriad forms of white
racial “suicide” and “genocide.” Moreover, the goal of this action is fairly consistent from group to group. It is best summarized by the “14 Words” principle shared by many Christian Identity groups: “We must secure the existence of our people and a future for White children.” The means by which groups intend to achieve this goal, however, differ somewhat. For some, the first step is relatively simple: Close the borders in order to halt the darkening of the United States. William Pierce (1995) suggested one mechanism by which to stop illegal immigration from Mexico: Shoot anyone attempting to cross illegally. He assured us that after “two or three shootings in the first night . . . the word would be out: Don’t cross the border unless you want to die.” He justified this approach by resorting to the rhetoric of vilification, in which the “alien” is constructed as criminal, explaining, “Fewer immigrants would have to be shot trying to come across the border that first night than law-abiding Americans are now being murdered each year by illegal-alien criminals in California and Texas.” Hence, the most extreme violence can be justified by recreating the “Us” vs. “Them” opposition, which portrays “Them” as being even more violent and therefore deserving of exclusion and, where necessary, execution. For, as Razack asserts, “a specific geographical imagination is clearly traceable in the story of origins told in anti-immigration rhetoric, operating as metaphor but also enabling material practices such as the increased policing of the border and of bodies of colour” (2002, p. 4).

Another common theme—shared by hate groups and the militia movement—is the idea of racial segregation, generally in geographical terms. According to this position, the white race can survive only if it is isolated from the biological and cultural influences of the non-Aryan races. Writing of what he sees as the racist culture of the west generally, Goldberg (1993, p. 187) asserts that “threatening to transgress or pollute established social orders necessitates their reinvention, first by conceptualizing order anew and then by reproducing spatial confinement and separation in the renewed terms.” No more apt description could be offered of the white supremacist vision of the United States in particular. Angry and apparently in fear of the changing demographics of the U.S., white supremacists call for a renewal of the great white homeland, preferably through a thorough purging of the “dirt and filth,” or, as a compromise, through a rigid separation of “us” from “them.” The most effective way to keep the bloodline pure is to establish—or re-establish, as they see it—autonomous racial nations. Keith and Pile (1993, p. 2) make the intriguing observation that the trouble with so much talk about “place” is that it is “rarely clear whether the space invoked is ‘real,’ ‘imaginary,’ symbolic,’ a ‘metaphor-concept’ or some relationship between them or something else entirely.” At least white supremacists are explicit in their use of the term. They quite literally mean “place” as some-
thing “real,” as something that is—or at least should be—filled with particular people:

Racist groups support not only racial separation but also absolute racial hierarchies of domination and subordination, superiority and inferiority. They seek a division of racial space that is vertical as well as horizontal, thereby ranking as well as distinguishing among racial groups. Moreover, the construction of spatial separation is designed to maintain the perceived vertical divisions, and the strength of the social hierarchy will facilitate the success of the geographic project. (Blee, 2004, p. 53)

At the broadest level, the crucial space for American supremacists, as white “separatists,” is the United States of America, which is best filled with solid white Christians. For some within the hate movement, this would mean deporting non-Europeans to their country or continent of origin: Africans to Africa, Asians to Asia, Hispanics to Mexico, Cuba, Haiti, or wherever. The National Socialist Vanguard (online) claims that the “Black folks in the large or small cities will have no way to survive except repatriation.” Strom (online) agrees:

Since Farrakhan and other Black Nationalists want a nation of their own, let them have one. That means that we can have a nation of our own. Since Black Nationalists want to go to Africa, let them go. That means that we can have our America back.

For others, racial separation can be established within the existing borders of the United States. A white racist newsletter, The National Observer (online) suggests “strict geographical separation, devoid of racial conflict or oppression,” in which each ethnic group would establish its own political territory. Groups like the NAAWP, some cells of the KKK, and Aryan Nations have long called for a white racial homeland in the Northwestern United States, leaving the rest of the nation to diverse minority groups. The NAAWP—under the initial leadership of David Duke—has designed an elaborate “relocation” strategy, consisting of nine ethnically based regions. What such mapping allows—in the best tradition of de Champlain, or Lewis and Clark—is for supremacists to once again become masters of the territory that they survey.

The “White Bastion” would cover the extreme northwest (more on this below). “Navahona” would contain all Native Americans in the area currently known as New Mexico. “Alta California,” the twenty-mile-wide band along the United States-Mexico border, would be home to Mexican Americans; illegal immigrants would be shot on sight. Hawaii would become “East Mongolia,” the nation of all Asians and Pacific Islanders.
African Americans would be “regrouped” in the deep South, in what is now Florida, southern Alabama, and part of southern Mississippi, and would be called “New Africa.” However, Miami, Miami Beach, and Dade County—“New Cuba”—would be reserved for Cubans. “West Israel”—the United States homeland of the Jews—would take up Manhattan and Long Island, while the remainder of the New York metropolitan area, or “Minoria,” would be set aside for “unassimilable minorities,” including Puerto Rican and Mediterranean immigrants. Finally, French Canadian immigrants would remain in “Francia,” the extreme northern portions of the states of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, and New York.

Of course, groups advocating such measures recognize that such strategies would involve “difficulty and temporary unpleasantness.” They might even require the use of force. Nonetheless, it is deemed the best solution to promote the long-term interests of all groups in question. It is especially important to them, however, that whites regain “a nation”:

> We must have White schools, White residential neighborhoods and recreation areas, White workplaces, White farms and countryside. We must have no non-Whites in our living space, and we must have open space around us for expansion. (National Alliance, online)

Only in this way can white society purge itself of the “alien” and “dangerous” hordes that threaten to destroy Aryan culture in the United States.

Perhaps David Duke’s NAAWP is indebted to South African policies of Apartheid. Specifically, the group seems to have borrowed from the Group Areas Act of 1950, which provided for the following:

1. A residential race zone or area for each racial group;
2. Strong physical boundaries or imagined barriers to serve as buffers between residential zones. These barriers may be natural, like a river or valley, or human constructions, like a park, a railway line, or highway;
3. Each racial group should have direct access to work areas (industrial sites or central business districts), where racial interaction is necessary, or to common amenities (like government bureaucracies, airports, sport stadiums) without having to enter the residential zone of another racial group. Where economies in furnishing such common access necessitate traversing the racial space of others, it should be by “neutral” and buffered means like railways or highways;
4. Industry should be dispersed in ribbon formation around the city’s periphery, rather than amassed in great blocks, to give maximal direct access at minimal transportation costs; and
5. The central business district is to remain under white control. With similar goals in mind, it is noted that “in every case the construct of separate (racial) group areas, in design or effect, has served to constrain, restrict, monitor, and regulate . . . space and its experience” (Goldberg, 1993, p. 196).

The white supremacist mapping of the United States brings to mind Oikawa’s (2002) discussion of the “cartography of violence” that suggests that the processes of nation building are “based upon systematic racial exclusions and other social divisions” (p. 74). None attend to this in more crude and explicit terms than those within the white supremacist movement. For them, social space is not nearly as central to constructing a white nation as is the very real geographical reconstruction of physical space. Members are very literal in their interpretation of racial space, laying claim to much of North America, and certainly all of the United States, as “white man’s land.” Never mind that the original inhabitants were overtaken by the violence and disease of colonization. If the pre-existence—and especially the devastation—of Aboriginal peoples is largely minimized in white settler rhetoric, it is completely erased from the even more extreme white supremacist discourse. It is as if they never were. And subsequent immigration (often forced), from the same perspective, should never have been.

IV. THE NORTHWEST IMPERATIVE

At the heart of this cartography of violence lies the notion of a great white homeland, located in the Pacific Northwest. Even if “Navahona” or “New Africa” remain distant visions, the imagined “White Bastion” can and should be made a reality. This preserve also occupies a distinct cultural and spatial locus, especially as envisioned by Richard Butler, one of the racist leaders who spearheaded this movement. Butler owned property in Hayden Lake, Idaho, outside of Coeur d’Alene, where he created an armed compound in 1978. The Aryan Nations had connections to The Order, a racist gang that committed murder and armed robberies in the Northwest to fund a “white revolution” in the early 1980s. Butler began hosting Aryan World Congress meetings in the 1980s to draw leaders from the white supremacist counterculture to the Pacific Northwest.

The rhetoric of the Christian Identity movement noted above included the idea that European whites were the lost tribes of Israel and had been called to North America as the prophesied “promised land.” While Butler was a leader of the racist right, he saw himself as a prophet of the “race of Adam.” Two events added to the fuel that the Northwest corner of the United States might be the biblically mandated homeland to racial separatists. The first event was the death of Bob Mathews, leader of The Order, at
the hands of the FBI (or his own) in 1984. Mathews escaped a gun battle with law enforcement in Portland, Oregon and fled to his cabin on Whidbey Island in Washington State. As he was cornered by the FBI, Mathews’ cabin went up in flames. Mathews’ death made him a martyr for the violent Aryan movement and the anniversary of his death, December 8th, is celebrated as a day of remembrance. Fellow member of The Order David Lane (in prison for The Order’s crimes) wrote a phrase that has taken on sacred significance: “We must secure an existence for our people and a future for white children.” This phrase, called the “14 words,” is an identifier of loyalty to the acts of The Order and the mission of the Aryan Nations (14/88 = 14 Words and Heil Hitler, a common racist greeting).

The second event of “biblical proportions” in the Northwest was the standoff in Ruby Ridge, Idaho in 1992. Randy Weaver was a white separatist connected to the Aryan Nations who attended their World Congress meeting in 1986. Weaver, his wife, and their children lived in a hilltop cabin when Weaver failed to appear in court on a weapons charge. Knowing that Weaver was a well-armed antigovernment separatist, U.S. Marshals organized a blockade of his home and a tactical assault to force him out. The resulting 10-day standoff left Weaver’s 14-year-old son, Sam, and wife, Vicki, dead from marshals’ gunfire. The siege was finally resolved by racist survivalist Bo Gritz acting as a mediator between federal authorities and the surviving Weavers. The standoff was witnessed by scores of antigovernment sympathizers and racist activists, including skinheads from the Aryan Nations compound. Eventually, the government admitted violating its own rules of engagement and awarded the victims of the siege a multimillion-dollar settlement.

The deaths of Robert Mathews and Vicki and Sam Weaver have become sacred events for white separatists, demonstrating that the land of the Northwest has been consecrated with the blood of racialist heroes. The proximity of the Aryan Nations compound and the ability of Richard Butler to capitalize on the events through his sermons, publications, and the Internet have helped the Northwest to become the geographic focus of the racist movement. Butler and others, like Klansman Bob Miles and the American Front, began using Old Testament-style claims on land to make the case that there was a “Northwest Imperative” for the creation of a five-state homeland for racially conscious whites. Recognizing that David Duke’s plan of ethnically cleansing the United States of racial enemies (including whites who were homosexual, involved in relationships with nonwhites, or liberal) might be overly ambitious, separatists set their sights on the disproportionately white states of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Wyoming, and Montana (alternative plans would have the white homeland
larger, including British Columbia, or smaller, made up of only southern Oregon and Northern California).

In addition to the manufactured biblical value of land in the Northwestern states came a mathematical one. These states had small percentages of minorities and large amounts of open land, suitable for homesteading. Crime-ridden cities to the south and east could be seen as examples of failed attempts of multiculturalism and big government. Separatists adopted the philosophy of *posse comitatus* (from *The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878*): the belief that the only constitutionally recognized authority is the local sheriff. The call for an internal migration of racists to the Northwest received a positive response from many racists. In 1994, Harold Covington of the National Socialist White People’s Party wrote a press release:

> The NSWPP has relocated its national headquarters from Raleigh, North Carolina. The NSWPP is extremely pleased so far by our reception in Seattle. Our printing facility plans to make available sufficient amounts of National Socialist literature for the youth of Seattle to promote the “Northwest Imperative – 5 white states.”

However, the the Northwest Imperative was not uniformly accepted by varied groups of the racist counterculture. Many groups connected to their Confederate states’ identities in the South, or just entrenched in defending their home turf, did not take to the idea of abandoning their homes to their enemies in order to move to the Northwest. Their fears of what might happen ironically looked something like the images of Palestinians destroying the settlements of retreating Israeli homesteaders in Gaza in 2005. However, some recognized the strategy of colonizing the Pacific Northwest. The following interchange with Thom Robb, National Director, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, took place at an Aryan rally filmed for the 1991 documentary *Blood in the Face*.

Robb: Well, you have all different concepts on that, you know, Pastor Miles speaks about moving to the Northwest. I personally like Arkansas, and I don’t particularly see any reason why I should want to move. However, I think most of us are willing, would be willing to move if that’s what it takes.

Interviewer: Excuse me, what Bob Miles says is that, uh, get five states for the Whites in the Northwest, maybe give the Southwest to the Latinos and maybe give the South, including Arkansas if I may say so, to the Blacks. Now, this might be the point where you disagree with, uh . . .

Robb: Well, I possibly disagree from the standpoint that, that I want to
preserve Arkansas, but like I started to say, I think most of us are mature enough to realize that the preservation of our society and our people is of paramount importance, and I, yes I would move out of Arkansas tomorrow if that’s what it would take to . . . to preserve our people.

Despite the reluctance of some, the idea of a multi-state area that could be colonized by white supremacists began to gain popularity in the 1990s as the Aryan Nations compound became a focal point of activity. The Portland-based skinhead group Volksfront declared its desire to create an “autonomous Aryan homeland” in the region and posted pictures of property to be homesteaded on its website (allegedly owned by the Aryan Nations). Volksfront’s ten-point mission begins with the desire to “support the creation of an autonomous White European State in North America,” along with a desire to end nonwhite immigration to other white areas, such as South Africa (www.volksfrontinternational.com).

Right-wing militia icon Bo Gritz went so far as to start a white colony near Kamiah, Idaho called Almost Heaven. Residents purchasing property in the development were approved by Gritz and had to sign a “covenant” pledging to defend the constitutional rights of Almost Heaven residents. Gritz’s third wife was awarded the development in 1998 in a divorce settlement after Gritz attempted suicide on the property (Thomas, 1999).

The dream of an Aryan Homeland in the United States was dealt a crushing blow in 2000 when Richard Butler lost his Aryan Nations compound at Hayden Lake. A Cherokee woman and her son had stopped along the road outside the armed camp to look for a lost wallet. The camp’s guards, complete with neo-Nazi armbands, believed the two were Jews attacking the camp and fired on them, after which they chased and beat them. The Southern Poverty Law Center won a $6.3 million lawsuit against the Aryan Nations on behalf of the victims that led to the confiscation of Butler’s Idaho property, which was then turned into a peace park (Sugg, 2006). The decision effectively destroyed the Aryan Nations’ dreams of becoming the center of any new nation, and Butler died in 2004 with little organization left.

With the geographic base gone, the vision of an Aryan homeland has naturally moved to the internet, where numerous discussions about the future home of white separatists continues, complete with competing flags and national names. Websites such as northwesthomeland.org discuss actual strategies for achieving this goal. The site promotes the internal migration of racially conscious whites to the Pacific Northwest, using supporters in the region as a simple recruiting network. The site uses fears of immigration by nonwhites to urge movement to the Northwest to help create a new nation called the Northwest American Republic (NAR).
Either we as White people will face our racial crisis and act, or we will become extinct within the next century. Two choices, that’s it. For now we must focus on getting our people to the Pacific Northwest to secure White living space. No other concrete plan for our survival exists. (www.northwesthomeland.org/principles.html, para. 3)

We see a four-phase plan to achieve this homeland that forgoes the massive violence promoted in The Turner Diaries, the book penned by the late National Alliance leader William Pierce. The Turner Diaries, a 1978 novel about a race war to reclaim America from Jewish control, has long been seen as a “how-to” guide by members of the racist right, including Timothy McVeigh, the “Oklahoma City bomber.” The less aggressive plan from northwesthomeland.org follows the following phases:

1) Relocating racially conscious whites to the Northwest;
2) Racially propagandizing whites in the region to engage in the cause of separatism;
3) Creating a legal political movement for Northwest independence; and
4) Creating an economic, social, and organizational infrastructure that will take power in case of a failure of the federal government (www.northwesthomeland.org/four_phases.html, “Four Phases to Victory,” para. 2).

The site sees the NAR as a product of a national collapse, much as the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 paved the way for new nations, such as the Ukraine, based on ethnic identities. The site goes on to talk about the pleasant (“European”) climate in the region, the lack of liberals in rural areas, and the fact that “White martyrs Robert Mathews and Vicky [sic] and Sam Weaver died in the Northwest” (FAQ page, para. 4).

The blog at nwhomeland.blogspot.com makes a similar case for the foundation of the NAR, referring to the deaths of Mathews and the Weavers, and to the Census Bureau prediction that the number of non-Hispanic whites will be eclipsed by that of minorities by the year 2050. The forum takes a more militant position, targeting Zionists and making more overt calls to violent acts. On October 21, 2006, the website’s author (who goes by “The Old Man” from Olympia, Washington) published a draft of a constitution for the NAR. David Lane’s “14 Words” were included in the preamble: “In the name of the Divine Creator of all things we, the Aryan peoples of the earth, do hereby set forth this Constitution of the Northwest American Republic, in order that we may secure the existence of our people and a future for White children” (http://northwestfront.org/about/nar-constitution/, para. 1).

Residence and citizenship in the imaginary nation are restricted “to
those persons of unmixed Caucasian racial descent from any one of the historic family of European nations” (nwhomeland.blogspot.com). Jews are defined as non-whites and are not allowed to enter the NAR under any circumstance. The sixty articles include sections defining citizenship (“white”), the government (a one-party democracy), the judiciary (due process), the bill of rights (the right to keep and bear arms is first; others include universal health care and the rights of the unborn), and a “bill of responsibilities” (including mandatory military service and prohibitions against homosexuality and sexual relations with non-whites). Earlier that month, “The Old Man” posted an answer to the question of when the Aryan revolution would occur: “The revolution will come when White people love their children more than they love their possessions.” It is notable that none of the blog entries on this site have any comments from readers.

A more active forum is www.hateandflame.com. The site (which also features speeches by Adolf Hitler) is home to hundreds of topics related to the “northwest migration.” These topics include discussions of good places to move to, such as Boise, Idaho (“the best place to retire to”) and names for the nation (“Cascadia”). The site links white residents in the Pacific Northwest with those who are considering fleeing other parts of the country in hopes of creating a critical mass of racist whites and pushing unwanted groups out.

The ongoing desire of white supremacists to create a racial separatist movement and carve out a homeland is an example of Swyngedouw’s concept of “glocalization,” the location of global processes in local space (Swyngedouw, 1997). The previous notion, that of the United States as a “white nation,” has been scaled down, infused with religious context, and given a timetable (2050). The imaginary country has been given names, flags, and constitutions, and calls for migration in a backwards Field of Dreams form of nation building (“If they come, we will build it”). The soil, consecrated by “martyrs,” holds the sacredness of the region, despite the fact that racists have died in many places in the United States.

The racist dream of a northwest homeland ignores obvious barriers. The succession of the region could not take place without violence. The American federal government is not going to surrender five (or one) states to religious extremists. And while Aryan separatists are still living in the NAR, but within the United States, they still must pay taxes and follow local, state, and national laws. Racist activists might rethink taking cities such as Seattle, in which nearly a quarter of residents are not white. Additionally, it would be wrong to assume that resident whites would like the idea of turning in their diverse culture for citizenship in a fascist state. The greatest obstacle would be the determination of actual citizenship. Could a white person who had a Hispanic grandmother be allowed to live in Cas-
cadia? If a white couple had a gay son, would the whole family have to move? Do those with Italian, Irish, or Iranian roots count as “white”? And how would an Aryan nation enforce bans on abortion and interracial relationships? Could you listen to Marvin Gaye in the NAR? Of course, the global community would isolate such a nation, much as South Africa was sanctioned in the 1980s, making it hard to even get Marvin Gaye albums in. Finally, there is little unity among the interested groups, with many competing to be the rulers of the Aryan homeland.

Obviously, the fantasy of a homeland will remain just that. However, racists draw upon the historical examples of Israel, Palestine, apartheid-era South Africa, Bosnia, and, of course, Nazi Germany as contemporary geographic spaces that have been (violently) claimed in the name of racial and ethnic separatism. The need for a “land of one’s own” is a powerful part of the eminent domain philosophy that led white settlers to the Pacific Northwest in the 1800s. In a diverse nation of 300 million, the open spaces of the Northwest still appeal to those who would like a little more space and a little less diversity.

There are still those within the racist subculture who have not given up on the old mantra, “The South will rise again.” In September 2006, the remnant of Richard Butler’s Aryan Nations held its 25th World Congress in Laurens, South Carolina. Those who attended discussed alternatives to the Northwest Imperative, including colonizing Alaska. The resolution was to focus on land a little closer to home, with one leader announcing that the best option was to “look at the secession of South Carolina. Start with this state” (Sugg, 2006, p. 8).

V. EXPANDING THE SPACES: CYBERHATE AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF A MOVEMENT

Over the course of this paper, we have collapsed a diverse array of hate groups under the broad rubric of a hate or white supremacist “movement.” Clearly, this has been a heuristic device. While there are obvious points of convergence across the various Klan groups, or Identity Churches, or Skinhead organizations, the hate movement historically has been varied and, in fact, fractured. Significantly, however, Internet communication facilitates the creation of the collective identity that is so important to movement cohesiveness (McAdam, 1982). As a Klanwatch (1998, p. 25) report observed, increasing reliance on email, Web pages, and electronic chat rooms “give[s] racists an empowering sense of community. Even lone racists, with no co-religionists nearby, feel they are part of a movement.”

