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INSTITUTE FOR ACTION AGAINST HATE

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Call for Papers and Submission Guidelines

The Institute for Action Against Hate is soliciting submissions for the fourth volume of the interdisciplinary Journal of Hate Studies.

We are interested in articles from various disciplines that address the topic of “Hate and Culture.” This may include unequal treatment of certain populations in terms of race, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, ability, age, religion, socioeconomic levels, and other issues. We are also interested in articles that explore solutions and strategies for addressing hate manifested within and against various cultural settings. A special invitation is extended to scholars from disciplines such as history, psychology, philosophy, women’s studies, cultural studies, anthropology, political science, economics, literature, rhetoric, and religious studies.

Submissions are due by May 1, 2005 and should be between 5000-10,000 words. Submissions should be one hard copy and an electronic copy in MS Word format. Please do not submit PDF files.

Address submissions and questions to the Gonzaga University Institute for Action Against Hate, AD Box 43, 502 E. Boone Avenue, Spokane, WA 99258-0043; email address: againsthate@gonzaga.edu; phone: (509) 323-3665.
Preface

The pueblo’s elders called a council to decide what to do about the federal government’s proposal for a land trade involving mineral rights. A fire burned at the center of the kiva’s dirt floor, around which the twelve elders gathered. A traditional reflection stone sat on the open side of the fire, opposite the sipapu, which signified the opening in the earth through which the first people arrived from the unseen worlds. A ledge cut into the curved adobe wall held pots, drums, and bundles of dried corn.

The elders sat quietly for a while, until the chief unwrapped a bundle he had placed in front of him. He took out the talking stick, which looked like a pipe stem about a foot and a half long. Feathers and strands of turquoise were tied to one end and the other was wrapped in leather.

The council began as the talking stick was passed around the circle, each of the elders relating a tale or portion of the tribal history. Then the men sat quietly together without discussing the matter directly or apparently coming to any decision. After a prolonged silence they nodded, rose, and left the kiva. In the silence, they had “seen the truth of the council” and in this way evoked the appropriate decision.

This story is retold by Dr. Raymond Reyes and Dr. George Perrault in their article “Wholeness and Council: A Native American Perspective on Leadership.” The authors conclude that the underlying intention of a council process is to move the followership and leadership toward community, rather than relying upon hierarchy, personality, or dominance. Council is about the creation of “a space in which obedience to the truth is practiced” (Palmer, 1983, p. 69).

The theme of community speaks clearly in the work of the Institute for Action Against Hate. Since our beginning in 1998, we have been blessed with an ever-growing circle of people of goodwill who join us in fighting hate through education, research, and advocacy. An early aspiration of the Institute was to create an academic discipline to study hate, and we formally began this process this year.

The Gonzaga University Institute for Action Against Hate hosted the first International Conference to Establish the Field of Hate Studies at Gonzaga University in Spokane, Washington on March 18-20, 2004. The conference was co-sponsored and supported by the American Jewish Committee, the Simon Wiesenthal Center, the Southern Poverty Law Center, the Kootenai County Task Force on Human Relations, the Alberta Civil Liberties Research Center, and regional educational institutions. We had 65 conference attendees and 200 attendees at the Banquet, which featured Morris Dees.
OBJECTIVE

The objective of the conference was to bring together individuals with recognized expertise from complementary academic fields to define the field of hate studies. This was a founding scholarly event for the field of hate studies, and the first international conference of its kind. The conference provided opportunities for meaningful academic scholarship via presentations, round table discussions, and scholarly papers.

THE CONFERENCE

The International Conference to Establish the Field of Hate Studies was a two-day event at Gonzaga University, designed to bring together leading academics and researchers with expertise relevant to Hate Studies. The presenters included:

Ken Stern, J.D. Moderator and Keynote Presenter, American Jewish Committee
Raymond Sun, Ph.D. History, Washington State University
James Waller, Ph.D. Evolutionary Psychology, Whitworth College
Evan Harrington, Ph.D. Social Psychology, John Jay College
Kathleen Blee, Ph.D. Sociology, University of Pittsburgh
John Pawlikowski, Ph.D. Religious Studies, Catholic Theological Union
Vernon Johnson, Ph.D. Political Science, Western Washington University
Richard Foltin, J.D. Law, American Jewish Committee
Bill Morlin Journalism, Spokesman-Review

The conference began with a keynote address by Ken Stern, who presented on the need for an interdisciplinary field of hate studies. This was followed by panel discussions made up of the presenters listed above. Questions addressed by these presenters included:

• What should an integrated field of Hate Studies look like?
• What does the presenter’s expertise or discipline contribute?
• What needs to be contributed by other fields?
• What are the next steps for creating the field of Hate Studies, for developing workable and relevant curricula on college campuses, and for integrating Hate Studies with institutions outside the academy?
Each presenter delivered a paper that served as a focus for discussion by other experts.

The panel discussions were followed by focus groups led by Institute board members, Bob Bartlett and Raymond Reyes (Defining and Developing a Field of Hate Studies) and James Beebe and George Critchlow (Scholarly Research and Writing).

The conference banquet featured Morris Dees, J.D., Chief Counsel for the Southern Poverty Law Center. In addition to developing ideas for Teaching Tolerance, the Center’s education project, Mr. Dees devotes his time to suing violent white supremacist groups. Mr. Dees is well known in this area for financially bankrupting the Aryan Nations World Headquarters. Mr. Dees’ presentation, which was quite well attended, was the perfect endnote to our conference.

The Institute presents the following articles as proceedings from the conference. Although the articles were reviewed in the editorial process, they were not peer reviewed, unlike those in our previous journals. This was a conscious collaborative board decision. We are pleased to present the varying perspectives and are truly grateful to the writers. This year’s journal includes the following articles.

In “The Need for an Interdisciplinary Field of Hate Studies,” Ken Stern discusses Bill Wassmuth’s passion for justice and the origins of hate studies. Noting that hate has not been clearly defined, he offers a working definition before examining the topic through the lenses of various disciplines. He then addresses the possible effects of a field of hate studies and offers suggestions about how to make the new field a reality.

John Pawlikowski’s article, “Religion as Hatred: Anti-Semitism as a Case Study,” explores Christian hatred toward and action against Jews as an example of how religion can generate prejudice that leads to hatred. His explanation of the history of such antisemitism provides context for his argument. Pawlikowski concludes by noting that it is only when religion is embodied in its people that it is a powerful tool for social transformation.

In “The Social Psychology of Hatred,” Evan Harrington discusses social psychologists’ three primary approaches to studying prejudice, noting how context, interpersonal attitudes, and social grouping affect intergroup aggression. He also describes the importance of the empirical studies conducted in the field of social psychology in understanding hate-driven behavior.

Kenneth Hoover and Vernon Johnson begin “Identity-Driven Violence: Reclaiming Civil Society” with a brief review of the historical context of identity-driven violence. They discuss factors in individual and societal development, noting that studies in developmental psychology reveal that identity is built upon competencies, communities, and commitments. Their conclusion advocates for regional-local networks that use positive methods of promoting
diversity, suggesting that community action is the main front in the battle for a society in which people accept one another.

Sociologist Kathleen Blee examines the relative merits of considering racial hatred as an individual motive or as an outcome of social action in “Positioning Hate.” She suggests re-examining the presupposition that those who join racist groups are necessarily motivated by hate and discusses the implications for scholarship and anti-racist politics if, in fact, hatred is not the primary or only motivation for joining and acting within such groups.

The educational component of hate studies is addressed by Phyllis Gerstenfeld in “Teaching a General Course on Hate Crimes: Challenges and Solutions.” Gerstenfeld describes some of the challenges she has faced in teaching about hate crimes, including deciding on the scope of the class, finding appropriate texts, and encouraging class discussion. She discusses approaches she has taken to meeting those challenges and outlines some of the benefits of offering such classes.

Harold Fishbein explains in “The Genetic/Evolutionary Basis of Prejudice and Hatred” how three sets of genetic and evolutionary processes that lead to prejudice and discrimination—inclusive fitness, authority bearing systems, and intergroup hostility—evolved in hunter-gatherer societies. After discussing several studies that address reducing hatred in various ways, he notes that “individuation of self and others is effective in reducing prejudice” and advocates for the inclusion in curricula of methods that promote self-acceptance and a valuing of diversity.

In “Our Ancestral Shadow: Hate and Human Nature in Evolutionary Psychology,” James Waller discusses the discoveries of evolutionary psychology in its search to understand human nature. He notes that our history reveals and results in aspects of human nature that predispose us to being able to hate. Until our evolution catches up with our current social situations, he argues, we must be able to understand and acknowledge that a capacity to hate is part of the human condition if we are to begin to address the problem of hate realistically in our social structures.

In “The Last Uncomfortable ‘Religious’ Question? Monotheistic Exclusivism and Textual Superiority in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam as Sources of Hate and Genocide,” Steven Leonard Jacobs examines selected texts of each of the three major religions to reveal their attitudes toward their God and toward each other. He suggests a new way of reading these texts for those who wish to both “remain within and reach beyond” their own faith tradition.

In “Hate, Oppression, Repression, and the Apocalyptic Style: Facing Complex Questions and Challenges,” Chip Berlet argues that understanding the interrelated dynamics of hate, apocalyptic dualism, institutionalized oppression, and political repressions is crucial to increasing the accuracy and effectiveness of our research. He notes that organized hate groups are not an isolated phenomenon, but spring from larger systems of oppression. We must be scrupu-
lous, Berlet declares, in examining ourselves as we embark upon the field of hate studies, taking care not to demonize or treat unjustly those whom we see as demonizers.

“Finding Light in the Darkness? Modest Suggestions Toward the Study of Hatred Through History” by Raymond Sun asks why we are drawn to studies of hatred and reflects upon the role historians can play in furthering these studies. Sun asks questions about the best methods and ultimate goals of hate studies, intending to provide a starting point for discussion. He notes the importance of keeping a human face in hate studies and hopes that eventually we will understand the reasons for and consequences of hate from a variety of angles.

In addition to the paper presentations, which provided the substantial scaffolding for the conference, there were numerous breakout sessions, which provided rich supplement to this event.

One breakout session was presented by a Gonzaga student, Julian Arguon, who contributed a student’s perspective to our last journal. Julian’s voice represented a non-academic, yet powerfully emotional session. He spoke as a student who has participated wholeheartedly in addressing issues of discrimination and racism on our campus.

Julian’s presentation began with the showing of And We Stayed, a video produced by the Academic Vice President’s office two years ago. The video presents the testimony of several students who have felt marginalized by experiences of racism and discrimination at Gonzaga. The reason it is important to address student angst is that this was our impetus for starting the Institute. The courage of the students in the video is underscored. Julian and others chose to work with Gonzaga’s justice committee to address problems identified in the video. And he continued to experience discrimination . . . and he stayed.

Following the showing of the video, Julian most eloquently challenged academics to also address these issues in a heartfelt, non-academic manner, to attend to the emotional component of hate and develop effective strategies for dealing with hate. There was an overwhelming response to the honesty and vulnerability presented.

Conference participants contributed greatly to discussions. Clearly, the need for community voices was heard, and specifically those of women, people of color, gay and lesbian men and women, and students. Although an academic discipline presents an intellectual perspective, our work represents all people and our respect for them can best be shown by including all people in this process. As we continue our work to develop an academic discipline, we have the opportunity to practice inclusion on all levels and, in that way, to create and maintain community.

The need for an academic discipline on hate studies has been presented at the Annual National Conference on Race and Ethnicity in American Higher Education (NCORE) for two years in a row. In 2003, Raymond Reyes and
Jerri Shepard presented at the NCORE conference in San Francisco. In 2004, Bob Bartlett, Raymond Reyes, Jerri Shepard, and Sima Thorpe presented at the NCORE conference in Miami. Both presentations were well received and board members decided that the NCORE conference is an important avenue for addressing this issue. The Institute has been invited to present a three-hour major workshop at the NCORE conference in New York City in June of 2005. Our intent is to formally continue the dialogue on developing a hate studies curriculum at the conference, and plan another Institute for Action Against Hate International Conference to Establish the Field of Hate Studies in 2006, on the east coast. Information on our work can be obtained at our web site, www.gonzaga.edu.againsthate.