Internet communication helps to close the social and spatial distance that might otherwise thwart efforts to maintain a collective identity. Given
the geographical dispersal of hate groups across the country—indeed, across the globe—the medium of cyberspace allows members in Maine, Mississippi, and Idaho to engage in real-time conversations, to share the ritual and imagery that bind the individuals to the collective without having to travel great distances or incur great costs. Virtual conversations and ready access to Web pages aggressively asserting the shortcomings of the Other strengthen the resolve of individual members by creating the framework for a shared sense of both peril and purpose.

Moreover, Internet communication knows no national boundaries. Consequently, it allows the hate movement to extend its collective identity internationally, thereby facilitating a potential “global racist subculture” (Back, Keith, & Solomos, 1998). There is no reason to expect that processes of globalization affecting commerce, politics, and demographics will not also affect the realm of identity politics played out by the hate movement (Weinberg, 1998). Weinberg argues that the Internet will in fact provide the vehicle for the construction of a “common racial identity reaching across the Atlantic” (p. 79). Regardless of national affiliation, Internet communication allows white people across the globe to share in the celebration of a common race. Thus, for example, cyberhate sites are increasingly multilingual. They tend to exploit (white) multicultural symbols drawn from Nordic, Celtic, or Nazi mythology. Furthermore, such sites facilitate the importation of outlawed documents and rhetoric so that all can share in the discourses of hate. For example, while Germany and many other European nations have criminalized the publication and dissemination of racist propaganda, these nations have yet to establish an effective means of regulating the virtual border crossing of cyberhate. In short, the potential of the Internet for creating an enhanced sense of unity among the computer-mediated community of haters is vast, and in fact, global. Ironically, at the same time that white supremacists seek to shore up the borders that separate “us” from “them,” the Internet allows them simultaneously to erode the borders that have separated “us” from “us.”

VI. CARVING OUT SPACES: FUTURE RESEARCH IN THE GEOGRAPHY OF HATE

Colin Flint’s 2004 volume, Spaces of Hate, has opened the discussion on geographic approaches to hate studies. This paper and future research can add areas of additional study. As racists continually try to define territory and the boundaries between their “us” and our “them,” how do these groups police their own borders? Remembering that Irish immigrants were not considered white one hundred years ago, how is racial purity determined? Racist groups have purged members upon discovery of non-white
ancestors in the past. How are these genetic boundaries established and enforced?

Similarly, the battle to determine who is “white” also concerns lands of origin. There is a debate within the white supremacist subculture over which Europeans are the true Aryan people. While there is a consensus that most northern and western Europeans (excluding Laplanders) qualify, other parts of Europe remain controversial. Slavs, Greeks, Italians, and Spaniards have been declared by some racists to be “mongrels” or not “truly white.” Even the French are disqualified because of the high percentage of Arab lineage among the residents of France. How are these borders determined and adjusted?

Maybe one of the more compelling geographic issues suggested by this paper is the concept of a racially homogenous homeland. As mentioned, many white supremacists look to the historical models of Nazi Germany, Apartheid-era South Africa, and even Israel and Palestine as examples of the possibility of racially-driven nations. In recent years, the model has become Serbia. The bloody Yugoslavian civil war in the 1990s used a form of genocide called ethnic cleansing to remove or murder Muslims and Croats. Those who did not fit the ethnic profile of the Orthodox Christian Serbs were driven out to refugee camps or into mass graves. In 2002, the heterogeneous nation of Yugoslavia ceased to exist and in its place emerged a variety of homogenous nations, include Serbia, Bosnia, and Macedonia.

White supremacists see Serbia as a modern European example of a created racial homeland. Hate rockers, popular with racist skinheads, have networked with nationalist bands in Serbia. Hate rock bands have traveled to Serbia for concerts, sponsored by Blood & Honour, a national skinhead organization. The Serbian record label White Eagle Records has released music by Serbian skinhead groups, such as Battle Flag, and National Socialist Death Metal groups, such as Terrormachine. This music, and Serbian nationalism in general, has become very popular with racist skinheads in Europe and North America.

White supremacist claims on land and the reactionary violence to define symbolic space has a long history. From Klan nightriders in the 1870s forcing freed slaves off of their land to racist blogs in the 2000s encouraging whites to move to the Pacific Northwest, the claim to land has always been imperative. The fear of losing America to immigrants and others encourages a defensive posturing and a need to erect walls, symbolic and otherwise. To understand hate crimes, an understanding of how people define their space as “theirs” is key.
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My Homeland, My Diaspora: 
Iranian Jewish Identity in Modern Times

Orly R. Rahimiyan

From all meaningless earthly possessions, if I acclaim 
Thee oh ancient land, I adore
Thee oh ancient eternal great
If I adore any, thee I adore
Thee oh priceless ancient Iran
Thee oh valuable jewel, I adore

In a gathering of Iranian Jews in Shiraz at the end of 2002, one of the leaders of the Jewish community spoke of the 13 Jews recently released from prison after being accused of spying for Israel, saying:

Our community needs to be united more. We need to take advantage of every opportunity to bond tighter. We are not the same subdued people as before. We are alive, joyful, active and Iran-lovers. We’ve been inhabitants of Iran for the past 2,700 years . . . and Iran is our native country. We are essentially Iranians first and then Jews. We are proud to be Iranians. Long live Iran. Long live Iranians Jews.

I. INTRODUCTION

One of the essential questions arising from the plurality of ethnic and religious groups in the Middle East, and specifically Iran, concerns the relationship between “diaspora” and “homeland.” What do these two concepts signify? What criteria define these terms? Do these concepts have permanent, uniform criteria? Who determines these criteria? Furthermore, can religious, ethnic, linguistic, and/or national criteria define the identity of
one group for the geographic region considered that group’s “homeland” or “diaspora”?

These questions become even more problematic if one group (group A, in this case study Iranian Jews) sees itself as residing in its homeland, while another group (group B, in this case study Iranian Muslims) in the same area perceives the former as not belonging to that “homeland.” How will the perceptions and images generated by group B regarding group A affect group A’s own perceptions of itself? Will group A’s self-image change as a result of the perception of group B?

I will seek answers for these questions based on the case of Iranian Jews under the Iranian Islamic Republic in terms of their attitude toward Iran and their immigration outside of Iran (Israel, Europe, and the USA): Did their Jewish identity negate their Iranian identity? Can Iranian Jews carry multiple, non-contradicting identities? That is to say, are they Jews first and Iranians second? Or, alternatively, are they Iranians who, incidentally, are also Jews?

The prevailing narrative regarding Iranian Jewry, the Israeli and Western one, has a tendency to conceive of Iranian Jews as living under a tyrannical regime that makes their lives so miserable that they are forced to seek refuge abroad, as I will portray in the first part of this narrative.

In the second part of my study, I plan to refute these sweeping claims and to assert, instead, that the relationship between Iran’s Jews and its government and culture constitutes a dialectic far more complex than the superficial picture presented thus far. It is not simply that issues of “diaspora” and “homeland” are topics of discussion among the Jews of Iran, but that non-Jewish Iranians themselves also take part in such conversations, especially in the wake of the 1979 revolution. This study will also touch on the methods of representation used by Iranian Jews outside Iran that stem from erroneous attitudes toward Iranian Jews in Israel and the West. It is impossible to distinguish arbitrarily between the Israeli/Western discourse regarding Iran and the important internal developments in Israeli/Western society, since they are interwoven.

On the basis of the research I have conducted, applying theories of diaspora and homeland to the Iranian case, it has come to light that at least some Iranian Jews traditionally have seen themselves as autochthonous Iranians residing in their homeland. No less important, however, is to understand the perceptions of Iranian Muslims regarding Iranian Jews: that is, do Iranian Jews appear in the eyes of Iranian Muslims as native sons of the Iranian soil and heritage, or as a group living in exile that is not part of the Iranian nationality? In order to clarify this point, we should keep in mind that most theories of nationalism recognize the presence of the “other” and its significant role in forging and defining national identity. Therefore,
in the third part of my paper I will also try to gauge the “otherness” of Iranian Jews and see whether they play a role of the “other” in shaping the Iranian nationality upon which Muslim Iranians construct their Iranian identity.

II. “REDEMPTION OR DESTRUCTION”

Let us begin by analyzing the prevalent narrative regarding the place of native Jews in Iranian society. Zionist and western historiography has generally subordinated the history of Iranian Jewry to the Zionist master-narrative through a binary separation of the following concepts: West versus East, the Western/Israeli/Zionist sphere versus that of Iran, homeland versus diaspora, Jewishness versus Iranianess.

This separation falls in line with the national logic of situating ethnic belonging, a symbolic construction of a collective consciousness based on ethnic identity, as part and parcel of an ideology that seeks to assimilate all the groups constituting the nation as a homogenous collective (Shenhav, 2003, p. 18). Iranian Jews were thus perceived and imagined as part of the teleological Zionist order, disconnected from the Iranian national timeline and their own history in the Iranian sphere (Ram, 2005). In the West, especially in Israel, the national history of Iranian Jewry was constructed as an unchanging, coherent story, situated within the boundaries of Zionist discourse; the origin of Iran’s Jews lies in the tribe of Judah, to which they must return. Iranian Jews were thus removed from their national, Iranian context, only to be identified as organically belonging to Zionist nationalism. The idea of national purity resulted in the separation of identities: Iranianess and Jewishness were presented as polar opposites incapable of overlapping.

The presence of 30,000 Jews currently living in Iran as the largest Jewish community in the Middle East outside of Israel, however, undermines the Zionist-Israeli narrative and its claim that the natural affinity of Iran’s Jews belongs to Zionist nationalism and that they naturally belong in the Western camp. In his new book, Iranophobia: The Logic of an Israeli Obsession (2010), Haggai Ram demonstrates that the Iranian revolution did not lead either to the destruction of Iranian Jewry or to its ultimate redemption in the state of Israel. According to Ram, the case of Iran’s Jews proved to the Israeli establishment that Jews are capable of sustaining themselves outside of the sovereign, Jewish state and the Israeli “melting pot.” This possibility contradicted the Zionist master-narrative, according to which Jewish existence is possible only within the State of Israel, lest diaspora Jews once again fall victim to holocaust and destruction (see also Ram, 2005; Ram, 2008).
The difficulty of situating Iran’s Jews in the Iranian sphere is not only a result of the Israeli national narrative, but also of that of the Western, especially American, narrative. The following paragraph comes from a letter from a correspondent named “Nariman N.” posted on www.iranian.com, a well-known site in which Iranians who live outside of Iran express their views about and nostalgia for their homeland, in 1998. This anonymous voice serves to illuminate the above-mentioned phenomenon. 

Iranian Jews are IRANIANS
I would like to add that many American Jewish leaders like to look upon Iran’s Jews as this small oppressed minority, who don’t have anything in common with the Muslim population—almost as if they were foreigners living in a foreign country. To them, Iranian Jews really aren’t Iranian but rather just Jewish; they try to somehow disassociate their Iranianness from their Jewishness, in the process just ignoring the fact that they’re Iranian as much as they’re Jewish. I believe this reflects these Jewish Americans’ own prejudices and ignorance about Iran, and that’s just too bad.5

This post, probably by an Iranian Jewish woman who lives in the U.S., corresponds with the master-narrative of the Israeli/Western sphere. The voice of Nariman shows the common argument, which the poster rejects, consisting of the common assumption that Iranian Jews are foreigners and outsiders in Iran. As Stuart Hall, a cultural theorist and sociologist, explained in his 2006 article “Cultural Identity and Diaspora”: “In Said’s ‘Orientalist’ sense, we were constructed as different and other within the categories of knowledge of the West by those regimes. They had the power to make us see and experience ourselvess as ‘Other’” (p. 225). According to Hall, the image of Iran in the West derives from inner-interests and discourses of Western regimes.6 This article will suggest a contra-picture from the one that prevails in the West: one of Jews who are integral components of the Iranian surroundings, who negotiate their Iranian identity, who respond to different historical circumstances, and who undergo transformation as a result.

III. “WE’VE BEEN INHABITANTS OF IRAN FOR THE PAST 2,700 YEARS”

In this section, I will try to contextualize Iranian Jews in the Iranian sphere and place Iranian Jews once again within Iranian-national historiography. I will attempt to penetrate the binary characters and imaginary, homogenous spaces to show that between Jews and Iranians there exist numerous overlapping points, examining whether the criteria that define “Iranian identity” are valid as well for Iranian Jewry. I will demonstrate that
the identity of Iran’s Jews intersects with central components required for the establishment of Iranian identity, especially language, territory, historiography, and culture.

Introducing his entry on “Iranian Identity” in the Encyclopaedia Iranica, Ahmad Ashraf defines these aforementioned criteria as follows:

A collective feeling by Iranian people of belonging to the historic lands of Iran. This sense of identity defined both historically and territorially, evolved from a common historical experience and cultural tradition among the people who lived in Iran, and shared in Iranian mythologies and legends as well as in its history. It was further defined and made distinctive by drawing boundaries between Iranians (the in-group) and the ‘others’ (out-groups). (Ashraf, 2006, p. 501)

If this is the case, Iranian identity comprises shared historical experience, affinity for territory, cultural tradition, and a feeling of cohesion vis-à-vis the “other” that defines the “self.” We will now examine this definition as it pertains to the case of Iranian Jewry: How do these criteria apply to their situation?

IV. Territorial and Historical Commonality

The Jews of Iran have seen themselves as denizens of Iranian territory for the 2,700 years since the Assyrian exile (722 BC). Numerous Jewish-Iranian public figures often repeat that Judaism constitutes the oldest religious minority in Iran, and one that settled there a millennium before the rise of Islam. Nevertheless, this fact does not dull the common historical memory shared by Iranian Jews and other Iranians. The late researcher of Iranian Jewry, Amnon Netzer, provided some clarification on the common historical memory shared by Iranian Jews and other Iranians:

The Jewish minority in Iran is that country’s oldest religious minority. Even despite the rather difficult entanglements of Jewish existence, there is still a positive historical memory of the distant past. Consciousness of the exile, the place of Cyrus in Jewish history, and Megillath Ester—the story of Purim—all constitute milestones in this historical memory. The Jewish community attributes its beginnings to the Babylonian exile. The end to a Jewish presence in Eretz Yisrael—the biblical land of Israel, was accompanied by the historical memory of integration into Iranian society, economic prosperity, and cultural flourishing. Consciousness of the positive past of Jewish presence in [Iran] was not at all undermined by the difficulties of the Khomeini period. (2005a, p. 9)

Many Jews view Iran’s distant, royal past as an integral part of Jewish his-
The attempt to establish this link found special success during the Pahlavi period. Father and son attempted to revive what they have seen as secular Iranian nationalism that thrived with the rule of Cyrus the Great, founder of the Achaemenid Iranian Empire, constituting a source of pride and inspiration. They worked to establish continuity between the pre-Islamic period and their own with regard to conceptions of the monarchy, symbols, and cultural values. Jews identified with the nationalist aspirations and values of a revived Iran due to social and economic reasons and integrated them into their Iranian, Jewish identity. One of the more important connections is found in the story of Cyrus, often represented as no less than the messiah, savior of the Jewish people, and even, in the Judeo-Persian literary tradition (Shahîn’s Ardashîr-nâmeh), a Jew himself. The story of Cyrus is well ingrained in the collective memory of all Iranians, Jews and Muslims alike.

The emphasis placed on Iranian Jewry’s solid historical connection to Iran’s past by way of Cyrus the Great is by no means unique to the Pahlavi era. Even today, in the days of the Islamic Republic, the memory of Cyrus still blazes in the minds of Iranians, as seen in a story told by a former Israeli representative to Iran, Meir Ezri. Ezri was told by an Iranian-Muslim professor he met at UCLA that on visits to Iran, Iranians say to him: “Once Cyrus saved the Jews, now it’s your [the Jews’] turn to come and save us Iranians.”

A prevalent tale among Iranian Jews that links the two components of their identity—Jewish and Iranian—is the story of the settling of the exiles in Iran. According to this myth, preserved especially by the Jews of Isfahan, the first exiles who fled Nebuchadnezzar brought with them water and soil from Jerusalem. Anytime they would stop in a place, they would check its soil and water and compare it with that which they carried. When they arrived in Isfahan, examining the water and mud, they found that it was equal to that of Jerusalem, and immediately settled there, building homes and begetting their offspring. For this very reason, they named the place “Yahûdiye,” which means “place of the Jews” (Fischel, 1935, pp. 523-526).

Iranian Jews frequently stress the collective, historical memory they possess in common with the imagined Iranian nation and their continued presence in Iran as a means of generating a sense of belonging to the Iranian homeland. The leaders of the Jewish community in Iran claim their community has deep roots in Iran, more so than those of other Jewish communities in the Middle East, and emphasize the unbreakable connection that started in the days of the bible with the story of Cyrus and the Book of Esther. They emphasize their long history in Iran, which includes 2,700 years and 1300 years before the arrival of Islam in Iran and the composition of the Biblical Talmud under the Iranian Sassanid dynasty, respectively.
Similarly to the Pahlavis’ agenda, Iranian Jews stressed the pre-Islamic history and enjoyed the modernization and secularization process in Iran, which allowed them to assimilate into Iranian society more effectively. Following the accession to power of Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1925, the authority of religious officials diminished and the Jews were granted legal equality, which was implemented mainly in the urban areas of the country and especially in Tehran, where modernization and secularization were prominent.

Michael Zand, a scholar of Iranian studies, discusses the decreased social import that the concept of Jewish “impurity” (nejāsat) began to play in the 1930s in Iran. Zand writes,

The processes of Westernization and secularization and its effect on the thinking of Iranian intellectuals and of the political establishment, helped bring about, if not the abolishment of the concept of “impure infidels,” then at least a lessening of the stigma of that label. This was especially true among the new urban middle classes, especially in Tehran. In this way, by the 1930’s the Jewish image lost some of the stigma of impurity, both in the eyes of the ruling elite and in the eyes of the intellectual elite, and to a high degree in the eyes of the Iranian urban middle classes.

This atmosphere under the Pahlavis allowed the Jews to differ from the traditional concepts. In a leading article from the Jewish Iranian magazine Alam-e Yahūd [Pers. The Jewish World] (February 26, 1946, no. 27), the author raised open questions, asking why the offspring of the Arabs and Mongols who attacked Iran and destroyed it are still considered Iranian, while the Jews, who have lived there since the days of Cyrus, are considered foreigners and impure. The author also emphasized that the Jew in Iran is first Iranian and then Jewish and asked how it is possible that Jews serve in the army for twenty years, yet there isn’t one officer among them. In another article in the same magazine (April 2, 1946, no. 30), the author stressed that many crimes were executed during the Iranian history against the Jewish minority, even though its sons kept their loyalty to the country and their love for their homeland (as cited in Netzer, 2005b, p. 150).

V. Language

Language is a powerful symbol of national and ethnic identity. Using certain language or a linguistic register is a means by which we can present our own identity and the group to which we belong (Spolsky, 1999, p. 181). Iran’s Jews are connected to Iran not merely through history and territory, but also as speakers of the Persian language. By using the mother tongue of Persian, Iranian Jews draw the line of belonging to the native speakers of Persian. This is unlike other minorities in Iran, such as the Armenians and
Assyrians, who preserved their original language both as their spoken language and as the language of cultural creativity (Netzer, 1980, pp. 26-27). Thamar Gindin, a researcher of Jewish-Iranian languages, asserts that the Jewish community of Iran, one of the oldest in the world, dates back to the eighth century B.C.E. While adhering to their religious tenets even under severe persecution, Iranian Jews readily adopted Iranian culture and literature and regarded them as their own. Like their brethren in other diasporas, Jews in Iran adopted the common vernacular for everyday life, while retaining the use of Hebrew predominantly as a sacred language, in order to survive as a religion and a nation, and to communicate with other Jewish communities in the world. Naturally, some Hebrew and Aramaic words and calques found their way into the Jewish variety of the local language. (2010, para. 2)

The majority of Iranian Jews speak or spoke Persian or other, related dialects, and, as is well-known, language plays a meaningful role in their sense of belonging.

However, “like other minority groups [such as other Jewish communities in the diaspora],” Gindin asserts,

Most Iranian Jews were at least bilingual, speaking the local Jewish dialect at home, and using the common vernacular—usually (Muslim) Persian—with the authorities and with their non-Jewish neighbors. Judeo-Persian was used for communication between communities in Persia, tafsīr (Bible translation and commentary), synagogue sermons, and official documents, such as legal treatises. (2010, para. 3)

Nevertheless, Iranian Jews translated some of their prayers into the local language, which shows the prominence of the language in their identity. For example, on the eve of the Passover Seder, Jews would render passages from the Haggadah into Persian after declaiming the original Hebrew. Additionally, certain traditional blessings were recited in Persian, and if they were read in Hebrew or Aramaic, the traditional response would come in Persian (Gindin, 2005, p. 108).

Thus, Jewish cultural intercourse was conducted through the hybrid form of Judeo-Persian. Nahid Pirnazar, the researcher of Judeo-Persian literature, claims that Judeo-Persian literature represents the cultural heritage of Iranian Jewry and serves as a living document that speaks to the love and connection between Iranian Jews and Iran’s culture and literature (Pirnazar, 2005, p. 37).