Moving toward a global community, full of diversity and difference, requires a universal effort. The Journal of Hate Studies and The Institute for Action Against Hate are venues for confronting hate, and ultimately, preventing it through education, research, and advocacy in collaboration with professionals of like mind. This is no small task in a world of competing cultures and ideologies, dwindling resources, and widespread poverty. It is the responsibility of educators, professionals, and people of goodwill everywhere to collaborate in the effort to combat hate with unyielding determination. We can never stop questioning acts of hatred, which are often initially expressed as bias, discrimination, and stigmatization of marginalized peoples. Our work offers a challenge to create community as we continue to establish a space in which obedience to the truth is practiced (Palmer, 1993) in our efforts to combat hate.

We are pleased to offer the third issue of the Journal of Hate Studies. We hope you will find it to be a relevant and meaningful addition to your personal and professional libraries.

Jerri Shepard
Director
Institute for Action Against Hate


The Need for an Interdisciplinary Field of Hate Studies

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Adapted from the opening keynote speech to the International Conference to Establish the Field of Hate Studies, Gonzaga University, Spokane, Washington, March 19, 2004.

My organization, the American Jewish Committee, has a poster of cuddly diapered babies of different skin colors, with the caption “No One Is Born Hating.” We sometimes use this image on billboards or print it in newspapers, especially in the aftermath of a hate crime. I’m probably the only person on staff who hates that poster.

No one is born speaking either, but at a certain point we would think it odd if a youngster didn’t develop that capacity. People may need help in figuring out whom to hate, but the instinct to hate is part of who we are. The poster sends the opposite message: that human beings, if not somehow polluted, would not indulge in hate.

Hate is a normative part of the human experience. Look at history. Regardless of when, where, under what economic or political system, what major religion is followed, or any other variable, people have always had the capacity to define someone else as an “other,” and hate him, often with deadly results.

Yet, despite how much hardship has been caused by hate throughout history, we know much too little about it. With America becoming an increasingly diverse society, with the world witnessing an upsurge in antisemitism and other ideologies and theologies of hate, and with terrorism in most corners of the globe, we need better to understand this phenomenon, and to identify testable rather than gut-instinct and “feel-good” remedies, sooner rather than later.

I. BILL WASSMUTH AND THE GENESIS OF HATE STUDIES

About a decade ago Bill Wassmuth, director of the Northwest Coalition against Malicious Harassment, invited me to give a keynote address during his organization’s annual meeting.

Bill, who died in 2002 of Lou Gehrig’s disease, knew more about fighting hatred than most people. Before he founded the Coalition, he had been a parish priest in a small town in Idaho when the Aryan Nations began harassing Jews and spreading their doctrine of white supremacy. Bill helped organize, and then became the spokesperson for, a local task force formed to combat the bigots. A day after Bill was denounced as a “closet Jew” by the head Aryan, his house
was firebombed, with him in it. Luckily, he escaped without major injury or loss of his sense of humor, commenting to a Jewish friend, “I’ve been a Jew for only a day, and already I don’t like it.”

The firebombing only increased Bill’s commitment to fighting hatred, and he soon organized the Coalition, which covered the entire Pacific Northwest region. The group reflected the religious, ethnic, and sexual diversity of the area, and became a model of how government, community groups, labor organizations, and others could work together to combat bigotry and hate violence through education, monitoring, and political action.

Bill asked me to “challenge” the group—not an easy task, as this was a committed gathering which I regularly cited as a model to other groups around the country. But as I thought about the people who belonged to the Coalition, I reflected on the few academicians I had met over the years. These were people who were eager to fight racism and discrimination, but did so from their personal perspectives. Unlike the religious leaders or law enforcement officials in the Coalition, the academics were not representing their institutions, communities, or disciplines.

Nor did they regularly provide advice based on their expertise. Whether the issue was how to fight an anti-gay ballot initiative, or how to counter the rise in skinhead activity, none of those professors, to the best of my memory, had ever provided academically-rooted theories about how the Coalition might be most effective.

Part of the reason, no doubt, was that each of the various academic disciplines, despite bringing some valuable insights and information to bear about hatred, looked at this phenomenon in frustrating isolation. Psychologists look at the individual, social psychologists at the individual as influenced by the group, sociologists at the group, and political scientists at government. Strategies for action, as well as for better understanding how hate functions in the real world, require a pulling together of these distinct inquiries into an interdisciplinary whole, larger than the sum of its parts, because most actions taken to fight hatred necessarily implicate all of those parts.

People get sick, so we have an academic field of medicine that is more than its component parts of chemistry, biology, anatomy, and other related disciplines. People need structures, so we have a field of architecture, which is more than its component parts of physics, mathematics, and art. Hatred is also a basic part of the human condition, yet we have no synthesis of academic disciplines to look at the problem holistically. In fact, reading the literature from the different disciplines sometimes reminded me of the old story of the seven blind men, each trying to describe an elephant from his unique vantage point.

So I implored the gathering to find an academic institution that would create a field of hate studies and work with the Coalition to give birth to a model that could be copied by other institutions.

Bill was taken by the challenge and tried to find an academic partner,
arguing that while “we do the best we can, there is a sense that we are shooting in the dark. We need a better understanding of what works and why.” Ultimately Gonzaga University became that place, and Bill—after he retired from the Coalition—became increasingly active with Gonzaga’s Institute for Action Against Hate.

It is fitting, then, that this first International Conference to Establish the Field of Hate Studies, held at Gonzaga, is dedicated to the memory of Bill Wassmuth.

II. DEFINING HATE

What is hate? An easy question, to which there is no easy answer.

Renae Cohen, in her monograph “Hate: A Concept Examined,” co-authored with Wayne Winborne, noted that there is no commonly accepted definition of prejudice or stereotyping. She wrote that “[h]ate may be best described as a spectrum, with varying degrees of strength and meaning, all sharing the common component of negativity.” Hate is, Cohen asserted, sometimes an emotion, sometimes an attitude, and sometimes a behavior. And, she claimed, it has two intersecting dimensions: passive to active, and thought to behavior.

Yes, but what is hate? Cohen’s answer:

[T]here is so little research examining hate and its related aspects in the social scientific literature that one must look closely at related areas such as prejudice and stereotyping to begin to build a useful body of work on hate. Yet that body of work will still need to be diverse in its content and flexible in its embrace of emerging areas of inquiry. Theories need to strive to synthesize insights from areas such as religion, philosophy and literature. Similarly, research delineating active hate from prejudice and demonstrating an explicit relation between prejudice and hate, or identifying prejudice as a form of hate, is also needed.

But Cohen’s observation, as good as it is, isn’t sufficient. It focuses on the individual alone, not on the individual in the context of the group, or society at large. And it doesn’t consider the roles of political machinations and ideological appeals, which can move hatred onto a larger and more dangerous stage — from that of distasteful attitudes into that of state policies supported by lofty-sounding theories.

Perhaps hatred is a too-difficult word to define. Sometimes, I’m tempted to use the word “otherism” because we are concerned with how humans relate to people who are “others.” Regardless of what we call it, the questions are numerous and the answers too few.

Where does hate—and its various manifestations (racism, sexism, antisemitism, homophobia, etc.)—come from?
What motivates individuals to hate? Do we need to hate? If so, why?

Hate frequently manifests itself in life-and-death images—fear of death of the group, for example, or willingness, even eagerness, to die in order to harm an “other.” How and why do these life/death images work?

Do we need to feel strong emotions, such as hate, in order to feel alive?

Is fear of death of group identity an extension of self, or something else?

Do hateful ideologies skew our vision, so that dangers to our existence are seen in every aspect of human life, such as culture, religion, social, and global changes?

When and why do different hateful ideologies find common cause (black supremacist and white supremacist, left-wing and right-wing zealots)?

What role does self-esteem play?

Is there a correlation between how much we hate the other and how strongly we feel connected to—or good about—our group?

If bigotry has to do with identity, when and how is identity formed, influenced, and changed—or at least managed?

What is the role of education?

What should governments and “social change agents,” such as religious institutions and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), be doing?

Why are some differences more important for defining others (skin color as opposed to eye color, for example) in some places, while in places where these differences don’t exist, others are found? (For example, a study showed that Greek and Turkish Cypriots distinguish each other based on the types of cigarettes smoked.)

What is the role of dehumanization in all this?

What is the role of demonization?

Why are conspiracy theories so prevalent in hateful ideologies?

Why is hate of the other so frequently expressed as love of self?

If you draw a graph between the human thirst for universality, on one hand, and tribalism, on the other, how does hatred play out on this field?

What motivates group hate?

What makes it stronger? Weaker?

What are the roles of stress, fear, envy, race, power, land, economics, sovereignty, religion, memory, rage, biology, sex?

How do individual pathologies, group pathologies, political ideologies, and theologies mesh?

When and why do people act differently than they feel? (There is a study of restaurateurs saying they wouldn’t serve Chinese people, but they did; many white people have black friends at work, but don’t invite them home; people surveyed in Louisiana said they wouldn’t vote for David Duke, but did.)

Is hate ever a good thing? To motivate the Allied Forces in World War II, for example?
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These, and countless other related questions, are critical. But more important is the framework in which we address them.

We tend to think that if hate is a mental disorder, analysis is the cure. If it is a matter of economics, we need only wait for the next “up” cycle. If it is connected with political events, then wait for or try to effect change. If it is criminal activity from the “racist fringe,” call the FBI. If it is a lack of education, educate.

If hate is defined as an individual problem, we turn to psychology; if it is the individual in the context of the group, social psychology; if it is the group, sociology; if it is cultural, anthropology; if it is political, political science; if it is moral, philosophy.

Practically speaking, this is too disjointed an approach. Because when the Bill Wassmuths of the world—let alone the governments, journalists, diplomats, and lawyers—address hate, they are doing so on all these planes simultaneously.

How do we combine these disparate parts into a logical and workable whole? There’s no easy answer, but we need to start by identifying the various disciplines that have something valuable to say about hatred, analyzing their component parts, and pulling them together into the larger enterprise of hate studies.

And what exactly is hate studies? A working definition might be: Inquiries into the human capacity to define, and then dehumanize or demonize, an “other,” and the processes which inform and give expression to, or can curtail, control or combat, that capacity.

III. ADDRESSING HATE WITHIN THE DISCIPLINES

Various disciplines need to be integrated and cross-pollinated. I have limited literacy in many of these areas, and none in others. My undergraduate major was political science, and I am a lawyer by training. But let me offer a few thoughts about some of the things some of the relevant academic disciplines might offer to this enterprise.

A. Hate from a Historical Perspective

First, history. History is the study of the past, and as such, provides a framework for understanding hatred and how it has manifested itself at different times and places. It focuses our attention on the societal origins of intergroup hate, on the building up and lifespan of various ideologies and theologies, on the role of dehumanization, how institutions are used, and how old battles are recycled symbolically to energize new ones. It also helps us focus on the “triggers,” the events that combine the ingredients of hate into a combustible brew.
This focus on triggers, or what I call “Dashiell Hammett moments,” is an important contribution of the discipline. For those who don’t recall Hammett, he wrote detective stories, including *The Maltese Falcon*. His private-eye hero, when stymied, would “stir things up” and see how they played out, providing new clues. History does this too. Study of these “triggers” or “Dashiell Hammett moments” helps us both identify the types of situations in which hatred may come to the fore, and gain better insights into the ingredients which may simply be awaiting the right catalyst to be activated (much like a dormant volcano near an earthquake zone). When writing about contemporary antisemitism, I frequently cite four “triggers” or “Dashiell Hammett moments”: the fall of the Soviet Union, the collapse of the Middle East peace process in 2000, the United Nations’ World Conference Against Racism in Durban, and the attacks of September 11.

History offers another insight: It is also a discipline abused to promote hatred. Historical events are frequently twisted in credible-sounding ways for nefarious purposes. The prime example of this is Holocaust denial, the brainchild of neo-Nazis and now a growth industry in Arab and Muslim parts of the world. But there are many other examples too: White supremacist teachings, which deny any meaningful role by non-whites in the betterment of the world; Afrocentrist teaching, which denigrates whites and, for purposes of self-esteem, tells young black children that their ancestors were flying glider planes in Egypt 2000 years ago (and that whites have stolen the knowledge of this history from them); and much fundamentalist Islamist teaching, which denies not only contributions of Christians and Jews, but also any historical claim on their parts to any real rights, including but not limited to the right to have any sovereignty over any land once ruled by Muslims.

From the viewpoint of the long gaze of history, a progression of the disciplines emerges. We start with those that focus on the individual, particularly individual psychology and evolutionary psychology.