The prominent Judeo-Persian researcher David Yerushalmi also stresses this Jewish-Muslim symbiosis, seen in the Judeo-Persian literary repertoire:
Most original compositions were written in Judeo-Persian, with only a small number in Hebrew. . . . These compositions are firmly planted in the Jewish religious/literary tradition that developed among Iranian Jews residing in the Persian cultural-linguistic sphere beginning in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and perhaps even earlier. . . . This religious, literary tradition was influenced by the widespread aesthetics and linguistic and literary conventions of classical Persian literature, especially with regards to epic, romantic, and mystical poetry. (Yerushalmi, 2005, pp. 130-131)

Jewish authors interspersed their stories with literary motifs and devices borrowed from classical Persian literature, as Vera B. Moreen, the scholar of Judaeo-Persian literature, shows regarding Shāhīn’s manuscripts. One of the most outstanding examples of this cultural diffusion is Shāhīn’s Ardešīr-nāmeh, an epic poem completed in the year 1333 that involves the Jewish Purim narrative, Megillat Esther. Shāhīn borrows the meter from “Leyli and Majnūn,” composed by his Persian contemporary Nizāmī. In the Ardešīr-nāmeh, which stands at over six thousand stanzas, Shāhīn follows in the footsteps of the illustrious 10th century Persian poet Ferdowsī, producing an epic that revolves around King Ardeşīr (Ahasuerus in Megillat Esther). Shāhīn paints spectacular portraits of love and vengeance, nature and the hunt, battlefields and royal sporting contests, all scenes reminiscent of the mythical world described in the Shāh-nāmeh. Shāhīn’s borrowings and literary kinship to Nizāmī and Ferdowsī are consistent with Ashraf’s aforementioned definition, which posits shared mythology as a central component of Iranian identity.

Jewish Iranians, however, do not regard the Judeo-Persian literary oeuvre as their sole literary heritage, and consider well-known Iranian poets to be theirs as well. A magazine printed in 1980 by the umbrella organization of Iranian Jews in Israel gives us a glimpse into this strong tendency of Iranian Jews:

We Iranians have Khayyāms, Hāfezes, and Mūlawīs. We have a rich and ancient culture, just as westerners have their Goethes, Shakespeares, and Victor Hugos in whom they take pride. Why should we not also take pride in our poets and writers whose works have enriched our very souls, on whose poems we were nurtured, and with whose words we have spent many generations.

The Jewish-Iranian symbiosis does not manifest itself only in the world of letters, but also in the visual arts. The 2005 film The Jews of Iran, directed by the Iranian-Dutch filmmaker Ramin Farahani, presents the Jewish artist Sassoon at an exhibit introducing his work, which combines motifs bor-
rowed from the Iranian artistic heritage and elements of Jewish culture. According to Sassoon:

I’ve always been drawn to our traditional Iranian art and culture, especially since my father was an antique dealer. As a child I was always around Iranian antiques and crafts. So I developed a passion for ethnic and ancient Iranian art forms, such as miniatures, architecture and handicrafts. These objects and designs have unconsciously influenced my work. As you can see, this painting was inspired by traditional Jewish forms from Isfahan and Iranian religious motifs such as the Ten Commandments; this candlelight [referring to the Jewish seven-branched candelabrum]; Moses, the name of the prophet Moses; this design in the middle contains David’s prayers; the Grand name of God. The rabbis of Isfahan used to hand draw and color these designs in the past. (Jews of Iran, Isfahan 1, 28, pp. 20-29, 55)

Other examples of these mutual influences of Muslims on Jews and vice versa are manifested in additional aspects of Jewish religious life: The Jewish educational institution in Iran is called the Mulla-Khâneh or Maktab-Khâneh, where the Torah is taught by a teacher known as Khâkhâm (Hebrew for wise man) or Mulla; the title of his counterpart in the Iranian Islamic is Makteb (Ram, 2008, pp. 8-9; Rahimiyan, 2005, p. 82). Jewish emissaries in Iran in the early 20th century reported that synagogues were devoid of furnishings, covered instead in rugs according to local custom, with worshippers sitting on pillows placed along the walls (Levy, 1986, p. 19). Furthermore, Jews customarily removed their shoes upon entering the synagogue, much like Muslims in a mosque (Kopellowitz, 1930, p. 49).

VI. CULTURE

Furthermore, Iranian Jews listen to Iranian music, take Iranian names, and enthusiastically celebrate Iranian holidays, including the Iranian New Year, Nowrûz. In her autobiography, Iranian Jewish author Roya Hakakian—who left the country in 1985—describes the level acculturation attained by her uncle, Ardi, in 1970s Iranian society:

He was the Jew who had shed the “ghetto” speech, Persian peppered with Hebrew. Even Jews mistook him for a Muslim and behaved as they did in the company of one. They offered him the best seat in the house and waited cheerfully on him. They watched their manners and spoke flawless Persian, even quoted passages from the holy Koran . . . Everything about him was Iranian, even his name: Ardi, short for Ardeshir, the king of the ancient Persian Empire. (Hakakian, 2004, pp. 50-51)

Poignant examples of the reciprocal ties between Jews and Muslims in Iran
can be found in many areas and appear to be firmly rooted in Iranian culture, as Jewish-Iranian identity was established through constant links with the cultural and geographical sphere of Iran. Studies on diasporic discourse demonstrate that this synthesis between Jewish and local culture—in this instance, Iranian—was a necessary factor in the survival of the entire diaspora community. As Boyarin and Boyarin observed:

Within conditions of Diaspora, tendencies towards nativism were also materially discouraged. Diaspora culture and identity allows (and has historically allowed in the best circumstances, such in Muslim Spain) for a time that the same people participate fully in the common cultural life of their surroundings . . . Diasporic cultural identity teaches us that cultures are not preserved by being protected from “mixing” but probably can only continue to exist as a product of such “mixing.” (2003, p. 108)

To paraphrase the Boyarins, it seems that the Iranian Jewish identity answers the required criteria of Iranian identity: a sense of identity defined both historically and territorially, common historical experience, and cultural tradition shared in Iranian mythologies and legends as well as in its history. It thus appears that Iranian Jews did not constitute a separate and foreign entity in the Iranian environment, but an Iranian group of foreign origin (Semitic) with a steadfast connection to Iran, the country they viewed as their homeland (vatan) in the second half of the twentieth century. It is clear, therefore, that the Iranian Jews feel a deep affinity toward their place of birth, so much so that they love its scent, as described by Manuchehr Eliyāsī, the former Jewish representative in the Iranian parliament (as cited in Greenberger, 1980, p. 79).

VII. THE “SELF” VERSUS THE “OTHER”

Eliyāsī’s statement brings us to the last ingredient of Iranian national identity, which in my opinion is one of the most important: the feeling of belonging to one group instead of another. Similarly, sentiments of not-belonging, transience, and exile are contingent on the state of one’s consciousness. As Shuval put it, “Diaspora is a social construct founded on feeling, consciousness, memory, mythology, history, meaningful narratives, group identity, longings, dreams, allegorical and virtual elements, all of which play a role in establishing a Diaspora reality” (2000, p. 43).

Homi Bhaba, one of the most important figures in contemporary post-colonial studies, asserts that national ideology aspires to transform the heterogeneous nation into one people and to instill an impression of a united nationality. It is for this reason that nationalist ideology is given to distorting the internal contradictions and conflicts among the different groups
constituting the nation and between the individual and the collective. Nationalist ideology attempts to create distinct boundaries of belonging vis-à-vis foreignness. Bhaba adds, however, that beneath the cloak of homogeneity woven by the super-narrative lie latent tensions, contradictions, and fractures (1994, pp. 145-148).

Critical historiographical research demonstrates how historical writing is clearly tied to the manner in which nations construct identities through selective historical memory, the overlooking and even intentional suppression of historical events and figures. According to Rubie Watson, the past is viewed from the perspective of the present; but, just as the present changes, so too does the past (1994, p. 1).

It thus follows that not only must the Iranian identity of Jews be examined with respect to present circumstances, but that we must also analyze the role of the Jew in the ongoing ambivalence of Iranian identity. Is the Jew the “other,” set apart from the majority, a kind of marker indicating the boundaries of Iranian nationalistic identity against which the subjectivity of the Iranian collective is built? Or, alternatively, is he an active participant in the construction of this identity?20

Anna Triandafyllidou (1998) demonstrates that most prominent theories of nationalism recognize the “other” and its fundamental role in the creation and definition of national identity. The nationalist experience supposes, a priori, the existence of “others,” who simultaneously belong and do not belong to the national community, whose members define themselves as distinct from these “others.” Triandafyllidou claims that national consciousness is not defined only by the positive characteristics of a certain culture—for example, its language, origin, and territory—but also by its awareness of “the others.” In the case of Iran, the position of “the other” is filled by the Jew, with his distinct (“Semitic”) origin, different speech (Judeo-Persian), separate values, and unique culture (Judaism).

One of Triandafyllidou’s (1998) particular contributions to ethnic studies is her coining of the phrase “Significant Other,” by which she means the other nation or ethnic group, residing in close territorial proximity to the national community (or even in its midst), that threatens or is perceived as threatening either the nation’s freedom or its ethnic and/or cultural purity. The presence of this “Significant Other” is all the more conspicuous in times of crisis—especially of nationalist ferment like the Islamic revolution—in a way that defines how the “imagined community” of the nation finds lasting expression in the rhetoric of peril (McAlister, 2001, p. 6). The tension that stems from the conflict is likely to increase the tendency to emphasize the foreignness of the “other” and set it as the negative polar opposite of the national collective, through an emphasis on social, cultural, religious, and even physical differences (Triandafyllidou, 1998).
As mentioned, throughout the Pahlavi dynasty, Iranian Jewry felt an inseparable connection to Iranian nationalism. In the introduction to his book *The Comprehensive History of the Jews of Iran*, first published in Tehran in 1960, Habib Levy, a Jewish Iranian community activist, explains one of his reasons for writing this book:

Rather unfortunately, we must confess that the Iranians, our countrymen, still do not recognize the legitimacy of the Jews who have lived as their neighbors for 27 centuries. In other words, our Iranian Muslim compatriots do not view Judaism as worthy, with its heavenly book and people, the first to travel the path of monotheism . . . . These dwellers of water and earth of every class must therefore stand as united allies, striving as one for the glorification and flourishing of this, our country, in which we all rejoice. This collaborative effort will be on the right track when Iranians begin to understand each other, knowing that the members of the Iranian nation of every race and religion, wherever they may be, desire happiness and prosperity for their land in which their descendants shall continue living. Iranians of every race and religion were born in this country, and it is in this country that they shall be laid to rest.

In principle, Islam and Judaism are not in conflict; they are both founded on the oneness of God, purity, holiness, and the path of righteousness. The Jew was the first monotheist, and consequently, the morals-instructor of mankind, traveling upon a lonely road for many a dark century, surrounded by profligacy and idolatry. Of all places the Jew has come to live, he sincerely loves Iran, the land of Cyrus and Darius who protected his forefathers.

The Jew lost his freedom and independence for the past 19 centuries because he fought against the Emperors of Rome, those enemies of Iran. Mankind must decide how to reward its morals-instructor and compensate him for his troubles. If only God would reveal his intention by making the Jews familiar with their own history, drawing them closer to the Iranian nation.” (pp. 3-4) (emphasis added)

Levy thus attempts to place Jews along with fellow Iranians as partners in a common struggle. Reading into his words, one can discern the purging mechanisms that serve the creation of a sense of common national identity. Levy sets down distinct boundaries of belonging versus foreignness, while constructing a common, albeit “imagined,” past. Also finding expression in this quotation is the Jewish concept Eldad Pardo terms “Universal Judaism”—the idea that Judaism’s role is to serve as “a light unto the nations” that serves as a model for correcting injustice in the world (Pardo, 2004).

This conception also suits the fact that Israel in the 1960s served as an example for Iran, as a state opposed to Western imperialism. Burgeoning Zionism and the establishment of the State of Israel constituted a critical juncture that brought about a new discourse in the perception of Israel and
the Jews. Erudite Iranians of the left viewed the new Israeli state as a political model worthy of imitation. The creation of the “New Jew” in the spirit of the Zionist vision introduced a new and important element into the world of representations of the Jew.

On this subject, we look to the words of the most prominent Iranian leftist thinker of the day, Jalāl Al-e Ahmad,21 writing about Iranian Jews in his travel log after his visit to Israel in 1963:

I am the son of the East, a Persian speaker–from the bottom of history–I am connected to Judaism. In the period of Darius and Ahasuerus–I crowned Esther and appointed Mordecai as a minister and ordered the temple rebuilt. Although in the alleys of Ray and Nayshābour sometimes due to inciting and wickedness on the part of one governor or the interests of one ruler, I had a hand in Jew killing, the tomb of Daniel the prophet in Susa still initiates miracles and the Esther and Mordecai tombs in Hamedān are no less important than the tombs of the holy son of the Imam. (Al-e Ahmad, 1964, p. 382)

Al-e Ahmad presents the common historical destiny of Jews and Iranians as a component of the purging and hybridizing mechanisms of the Iranian national project. A close reading of Al-e Ahmad, however, reveals contradictions and divisions, as in certain circumstances, Iranian Jewry was excluded and even separated from the rest of society.

The Six-Day War of 1967 served as a catalyst for anti-Israeli trends in Iran, as it turned the tables on Israel’s once-glamorous image. Israel was now perceived as a colonial power opposing the anti-colonial ideals of the third world with which Iran identified. The most prominent example of this change of heart on the part of Iranians regarding Israel is the 1968 AFC Asian Cup final soccer match between Israel and Iran.22

The unruly behavior of the Iranian crowd throughout the game was indeed a sign of hatred towards Israel, but also, simultaneously, a veiled expression of negative feelings toward Iran’s Jews. The soccer game constituted a device for cultivating the solidarity of internal Iranian society, and thereby creating a distinction between the “good guys” (the Iranian team) and the “bad guys” (the Israeli team). In this dichotomous framework, Iranian Jews were identified with Israelis as the “bad guys.” The game thus served as a means for excluding Jews from participating in the Iranian national project. This example demonstrates that “we must therefore rid ourselves of simplistic dichotomies . . . . A complex system of variegated circumstances, dependent on local conditions has created a heterogeneous, multi-faceted picture of life full of contradictions” (Gruen, 2004, pp. 17-18). Hence, although it appeared that Iranian Jews were well integrated in
Pahlavi-era Iranian society, in reality, this integration was somewhat superficial.

VIII. IRANIAN JEWS AFTER THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION

This complicated picture from the days of the Shah—who strove to create a secular Iran with a Western orientation and without Islam—has continued in the Islamic Republic, despite attempts to present post-Pahlavi Iran in a one-dimensional light. Researchers of Iranian Jewry have found puzzling the prospect that Jews could feel “at home” in a religious, Islamic, and Eastern-oriented Iran. Regarding Jewish participation in Iranian nationalism after the Islamic Revolution, Netzer claimed, “It is indeed inconceivable that religious Iranian nationalism in its Shi’ite variant will prove tolerant towards the Jews that are considered in their eyes as a foreign sapling that must be uprooted, or whose development at the very least must be restricted within the country” (1979, p. 73).

When Ayatollah Khomeini, the senior Shi’ite cleric and future Supreme Leader of the country, returned to Iran on the February 1, 1979, five thousand Jews, led by Iranian Chief Rabbi Yedidy Shofet, were among those welcoming him. Some of them held pictures of Khomeini and signs proclaiming: “Jews and Muslims are brothers.” But beneath the surface of this attempt to create a uniform national identity, there were also rifts which labeled the Jew as the “other” over the course of the revolution and the initial years of the Islamic Republic.

During the revolution itself, a wave of anti-Israel sentiment swept over Iran, affecting the Jewish community. Private wealth was confiscated on a large scale, sending thousands of affluent Jews fleeing to the United States or Israel. On May 14, 1979, five days after the execution of Jewish community head Habib Elqanayian, who was accused of Zionist espionage and activities, a delegation of Jewish leaders set out for Qom to meet with Khomeini, who allayed their fears with the following words:

We make a distinction between the Jewish community and the Zionists—and we know that these are two different things. We are against [the Zionists] because they are not Jews, but politicians . . . but as for the Jewish community and the rest of the [minority] communities in Iran—they are members of this nation. Islam will treat them in the same manner as it does all other sectors of society. (Radio Tehran, May 15, 1979)

Despite the fact that Khomeini propounded a distinction between Iranian Jews and Zionist Israelis, the lines were often blurred. Harangues took place not only against Israel and Zionism in the Iranian media, but often
against the Jews as well. In the 2005 film The Jews of Iran, a Muslim student is asked if she spends time outside of school with her Jewish classmates. She responds that she prefers not to, and that “because of the atmosphere that Israel has created, I am not fond of Jews.” The director prods his subject and points out that Iranian Jews are not Israelis, to which she answers that it also because of their religion and that the Jews also keep to themselves.

This blurring of identities befits Triandafyllidou’s (1998) theory, according to which the presence of the “significant other” finds prominence in times of national crisis and nation-shaping. Iranian Jews were thus forced to redefine their place in the post-revolutionary period, emphasizing their Iranian identity. We can learn much about this phase from the pen of Hārūn Yeshāyāʾī, a leader of The Organization of Iranian Jewish Intellectuals and editor of its magazine, Tamuz:

Yes! I am God’s servant; I am an Iranian and a Jew . . . I feel myself inside the eternal tapestry of this [Iranian] nation. This feeling permeates my entire body and flows into my veins. My ears know the calls of Allahu Akbbar that erupt from the minarets of the mosques under blue skies, yet cannot identify the sounds of Big Ben in London. In times of joy I have laughed with the Muslims of my homeland, and in times of sorrow I have cried with them. My mother wept in the days of the ‘Ashūra next to the mosque over the tragedy which befell Hossein and his companions. I counted the days so that I too would have a part in the ‘Ashūra ceremonies. I am a dhimmī and must pay jīzāya. This is all true . . . I recognize this law. (Tamuz, November 26, 1985)

Roya Hakakian expresses her feelings in the wake of revolutionary anti-Jewish acts in a pained, sardonic monologue:

Was it not your beautiful handwriting on the wall across our door, “Johouds [derogatory term for Jews] go Home”? My real homeland is Israel. True, I wasn’t born there, went there as a child once, can’t carry on a conversation in Hebrew, don’t write in it, or speak it with my family. (2004, p. 222)

Reading Yeshāyāʾī and Hakakian, it is not difficult to sense the searing insult Iranian Jews felt when excluded from the national Iranian project. Unlike the Pahlavi regime, which gave highest priority to the principle of nationality and viewed Jews as equals, the Islamic doctrine of the Islamic Republic of Iran embraced religious values, which inevitably resulted in perceptions of the inferiority of the Jews and the superiority of the Muslim majority. The doctrine of Ayatollah Khomeini, leader of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which was created before the Islamic revolution, emphasized
the Shi’ite tenet of the impurity of non-Muslims (nejāsat) discussed above. This perception of impurity significantly affected the lives of the Jews and their daily interaction with the surrounding Shi’ite society (Menashri, 2002, pp. 399-400).

It seems that the love of Iran did not survive the test of the Islamic revolution, on the eve of which thousands of Jews cut the thick chains that tied them to their homeland (as was the case for many Muslim Iranians); they felt like the “other” and unwelcome, whereupon they emigrated from their home. Many of Iran’s Jews avoided wrestling with the national conflict entirely when they emigrated. Those who remained stressed their firm connection with the Iranian homeland while emphasizing their weak link to the state of Israel and world Jewry. Furthermore, Iranian Jews felt the need to demonstrate their loyalty to Iranian nationalism more strongly in light of the transformation of Jewish identity into a national one with the advent of Zionism.

IX. Lip Service or Sincere Declarations of Loyalty?

Iranian Jews continue to believe that their allegiance to the homeland is cast in doubt by their very existence as Jews, despite their upholding the practices of Iranian nationalism in addition to those of religious Judaism. Shuval (2000, p. 45) observed, “Diaspora communities make it clear that identity with a political or geographical entity does not need to be binary—in the sense of all or nothing—but can involve loyalty to more than one such entity” (emphasis added).

But this allegiance many Iranian Jews pledge to their homeland has stood strong, notwithstanding the 1979 revolution, and is coupled with an emphasis on displaying Jewish-Iranian fealty to the Iranian nation to avoid harassment. In an interview I conducted with a recent Iranian immigrant to the United States in her twenties (April 2, 2007), my subject reported instances in which she was labeled with the derogatory epithet “Zionist” despite living in Islamic Republican Iran. She would respond that she was a non-Zionist Jew, and that calling her a Zionist was similar to calling an Iranian an Arab. She would explain to her Iranian interlocutor that being Jewish did not necessarily make her a Zionist, just as an Iranian who adheres to Islam does not immediately become an Arab. This anecdote suggests that Jews in Iran insist on this separation between Judaism, on one hand, and Zionism and Israeliness, on the other.

Additionally, Iran’s Jews often take ardent public stances against Israel, and many Jews join the Iranian masses in protesting the State of Israel on the annual “Rūz-e Qods” (Jerusalem Day). On the website of the central committee of the Iranian Jewish Community (www.iranjewish.
com), myriad expressions of opposition to Israeli policy in the Palestinian territories and in Lebanon are present. For example, during the Second Lebanon War of August 2006, the community website featured an article disparaging Israel entitled “The Jewish Community Condemns the Brutal Massacre of Lebanese at Qānā.” The piece’s authors, the community’s official leadership, wrote, “Israeli soldiers have violated every last letter of international law and human rights, massacring women and children in Qānā.” They added that “the Israeli attack on Qānā and various locales in Palestine and Lebanon contradict the Jewish faith and the Torah of Moses.”

One of the central claims regarding Iranian Jews during the Islamic Republic that arises again and again is that Iranian Jewish demonstrations of loyalty to Iran and the regime are nothing but the lip service of an oppressed minority. Some have compared this phenomenon with the Shiite concept of ‘taqīyah’ Jews have supposedly adopted in order to continue living securely in Shi’ite Iran (Ram, 2008, p. 16). Nevertheless, the Western observer has a tendency to conceive of Iranian Jews as living under a tyrannical regime that makes their lives so miserable that they are forced to seek refuge abroad. This viewpoint holds that the declarations of Iranian Jews are products of their fear that they will be associated with Israel, leading to repeat occurrences of events similar to the aforementioned arrest of 13 Iranian Jews on spying charges; such events cast doubt upon the allegiance of Jews to the Islamic Republic and threaten their security.

In recent documentaries, Jews have told journalists and filmmakers that they have a good life in Iran, possess ritual freedom, and can live however they wish. Nevertheless, filmmaker Ramin Farahani found most Jews too afraid to be open, saying: “The Jews’ fear of freely expressing themselves in front of the camera, and, incidentally, in front of others who may see the film, is apparent throughout the film.”

Some explain the declarations and parades supporting the Islamic Republican regime as a means by which the Jewish community can achieve freedom of religious practice and breathing space by proving its loyalty to the regime, given the fact that in the past the Jews were faithful to the Shah’s regime (thus earning Khomeini’s scorn) and that with the success of the revolution, Iranian Jewry turned to explicit support of the Islamic government (Menashi, 2005, p. 67). Iran’s Jews deny any connection to Israel, as Zionism and a connection to Israel are considered in the Islamic Republic to be serious crimes for any Iranian citizen, regardless of religion. Because of their Jewish identity, sometimes mistakenly tied to that of Israel and Zionism, Iranian Jews are suspected of constituting a fifth column.

Another opinion holds that these expressions demonstrate the rootedness and self-confidence of Iranian Jews as an integral component of Iranian society, not just in the Pahlavi period, but in the Islamic Republic as
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well. I interpret this Iranian-Jewish practice as one that characterizes complex, hybrid identities:

Whenever any group is called to answer charges of contradicting identities, it is obligated to adopt a different, quantal appearance which must express one component of its identity while concealing contradictory elements. This is not a theoretical position: it is the theatrical praxis of life, which occurs against its will, aims at gaining visibility in the public sphere, which ties the option of visibility with axioms, fantasies and narratives that are individually connected to every contradictory aspect of identity. (Shemeolof, Gorfinkel, & Herzog, 2007, pp. 6-7)

The aforementioned quotation may teach us something regarding Iranian Jews under the Islamic Republic: They are forced to maneuver between two intertwined identities, each of which is expressed publicly in different socio-political contexts. Iranian Jews demonstrate their Iranian identity to the outside world, but stress their Jewish identity when it comes to intra-communal interaction.

It was for this reason that in 1981 (in the 61st issue of Tamuz, September 25, 1981) the Organization of Iranian Jewish Intellectuals substituted the more Islamic term Kalim (Jew) for the original Yahudi in the group’s title. The term Kalim derives from the title of Musa Kalim-Allah, Moses, who speaks to Allah, and is also recognized by Islam as a prophet. This quality is attributed to Moses in the Koran because he is the only one of the prophets who has actually spoken to God directly. The use of the term Kalim by the organization is meant to emphasize the shared historical connection between Iran’s Jews and Muslims.

In a protest by Tehran’s Jewish community against Israel’s military offensive in Lebanon in 1982, a banner could be seen bearing the slogan “The actions of Zionists go against the sublime and humanistic teaching of the Prophet Moses,” signed by “The Jews of Iran.” In this banner, Moses is referred to by his Islamic name: Musa Kalim-Allah (Moses who speaks to Allah). The use of Moses’s Islamic name has an obvious resonance within the context of the demonstration and Iran’s political atmosphere.

This sense of partnership has continued until today, when, despite all the difficulties, Jews still feel a part of the Islamic Republic. A BBC team that was dispatched to gauge the status of Iran’s Jews reported that most of the community was determined to remain in Iran regardless of any pressure applied by the regime. According to the BBC, the members of the community—25,000 strong—are just as proud of their Iranian culture as of their Judaism.

In summer 2007, the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz published an article on a special fund offering sixty thousand dollars to any Iranian-Jewish fam-
ily willing to immigrate to Israel. The Iranian news site \textit{Asr-e Iran} published an article according to which “the attempts of the Zionists who live in American and Europe” to summon Iran’s Jews to leave the country resulted in abject failure: “It must be noted that not long ago the Western media uncovered a program to bribe [Iranian] Jews into leaving for the Israeli regime in exchange for an enormous sum of money. The program met a resounding defeat as Iranian Jews were by no means ready to leave this country and immigrate to occupied territory.” The article reported that Iranian Jews received letters sowing fear among them and urging them to emigrate:

Recently a large number of letters were sent to Jews residing in Iran from abroad. These letters requested that the receiving families leave Iran within the following two months, as quickly as possible, and move to Israel or anywhere else. According to Jâhân, these letters announced, under the heading “danger-danger-danger” that anyone who did not flee should expect worrisome events.28

Only 40 Jews answered this call, arriving in Israel at the end of December, 2007.29 The proposal was strongly spurned by those Jews who prefer to stay in Iran, and the official website of the community (http://www.iranjewish.com/News_e/Iranian.htm) condemned the initiative, asserting that “Iranian Jews’ identity is not exchangeable for money” (para. 2).30 On the site, community leaders demanded that Iranian Jewry be left alone and that others not interfere in the internal affairs of Iran and the Jewish community. Their statement went so far as to deny all published reports relating to Iranian Jewry in the foreign press, stressing that they did not assist in organized Jewish emigration and viewed the enemies of the Iranian nation as their own.31

Shuval observes, “Diaspora discourse reflects a sense of being part of an ongoing transnational network that includes a homeland. It is characterized by a sense of living in one place while simultaneously remembering and/or desiring and yearning for another place” (2000, p. 44). This description does not seem valid in the case of Iranian Jews, the majority of whom chose and continue choosing to remain in “exile” in Iran. Some visit Israel, however, but return to Iran. They express longing and love for Zion, in a messianic vein or on a personal level. \textit{Eretz Yisrael} and Jerusalem represent potent ideals for Iranian Jews. Judaism is part of their identity, but it does not contradict their Iranianness, and they view Iran as their home.

The lack of desire on the part of Iran’s Jews to abandon the country is viewed with amazement in Israel and the West, especially in light of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s declarations regarding the authenticity of the Holocaust, the elimination of Israel, or the offer to relocate it to Europe
or Alaska. One would be mistaken to assume that the Jews of Iran remain aloof in such instances; they express their opinions on these matters like any Iranian citizen.

In January 2006, in response to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s critical tone and his frequent inflammatory statements regarding the Holocaust, Hārūn Yeshāyāʿī, the head of Iran’s Jewish community, sent a letter complaining to Ahmadinejad about his Holocaust denial comments. Yeshāyāʿī reported that the remarks shocked the international community and struck fear within Iran’s small Jewish community. He described the Holocaust as one of the 20th century’s “most obvious and saddest events” and asked: “How is it possible to ignore all the undeniable evidence existing for the killing and exile of the Jews in Europe during World War II?” Yeshāyāʿī’s remarks, although stemming from personal offense and a sense of betrayal, provide further evidence that the Jewish community feels secure in its homeland. Although no response to the letter was made by Iranian officials, this rebuke joins a long line of statements made by community leaders whenever they felt their safety as Jews had been undermined.

Many Jews in Iran today choose to remain there, since they consider it their homeland (vatan) and its culture, their culture. Iranian Jews stress that they feel part of Iranian society and emphasize the distant past shared by the Iranian and Jewish peoples. Hārūn Yeshāyāʿī said in a statement to the Iranian press that “the hardships minorities suffer in many countries are the isolation forced upon them by the majority; this situation does not exist in Iran. Nothing isolates the Jews in Iranian society. What is available in Iran is available to all Iranians.”

Yet, it would not be right to provide an explanation for this phenomenon only in the cultural context. Other factors besides feeling connected to the country explain the reluctance of Iranian Jews to emigrate:

- Good financial and social status—“According to most of the information accumulated in the past few years, it appears that the majority of the Jewish community enjoys an average standard of living compared to the rest of the Iranian population” (Peskin, 2009, para. 4). Iranian Jews do not want to part with the possessions they worked so hard to accumulate, and some are waiting for the moment when they can take at least some of it with them. Shīrīn Tāleh, who left Iran with her family in 2001 for California, pointed out that “Jews stay in Iran because they have their work, their life, and they love the country” (Greenberger, 2006, p. 78).

- The inability to take possessions and money out of Iran.

- The value of Iranian currency (Tomān). It is low compared to that of
the dollar, so the initial sum an Iranian takes out of the country is not sufficient for a fresh beginning in a new country.33

- Messages of the Islamic Republic regime to the Jews. These messages convey that Jews are safe as long as they behave according to their minority status in a Muslim country, meaning that they stay out of politics and do not speak in favor of Israel.

- The objective difficulty of beginning a new life and acclimating oneself in a new country and to a new language, especially for the elderly population. Iranian Jews’ emigration levels in the past few years are very low. This may be the result of their fear of the authorities’ attitude towards those left behind, or the fact that the Jewish community in the country is growing old and prefers what it has in Tehran over the unknown in Israel (Peskin, 2009; Perelman, 2007).

- One more reason for the decline in the rate of immigration to Israel from Iran is the two-way traffic of Iranian Jews visiting Israel and vice-versa. To be sure, in the 1980s Iranian Jews had great difficulty acquiring a passport and exiting the Iranian borders, but today the Iranian government looks the other way when Iranian Jews visit Israel via a third country. They meet their families and return to Iran. Beyond this traffic of family visitations between Iran and Israel, Iranian Jews who have emigrated are able to come to visit their families in Iran. Theoretically, they can go to Iranian consulates around the world, receive Iranian identification documents, and then visit Iran without any problems. If they wish, Iranian Jews theoretically can even return to settle in Iran again. Yet, many Jews are afraid and few take such action. These possibilities make it easier for Iranian Jews to maintain contact with their families and, in contrast to what prevailed earlier, do not even require them to take advantage of emigration and family reunion.

Other reasons help us understand why the destination of Jews who choose to immigrate is not Israel, but rather European countries and particularly the United States:

- The security situation in Israel raises concerns among Iranian Jews.
- Iranian Jews do not wish to be supported by welfare in Israel, which they do not consider to be sufficiently stable financially.
- They fear that they will have difficulty in finding work in Israel (Protocol no. 171, 2001). Iranian Jews are mainly owners of small businesses, since they are not able to obtain government and clerical positions owing to their status as a minority. When they arrive in Israel, they cannot always manage to open an independent business, which means that immigration to Israel sometimes necessitates learning a new profession and filling in technological gaps.
The image of the Iranian Jews in Iran is more positive than in Israel. In the opinion of Sorour Suroudi, not only teenagers but also the other Iranian Jews feel alienated in Israeli society and find it difficult to be absorbed into it (Netzer, 1980, pp. 35-36). While Iranians in Israel are trying to conceal their Iranian identity because of the negative stereotypes that haunt them, Iranians who were absorbed in the United States are happy to emphasize their Iranian identity, mainly due to their financial achievements there.

Iranian Jews went through secularization and modernization processes during the period of the Shah that weakened their sense of Jewishness and their affinity with Israel.

During the years of the White Revolution, Iranian Jews improved their financial situation significantly and attained higher education, which increased their chances for settling in Western Europe and the United States rather than in Israel. The young country did not attract thousands of the educated, wealthy Jews who controlled the carpet, gold, jewelry, and textile trade, and the pharmacies (Gawdat, 2003, p. 521).

When they arrive in Israel, Iranian Jews are compelled to waive their Iranian citizenship (a regulation already imposed in the Pahlavi era). In an article published in the sixteenth issue of Tamuz, the magazine mentioned previously, on December 6, 1979, a Jew by the name of Mûkbûn complains that the Iranian citizenship of Iranian immigrants to Israel is being revoked (Netzer, 1986, p. 50). Some preferred, however, to keep their Iranian citizenship and retain the possibility of returning to their country of origin.

In the film Jews of Iran, we find two trends: on one hand, we have the story of Parandis, the girl who left Iran with her family, although she says decisively that “we love Iran. It’s our country. But we are forced to leave. We don’t want to leave.” She concludes by saying, “I will miss everything [in Iran], even the bumps on the road” (Jews of Iran, 08:13-09:05). On the other hand, we have the other story of Mr. Sasson. Even though he had encountered difficulties, he decided to stay in Iran with his family, saying: “I had a few jobs that I didn’t want to lose by leaving Iran. And the love and attachment that my whole family has for Iran, made us stay here” (Jews of Iran, 38:10-38:24). Although these two Iranian Jews chose different paths, the connecting thread is the love for Iran that they share.

X. Conclusion

Contrary to the perception of one-dimensional national identity, this article presents the tensions Iranian Jews experience between feelings of
belonging and feelings of foreignness. This pendulum represents a stage in the establishment of national identity. Although nationalist discourse aims to build nations through ideals of purity—belonging versus foreignness, majority versus minority—it also creates contradictions and tensions that combine with existing complexities in the personal and public realms. While this narrative imagines the nation as a complete, homogeneous unit, it also represses the diverse elements that refute this ostensible uniformity.

This study allows us to examine the wider issue of diaspora and homeland from a more theoretical point of view. It casts doubt on a clear-cut division between the two concepts and considers the validity of preferring the homeland over the diaspora, and vice-versa. Have Iran’s Jews themselves made this decision? From what we have seen above, they do not appear either to have either severed their ties to Jewish identity or to believe themselves to be disconnected from their roots. They find no contradiction between the respect and awe they feel toward the Holy Land, on the one hand, and their obligation to the local community, the land of their birth, and its government, on the other. Eretz Israel and Jerusalem have remained powerful symbols in the consciousness of Iranian Jews, but does this awareness reveal a strong desire to pack their suitcases and return to the biblical homeland? It does not seem that Iran’s Jews today wish to leave their home. While Judaism remains an essential component of their identity, this does not contradict their Iranianness; Iran remains their homeland. The Jews of Iran have built strong communities and participated in the social, economic, and even political life of Iran—not only in the Pahlavi era, but also during the Islamic Republic. The Iranian Jewish community thus represents a complex model in which Jews keep their national, Iranian identity without forfeiting their Jewish one, to which they steadfastly cling despite its being identified with the Zionist enemy and all the accompanying challenges this association provides in today’s Iran. They neither lament their fate nor yearn to flee their homeland. They feel no need to apologize for living in Iran and sense no obligation to reconcile contradictions where they see none.

Moreover, Iran’s Jews have enigmatically sought to preserve some aspects of Iranian identity that other Iranians have long since abandoned. The hybrid space occupied by the Jews of Iran is one in which they can attempt to maintain their “Iranianness” more than any other Iranian. Here they can keep their Iranian identity intact, just as they insisted on maintaining now-lost elements of ancient Persian in their Judeo-Persian dialects. In the Passover Seder a few months ago, Iranian Jews read aloud from the Haggadah, saying, “This year here, the next year at home in the land of Israel”; yet they were by no means tempted to make haste and pack their bags to leave the land of their birth.
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APPENDIX – “A TASTE OF IRAN” (BBC, 2009), PART 6 – SHIRAZ, 5:59-8:39

Below is an excerpt from an interview between The BBC journalist Sadeq Saba, who traveled around his home country of Iran, and Mershad Mehrabi, an engineer and an activist in the Jewish community of Shiraz.

Mershad: There are Jews all over Iran, but since very few emigrated from Shiraz, there are more here [i.e. in Shiraz], which means our religion is stronger here.

Q: So people like you prefer to stay here rather than move abroad like many others who’ve gone to America or Europe?
A: I really love Shiraz. Maybe it’s in my blood.

Q: So do you describe yourself Jewish, Iranian, or Shirazi?
A: I say that I am an Iranian Jew.

Q: And what about Shiraz?
A: I put that in brackets at the end. (laughing)

Q: So it doesn’t matter then?
A: People ask where you’re from. They don’t ask about your religion. We all believe in God. Nobody says God is this or God is that. . . We all believe in one God.

NOTES


2. Ramin Farahani, Jews of Iran (film, 2005). The same perceptions can be found in a discussion that appeared in the 2009 BBC’s documentary film A Taste of Iran. The BBC journalist Sadeq Saba, who traveled around his home country of Iran, met Mershad Mehrabi, an engineer and an activist in the Jewish community of Shiraz, which numbered approximately 6,000 Jews as of 2009, and discussed with him his Jewish Iranian Shirazi identity (see appendix).


4. The phrase “ethnic identity” is used as a categorization for groups of people to
describe their cultural characteristics, such as country of origin, common history and heritage, religion, and race. Some researchers see this identity not as a closed category, but as social constrictions, colonial conquests, a site of struggle of power and politics and social networks. For an extensive discussion of this term see Shenhav, pp. 50-54.


6. Shakman-Hurd depicts the common attitude toward Iran in the United States as being that in order to preserve the U.S. as a secular and democratic, it is important to oppose the Islamic Republic of Iran, which imposes religious tyranny. In order to do so, the image of Iran in the eyes of many Americans should be preserved as a mirror image of the United States (Elizabeth Shakman Hurd [2004], “The International Politics of Secularism: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Alternatives, 29, 115-138).

7. It should be stated that the followed categorical division into “Territorial and Historical Commonality,” “Culture,” and “Language” is artificial, since in one’s identity these categories are indivisible. I used this categorization due to formative logic.

8. Another legend dates their arrival in Iran to the exodus from Egypt. According to this legend Serah Bat Asher, granddaughter of Jacob, had arrived with the exiles of Yehuda Tribe to Isfahān (Soroudi, 1979, p. 257). I want to thank Professor Galit Hazan-Rokem for this comment.

9. For the usage made by Mohammed Reza Pahlavi of pre-Islamic past, see Ervand Abrahamian (2008), A History of Modern Iran (UK: Cambridge University Press); Nikki R. Keddie (1981), Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran (New Haven: Yale University Press); David Menashri (1996), Iran: Ben Islam ve-Ma'arav (Tel Aviv: Matokal/Ketsin himukh rashi/Gale Tsahal, Misrad ha-bit’oahon), 123-124; Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet (2002), “Cultures of Iranianness: The Evolving Polemic of Iranian Nationalism,” in Nikki R. Keddie & Ruddi Matthee (eds.), Iran and the Surrounding World: Interactions in Culture and Cultural Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press), 162-181. On this topic see also Menahem Merhavi (2010), “Iranian Sites of Memory: The Case of Persepolis,” Ha-Mizrah Ha-Hadash (The New East), 49, 114-133, which is part of his unpublished dissertation of Menahem Merhavi that examines the dynamics of indoctrination in Iran in the period above-mentioned in the uses of history by the regime, in search of legitimacy. The research is part of a body of research literature on historical myths and the central role they play in the modern Middle East for a dual purpose: to assert claims for the legitimacy of the powers-that-be from within, while confronting neighboring countries and their own myths in the region.

10. Under Pahlavi rule, especially that of Muhammad Reza Shah, the economic status of Iranian Jews improved greatly. Iran’s economy began to soar in the mid-20th century, especially following implementation of the “White Revolution.” In one generation, Iranian Jewry made impressive strides, in large part due to its dynamic urban nature, which enabled it to participate fully in Iran’s economic growth. Many Jews took advantage of this window of opportunity, abandoned their traditional crafts, and integrated into new branches of the economy. The improvement in Jewish life prompted many Jews to leave the Jewish sections and move to integrated neighborhoods (the rich Jews moved to Tehran’s southern suburbs). The assimilation of the members of the Iranian Jewish community, together with increasing secularization and Iranization, weakened Jewish values (Rahimiyan, Iranica).


12. Ardashīr-nāmeh (The Book of Ardashīr/Ahasuerus) by Mowlānā Shāhīn-i Shīrzā
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(Jud./Pers. Our Master, the Royal Falcon of Shiraz), the “father” of Judeo-Persian belles-lettres (fl. 14th century), is a versification of the biblical Book of Esther recast as a Persian epic romance that resembles the works of the classical Persian poet Nizâmî (d. 1209). The content of Ardashîr-nâmeh is not limited to the narrative of the Book of Esther. It is richly amplified by details supplied by the poet’s imagination. Vera B. Moreen, “Ardashîr-nâma,” in Norman A. Stillman (Ed.) (2010), Encyclopedia of Jews in the Islamic World (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill).

13. Meir Ezri, “Israel-Iran Relations During the Reign of the Shah of Iran,” International Conference on Iranian Jewry: History, Society and Cultural Achievements, Dahan Center, Faculty of Jewish Studies, Bar-Ilan University, June 16, 2005. The story was also verified to me in person by Nahid Pirnazar, who teaches at UCLA.