B. *The Psychology of Hate*

Evolutionary psychology helps us understand, as Jim Waller wrote in his wonderful book *Becoming Evil*, that most everyone is capable of hatred. To use his metaphor, hatred is part of the grain of wood on which each of our individual personalities is carved.

But what makes some develop hateful attitudes and others not? What makes some act on this instinctual material, and others not? And if we all act out in some ways, what are the variables that define more, or fewer, anti-social manifestations?

Years ago, when I was on tour for my post-Oklahoma City bombing book *A Force Upon the Plain: The American Militia Movement and the Politics of Hate*, I appeared on a talk radio show in Chicago with the *Chicago Tribune’s*
Jim Coates. I felt for Jim, and it was a shame that the program wasn’t on television since the audience couldn’t see his pained look on radio. He had written a fantastic book a few years earlier on far-right hate groups, hoping to steer young people away from them. It turned out that Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh loved Coates’s book. He read it in an entirely different way than Coates had intended, seeing what Coates deplored as something to which to aspire.

Jim and I agreed on everything except one thing: the “profile” of a militia member. I said that while there were no sociological studies to say definitively who was in the militias, anecdotally I was aware of people from just about every stratum. There were the “losers” one would expect, but I also knew of college graduates and small business owners. Jim disagreed. He said they were almost all the stereotypical products of broken homes and alcohol and drug abuse.

Afterwards, I came to the conclusion that we were both right. I recalled my friend Ken Toole, head of the Montana Human Rights Network, and his excellent metaphor for the militia movement as a “funnel moving through space.” He said that at the wide lip of the funnel, there were people who were attracted by the more “mainstream” aspects of the movement, such as its focus on gun rights, an overly intrusive federal government, environmental regulations, and so on. Move a little further into the funnel, and there were the people animated by conspiracy theories in general, and antisemitic conspiracy theories in particular. And at the small end of the funnel were those who were fully engaged by these ideas, ready to pop out and wage war. Coates was probably right that the militia people at the small end of the funnel were more likely those who fit the profile he described, whereas I was right in describing the variety of people throughout the funnel.

But what makes some people—a Timothy McVeigh, a Kamikaze pilot, members of Hizballah, or the 9/11 hijackers—come willingly and with gusto out of the small end, when others do not? In what important ways do they differ? The accepted profile of the Southern Ku Klux Klaner in the 1960s was someone with less than the average education (although educated people certainly belonged to the Klan and the other hateful institutions of the time, such as White Citizens Councils). But studies of suicide bombers show them to be better off and better educated than the general population.

What can we learn from psychology in its focus on the important issue of identity and its relationship to hate? We tend to think of people as black or white, Christian or Jew. But we are really a huge bundle of identities, some more important in one situation than another. I’m an American, but I’m also a Jew, and a father, and a husband, and a fisherman. I’m also a basketball fan, and although I’d like to think that always forms a lesser part of my identity than my role as a father, my daughter might disagree, recalling how I once (okay,
twice) forgot she was on my lap and how she flew off when I got up to cheer the Knicks’ getting a key basket in the final seconds of a playoff game.

Most people who act on their hatred seem to have one single aspect of their identity that becomes supercharged and all-important—white supremacists, black supremacists, Islamists. Alvin F. Poussaint, a clinical professor of psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, wrote an op-ed in the New York Times in 1999 in which he advocated a new psychological tag for these turbocharged haters: people with “extreme racism,” which, he argued, should be considered a mental disorder. Reacting to the case of Buford Furrow, the former Aryan Nation member who shot up Jewish kids at a Los Angeles community center and killed a Filipino postal worker, he cited the classic work of Gordon Allport to argue that “the acting out of extermination fantasies [is] readily classifiable as a mental disorder.” But here again is the problem of looking at primarily one aspect of hatred, the individual, with the worthwhile goal of reducing the number of people who act out their hatred violently, while largely discounting other concerns. While it might make sense to get the Buford Furrows of the world into treatment in their HMOs, this approach didn’t fully consider the legal implications. Under certain circumstances, people can be acquitted of a crime if they show they have a mental disease or defect. Would this proposed new classification, as satisfying as it might be to some psychologists and psychiatrists, actually help acquit some violent racists charged with murder or other serious offenses?

And the narrow focus of the op-ed’s author on the individual, failing fully to consider the other related aspects and academic approaches, creates another problem: How would this work on a societal basis? One month after the attacks of September 11, a survey showed that 48 percent of the people of Pakistan believed the newest antisemitic canard: that Israelis/Jews were secretly responsible for 9/11. Should nearly half a country be declared mentally diseased?

The focus on the individual needs to be integrated into a larger framework, but we also must ask the opposite questions, such as: What makes someone stand out in heroic ways to combat hatred? Consider Beth Rickey, a Republican official in Louisiana who couldn’t stand that former Ku Klux Klan leader and neo-Nazi David Duke was elected to the legislature as a Republican. At great personal risk she followed him around and exposed him for selling Holocaust-denial literature from his legislative office. Or Anna Rosmus, a high school student from Passau, Germany, who decided to investigate what her town did during the Holocaust, and discovered, at great risk to herself—her house was firebombed—that town officials serving at the time she was doing her research had been involved in unspeakable atrocities and war crimes. Or Irshad Manji, a Canadian Muslim woman who, as a youngster, was told at a madrassa that she had to hate Jews. She said, “What’s up with that?” and was told not to question, but only to believe. Since then, she has been on a quest to promote those strains of Islam that encourage questioning, pluralism, and rights. Or Bill Wassmuth, whom I mentioned before. I’ve had the pleasure to get to know all these brave
and incredible people and to count them among my friends. But what made
them see some aspect of hate in institutions or communities that held great
meaning for them, and rather than just accept or ignore it, speak out about it,
even at great personal risk?

These are just a few of the questions about the “individual” that a field of
hate studies needs to address.

C. The Social Psychology of Hate

Then there is the academic discipline that looks at how the individual
functions, not based on his particular personal pathology, but as a creature in
social situations: social psychology. As James Waller has noted, this discipline
looks at the critical mass, and how in these social situations individual attrib-
utes come to the fore.