14. The concept “impurity” (nejâsat) is part of the Shiite religious laws and has been prominent in Iran since the rule of the Safavid Dynasty in the beginning of the 17th century. Writings by theologians and Shiite religious officials in the 17th and 18th centuries indicate that the Jews, like other minorities, are spiritually impure (najes). The Jews, therefore, lived according to a long list of regulations. For example, we have evidence that during the 19th and the beginning and middle of the 20th centuries, whenever it snowed or rained, Jews could not leave their homes, lest their impurity be transferred through water to others: Jews were not allowed to use public water sources or public baths; Jews could not sell meat slaughtered according to Jewish ritual to Muslims, touch goods in the market (if a Jew touched a fruit with his hand he was required to pay for it because he had suffled it by contact), or speak loudly in public. Shiites’ contact with non-Muslims or with clothes, food, or dishes touched by them leads to ritual impurity. This idea created a situation in which Jews, like other non-Muslims, were not allowed out in the neighborhood when it snowed or rained, since the water might carry the impurity of Jews to the Shiite Muslims. When Jews and Muslims traded, it was only in dry goods, such as different types of fibers, for only such goods were allowed to be handled by non-Muslims. In addition, the Jews were mocked and abused in public in various ways. For more on the status of Jews in Imami Shiâ, see Meir Bar-Asher (1994), ‘Al Makom ha-Yahadut ve-ha-Yehudim ba-Sifrut ja-Datit shel ha-Sh?ia ha-Kedumah [The Place of Judaism and Jews in the Religious Literature of Ancient Shia], Pe‘amim, 61, 16-36; on the status of Jews in Shiite Iran during the nineteenth century, see David Yeroushalmi (2009), The Jews of Iran in the Nineteenth Century: Aspects of History, Community, and Culture (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill), Daniel Tsadik, “The Legal Status of Religious Minorities: Imâmi Shi‘i Law and Iran’s Constitutional Revolution,” Islamic Law and Society, 10(3), 376-408; on the issue of impurity of Jews as reflected in the Persian and Judeo-Persian sources and on the practical meaning of the status of Jewish Iranians according to religious laws in everyday life, see Sorour (Sarah) Soroudi (1993), “The Concept of Jewish Impurity and Its Reflection in Persian and Judeo-Persian Traditions,” Irano-Judaica (Eds. Shaul Shaked & Amnon Netzer), vol. 3 (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 1993), pp. 142-170, especially 154-165.


16. Jews have served in the Iranian army from the beginning of the Pahlavi reign to this day.

17. Judeo-Persian language is a large group of similar and usually mutually intelligible dialects of Persian spoken or written by Iranian Jews. Most Jewish languages use the Hebrew alphabet for writing and contain Hebrew and Aramaic components.


21. Jalāl Al-e Ahmad (1923-1969) was a prominent Iranian writer, thinker, and social/political critic, and one of the harbingers of the Islamic ideology in Iran. Al-e-Ahmad is perhaps most famous for coining the term Gharbzadegi—variously translated in English as westernstruck, westoxification, and Occidentosis. He visited Israel in February 1963; see Pardo, 2004, pp. 1-29).


23. Jāme-yi Rowshanfikrān-i Yahūd-i Iran (Pers. The Organization of Iranian Jewish Intellectuals, JRYI), a body that deals with Iranian Jewish communal matters, was founded in March 1978 when the new generation of progressive Jewish Iranian intellectuals succeeded for the first time in supplanting the established Jewish communal organization, Anjumān-i Kalīmān. The political platform of JRYI, which functions alongside Anjumān-i Kalīmān, supports the Islamic Revolution of 1979, calls for a religious and cultural revival within the Jewish community, and seeks to defend the Jewish community. Since 1979, JRYI has been publishing a monthly newspaper called Tamuz (Heb., the name of the tenth month of the Hebrew calendar) that expresses some of its political views.

24. taqīyah’ is a term in the Shia theology that refers to a dispensation allowing believers to conceal their faith when under threat, persecution, or compulsion.


26. There are some positive terms that denote a “Jew” in Persian, such as Kalīmān and Mūsāvī, both of which have a more positive connotation. These terms owe their etymologic origin to the name of Moses: Musāvī comes from Musa or Moses, who is viewed in Islam as Kalīm-Allāh, the one who spoke with Allah and who is recognized as a prophet. These terms were usually used in official documents. There is also the expression Johoud, which is the derogatory term for Jews that has negative and humiliating associations.

27. Since the establishment of the State of Israel we have witnessed two large immigration waves of Jews from Iran: The first took place during the early years of the state, between 1950 and 1953, and the second came after the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran. From 1948 until the beginning of 1978, approximately 70,000 people emigrated to Israel from Iran. Most of them came with the mass emigration of 1950-1953. As early as 1953, there also began a wave of reverse immigration (called yerida in Hebrew) of Iranian Jews. No precise data is available on the number of Iranian Jews who emigrated from Israel, but it is estimated that between the years 1953 and 1957 it came to some 5,000. According to the 1966 general census, the Jewish community in Iran comprised 60,683 members, but the Jewish community estimates put the figure at more than 70,000. It seems that despite the emigration from Iran, the number of between 80,000 and 100,000 Iranian Jews did not change significantly until the 1970s. In the 1980s that number declined drastically following the founding of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

From early 1978 to 2008 over 60,000 Jews left Iran, particularly from Tehran. The emigrants included the majority of the community’s leaders, philanthropists, and professionals. According to an unofficial survey, between 30,000 and 40,000 immigrated to the United States, about 20,000 arrived in Israel, and 10,000 went to Europe, mainly England, France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland. Of those who immigrated to the United States, some 25,000 people live in California, out of which 20,000 settled in Los Angeles;
8,000 in New York on Long Island; and more in other cities, mainly Boston, Baltimore, Washington, Detroit, and Chicago. Currently, the remaining Jews of Iran live in three major cities: Tehran, Isfahan, and Shiraz. The other towns and villages, such as Hamadan, Kermanshah, Kashan, and Sanandaj, once populated by thousands of Jews now have one or two Jewish families, or none.

The number of Jews still living in the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2008 has been estimated at about 25,000. According to the official numbers from the last two censuses reported by the Iran Center for Statistics (Markaz-e əmār-e Irān), there were 12,737 Jews living in Iran in 1996, while in November 2006 there were only 9,252 Jewish inhabitants in Iran (http://www.sci.org.ir). For more information about the immigration of Iranian Jews, see Rahimiyan (2009b), “Entre chiisme et khomeynisme.”

29. During the first decade following the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979-1989), 8,487 people emigrated to Israel. The Israel Central Bureau of Statistics does not provide data regarding the second decade (the 1990s). Between 2006 and 2008, 1,408 people emigrated to Israel from Iran. See The Statistical Abstract of Israel (2007), no. 58, chapter 4, p. 231.
33. At the beginning of the revolution, 7 Tomān, the Iranian currency, equaled 1 US dollar. In 2001, as a result of the inflation in Iran, 1 US dollar equaled 950-1000 Tomān.
36. See the discussion held regarding Iranian immigrants’ renouncing their Iranian citizenships upon their arrival in Israel, as it appears in documents in the Israel State Archives, especially file no. 5317.20.
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The Internet’s Promise to Improve Bias-Crime Reporting: The Case for Including Bias Crimes on Official Crime-Reporting Websites

Jordan Blair Woods*

The Internet has expanded the available methods by which law enforcement can respond to criminal incidents and distribute information about crime. On many official police department websites, individuals can access crime statistics, read official press releases, and learn how to become involved in community policing programs. With the click of a button, people can use their personal computers to report crime and to send anonymous crime tips to the police.

Law enforcement is not taking full advantage of the various potential improvements to crime reporting that are offered by the Internet. A number of police departments have developed links on their official websites that enable people to report crime online. On each of these websites, people are permitted to report only minor crimes, such as damage to property, phone harassment, theft, and fraud, in which no suspect information is known. People must contact law enforcement directly, either in person or by telephone, to report other categories of crime or crimes with known suspect information.

This article argues that online crime reporting has the potential to avoid some of these obstacles, and thus improve bias-crime reporting, by giving victims and * Ph.D., University of Cambridge, expected 2013; M.Phil., University of Cambridge, 2010; J.D., UCLA School of Law, 2009; A.B., Harvard College, 2006.

witnesses the opportunity to report bias crimes in a setting that is distanced from the stresses of police stations and police officers. The Internet may also be a more appealing method of bias-crime reporting for youth, who are more inclined to use computer technology, and also fail to report bias crimes at high rates (Woods, 2009). Through crime-reporting websites, law enforcement can communicate to bias-crime victims and witnesses that the proper handling of bias crimes is a priority. Law enforcement can also distribute contact information for nonprofit organizations that provide victim support services, and assure victims that responding police officers will be experienced in handling bias crimes.

Part I of this article focuses on the problem of bias-crime underreporting. Part II discusses the limited use of online crime-reporting systems by U.S. law enforcement agencies. Part III explains the benefits of online bias-crime reporting and responds to possible objections to including bias crimes on the crime-reporting websites of law enforcement agencies.

I. The Problem of Bias-Crime Underreporting

The existence of bias-crime laws, police officers who are specially trained to handle bias crimes, and qualified prosecutors cannot guarantee that bias crimes will be punished. If such crimes are to be punished, victims or witnesses must first report them to the police. If victims do not report bias crimes, then law enforcement cannot gather sufficient incriminating evidence to arrest and to charge suspects.

Bias crimes are severely underreported (Herek & Berrill, 1992; Perry, 2001; Gerstenfeld, 2004; Hall, 2005; Wong & Christmann, 2008). Although the exact percentage of unreported bias crimes is unknown, researchers have estimated that the rate may run as high as 90-95% for certain bias crimes (Herek & Berrill, 1992; Sorensen, 2002). Because of underreporting, official statistics do not paint an accurate picture of the actual number of bias crimes that occur (Rubenstein, 2004).

Many factors contribute to the severe underreporting of bias crimes. Victims and witnesses may not report bias crimes to the police because they distrust law enforcement, feel that law enforcement will not take the crimes seriously, fear deportation, or fear additional victimization by the police (Berrill & Herek, 1992; Bowling, 1994; Sorensen, 2002). These fears stem from negative histories and experiences that racial and ethnic minorities, immigrant and refugee populations, women, religious individuals, LGBT people, and individuals with disabilities have had with law enforcement (Perry, 2001; Davis & Henderson, 2003). Language barriers, fear of retaliation, and fear of public exposure are other common factors that discourage people from reporting bias crimes (Lawrence, 1999). Members of refugee
and migrant populations may also choose not to report bias crimes to the police because they believe that the crimes are inconsequential compared with the traumatic events that they fled from in their home countries (Wong & Christmann, 2008).

The three primary methods of crime reporting that are available to bias-crime victims and witnesses in the United States (in person reporting, telephone reporting, and third-party reporting) feed into these fears. First, victims and witnesses can report bias crimes directly to law enforcement by entering police stations or by approaching police officers. But victims and witnesses who belong to communities that have histories of conflict with law enforcement may perceive police stations as hostile and uncomfortable environments. For instance, a black man who is violently targeted because of his race in an area with an overwhelmingly white police force may believe that he will be treated in a racist fashion if he enters the local police station or approaches a white officer on the street to report the bias crime. Or, an undocumented female immigrant who is violently targeted because of her national origin may fear that she will be detained and deported if she walks into a police station or approaches an officer to report the crime.

Many other factors could discourage victims and witnesses from reporting bias crimes directly to police stations or individual officers. For instance, victims and witnesses cannot predict whether officers will take bias crimes seriously or be sympathetic to their injuries when they approach officers or enter police stations. Bias-crime victims and witnesses from particular minority communities may also fear that they will bring shame to their immediate and extended families if they are seen entering police stations or interacting with police officers (Wong & Christmann, 2008). Non-English speakers could be discouraged from reporting crimes at police stations or to individual officers due to a lack of confidence that officers will be able to communicate in their language. In some cases, the cost of time lost from work or daily routines may prevent victims and witnesses from traveling to police stations or from seeking law enforcement officers to report bias crimes.

Second, victims can report bias crimes to law enforcement by calling 911 or local police stations. Telephone language banks provide 911 access in a variety of languages to potential victims and witnesses of crime. Despite widespread access, victims and witnesses who distrust law enforcement may still be hesitant to report bias crimes by telephone. These individuals may fear that the receptionist will not take the crimes seriously, may put them on hold, or may trivialize their injuries.

Bias-crime victims who are afraid of revealing private information, such as their citizenship status, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability, may also be hesitant to report bias crimes by telephone. For instance,
I vividly remember an incident during my volunteer work with an LGBT nonprofit organization in which a transgender woman contacted the police after being violently assaulted because of her gender identity. The woman left her phone number for the police to contact her about the crime. Upon returning the call, a police officer left a message on the answering machine that inadvertently disclosed the victim’s gender identity. The victim’s roommate, who did not know about her gender identity, was the first person to listen to the message. The victim later had to move out because her roommate was hostile toward her because of her gender identity. Stories like this illustrate that victims and witnesses may fear using the telephone to report bias crimes because law enforcement could reveal sensitive information to other individuals who may answer the telephone, such as family members, roommates, or co-workers.

Finally, in some regions, victims can report bias crimes to third-party agencies, such as community centers or anti-violence projects that help facilitate interactions between bias-crime victims, witnesses, and law enforcement. For example, a Latina immigrant who is victimized on the basis of her race, ethnicity, and/or national origin may be able to report her crime to a local Latino community center. A representative from the center will then document details about crime and provide support during her initial and follow-up interactions with law enforcement.

One limitation of third-party reporting is that it may be unavailable to many victims and witnesses because there is a lack of organizational support for populations that are most vulnerable to bias crime in many non-metropolitan areas. Victims and witnesses may also be hesitant to contact identity-based organizations if they do not want to associate openly with particular identity groups. For instance, a closeted gay man who has been assaulted because of his sexual orientation may refuse to contact an LGBT anti-violence project if he fears that initiating contact with the organization will expose his sexual orientation.

Therefore, the three main methods of bias-crime reporting have qualities that may discourage victims and witnesses from reporting bias crimes. In highlighting these inadequacies, I am not arguing that in person, telephone, and third-party bias-crime reporting methods are ineffectual or should be abolished. Even if online bias-crime reporting is made available, a substantial proportion of victims and witnesses will continue to report bias crimes through traditional methods. These criticisms merely demonstrate that there is a need for law enforcement to create new bias-crime reporting methods that appeal to a particular subset of victims and witnesses who may be hesitant to report bias crimes through traditional reporting methods.
II. The Limited Availability of Online Crime Reporting

After the use of the Internet expanded rapidly during the 1990s, researchers predicted that it would transform crime-reporting practices (Lasley & Palombo, 1995). Many police departments have developed links on their official websites that allow victims and witnesses to report certain categories of crime online. A systematic analysis of these websites, however, reveals that victims and witnesses are only permitted to report crime online in very limited circumstances.

In my research, I investigated the official websites of the police departments that are located in the fifty largest cities in the United States as determined by census population estimates (U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/popest/cities/SUB-EST2008.html). Nineteen of these police departments have developed links on their official websites that enable victims and witnesses to report certain crimes online. All of the nineteen departments permit victims and witnesses to report crimes online only if (1) there are no known suspects or information that can lead to identifiable suspects; and (2) the crime is a minor crime, such as damage to vehicles or property, phone harassment, theft, or fraud. Victims and witnesses must report other categories of crime, and crimes with known suspect information, in person, or by telephone.

Law enforcement agencies control the circumstances in which victims and witnesses can report crimes through official online crime-reporting systems. Researchers have not explored the reasons for law enforcement agencies’ using online crime reporting in such a limited fashion, but I posit that three factors may explain its limited use. Given the lack of research in this area, these factors are not intended to be an exhaustive list, and other factors may explain the limited use of online crime reporting by law enforcement agencies.

The first factor explaining the limited use of online crime reporting by law enforcement involves the bureaucratic structure of law enforcement agencies. Social theorists, such as Max Weber (1946), have argued that as modern society evolved after the Industrial Revolution, its institutions became increasingly goal-oriented and designed according to rational principles. Social institutions, including law enforcement agencies, became more bureaucratic in nature. Many law enforcement agencies are currently structured according to hierarchies of command, have specialized departments, and standardize their procedures (Dantzker, 2005). Bureaucracy often causes law enforcement agencies to operate through extensive paperwork, records, and formal rules (Collins, 1999).

The limited use of online crime reporting may be explained by the need for efficient ways to process crime in law enforcement agencies char-
acterized by bureaucracy. As of 2010, online crime reporting manages minor and mundane cases that ordinarily would be processed by individual officers or receptionists. These cases would likely result in no arrests or law enforcement follow-up due to a lack of evidence. By filtering these cases to online crime reporting systems, individual officers and receptionists no longer have the burden of manually completing initial reports, and therefore can dedicate more time to handling other crimes. This practice may be fostering the perception that the utility of online crime reporting lies only in its ability to promote efficiency by filtering crimes that require little to no follow-up.

The second factor that may explain the limited use of online crime reporting involves the integrity of evidence-gathering procedures. The police departments that have developed online crime-reporting systems state on their websites that victims should contact the police directly when suspects are known or evidence exists that could lead to identifiable suspects. Law enforcement may believe that evidence will spoil or that suspects will flee by the time that officers would respond to an online bias-crime report. This belief may be perpetuated by the current practice of law enforcement departments to monitor online crime reports a few times per day. Law enforcement may also fear that victims or witnesses will make mistakes on online reporting forms that could undermine cases, mistakes that could be avoided if the police could clarify information in person or by telephone.

The impersonal nature of the Internet is the third factor that may explain the limited use of online crime reporting. The Internet provides a less personal method of communicating with law enforcement than the telephone or in person because victims and witnesses do not have to engage with law enforcement officers to provide information about crime. Law enforcement officials may believe that if a crime is serious enough, then victims and witnesses should communicate directly with police officers. Direct communication enables law enforcement employees to give necessary instructions or dispense needed support for victims.

In summary, efficiency concerns, evidence-spoiling fears, and skepticism regarding the impersonal nature of the Internet may explain why law enforcement agencies are using online crime reporting only in limited circumstances. As the following analysis argues, these concerns may be fostering certain misconceptions about the utility of online crime reporting, especially in regard to bias-crime reporting.
III. PROPOSAL: INCLUDING BIAS CRIMES ON ONLINE CRIME-REPORTING WEBSITES

The following analysis explains the benefits of online crime reporting and why it may be appealing to bias-crime victims and witnesses who are hesitant to report crimes through traditional methods. It also illustrates why efficiency considerations, evidence-spoiling fears, and the less personal nature of the Internet are unpersuasive reasons to exclude bias crimes from the crime-reporting websites of law enforcement agencies. Finally, the analysis answers practicality and efficacy objections to including bias crimes on crime-reporting websites.

A. Advantages of Online Bias-Crime Reporting

Online crime reporting differs from in person, telephone, and third-party reporting in ways that may increase its appeal to victims and witnesses who are hesitant to report bias crimes through traditional reporting methods. Online crime reporting provides informants with the opportunity to report bias crimes in a setting that is distanced from the potential stresses of law enforcement stations, officers, and receptionists. Bias-crime informants can take as much time as they need to formulate a detailed written description of incidents in their own words. Victims and witnesses who are hesitant to use in person or telephone reporting methods can also set up their own private e-mail accounts to use for initial communication with law enforcement. Using private e-mail accounts may be more appealing than leaving telephone numbers if victims or witnesses fear that upon responding to a report, law enforcement will reveal private information to other individuals who may answer the telephone. Additionally, since it is relatively easy to establish website links in multiple languages, online crime reporting can be accessible to bias-crime victims and witnesses who do not speak English.

Online bias-crime reporting also has numerous advantages from the perspective of law enforcement. Through crime-reporting websites, law enforcement can communicate to victims that the officers who will respond to online reports are experienced in handling bias crimes, can communicate in the reported language, and are sympathetic to bias-crime victims’ injuries. Law enforcement departments can also underscore their commitment to handling bias-crime reports promptly and appropriately, tell victims the appropriate steps to take in order to preserve evidence, and provide contact information for organizations that can provide victim support services.
B. Overcoming Misconceptions About Online Crime Reporting

Despite these advantages, three misconceptions about online crime reporting must be corrected in order to persuade law enforcement departments to implement online bias-crime reporting systems. These misconceptions are correctable through conversations with law enforcement administrators who influence decisions regarding information technology.

First, law enforcement departments must acknowledge that online crime reports do not need to function as complete criminal reports in order to have utility. Currently, the information that victims provide in online crime reports serves as the basis of the complete criminal report. After the report is submitted online, it is usually reviewed by a law enforcement officer without alteration and filtered into an information database. This practice is likely influenced by the fact that victims and witnesses can only report crimes online that often result in little to no follow-up due to a lack of suspect information.

The utility of online bias-crime reporting lies in its promise to facilitate initial communication between law enforcement and bias-crime informants, and not in its promise to create complete criminal reports. For instance, bias-crime victims can submit as much information as they can recollect about their crimes in online reports. Law enforcement agencies can use the information provided online not as the complete criminal report, but as the basis for more comprehensive follow-up discussions and investigations. The information provided by informants in online reports can then be validated during subsequent interactions between the informants and law enforcement.

Second, law enforcement must acknowledge that online crime reporting can be appropriate for cases with existing evidence or suspect information. If victims and witnesses who report bias crimes through crime-reporting websites would have refused to report their crimes through traditional methods, then the evidence of those crimes would have spoiled anyway. In certain cases, online reports may generate more information about bias crimes than initial reports made by telephone or in person. For instance, some victims may initially provide less information during a telephone call than in an online report because they are afraid that they will cry if they speak about the crime, and they do not want police officers to hear them cry.

Law enforcement officials can take numerous steps to decrease the risk of evidence spoiling when bias crimes are reported online. Crime-reporting websites can provide bias-crime victims with guidance on preserving evidence. Moreover, to reduce the amount of time that it takes for officers to respond to online bias-crime reports, any online reports should be for-
warded immediately to the e-mail accounts of bias-crime police units or to the pagers of individual police officers who handle bias crimes.

The concern that bias-crime informants will make mistakes on online reports that could undermine cases also should not discourage law enforcement agencies from including bias crimes on online crime-reporting systems. Traditional methods of bias-crime-reporting have similar risks. For instance, in the case of bias-crime reporting answering machine hotlines, there is no person on the other end of the phone to clarify ambiguities. In third-party reporting centers, the staff member taking the initial report is not a law enforcement officer, and therefore, could make mistakes or collect information that may undermine a case. Despite these risks, these methods of reporting are viewed as useful because they facilitate future interactions between law enforcement and bias-crime informants that could lead to complete criminal reports in the future. Online bias-crime reporting is no different; the information contained within online reports can be corroborated during later follow-up discussions and during formal investigations to construct complete criminal reports.

Finally, the less personal nature of the Internet should not discourage law enforcement departments from including bias crimes on their crime-reporting websites. The Internet now plays a major role in everyday communication. Many people prefer to communicate with others through the use of e-mail, instant messaging, and other Internet technology. Extending online crime reporting to bias crimes simply acknowledges the central role that the Internet has in the communication practices of today’s society.

Law enforcement should not view online crime reporting as impersonal simply because it is an indirect method of communication. One of the benefits of online crime reporting is that it provides victims and witnesses with a safe space to tell their own versions of criminal events. Writing out a narrative can be just as emotionally taxing as orally recounting the events of a crime either in person or by telephone. Moreover, online reporting does not trivialize the consequences of bias crime by forcing victims and witnesses to approach reporting through a series of checkboxes. The purpose of online bias-crime reporting is to give informants who are hurt or scared, and afraid to report bias crimes through traditional methods, an alternative space to tell law enforcement about bias crime.

Law enforcement may fear that online bias-crime reporting will waste resources by opening a floodgate of false reports. Law enforcement should emphasize in bold on bias-crime reporting websites that filing a false report with the police is a crime that will be punished accordingly. Admittedly, the less personal nature of the Internet may increase the risk of false reports. However, the risk of receiving false online bias-crime reports is not dramatically greater than the risk of receiving false reports through other reporting
methods. For instance, any person can go to a pay phone and file a false report with the police by telephone. Moreover, some police departments are establishing websites for people to send anonymous crime tips to the police. The risk of false reports on these systems is far greater than in online bias-crime reporting systems, given that any person can submit a false tip for a wide range of crimes.

Of course, law enforcement has legitimate reasons for preferring direct contact with bias-crime victims and witnesses. Interaction is important, especially when victims need support, as is the need to shape information received by victims and witnesses. Law enforcement officials should continue to encourage direct contact, especially in emergency situations. At the same time, law enforcement employees must acknowledge that some informants may prefer to report crime initially through more indirect means. Law enforcement officials should not perceive including bias crimes on crime-reporting websites as a new trend to replace personal with impersonal communication. Rather, the inclusion of bias crimes on these websites merely expands the available reporting options to appeal to particular victims and witnesses who may not otherwise tell the police about the crimes.

C. Practicality and Efficacy

Practicality considerations should not discourage law enforcement departments from developing online bias-crime reporting systems. Developing and maintaining bias-crime reporting websites is relatively inexpensive. Law enforcement departments merely have to (1) construct the appropriate links on their official department websites and (2) designate point people to monitor the incoming reports. Many departments already have officers that are trained specifically to handle bias crimes; these officers would be the appropriate point people to monitor submitted online bias-crime reports.

In my view, the most convincing evidence in support of the practicality of including bias crimes on crime-reporting websites comes from the United Kingdom. During the past five years, many police constabularies in the United Kingdom have established online bias-crime reporting systems, including Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Fife Constabulary, Metropolitan Police, Norfolk Constabulary, and Surrey Police. Consistent with my proposal, many of the bias-crime reporting websites emphasize the department’s commitment to respond to bias crimes, as well as explicitly acknowledge the reluctance of some victims and witnesses to come forward to the police to report bias crimes.

Of course, there is a risk that online bias-crime reporting systems may be ineffective because individuals will not use them. In the course of my
research, I was unable to assess how many bias-crime victims use online reporting as opposed to other reporting methods in the United Kingdom. Police constabularies commonly responded to my public record requests by saying that it would be too burdensome to determine from existing bias-crime case files how many individuals used online versus other reporting methods. During informal discussions, I learned that the method of reporting bias crimes was not often documented and that many case files are difficult to find, lost, or destroyed. Even if this information were obtainable, it would not necessarily reflect the potential efficacy of online bias-crime-reporting systems. A lack of use could simply reflect the possibility that bias-crime victims in the United Kingdom do not have knowledge that these systems exist.

Although empirical research in this area is rare and needs further development, existing studies may provide support for the notion that bias-crime victims and witnesses would use online crime-reporting systems if they were available. During the height of the Internet’s explosion in the 1990s, Lasley and Palombo (1995) undertook the first empirical study to examine whether computer-based reporting methods would affect crime-reporting behavior. The study was a fully randomized experiment involving 140 undergraduate students enrolled in a large urban university that compared the use of telephonic and computer interactive crime reporting methods for low to moderate criminal acts. Serious crimes were not examined in the study.

Lasley and Palombo found that crime reporting increased, in terms of both telephonic and online reporting, as the perceived seriousness of the crime increased. However, they found substantial differences between the two methods in terms of the absolute percentages of victims that reported low and moderate criminal acts. The experimental subjects who used computer interactive reporting were three times more likely to report crime of low seriousness than control subjects who used telephonic reporting (17.1% versus 5.7%). Experimental subjects were also one-and-one-half times more likely to report moderately serious crime than the control subjects using telephone reporting (37.1% versus 24.3%). Based on these findings, Lasley and Palombo predicted that computer-based reporting had the potential to increase the reporting of low and moderate criminal offenses.

Bias crimes can range in severity from vandalism to homicide. Lasley and Palombo’s findings may indicate that the reporting of minor and moderate bias crimes, such as vandalism, harassment, and non-aggravated assaults, would increase if law enforcement made online bias-crime reporting available to victims and witnesses. Additional research that focuses specifically on the reporting of bias crimes is needed to support this hypothesis.

Recently, Wong and Christmann (2008) conducted one of the first
empirical studies examining victims’ decisions to report bias crimes. The small-scale study included participants from members of five groups that traditionally are victimized by bias crimes: (1) racial and ethnic minorities, (2) lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals, (3) refugees and asylum seekers, (4) individuals with disabilities, and (5) religious individuals. Only 53 participants were included in the study.

In one part of the study, Wong and Christmann asked the respondents about their willingness to report a bias-motivated incident based on its severity. They found that respondents were generally more likely to report severe bias crimes (robbery, physical violence with weapons, threats to kill, arson, assault) than minor bias crimes (name-calling, spitting, graffiti, verbal abuse, public “outing”). Damage to the home was a minor offense that respondents had a high willingness to report.

In another part of the study, Wong and Christmann asked respondents about which method they would use to report a bias crime. Approximately 36% preferred telephone reporting, 23% preferred in person reporting, 17% preferred third party reporting, 8% preferred website reporting, 6% preferred text message reporting, 6% preferred telephone hotline reporting, and 4% preferred e-mail reporting. The respondents that preferred online reporting methods (website and e-mail reporting) indicated that they would use these methods only to report minor bias crimes.

Wong and Christmann interpreted these results as suggesting that only a marginal percentage of bias-crime victims would use non-traditional reporting methods. I interpret these results more favorably. Although a majority of respondents preferred traditional reporting methods, a considerable percentage of respondents (approximately 25%) preferred other methods. Even though the study included only 53 respondents, this percentage may highlight a demand for less traditional bias-crime reporting methods.

Two types of respondents could fall within the 12% of respondents that preferred Internet bias-crime reporting. For some respondents, online bias-crime reporting could be a non-exclusive preference. These respondents may prefer Internet reporting, but would still use other methods if Internet reporting were unavailable. However, for some of the respondents, Internet reporting could be an exclusive preference. These respondents would not report bias crimes if online bias-crime reporting were unavailable, and therefore, these crimes would never reach the police.

The proportion of respondents that fell within either of these two categories in Wong and Christmann’s study is unclear, and the percentage would likely differ among future studies. At the very least, Wong and Christmann’s finding that 12% of the respondents preferred website and e-mail bias-crime reporting supports the notion that online crime reporting would be used if it were available to victims and witnesses. Given the
severe underreporting of bias crimes, which has been estimated to run as high as 90-95%, a 12% figure is far from marginal. But as Wong and Christmann’s findings illustrate, it is unclear whether informants would use online crime-reporting systems to report more serious and violent bias crimes.

Wong and Christmann (2008) also acknowledged an age gap between respondents who preferred online crime reporting and respondents who preferred traditional crime-reporting methods. Younger respondents seemed to view online crime reporting more favorably than older respondents, who expressed difficulties in finding and using the crime-reporting websites. A technology age gap may also explain the receptiveness of the 140 university subjects in Lasley and Palombo’s (1995) study to using computer-based methods. Other studies suggest that college students are inclined to use crime-reporting websites (Iriberri, Leroy, & Garrett, 2006).

Although further research is needed to support this hypothesis, online crime reporting may reach a younger subset of bias-crime victims who are more inclined to use computer technology. This is by no means a negative or irrelevant point. Researchers have estimated that at least one out of every four bias crimes involves at least one youth offender, and approximately three in every five bias crimes committed against youth victims are perpetrated by youth offenders (Woods, 2009). Researchers have also found that hate crimes involving youth are severely underreported. One study released by the Massachusetts Governor’s Task Force on Hate Crimes revealed that only 3% of the polled students who were victims of bias offenses reported the offenses to law enforcement (Rosenwald, 2002).

To conclude this discussion of practicality and efficacy, I offer six suggestions to help law enforcement departments develop successful online bias-crime reporting systems. First, bias-crime reporting websites should be easy to find and to use. Second, bias-crime victims and witnesses must have knowledge of bias-crime reporting websites. Law enforcement agencies should publicize these websites in public locations, such as supermarkets or community centers, and in geographic areas populated by identity groups that are vulnerable to bias crime. Third, bias-crime reporting websites should automatically forward submitted reports to bias crime units or officers who are designated to handle bias crimes. This will decrease the amount of time that it takes for officers to respond to submitted reports. Fourth, bias-crime reporting websites should underscore law enforcement’s dedication to respond to bias crimes, acknowledge the reluctance of some bias-crime victims and witnesses to come forward to report bias crime, and assure informants that the officer who will respond their submitted report is experienced in handling bias crimes. These statements will help to persuade bias-crime informants that law enforcement officials can be trusted. Fifth,
crime-reporting websites should inform bias-crime victims of the support services available to them and provide contact information for the organizations that provide victim support services. Finally, to increase the accessibility of crime-reporting websites to non-English speaking bias-crime victims, law enforcement departments should develop bias-crime reporting websites in a variety of languages.

IV. Conclusion

This article has argued that the Internet has the potential to improve bias-crime reporting and that U.S. law enforcement agencies should include bias crimes on their official crime-reporting websites. More specifically, it has outlined the reasons behind the appeal of online bias-crime reporting to victims and witnesses from minority communities who may be hesitant to report bias crimes through traditional reporting methods because of distrust of police and fears of public exposure, deportation, and retaliation. This article has also explained that online bias-crime reporting may appeal to youth, who are frequently involved in bias crimes, yet fail to report them at staggering rates.

Online bias-crime reporting should be viewed as a supplementary crime-reporting method that expands the available options by which victims and witnesses can report bias crimes. Many victims and witnesses will continue to report bias crimes in person, by telephone, or to third-party agencies. The important characteristic of online bias-crime reporting is that it serves as an important springboard to facilitate interaction between law enforcement employees and bias-crime informants.

Finally, I conclude by making a broader point. Developing online bias-crime reporting systems is one of many steps that law enforcement agencies should take in order to improve their handling of bias crimes. Law enforcement agencies should train all officers regarding bias-crime issues, institutionally affirm their commitment to combating bias crimes, and develop community outreach efforts to build trust with members of minority communities. Improving bias-crime reporting is only one piece of the puzzle in ensuring that bias crimes are handled appropriately by members of law enforcement.
NOTES

1. In order of descending population, the fifty largest cities in the United States are: New York City, NY; Los Angeles, CA; Chicago, IL; Houston, TX; Phoenix, AZ; Philadelphia, PA; San Antonio, TX; Dallas, TX; San Diego, CA; San Jose, CA; Detroit, MI; San Francisco, CA; Jacksonville, FL; Indianapolis, IN; Austin, TX; Columbus, OH; Fort Worth, TX; Charlotte, NC; Memphis, TN; Baltimore, MD; El Paso, TX; Boston, MA; Milwaukee, WI; Denver, CO; Seattle, WA; Nashville, TN; District of Columbia; Las Vegas, NV; Portland, OR; Louisville, KY; Oklahoma City, OK; Tucson, AZ; Atlanta, GA; Albuquerque, NM; Fresno, CA; Sacramento, CA; Long Beach, CA; Mesa, AZ; Kansas City, MO; Omaha, NE; Cleveland, OH; Virginia Beach, VA; Miami, FL; Oakland, CA; Raleigh, NC; Tulsa, OK; Minneapolis, MN; Colorado Springs, CO; Honolulu, HI; and Arlington, TX.

2. The police departments that have developed online crime reporting systems are located in Houston, TX; Philadelphia, PA; San Jose, CA; San Francisco, CA; Fort Worth, TX; Charlotte, NC; El Paso, TX; Denver, CO; Tucson, AZ; Albuquerque, NM; Fresno, CA; Sacramento, CA; Cleveland, OH; Virginia Beach, VA; Oakland, CA; Raleigh, NC; Tulsa, OK; Minneapolis, MN; Colorado Springs, CO; and Arlington, TX.

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Holocaust-Denial Literature: A Sixth Bibliography

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This bibliography is a supplement to five earlier ones that were published in the March 1994, December 1996, September 1998, December 2000, and September 2002 issues of the Bulletin of Bibliography, which has since ceased publication. During the intervening time, Holocaust denial has continued to be discussed in both the scholarly literature and the mainstream press, especially during the trial resulting from the libel lawsuit filed by David Irving against Deborah Lipstadt and Penguin Books, and his subsequent appeal of that verdict. The Holocaust deniers, who prefer to call themselves “revisionists” in an attempt to gain scholarly legitimacy, have refused to go away and have continued to take advantage of new media.

Holocaust denial is a body of literature that seeks to prove that the Jewish Holocaust did not happen. Although individual deniers may have different motives and beliefs, they all share at least one point: that there was no systematic attempt by Nazi Germany to exterminate European Jewry. Hence they claim that the Holocaust is a hoax perpetrated by Jews (Zionists) in an attempt to blackmail the rest of the world for sympathy, money, and legitimacy for the state of Israel.

This bibliography includes both works about Holocaust denial and works of Holocaust denial. Although Holocaust deniers write in many languages, the scope of this project (as with the five previous ones) has been limited to works in English. Because of space constraints, URLs are provided for only some of the materials that are available online—most newspapers (including college publications) now have websites that make the full text of their articles available for various periods. Many of the articles dealing with David Irving and/or his lawsuits are available on the Holocaust Denial on Trial website, www.hdot.org, as well as on David Irving’s own website, www.fpp.co.uk. The Nizkor Project (see www.nizkor.org/) and The Holocaust History Project (www.holocaust-history.org) remain invaluable resources for information on Holocaust denial and deniers.

While this bibliography has been divided into many subject areas, it is acknowledged that many of the entries cross several categories, especially the works in the “General Overview” section. Materials regarding David Irving’s lawsuit against Lipstadt and Penguin Books are included under “European and Russian/Soviet Deniers,” since Irving is a British national
and the trial (and leave-to-appeal hearing) took place in London. Articles about the legal issues involved in the trial are included under “Legal Aspects of Holocaust Denial.”

As the sixth part of an ongoing research project, this bibliography does not include items that already appeared in previous installments of the bibliography, regardless of how important and useful they remain. In general, this sixth bibliography contains items that were published since 2002, or older materials that were missed in previous bibliographies.

GENERAL OVERVIEW


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DENIAL VIDEOS/DVDs

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WEBSITES PROMOTING HOLOCAUST DENIAL

Bradley Smith’s Blog: http://bradleysmithblog.blogspot.com/
Exposing the Holocaust hoax Archive: http://exposing-the-holocaust-hoax-archive.blogspot.com/
Holocaust Fact: http://holocaustfact.com/content/view/55/71/ - The site is registered to an organization in Damascus, Syria.
The Holocaust Historiography Project: http://www.historiography-project.com/index.html - This site is operated by former IHR official Greg Raven.
Holocaust is Nothing But a HoloHoax: http://www.israelect.com/reference/WillieMartin/HOLOHOAX.htm
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NaziGassings.com: http://www.nazigassings.com/index.html - This site is operated by Friedrich Paul Berg.
The Revisionist Clarion: http://revurevi.net/revclar/clarindex.html - This site is operated by former IHR official Greg Raven.
RODOH: Real Open-Debate on the Holocaust: http://www.rodoh.us/ - Although founded by denier Scott Smith, RODOH actually welcomes posts from both deniers and those who seek to refute deniers.

REVIEWS/REFUTATIONS/CRITIQUES OF HOLOCAUST DENIAL


WEBSITES THAT EXPOSE/CONFRONT HOLOCAUST DENIAL

CODOH Watch: Announcement Blog for the Holocaust Controversies!: http://codoh.blogspot.com/
Fred R. Crawford Witness to the Holocaust Project Files: http://sage.library.emory.edu/collection-0608.html
Holocaust controversies: What part of the word genocide do you not understand?: http://holocaustcontroversies.blogspot.com/
How to Understand and Confront Holocaust Denial: http://www.unitedagainstracism.org/pages/thema02.htm
MODIYA: Holocaust Denial: http://modiya.nyu.edu/handle/1964/251
Nazism Exposed: http://www.student.uit.no/~paalde/nazismexposed/
Voices of the Holocaust Project: http://voices.iit.edu/
INTERVIEW

Forgiveness: The Key to Self-Healing—
An Interview with Eva Mozes-Kor

Joanie Eppinga

_eva mozes-kor was ten years old when she and her family were deported from their home in transylvania to auschwitz. there, dr. josef mengele was doing medical experiments on twins. eva’s mother, father, and two older sisters were put to death in the gas chambers, but eva and her twin sister miriam were preserved to be subjected to experiments. eva was given an injection that nearly killed her at the time, and miriam died of the aftereffects of the experiments many years later. as an adult, having married and moved to america, eva watched her sister struggle with lingering medical issues. she donated a kidney to miriam and tried to gather information about what had been done to her sister at auschwitz, but mengele’s files have never been recovered. eva’s search to find more information, or even mengele himself, was unsuccessful; but in the course of her quest, eva discovered the powerful healing effects of forgiveness. on may 20, 2010, she met with our editor, joanie eppinga, at the holocaust memorial museum in terre haute, indiana that she started fifteen years ago, and gave the following interview._

eppinga: what would you have liked to have seen happen if mengele had been caught?

mozes-kor: my point was not that he needs to be caught. my point is that if he is alive, or was alive, he should have been found so that the survivors would have the information that has been taken away with him. my sister might still be alive today. her doctors kept asking what had happened, but we don’t have the information. the files disappeared. mengele disappeared.

eppinga: so it wasn’t that you were looking for revenge, but you were looking for information.

mozes-kor: even in the days when i had not forgiven him, i would not have wanted necessarily revenge. i always wanted the information. i might have not been kind to him as i would be today (laughter), not because he deserves it, but people need to understand that a victim who gets involved in revenge uses all the wrong behavior that a person can use. in so doing they are actually ruining their own lives.
EPPINGA: How do you think we can convey that message to people?

MOZES-KOR: That’s what I’m trying to figure out myself! I was talking yesterday to 10-, 11-, and 12-year-olds, and they’re so absorbed; we really need to grab them before they turn 13. (laughter) They are like a sponge, they are absorbing everything, and I told them, “If somebody hurts your feelings, beats you up, does something wrong, could you forgive them?” They’re looking at me dumbstruck. I said, “This is what I would like to teach you.”

EPPINGA: Do you think that the potential for evil in humans is inherent, or is it the result of experience?

MOZES-KOR: I would say that maybe a small number, maybe 5%, there are some wirings in the brain that don’t work normally, and therefore they are predisposed. But I would say that in those cases, there is not anything you can do with them. You have to protect society from them. But I would say we are not focusing in society on the right things. If a victim is not healed, there is the seed for more: a seed for murder, or a seed for problems.

EPPINGA: Yet it sounds as if you would agree with that statement Anne Frank made, that people are basically good at heart.