Let’s go back to Ken Toole’s funnel. Recall that he described it not as
stationary, but as moving through space. The aptness of this description goes
beyond the notion that the funnel is a system that scoops people up. What if not
all space through which it moves is the same? What if, in some places, the
societal norms are more hateful? Logically, more people will be scooped up at
the lip, pulled into the self-sustaining world of conspiracy theories (which see
any contrary thought as part of the conspiracy), and propelled toward the small
end. You don’t need a degree in hate studies to know that when societies praise
suicide bombers in sermons, on television, on street posters, and in other
venues, more people will be coming out the small end.

I reviewed a book for the Washington Post last year entitled Preachers of
Hate: Islam and the War on America by Kenneth R. Timmerman. While there
was much about the book I didn’t like, I thought Timmerman’s description of
the impact of societal norms on the individual was artful. As I wrote for the
Post:

Timmerman debunks the myth that poverty and hopelessness produce ter-
rorism and hatred; rather, the source is genocidal ideas, made mainstream
by societal institutions. The glorification of killing Jews by suicide bomb-
ing is especially targeted to children, a grotesque form of child abuse.
When a Palestinian blew up Jews of all ages at a Passover Seder in
Netanya in March 2002, killing 29 and injuring 159, a Saudi government
paper “gushed with praise for the bomber,” and the Palestinian Authority
named a soccer team in his honor. Death notices for suicide bombers
“resemble wedding, not funeral, announcements.” Timmerman juxta-
poses the celebration of the Netanya bomber in Palestinian society with
the scene of two sets of Israeli parents waiting at a hospital where lay a
girl so horribly wounded that she couldn’t be identified, each hoping that
maimed child was theirs, because she was at least living.
Timmerman’s observation about death notices seeming like wedding notices is a valuable insight. So much of hate revolves around images of life and death. And killing an enemy whom you define as a danger to your progeny is clearly seen as a life-affirming act.

Human beings die, and it is natural to fear death. But it is not only the physical death of ourselves and our loved ones that we fear. We also fear the death of our identities. Read white supremacist literature. This is its cornerstone—fear of diminished power, fear of inbreeding with minorities, and so on. Black supremacist literature is infused with similar themes. Every group is concerned with its own death, and this fear is clearly intertwined with how threats are defined.

So much of our culture reflects this life-and-death symbolism. Next time you watch a sports broadcast—especially the playoffs—pay attention to how many times sportscasters make allusions to life and death.

We fear the death of our identity because we love our identity, and, not surprisingly, hate of others is frequently cited as love of self. David Duke says he doesn’t hate black folk; he just loves white folk. Louis Farrakhan says he doesn’t hate white folk; he just loves black folk.

Consider Matt Hale, the white supremacist leader of the World Church of the Creator, who was asked about his disciple, Benjamin Smith, who had gone on a shooting spree targeting blacks, Asian-Americans, and Jews before dying himself. Hale said, “He was a selfless man who gave his life in resistance to Jewish/mud tyranny. I knew Ben Smith and refuse to condemn this man who, with a pure heart and pure will, struck back against the enemies of our people. Ben Smith certainly did not kill any white people.”

Or similarly, there was the classic story of a Long Island, New York, resident who saw hippies in his town in the 1960s and said, “We should kill them, or else there will be violence.”

Or take the many examples throughout history of people feeling comfortable enough to advocate publicly killing babies, whether it be Col. John Chivington in Colorado in 1864 explaining that Indian babies needed to be killed because “nits make lice,” or the Nation of Islam’s Khalid Mohammad, who spoke about why there might be a need to kill white children in South Africa.

Or, at the most extreme, the claim is made that hating victims is actually loving them. As the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini is reported to have commented:

If an infidel is allowed to pursue his nefarious role as corrupter on earth until the end of his life, his moral sufferings will go on growing. If we kill him, and we thus prevent the infidel from perpetuating his misdeeds, this death will be to his benefit.

And, clearly, sometimes the hate of the “other” becomes so important that one is willing to harm oneself in order to inflict damage on that “other.”
willingness of the Palestinian Authority to sacrifice the lives of young people and children in order to kill Jews is an example. I heard this mind-set best described by the story of a man who is granted one wish. He can have anything he desires. He can even wish for more wishes. There’s only one caveat: Anything he gets, his neighbor will get double. After thinking for a while he says, “Poke out one of my eyes.”

It also seems that there’s a strong linkage between conspiracy theories and hate. The militia movement was full of conspiracy theories. Antisemitism has historically been driven by them—from ancient claims that Jews poisoned wells to the commonplace belief in many parts of the world that Jews were secretly behind the attacks of September 11.

Social psychology, which looks at the individual in social situations, offers some insights into this problem, and perhaps some suggestions about what to do.

While there is in this academic discipline a treasure trove of research that I’m not going to discuss, such as the work of Theodor Adorno and others after World War II on *The Authoritarian Personality*, I will briefly mention the “Robbers Cave” experiment, conducted by Muzafer Sherif in the 1950s, which the American Jewish Committee partially funded. Twelve-year-old boys of similar demographic profiles were sent to a summer camp in which they were initially separated into two groups (neither of which realized there was another group) and kept totally apart. Over a period of time they were allowed to discover the existence of the other group. Negative stereotypes about the “other” group grew. But toward the end of the experiment, they had to cooperate together on a “superordinate” goal, namely a problem with the drinking water at the camp that could be fixed only if they worked on it together. It seemed the need to work together on something critically important created an overarching identity which broke down many of the stereotypes the campers had held before.

Over my years at AJC, I’ve seen many examples of this social psychology principle in practice: how the creation of superordinate goals, or rather the need for a common identity, can make or break an initiative. The longest-lasting of our intergroup efforts, such as black-Jewish dialogue groups, have been the ones that included another connection, such as black-Jewish business people. And one of the cleverest responses to bigotry on campus was an initiative designed by then-Barnard president Ellen Futter, who pulled together a group of students reflecting the diversity of her campus. She gave them the task of going to other schools and investigating how they handled such problems, and then reporting back. She took leaders who might have seen one another as antagonists, or at least competitors, and instead pulled them together with a common mission and task.