MOZES-KOR: Well I would agree with that, that they are born good at heart. You see people getting angry. I see young teenagers coming in so angry. I get some kids from the inner city whose parents neglected them: child abuse, parents are in jail, they don’t even know if they are going to have food tomorrow—in the United States!—but that’s the way it is. It is not their fault. Now what happens with them is the problem. They’re bonded with those parents. Bonding is good, but not with something that’s evil, or bad, or neglecting. And they are still “I can’t forgive them.” Molestation is the number one problem in the United States, from the letters that I get. So many, both boys and girls, have been molested. And how did these molesters become molesters?

EPPINGA: It’s well understood that many of them were molested themselves. So how do we heal the victims?

MOZES-KOR: Well, I think we teach children, from age three on, a skill for life. We teach them as soon as they’re old enough, how to read, write, arithmetic. These are all life skills for modern society. But we don’t teach them how to deal with one another. My philosophy is very simple. I would teach each child how to forgive. They know how to be good to each other.
If I say to you, “You look beautiful, you are smart,” you know how to deal with that. Now let’s try the opposite—difficult words. This is where we get our feelings hurt. And physical violence—how do we deal with that? We need to teach each child, Mary or Johnny or whoever, that when they are called a name, when they are pushed, beaten, spit on, insulted—how does that young little ego, which is very fragile, learn to ignore the insult? It festers in time, and who knows what it creates? Or we can say to Mary, “Go hit Joey.” Now we are teaching violence. We can’t ignore conflict because it’s part of life’s task. We have to deal with it.

EPPINGA: So what do we teach Mary?

MOZES-KOR: Well, we can say to Mary, “You go back to school tomorrow” (and the younger you start the better, but it depends on each child’s intelligence and development; but it should be part of the kindergarten curriculum) “and you tell Joey, ‘Joey, what you did yesterday was terrible. I think you should never do that again. But I forgive you.’” Now you’ve given the child a very powerful tool. You’re empowering the child. And you repeat that all through elementary school. As they get older it gets more and more complicated, but you’re putting the seeds there for conflict resolution that is simple and empowering. And helping the victim to find peace and resolve conflict is really the secret to creating a society that is less violent. What society does wrong today, in my opinion, is that they are teaching justice: “All the Nazis must be brought to justice.” It sounded good. But then as I got a little bit older I said, “Well, okay, suppose all the Nazis were brought to justice, including Mengele. Would my life change?” No. I still would have been orphaned at age 10. My family would still have been murdered. I still was used in experiments. How does that justice help the victim? Helping the victim is my only focus. Not that it’s the only way, but I found in myself that that was the most neglected part of the equation. There was a lot of lip service. But as I said in the film [the documentary Forgiving Dr. Mengele], if every Nazi were brought to justice, it would not heal the soul of one single victim.

EPPINGA: But what if it gave them a sense that there is an overall sense of justice in the world?

MOZES-KOR: But there isn’t. And let’s be fair about that. Let’s say Mengele is responsible for a hundred, two, three, four hundred, a thousand lives; he has only one life to give. So how is that just? You can always say, “How is it just if a guy who is maybe half crazy goes to a kindergarten and kills ten kids—all he can give is one life, so how is it just?” Not that I am against putting perpetrators in jail, or that the legal system does not have a
role to play in keeping society safe. They are already doing that. I think their idea is that once the perpetrator has been proven guilty and put in jail, the world is hunky-dory—and it is not! Again, the victims are left out there, dealing with their own emotional pain.

Jokingly I say to some of my audiences that I would like to go up to Mount Sinai and see the burning bush and ask God to give the 11th commandment: “Forgive your worst enemy. It will heal your soul and it will set you free.” Because how do you get the word out? That is the biggest challenge I have found. People don’t know about it. Some of these people stumble upon my DVD, Forgiving Dr. Mengele, and they say, “It is a miracle!” After every war is fought, the first step, after the victims are found, after nurturing them back to physical health, they should be taught to forgive. And that could be done in many interesting ways. I like Mandela’s idea of bringing the victims and the perpetrators face to face. Why? When two adversaries meet as equals, something very interesting happens: The humanity of each side comes out. Also, the perpetrators’ testifying validates the tragedy and the pain of the victim. You must validate that right at the beginning. And so, because there is a meeting and a validation, there is a change of ideas and a realization that the other side is also human, and instead of hiding and pretending it didn’t happen, like with the Holocaust—I mean, nobody talked about it for forty-some years! The victims were suffering, and the perpetrators weren’t that happy either! They were hiding, afraid they would be caught; they were lying; and I have met with German people in their forties and fifties who are tremendously traumatized by their parents’ being in the Nazi party. Once I was participating in a conference in Wurzburg and a man said, “I know my father was a Nazi. But he was my father. How do I deal with that?” Nobody was addressing that. In Germany today, if you say one good thing about the Nazis, you are going to be put on trial. That is overdone too. I think society hasn’t quite learned how to deal with that. There would have been no Hitler and no Nazis if children had been raised from a young age [learning] how to forgive. Hitler himself was a victim.

EPPINGA: How do you suggest that we teach children that, even if other people look different or dress differently or have different beliefs, they are not something Other? That they are in the same human family?

MOZES-KOR: They are human in the same way, but they believe differently, and that is okay. I talk to very young children about prejudice. When I talked yesterday, I said to one of the little girls, who was wearing a blue sweatshirt, “I don’t like you, Katie.” She looked at me. I said, “Because you are wearing a blue sweatshirt.” She still looked at me, and I said, “I actually
like blue. But what I am trying to show you: Do I know you? Do I know anything about you except that you are wearing a blue sweatshirt? Is that a reason for me to judge you as a person?” She said no. I said, “That is prejudice. I am prejudging you.”

I don’t even like the word antisemitism, because antisemitism is a buzzword for prejudice against Jews. But prejudice occurs in all its forms and shapes. So what I would like to teach is that we try to get to know people. The reason it’s important—yes, we as human beings are afraid of something that is different, because it’s not familiar; it’s strange. Everyone likes people who look like us, think like us, go to the same church or place of worship as us, dress like us. That is easy. The difficulty is when we have to like people, or at least try to get to know them, who are completely different. I don’t think it’s easy—it’s really not; the comfort disappears. When I have to meet with somebody with a long ponytail, a guy with earrings, with body piercings, with tattoos, it doesn’t even have to be somebody from another culture—What on earth are they thinking? And I don’t like it! Yesterday we had a gentleman come here, about 55 or maybe 50, with gray hair and a little ponytail; I looked at my associate and she looked at me; we rolled our eyes. (Pause) He was the nicest guy ever.

EPPINGA: So you were able to reach out to him.

MOZES-KOR: Yes. And why do they want to look like that? They maybe think someone who looks conventional, conservative, in a suit, looks stuffy; and they don’t want to look like that. Well that is their prejudice. This is where we have to go beyond. You don’t have to move to Iran or Iraq or any of these places where the cultures are different, where the values are different.

What I would teach every child is that we all have human feelings. We all have a brain; we have two eyes, a nose, a mouth; if we cut ourselves we bleed, and sometimes even that blood is the same type as each other’s. You get somebody with a completely different philosophy in life, different religion, different tribal background, and they still might be okay to donate blood to you. If we hurt their feelings, they’re going to be hurt. That doesn’t mean that we can instantly communicate with them; but what I teach is respect. You need to teach respect—respect people you meet, and treat them fairly, and judge them on their actions. Because really I don’t care if you belong to the same group as I do; if you’re a mean son-of-a-gun I’m still going to judge you on your actions. And that is the only fair way. So maybe reserve judgment on people until you know them. There might be people who look like we do and think different, and there might be people who think like we do and look different. People are more like us than differ-
ent, if you go back to the basic human being. We all want to be comfortable; we all need certain coverings for our bodies because we’re cold or hot.

EEPPINGA: Did you come to your understanding of forgiveness as the result of an epiphany, or is it an ongoing process?

MOZES-KOR: Well, not in the way that I was sitting at the table having a cup of coffee and... No. But it was a Eureka moment in one very simple way. I never, ever thought about forgiving anybody. It never entered my mind. Even when I was only 23, 24, I was living in Israel and was in the Israeli army, and there was very little discussion of the Holocaust. But one of my co-workers said to me, “So you hate the Germans?” I said, “Yes, I do.” “You hate the Nazis?” “Yes, I do.” “What are you going to do about it?” That was a strange question. I went home and I really didn’t know. I wasn’t going to fly over and kill somebody. What was I going to do about it? I got back next day to work and I said, “Well, I don’t hate them, I just don’t like them.” Because I didn’t know what to do with that very strong word. It’s a very strong word, to say hate. I couldn’t deal with that for many, many years, because when I lived in Israel from 1950 to 1960, nobody wanted to talk about the Holocaust. Not at all. I didn’t deal with it, and Israel was very ill equipped to deal with the Holocaust. I was sixteen when I was talking to my cousin, and he said to me, “Let’s not talk about it.” Nobody knew how to react. “What do I do with these two little kids who came back from the camp?” We had no psychologists; there were no experts; and I don’t even think that the experts know what to do.

Though she didn’t find Mengele’s files, Eva didn’t give up; she heard that there was a doctor who had worked at Auschwitz during the war, Dr. Hans Münch, who would be willing to talk with her. She flew to Europe to meet him and was surprised to be treated very respectfully by a former Nazi. It turned out that he had never seen Mengele’s data, but he was able to offer accounts of what had happened at Auschwitz.

MOZES-KOR: I thought, “What are the chances that I will ever have to ask this again of someone who will treat me like a human being?” So I asked: “Dr. Münch, do you know anything about what happened at Auschwitz?” I didn’t know what he would say, but he said to me immediately, “This is the nightmare I live with every day of my life.” He went on, describing the operation of the gas chamber. People would be told to hang their clothes and remember the number they hung them on, and to take off their shoes, to prepare to take a shower. The shower room looked luxurious, polished to perfection; it smelled very good–there was perfume everywhere, so people would be at ease. Then when the shower room was packed to capacity the
doors would close, and he was stationed outside at a peephole looking in. A hatch-like opening opened in the ceiling. The Zyklon B was dropped—it looked like pellets of gravel. They hit the floor, and the gas was operating like dry ice. So as the Zyklon B was dropped, the gas was actually rising from the floor, and as it was rising, people were getting away from the rising gas, climbing on top of each other, trying to grasp for air, forming a mountain of intermingled bodies. And when the strongest people, who were always on the top of the pile, stopped moving, he knew that everybody was dead, and he signed the death certificate. They were that meticulous about it. Never any names—just numbers, whatever numbers there were in the gas chamber. I told him, “I never heard about that. I never knew the gas chambers operated that way.” I said, “Dr. Munch, this is very important information. I am going to Auschwitz in 1995, and I want you to come with me and sign a document at the ruins of the gas chamber in the company of witnesses.” He said to me immediately, “I would love to.”

Now I came back to Terre Haute very, very excited. I didn’t tell anybody anything, but I was going to have this original document; if anybody ever said there weren’t any gas chambers, I could take this document and shove it in their faces. But I think basically that I am a pretty nice person. And I wanted to thank this Nazi doctor for his willingness to document. Now do you know where to go to find a gift for a Nazi? I did not know where to turn. So I went to the local Hallmark shop and I read a lot of cards.

EPPINGA: And none of them were right.

MOZES-KOR: Two and a half hours. The two ladies who worked there came up and asked if I was finding what I was looking for. I considered telling them what I was looking for, but I thought, “I better not go there; they’re going to think that I have lost my marbles.” I left very, very disappointed. I expected to come out of there with some kind of an idea, which I didn’t. But then I went back to my lesson number one. I have three lessons that I give kids when I lecture: 1) Never give up; 2) How to deal with prejudice; and 3) Forgive your worst enemy; it will heal your soul. So I went back to lesson number one—it’s the most important lesson, because without it nobody can accomplish anything in life. You can’t even get an education if you give up. For ten months, when I was cooking, cleaning, driving the car, doing laundry, whenever my mind was free to think, I kept asking myself, “What can I give this Nazi doctor as a gesture of my thanks?” Hundreds of ideas popped into my head, and none seemed appropriate—until ten months later, and it was a very simple idea: How about a letter of forgiveness? I immediately knew that he would like it. I discovered for myself such a life-changing experience. I did not start out to forgive anybody; I just wanted to
thank a Nazi doctor for his goodness. To realize that I, the little victim of almost 50 years, had the power to forgive—no one could give me that power. No one could take it away. It was mine to use in any way I wished. It is a lot of power.

All victims, it doesn't matter what the victimization is, are hurt, are angry, feel hopeless, feel helpless, and definitely feel powerless. I discovered I had a power. So I began writing my letter, and I asked a friend to correct my spelling, and she said to me, “You know, it’s very nice you’re forgiving Dr. Münch, but you really need to forgive Mengele.” I said, “No no no, this is just a little letter.” She said, “I know. Promise me you will think about it.” Once I began to think about it, I said, “Wow. I even have the power to forgive the god of Auschwitz.” And I liked that idea—I liked the fact that I had some power over my own destiny. And I wasn’t hurting anybody, so why couldn’t I do it? This is when I decided if I forgave Mengele, I forgave the kids who harassed me for several years; I forgave the people in Washington, D.C. who arrested me and roughed me up in 1986. There were a lot of people that had done me wrong here in the United States and hurt me. But finally I was free from all that. So that is the way it happened. It’s not a Eureka moment in the sense that I was sitting at the table eating something and boom. I was looking for something else completely.

EPPINGA: How would you suggest that other people prepare their hearts to forgive?

MOZES-KOR: I would ask, “Would you like to be free from the pain that you are suffering?” If the answer is no, there is nothing you can do. If the answer is yes, then I think that we can go on and try to teach them: Okay, write a letter. I find the idea of writing a letter is a very simple thing. You have your mind, your paper, your pen, and you can write. Try to write a letter to the people who have hurt you. Also, I would suggest that the idea of having a ceremony is important, because it makes it almost formal and final. You could have a ceremony in a church with a group of people who helped you, you can have it... Actually, I don’t like churches because they always focus on God. I feel that forgiveness has zero thing to do with God. It is the will of the person to be free of what was done to them. The victim does have that right—to be free. If you forgive someone because God told you to do so, that is not as correct as when you decide that you want to be free from that. We have done here two conferences on forgiveness, and we ended with a ceremony; we gave each person a little piece of paper, maybe 2 by 3 inches, to write something to somebody who they wanted to forgive. We put them in helium balloons, and we let them go. Just the idea that you
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let go. We could do something similar by a river, just like the Jewish Yom Kippur—you send your sins down. You could just . . . whatever. You could write a letter and do nothing with it! Shred it!

EPPINGA: So for you, forgiveness is very much about moving toward your own freedom.

MOZES-KOR: Absolutely. And no one can do it for anybody else. Each person has to do it for themselves. I also have added, halfway joking but I think it’s quite serious: I call forgiveness a miracle medicine. You don’t have to bill an HMO. There is no co-pay. It’s free. Everybody can afford it. It has no side effects. It works. The reason, I feel, that many survivors do not want to forgive is they do not want to give up the security of having that pain. They know how to deal with that. But if you don’t like the way you feel without the pain, I guarantee to you, you can go and take it back. No one will stop you.

EPPINGA: How has your life changed as a result of forgiving?

MOZES-KOR: The first thing I that found as we were standing by the ruins of the gas chamber January 27, 1995, and I read my document [of forgiveness] and signed it, I immediately felt the burden I was carrying was completely lifted from my shoulders. It was tremendously liberating emotionally. I was no longer a victim of Auschwitz. I was no longer a prisoner of my tragic past. I like the person who I am. I like the skin I am in. Most people do not feel comfortable in their own skin. That is probably the biggest thing that has happened. I don’t say that I am perfect.

EPPINGA: How has forgiving changed your behavior?

MOZES-KOR: I can smile. I can dance. I can dance in Auschwitz. I can dance anywhere. And why not dance in Auschwitz? Some people think it’s sacrilegious, but I lived there, and if I want to dance there—

EPPINGA: You get to choose.

MOZES-KOR: That’s correct. I used to think that the world was a terrible place. I now think that the world is a wonderful place. My whole outlook on life has changed. The problem with victims is, you can hang every perpetrator, but if the victim is still in that mentality of “Poor me, look at what happened to me . . .” This is a mental trap! Some say, “If only they would say they are sorry!” We are giving them power for the rest of our lives, that they should say they are sorry? I take the power back! I forgive them! If they come to me and say they are sorry, fine; but my decision does not
depend on anything that anybody else does. I feel it is very easy to teach people; it would be easier if we taught if from a very young age. We would create a lot less victims and therefore a lot less perpetrators. I am 100% convinced that victims often, not always, but often, become perpetrators. Now I am sure that I am not the best mother I could have been. As a victim, I yelled a lot. Would I have known that I could heal myself a lot earlier . . . If the UN had one unit that would really help victims, it should be a forgiveness unit, one that not only clothes them and gives them medical help, but—nobody’s taking care of the human soul! This is a basic part of our existence!

EPPINGA: How has your understanding of forgiveness changed over time?

MOZES-KOR: 180% has changed. Not the major thing, but the depths of it. My understanding has changed. I was challenged continually and still am: “Why forgive?” and so I ask myself that same question. And how can I teach forgiveness? I know what worked for me. The thing is that I want it to work for everybody, because I can see, number one, that it can help heal the victim. And my focus is always going to be how to help the victim. If we can help the great majority of the human victims, we don’t need to worry about preventing war.

EPPINGA: Because their hearts will be healed?

MOZES-KOR: That’s correct. If you realize that every victim who is angry, and who carries that anger and pain, sometimes passes it on to their children and grandchildren—the children and grandchildren are already victimized because of the victim’s background.

My understanding of forgiveness wasn’t quite as deep and as subtle [before]. I knew when it started that it made me free. But I didn’t really understand that everybody can do it; that it actually is important for world peace. A person who is angry with the world—I call anger a seed for war. By the same token, forgiveness is a seed for peace. I did not understand all that because as I kept trying to redefine and elaborate on the ideal forgiveness, I realized that this is a tremendously powerful tool; it’s a doable tool. It’s not as expensive as people seem to think. We teach children many life skills, yet we are not teaching them how to deal with their emotional pain.

I would like to be able to add to this little museum a pavilion that I would call the Forgiveness/Peace Pavilion, with a little garden with it. I think people come here and leave tremendously encouraged. They go to other Holocaust museums and they are left with the burden of what happened. Or they say, “If we remember, it won’t happen again.” Baloney! Baloney! The Jews are good at remembering, but remembering does not do
anything to remove the threat. I would like to see one battle, one murder, one genocide that has been prevented because of remembering. So I disagree even with some of my dear friends who have a lot of good will; remembering is not enough. Yes, we must remember, but we have to decide why we remember. We remember to heal. If you do not heal the victim, you are leaving the seed for another tragedy. Jews have given the world the One God idea; they have given the world the Ten Commandments; but what if we gave the world a way to deal with pain? Wouldn’t that be a much better legacy to the Holocaust? Forgiveness is an individual thing; but you can advocate it. We can advocate forgiveness.

Many people ask me how they should live their lives. Sometimes young girls come, and they don’t tell me why they come. They finally ask, shyly, “How did you find out how to forgive?” I ask them, “Why do you want to know? Has someone hurt you?” And then it comes out: They have been molested. I ask: “Do you deserve to live free of what was done to you? Let’s forget about the perpetrator. You’re not running his or her life. You’re running only your life. Do you deserve to be free?” They say, “Yes.” And I say, “You can be free of that! You have the power to forgive, and it will free you.” Some say, “The perpetrator doesn’t deserve it.” I say, “That’s quite possible, but you deserve it.” It doesn’t make sense, but the strange thing is, it works. You have one power. I forgave Mengele. And you know what? There is not a single thing Mengele can do about it. I have the final word. Your forgiveness is the final word.
INTERVIEW

Last Man Standing:
The American Who Stayed During the Rwandan Genocide—An Interview with Carl Wilkens

Jerri Shepard

Narl Wilkens is a peace activist and an educator who headed up the Adventist Development and Relief Agency International in Rwanda (ADRA). He was the only American who chose to remain in Kigali, Rwanda during the genocide of 1994. His choice to remain in the country during that time of brutal atrocities resulted in the prevention of the murder of hundreds of children. Wilkens was featured in Frontline’s “Ghosts of Rwanda” and in “The Few Who Stayed: Defying Genocide,” an American Radio Works documentary broadcast on National Public Radio. He has received several humanitarian awards, including awards from Saint John’s School of Theology Seminary and the Simon Wiesenthal Centre. He is a Seventh-Day Adventist pastor who devotes much of his time to promoting activism for peace. Wilkens and his wife, Teresa, founded World Outside My Shoes (see http://worldoutsidemyslues.org), a nonprofit educational and professional organization committed to inspiring and equipping people to enter the world of “the other,” which Wilkens indicates may be under our own roof or on the other side of the globe. The Wilkenses also started Pedaling for Peace (pedaling2Peace.org) and travel around the United States sharing their stories of hope. Jerri Shepard, Associate Professor in the School of Education at Gonzaga University, spoke with Wilkens on June 8, 2010.

SHEPARD: In your definition of other, you talk about the fact that “the other” is fluid, and you said something about the “transitional” nature of “the other.”