I recognized a similar phenomenon in New York in the days and weeks after September 11. The sharing of the common experience of learning how to
cope with living (staying?) in a city that had just been attacked seemed to make people from different backgrounds interact more with, and be kinder to, one another. Fewer horns honked. Even my barber, whom I always suspected of some racist tendencies, commented about how 9/11 made him feel more open to black New Yorkers, as they had gone through the same trauma as he. I recalled the TV show *Star Trek*, and how there was never any real problem between the earthlings of various ethnicities and religions, because they all had to cooperate to fend off threats by the Klingons. Here was social psychology on TV, and on the sidewalks of New York.

Social psychology also teaches that there’s something very basic in the human makeup about how we identify ourselves and “others.” There have been many experiments in which people have been assigned to one group or another through random and meaningless means, such as a coin flip. Despite understanding how they were selected, despite having no competition for resources, despite knowing that the groups would never see each other again, people still stereotyped their group as better, smarter and more attractive than the “other.”

This human capacity is easily manipulated by authority figures. The experiment of Stanley Milgram and the investigations of those that built upon it are classic. People thought they were giving a subject an electric shock. Despite the protests of the subject, who complained, “My heart!” and “Let me out of here!”, most people kept on giving what they thought were shocks because the authority figure (the experimenter) said he’d take all responsibility, that it was important that the experiment not be terminated, and other such excuses. Most people felt uncomfortable continuing to inflict the shocks, but they did so nonetheless.

There are also studies in social psychology that show that hatred is more easily manifested when people are in groups and lose “individualization.” As Evan Harrington pointed out in his remarks prepared for Gonzaga University’s Conference to Establish the Field of Hate Studies, when attackers of blacks in the South wore masks, they generally became more violent and aggressive. And an analysis of newspaper articles from the South showed a direct correlation between the size of a crowd attending a lynching and the level of violence, including dismemberment.

Somehow mixed in with all this is the power of symbols and their political ramifications. One of the conflicts between the boys in the Robbers Cave experiment was over a flag, a symbol, and we see such behavior in real life, too.

I’ve been involved for many years with a group trying to retire racist sports mascots, most of them Indian. One of the most contentious battles has been at the University of Illinois, with its Chief Illiniwik of the “fighting Illini.” He’s a prancing and dancing mascot and is very offensive to Indian people. He sports eagle feathers, which are an important religious item. This would be the same as if some team were named the “Christians” and had a person (A Mus-
lim? A Jew?) in a Pope costume frolicking about with crucifixes. Or if the New York Yankees were instead the “New York Jews,” with stereotypical depictions on items from caps to toilet paper, playing at Synagogue Stadium, with a crowd-pleasing motion of the “Torah Scroll” and free yarmulkes on “kippah” day.

Yet despite the clear bigotry of this mascot, there is a powerful attachment to it and a denial of what it means. I spoke at a conference on this at the University and remarked that I simply didn’t understand why it was so hard to let go. I understood the pull of tradition, the power of symbols, and the role of identity. But a university’s main job is to attract and teach quality students. This fight only created distraction and controversy, which would not help that main mission. And I hazarded to guess that when choosing where to spend tens of thousands of dollars on tuition, students considering the University of Illinois focused on the quality of the education, the courses the school offered, the stature of its faculty, the prospects for jobs, and many other things. I seriously doubted that many chose the school because they thought, “It has a cool mascot.” So why was the fight over the symbol so tenacious?

Or consider the 1988 presidential race. Ed Koch, then the mayor of New York, stated that “any Jew or supporter of Israel would be crazy if they supported or voted for Jackson.” That statement was undoubtedly true at that time. Jesse Jackson had a record which included calling New York “Hymietown,” and, shortly after visiting the Holocaust memorial at Yad Vashem, said he was “sick and tired of hearing about the Holocaust.” Despite the basic truth of Koch’s comments, he was attacked, and ended up losing the next mayoral campaign because of it. Why? Because he wasn’t seen as attacking Jackson the man, but rather Jackson as the symbol of a whole group’s identity and aspirations.

Or consider the fact that the last two campaigns to take the radical step of changing the United States Constitution have been concerned with symbolic issues that animate proponents powerfully, but have very little impact in the world in which we live or on the terrorism that we fear to die from: flag burning and gay weddings.

Conversely, we need to understand the power and workings of symbols so that we can use them better for combating hatred, most particularly what social psychology and other disciplines tell us about how they relate to our identities and institutions. There’s the classic story of Billings, Montana, in which the window of a Jewish family had been shattered because their young son had put up a picture of a menorah at Chanukah time. The town adopted the symbol—the newspaper published it, and people put it up on their homes to make a statement against hate and to display unity of the community. The campaign was so successful that the little Jewish boy at the center of this episode, seeing all the menorahs around town, told his mom that he didn’t know there were so many
Jewish people in Billings. She replied, “No, there aren’t so many Jews here; these are our friends.”

But this episode would not have come about if the police chief, who had worked for many years in Portland, Oregon, had not learned the lessons from that city’s unfortunate experience with hate crimes: 1) If they are not denounced strongly, they will inevitably increase. 2) It is essential for those in positions of authority to take action against hate. Hate crimes are frequently thought of as purely a law enforcement matter—find the culprit, prosecute him or her, and push for a strong sentence. But the police chief, Wayne Inman, whether he knew it or not, applied lessons from social psychology, with great success.

One day, when this Billings response was still in the news, I asked Inman how he got others—especially those with children—to put menorahs in their windows. Wouldn’t that just make them more likely targets for the hate groups? He said, “Yes, but I also tell them that the more people who put up the menorahs, the less chance there is that any individual house will be targeted.” He helped create a communal identity in which people were willing to take risks that at the same time reduced the risk to their neighbors, and by encouraging others to follow their example, further reduced the risk to themselves.

D. A Sociological Approach

While it is imperative to understand how people behave in groups, it is also important to understand how groups behave and position themselves, which brings us to sociology.

As Kathleen Blee noted in the address she prepared for Gonzaga University’s Conference to Establish the Field of Hate Studies, group hate is a process which goes through stages, among them naming and labeling an “enemy” in a negative way, and myth-making about them. This need not be connected to our individual observations of people. For example, someone can be horribly homophobic and have a gay friend. One may sympathize with an individual (such as an immigrant in a desperate plight) but hate the abstract group to which that person belongs. Where different groups live, work or go to school, or how they otherwise interact or don’t interact which each other, are factors that also impact how the groups look at one another.