WILKENS: Yes, this phrase “the other”—I think when we talk about it being fluid, as I said, we are so surprised: “I thought I knew you.” And so instead of the “other” being Al-Qaeda, or somebody who we think is just so different and so opposed—I mean different isn’t always the thing, it’s usually when it is opposed to our way of thinking, or that person’s lifestyle, or whatever the political terminology. For me, our perceptions change constantly, and Dad used to say something that I think is really relevant: “What you are not up on, you are down on.” It is a simple little phrase, but it really speaks about what we are not informed on. It seems as if too often
our default is negative and defensive, and that is so for a lot of reasons. One of them is that we don’t take time; we are in a hurry; if something doesn’t fit in the pigeonhole right away, we are like, “Whoa, wait a minute . . . what’s going on here? Because I have a pretty well developed set of pigeonholes. And everything should fit in and all of a sudden this doesn’t.” We don’t see it as an opportunity as much as we see it is a problem or something in our way.

I think when I slow down . . . That was what was nice about pedaling this year: It forced us to slow down, and when I slow down it is easier to see these differences as opportunities. That is why we came out with World Outside My Shoes. My world doesn’t really exist. It’s just a little construct between my ears.

SHEPARD: I really loved one of the quotes on your website about “Seeing is believing,” and how now you are more inclined to think that “I see what I believe.”

WILKENS: It’s huge for me. I trained as a high school shop teacher, auto mechanics and welding and all that stuff. We went to Africa freshly out of college, freshly married, to Zimbabwe. That’s why our attitude is, “Show me. I’ll believe it when I see it. You are all just a bunch of talk until I see some action, and then I’ll believe it.” Something more wonderful is how we see. So after the genocide, I saw the physical things being destroyed. And that’s one of the things that challenged me. The grinding mill we installed at the clinic is hauled away, the school is devastated, the clinic you are operating in is destroyed. And you realize that what remains is the relationships. Not these physical concrete things. And that is when you shift in your thinking. It just takes you to deeper dimensions. I think that’s probably one of the greatest gifts out of that horrible tragedy, forcing me to think in different dimensions. And I think that when I talk to people who deal with great tragedy, sorrow, and hatred, some of the things that “break” us; that is, some event that makes you look from a different perspective or another dimension.

SHEPARD: So let’s go back to what you were talking about in terms of “the other.” Is that something we do from the time we are small children, that we make someone “other” if he or she is not exactly like us?

WILKENS: I think that is something we get from our parents and our surroundings. And then we have experiences that we fit into our pigeonhole. I think you have to navigate through life. I hate this term pigeonhole, but it is so useful. You can’t just be making new pigeonholes all of the time. You do tend to make pigeonholes or generalizations.
SHEPARD: Do you think that “othering” is an inherent thing we do?

WILKENS: When they asked a guy who was participating in a genocide why he did it, he said, “Because my uncle was doing it.” Because they had these models. Some families never had Blacks in their home. I have never sat down to construct where this came from.

SHEPARD: So how did you experience this construct?

WILKENS: In Rwanda, the construct of “the other” was no more profound than in any other place. I mean typically you will cite the radio propaganda that was going on. It was done in the name of equality, but still it was this building of “the other.” I think that is superficial when you look at the [high amount of] intermarriage. Wealth was sometimes an issue. And Tutsis, sometimes if you were to generalize, might have been a little better off than Hutus. But I think they start killing each other because they have “othered” them. But “other” was a part of it when it came time. I think a lot of times we don’t start “othering” people until a time of crisis. And then in a time of crisis, we want to blame someone. We want to unite people against a common enemy. And then this “othering” becomes an intentional act: “I told you you could never trust those people.”

SHEPARD: So how does hate fit into this? How do you define hate, and where does it come from?

WILKENS: We naturally think that it is hate [that is the cause]. I don’t think hate was always the key factor; I think that is important for people to realize. Right next door to hate was fear. If you are going to say hate was the big thing in the Rwanda genocide, then you have a lot of explaining to do [in light of] all of the intermarriage. There are tons of “others” [who are not treated that way]: business partners, church fellowships, beer-drinking buddies, [and people who have] shared gardens. So there are tons of examples of not being “the other,” not being “them” and “us.” I just mention marriage because it is such an easy example. So how are you going to explain that? That is why you have to look at other things in driving the genocide.

SHEPARD: How did that come to be? The fear? How did that start?

WILKENS: We had a three-year war going on and that is a huge context for fear. In a war everything is threatened: your home, your family, your health, your future; it’s great foundational soil for fear. Then you have acts of terrorism. You have a bomb go off in a taxi stand. Or some unpaved roads downtown and a semi hits a land mine. And then you get this really crazy
message from the government and they are supposed to be the ones to calm people down and say that everyone should get along, and they start broadcasting these negative messages about “the other.” In Rwanda, the main means of communication for years was your little radio; yes, you could pick up the BBC, but your main thing was the government’s one radio station. You don’t have telephones or newspapers; it’s the radio. And then maybe 18 months before the genocide, a second radio station comes along in Kinuwanda. They are really good; they have funny disc jockeys, they have new Western songs; this second radio station piggybacks on the credibility of this first one—it’s another radio station in your own country in your own language. So if you want to talk about the fear, then this radio station plays a big role. You have this radio station telling you about “the other” and they are hate messages. And then when it blows up in your city, in your block, and you fear for your life, and your wife or your grandmother is Tutsi—The Tutsis were thinking “this is stupid” all along. The international community has always stepped in, in different situations, and Rwanda has a long history of stepping in.

SHEPARD: Who are you are talking about when you say international?

WILKENS: The first line would be the French; it was a Belgian colony, but economically and politically, the French moved in after independence. So Rwanda became very tight with France; after that, the Belgians were still there, and they would come in too. After WWII there was UN involvement in Rwanda; there wasn’t the UN, but there was the League of Nations; there was this sense of international community. Probably more accurately, colonization, but there was a community out there, as far as the Rwandans were concerned, whether they knew it for their own selfish exploitive reasons or whether they simply knew that the missionary, the Bwana, is a nice guy. That community is there, and they always have a finger on the pulse, and what this radio is talking about will never happen because of the international community. Then you see ten Belgian soldiers being murdered, and then the UN leaves. Talk about fear! The things you have been counting on are melting away. This isn’t just fear like hysteria, which happens when guys start spraying the place with machine guns; yeah, that happens, but it is also fear based on long-standing things you thought you could depend on falling away. Then you do start to move to the more immediate fear of attacks in your neighborhood; of “What am I going to do for the safety of my wife, my children? I have to prove to them that I am a strong Rwandan, I am a real Hutu, and I don’t support these rebels.” I haven’t read a lot about it, but I know there are conversations about what part the war played in the genocide and the level of fear that would allow people to move on to
that. And then the fear and hatred are not two clear, separate things. I think it is when fear becomes second nature and habitual that we begin to see a stronger emerging of what we might call hate.

SHEPARD: How does the concept of territory factor into hatred?

WILKENS: I think about territory and I automatically jump to land and possessions, in terms of what we identify with. One of the initial reasons we stayed in Rwanda was that there was this young lady that lived and worked in our home and helped Teresa with domestic help. When we knew that she was being threatened because her ID card said Tutsi—that was a big part of the decision Teresa made to stay. And that was based on a relationship. And while the young lady wasn’t “family,” she was. Our youngest was in diapers when we got there. She was so gentle with the kids; they loved her, my wife loved her, she was so wonderful to have in our home. She lost family members and she married a man whose ID card said Hutu. And so her little boys are growing up in a home like thousands of others; now there is no Hutu or Tutsi on the ID cards. It is amazing to me when I see a picture of her family, by typical construct measurements. She looked at me and couldn’t quite get why she inspired people. She said we are all the children of God. That was the overriding construct in her mind. And if anyone had a reason to hate, it would be her. She wasn’t terrified during the genocide. She was still stable and still thinking of others.

SHEPARD: How did you and your family get through that time?

WILKENS: For Teresa and the kids, it was Wednesday night until Sunday. You maintain your sanity by focusing on the kids, and I was in charge of a group of American missionaries. I had three weeks of not being able to leave my home. I did a lot of reading. I had daily radio conversations. Then Teresa went to Nairobi, Kenya, and she stayed for the rest of the genocide in Kenya. The people in my home—there was this young man, and his dad had worked for us for a little bit; those two men had ID cards that said Tutsis. Then I invited a pastor and his wife to come; he was the financial guy. Their home was in a no-man’s land; that neighborhood got evacuated. I told him, “I am not leaving, and you can’t stay in your home, so come.” So when he came to my home, he and his wife were a huge support. Physically, she would deal with the thieves. Emotionally and spiritually, they were very mature. They were very other-focused, or outward-focused, not inward-focused. In terms of maintaining sanity during that time, being able to read, and being able to have conversations with my wife and family, and having the people in my home, really helped. My home took some bullets, but it stayed intact.
Shepard: How were you seen by the Rwandans?

Wilkens: Some people saw me as a thorn in the flesh, and some people saw me with great respect, and some people didn’t know what to do with us. Our neighbors came and stood outside our home and stood in front of the gate, and said “You can’t go in this home” [to those who came to do us harm]. So those neighbors who stood up for us, they basically said, “Their kids play with our kids.” This is a really important concept in the process of rehumanizing. Often with hate, and the subject of “the other,” we focus on the dehumanizing; it is essential that we focus on how we rehumanize. How is that going to turn a band of killers away? I can’t give you the exact point when our neighbors convinced these killers to move away. I do believe that stories are the most powerful tool we have to rehumanize ourselves and others. They did not need to rehumanize themselves, so with us, they managed to rehumanize us. We are not going to do these horrible things to us, we are going to do it to them. “Them” is always less than “us.” Stories—that is really what drives Teresa and our work—the opportunity to tell stories, believing that these stories will change the way people think. They won’t just be those Africans that have been killing each other for hundreds of years, or they won’t just be those Muslims. All of a sudden those people are going to have names, and characteristics, and acts of generosity. You are going to see acts of selflessness. Thus, it really complicates our nicely built pigeonholes.

Shepard: You have told me a few stories. Is there one that comes to mind when you think about this humanizing process?

Wilkens: For me, the one that comes to mind is the neighbor story, and it is the most powerful one because it could have easily been the difference of life and death for us. Earlier in the day we had heard these killers walking down the street with the furniture and the belongings of people; we heard the screaming and the killing of the people down the street from us. It doesn’t get any closer than that. That night we didn’t even know—the next morning we found out that the lady who was living in our house was talking to the neighbors, and they were explaining what had happened. She said, “They were at your house last night, at the gate, the gang was there, but we stood there and we came out.” That blows me away. To step outside their security—they are in a mud hut with a tin roof. We are in a nice Western-style house; they are in a mud house with a tin roof and it doesn’t seem secure; why step outside of that security for someone that is not even you? They could just say, “Oh those foreigners, they probably have guns; they could take care of themselves.” Or they could say, “Those foreigners they probably have a phone to call for help, or their government is sending
soldiers.” They could come up with any excuse they want. But for these people, they didn’t; they left the security of their home, they left other people in their home for a certain period of time, and they stood in front of our gate and told these stories.

SHEPARD: You had been there for four years . . . did you go as a pastor?

WILKENS: No. We were doing industrial arts for six years. After the first six years in Africa, of teaching at a school and working at a mission hospital, doing very practical things, I came back and got an MBA; then with the business and technology combination went to Rwanda as a humanitarian worker for ADRA [the Adventist Development and Relief Agency International]. I only became a pastor two years after the genocide. I didn’t go to seminary or college or anything; I just kind of got put in the job at a high school as a chaplain with a small congregation in southern Oregon. I did that for eleven years, then two years ago left that specific kind of pastoral work and am now a full-time activist and educator.

SHEPARD: How do you think people can remain hopeful when we continue to see these behaviors again and again? Where does forgiveness fit in?

WILKENS: We mean so many things by forgiveness. So you need to ask, what do you mean by forgiveness? To maintain hope you need to spend time in the lives and stories of people who will not accept hatred. They will not settle for less. There is a danger because people say that it is not real. I know it’s not the norm and it’s not average, but don’t tell me it’s not real. It is very, very real. When I spend time talking about Rwanda, I do not spend too much time talking about the horrific things, for several reasons. I spend time on what can happen when we make choices that are different from what might be expected of us. I sit down and talk to Rwanda genocide survivors and I am reminded how horrible it was. I almost have pangs of guilt. I ask myself, when I am not telling the whole story, are you disrespecting or minimizing the horror by not talking about these things when you tell your stories? I have to tell myself: Nope. I don’t shy away from visiting with survivors or the horror of it all. I was there; I was in the middle of it. I don’t deny it. So many other people are highlighting the horrors. There has to be a place to highlight the courage, the selflessness, and the willingness to go against the stream.

SHEPARD: Do you go back? Have you gone back?

WILKENS: Yes, physically and mentally. Last summer I was with a group of teachers. I took about nine high school teachers, who are teaching the
Holocaust and genocide, to have the personal experience of sitting down with survivors. When people want to deny the Holocaust or genocide, you need to sit down with the people who survived and are still trying to survive today. I think that is a huge part of rehumanizing. I am tempted to say all, but that can’t be true; an unimaginably huge amount of people come away from Rwanda with hope. You think how, in a country where one million out of seven million people were killed by their neighbors, not a tsunami or an official war machine, but betrayed by a neighbor, the most intimate relationships were betrayed. You think people would come away from it shaking their heads, saying “I feel dirty,” but people come away from that saying “Wow, what hope, what courage!” I may not be talking about the majority of people, but there are people who are willing to move past, not ignore and not minimize, but people who are willing to live in the present. I have hang-ups with people saying, “You’ve got to get over this,” but when you run across people who are really being able to live in the now with genuine respect to revisit the past, but really living in the now—that is really powerful. People who are not still controlled by their past, definitely influenced by their past, but they are allowing new life experiences to continue to shape them on their journey, and I think that is probably not unique just to Rwanda; people are willing to let new life experiences shape their perceptions and their choices.

SHEPARD: How do we focus on the solutions and not get stuck on the problems?

WILKENS: I would come back to service. Service just has this huge potential. When you talk about rehumanizing and service, [there is a] story that has been told about our time during the genocide—this attempted massacre at an orphanage. The government moved the orphans from the horrible, horrible, horrible place to just a horrible place. And it really did stop the massacre, and now recent research is showing that there were two attempted massacres at the orphanage; the first one, I was there on that day and managed to be part of a team that thwarted that one. The second one, the government came to evacuate them on a day where the second one was planned, and the government aborted it. I think it was a very political move. We needed to move the orphans to this other place and there would be a massacre, so hold on to your massacre horses. When they were moved and I got word of that, I went back there to collect their belongings. I got to the second place; it was only a stone’s throw away from this other place, made famous by this movie Hotel Rwanda. I got there and there were more than 400 orphans, close to 300 who had just been brought there; they didn’t have blankets or cooking pots; they needed their stuff, and it gets cold at
night. They wouldn’t let us take anything. So I go to the colonel that is in
charge; he is [now] in jail. He is a man I built a relationship with during the
genocide that allowed me to do a lot of the work I was able to do. So I said
to him, “Thank you so much for moving the orphans, but they don’t have
their stuff. Will you write me a letter authorizing me to go back there and
get their stuff?” He says sure, so he writes me this letter and the secretary
stamps it. He gives me the letter. I go back to the orphanage and it’s
deserted now, it’s like a ghost town, and as I come along the right side, here
are about a dozen of the militia guys, would-be massacreists with their
leader, looking around, poking around, seeing what they can loot from this
orphanage. And they are shocked to see me and I am terrified to see them.
All of a sudden, I am thinking, “I am going to die right here, right now”;
they are angry, they didn’t do their massacre, they are going to kill me; they
know I am connected. All of a sudden I remember the letter; I pull it out
and I show it to their leader. And I think it is very important to recognize
that planners of genocide, leaders of hate, somehow move to the point
where they consider themselves legitimate people. We look at them as these
hatemongers, these extremists, but they see themselves, and would like to
portray themselves, as legitimate people. So I think it is important, as much
as we disrespect what they are doing, and what they seem to be about, that
we can somehow see their humanity and somehow extend to them a respect,
a human treatment that can have the potential to change things. So I pull out
the letter, hand it to the leader; he reads it, he sees the Colonel’s signature,
and says, “Oh, of course, the orphans need their things.” He’s in a legiti-
mate, rational mode; so he says to his guys, “Help him load his truck.” So
the guys that would have been our killers a couple days earlier have now
been instructed to help us load our truck. I walk in the orphanage with these
guys behind me and I say to them, “Well, guys, if you could just put blan-
kets on the floor—” so they come out to my truck with a blanket over one
shoulder and an assault rifle over the other. My truck is way too small, so I
ask, “Hey guys, do you know of any other trucks in the neighborhood I
could rent? I will pay them well.” We organize a bigger truck and we work
for a couple hours, two truckloads, standing tables on end on each side of
the truck to build up the truck so we can round up these orphans’ belong-
ings on this truck. By the time we are done, these two-three hours later, I
am slapping the guys on the back, saying, “Hey, thanks for your help, that
was a really good idea with the tables,” and they were rehumanized for me,
and I think I was rehumanized for them. I believe it is hugely connected to
service; when we get involved in service we see a different side of people
that ordinarily would not have seen, and they see a different side of us.
The typical rhetoric of the hate and the prejudice just somehow doesn’t
seem to stick as easily; it seems to fall off when you are working side by
side with someone else. They probably did go on to kill others, but I would like to think that they got paused and that somehow that exercise of service did somehow change their thinking. I don’t know; all I know is that for that point in time when I treated them like they were rational, as irrational as they were, when I treated them human-like, they acted human. I think that is why it comes back to this concept that it is not so much believing what you see, but recognizing that you see what you believe. I believe there is a potential for good here, of course it’s not like I am sitting there thinking, “Should I believe in this guy or not?” It wasn’t a real rational thing, but when I expected and I looked for good—you don’t always find it, but you have a much better chance of finding it if you look for it.

Shepards: Please continue talking about service.

Wilkens: We share so much more in common than what separates us. We’ve got boatloads of stuff in common, and service really helps us to recognize and see, because there is this certain level of humanity. If you haven’t seen this documentary yet called As We Forgive, it’s about how do we live side-by-side after the Rwanda genocide. This one lady refuses to forgive, which I really value, because it’s not like, “Okay, everyone forgive, now we all live happily ever after.” But she is involved in service afterwards, building a home for a person released from prison, and I believe there is this psychological, physical, spiritual interaction that takes places when we are involved in service that literally physiologically changes us; we know that it produces chemicals in our brain. It opens the window for a new path in our brain to be formed that we never knew could be or would have never thought of. And it is actually connected with doing something physically with your hands and exerting yourself. We know that there are all kinds of mind and body relationships and that service is one of those potentials to do that.
FILM REVIEW

The Changing Face of England: Marc Isaacs’

*All White in Barking*

[Icarus Films, 2007, 73 minutes]

Jan Polek

Barking is a white, working-class community east of London. For many years it was a hub of shipbuilding, but recently many of the young people have moved away, with an influx of immigrants taking their place. The older residents are now living next door to citizens from Africa, China, Pakistan, Lithuania, Nigeria—with new countries represented every day. In addition to buying homes, the immigrants have purchased many shops featuring diverse foodstuffs and native goods. The face of Barking has changed dramatically in the past few years, and the white residents are feeling a sense of discomfort with the new diversity.

The film’s purpose, as described in the preface, is to show “how far we are willing to go to confront our fear of foreigners.” The technique is to interview white residents about their reactions to the new neighbors and film the immigrants in their new lifestyle. Much of the conversation focuses on food; it is filmed in a butcher shop and grocery store. We learn very little about the people filmed other than their first names, so it is often hard to follow the interviews. Some of the questions lead to serious answers, while others are flippant, such as exclamations about being upset that the neighbors’ cooking smells are “different” and that they simply “are not our people.” Dave, the most antagonistic of the citizens, insists that he is not racist; he merely has “personal preferences,” which are acceptable because, after all, “this is England.”

One white couple accepts a dinner invitation from a Nigerian couple and is surprised to find the food edible, even though the evening was, on the whole, “awkward.”

There is an underlying theme about Jewish residents; some of them are Holocaust survivors. Monty, a survivor of Aushwitz, has hired Betty, a Nigerian woman, as a caregiver, which causes some comments from his Jewish friends. Betty seems genuinely fond of Monty and wants to have him accompany her on a trip back to Nigeria. They seem to have the most equal relationship. On the whole, the white citizens do feel superior to the immigrants without seeming to realize that they will have to adjust to this new community life. One woman said that if she won the lottery, she might
move away, but she would always come back; she explains, “My son is buried here—these are my roots.”

Overall, the film has a fascinating premise, with the added value of being based on reality. Barking may well be a microcosm for what will happen to other small communities around the globe. However, the film itself is technically flawed. The camera work is reminiscent of The Blair Witch Project, looking like a hand-held camera technique. There is too much trailing the residents around; the viewer longs to see everyone settled and to hear in-depth conversations about their deeper feelings. Since the older white men seem similar in appearance, it would be helpful to have more identifiers on screen. The film lacks dramatic impact, and the audience’s attention might wander after the first hour (the film is 73 minutes long).

While there are some hopeful moments, the film dwells on the natives’ negative reactions to the immigrants. It ends as it began: with Dave, who is asked the question, “What would you do if more come here?” Dave is standing by the breakwater and he responds, “Africans or foreigners? I’d go in there . . . in the f—-ing drink.” The fact that it said in such a matter-of-fact way makes it all the more discouraging. The population may have changed, but the mindset is still “All White in Barking.”