Blee also observed that not all group prejudices work the same way. Her extensive interviews with white supremacists revealed that, regardless of whether their reasons have any empirical validity, people can cite “concrete references” in their lives for bigotry against black people. They will say things such as, “When I was in fourth grade, this black girl took up too much of the seat, or played her music too loud, and then I realized the problem with black people.” But antisemitism “has no concrete reference in their lives,” Blee says. People may have joined a white supremacist group casually, for social reasons,
but once inside they learn the “secret” about the Jews. This learning of the “secrets” has a key role in binding them together. Clearly, antisemitism, which has a long-standing and—to the hater—“logical” storyline about Jews conspiring to harm non-Jews through various means, provides them an explanation for what they see as wrong in the world, and in turn, helps strengthen their group identity.

Sociology also helps us understand attitudes between and among groups. What one group thinks of another, over time, is important, especially as our society grows and changes. But an increasing concern is whether one of the main tools we use to gauge these trends—attitudinal surveys—has adapted sufficiently over time. I’m not sure some are asking the right questions anymore.

For one thing, when these instruments look at issues of hatred, their construction is often faulty. When David Duke was running for public office in the 1990s, many people who told those conducting surveys that they would not vote for him, did indeed do so. There is some authority to suggest that people are less likely to answer surveys honestly if they felt that their answers might be interpreted as being racist. Those of us monitoring Duke thought it prudent to double his numbers in polls when figuring strategy, and that was a wise choice. But how does one recalibrate other types of attitudinal surveys focusing on hate?

I’m particularly concerned with the design of attitudinal surveys that purport to ascertain what people think about Jews. Classically, if respondents express a certain number of stereotypes, they are classified as antisemitic. That leaves aside the fact that most people are certainly antisemitic or anti-black to one degree or another; it’s not a simple “yes” or “no” question, as the polls suggest, but a matter of gradation.

But the problem is also one of definitions. A recent Anti-Defamation League survey said that while 17 percent of Americans were antisemitic, only 3 percent of college students were. But during the period when that survey was taken, the ADL and many other Jewish organizations, including the one I work for, were spending an inordinate amount of time tackling antisemitism on campus. Did this mean that this 3 percent were more active than the average antisemite? Possibly. But a more likely explanation was that the poll was looking at “classically” antisemitic attitudes, such as whether Jews stick together more than most Americans, whether they’re not as honest, or have irritating faults, or like to be heads of things, or have too much power.

The problems on campus were not coming from those who felt that Jews were greasy or slimy, or who wouldn’t live next door to or wouldn’t marry a Jew. They were from those who didn’t have a problem with a Jew individually, but whose antisemitism was manifest in its collective expression, namely in the State of Israel. This is not to say that criticism of Israel is necessarily antisemitism. It clearly is not, as anyone who has read Israeli papers knows. But to single out only one people on the globe as not having the right of self-determi-
nation, or holding the state to a standard of behavior not applied to any other nation, is a form of bigotry that doesn’t get picked up in the classic models looking at intergroup attitudes.9

As I said, I know antisemitism best because I spend most of my time working as an anti-antisemite. But I have to wonder whether there are similar problems with survey instruments that look at bigoted or hateful attitudes toward other groups as well.

So far, I’ve just touched on a few areas in which history, evolutionary psychology, social psychology, and sociology have important things to say about hatred, with some observations about how they might each better inform other disciplines that also grapple with hatred. There’s much more each of these academic areas offer, and perhaps many others that have contributions to make too, among them economics, philosophy, and anthropology.

But rather than focus on those today—we certainly will at future conferences—I want to review a few areas of a second category of disciplines, those that have connections to institutions that can have an impact on hatred, for better or worse.

E. Religious Studies

Religious studies is one of those disciplines. Religion encompasses both the best and the worst of human interaction with hatred. It has set norms for universal human dignity, and it has justified the most barbaric carnage as taking place in the supreme service of God. Religion’s intersection with hatred can be most dangerous when theology and ideology are combined. It is then not only identity and politics that command hatred, but also the Supreme Being.

Furthermore, when we speak about religion, we don’t mean only matters of theology and theory, but we also look at religious institutions, as they have an impact on the individual, the individual in conjunction with the group, the group, political, and many other considerations.

One of the good things that came out of the controversy over Mel Gibson’s film *The Passion of the Christ* was that I got to meet Father John Pawlikowski. I learned from him that what the Church could do and not do was influenced, perhaps dictated, by a great many interlocking factors, among them a sense of institutional inertia due to the health of the Pope, the ascendancy of conservatives within the Church, and many other related challenges. So figuring out how to avoid religion’s being used to promote hatred, and how to empower it to combat it is a complex matter involving institutional concerns as well as purely theological ones.

Over my lifetime, despite some incidents to the contrary, the history of interreligious affairs has been a story of great success, especially in Jewish-Catholic relations. I recall my mother, a pediatric hematologist, relating how she had a young patient who asked her to help him memorize his catechism,
including its reference to “perfidious Jews,” while getting his regular blood transfusion. Vatican II and the acceptance of religious pluralism have been major steps forward in the last decades. But what else should be transpiring in this field?

We had a debate inside AJC about Irshad Manji. She is the Canadian Muslim woman mentioned earlier who is the author of *The Trouble with Islam: A Muslim’s Call for Reform in her Faith.* I wanted AJC to help Manji. Here was a woman who loved her religion, but saw its institutions and theological vision being taken over by people who discriminated against women, hated Jews and other non-Muslims, justified violence to achieve their goals, and beat down any impulse for pluralism or thought in favor of blind faith and obedience. How could we not help a woman who was trying to use religion to combat hate? But some of my colleagues argued that because Manji was outside the mainstream religious structure and was further looked down upon as a woman and a lesbian, we should avoid any association with her if we were to be “credible.” Ultimately, we helped Manji and that didn’t hurt our interfaith work, but the question raised in this debate—How do religious organizations best support the voices against hatred, both among their coreligionists and in other religions?—is a complex one.

And what about government? In the United States, church and state are separate, but that doesn’t mean that government doesn’t have a role. AJC, for example, exposed the fact that Saudi textbooks routinely promote antisemitism, anti-Americanism and anti-Christianity. That our ally is preaching hatred in the name of Islam to its populace has a real impact. Beyond the observation that the nationality of the majority of the September 11 hijackers was Saudi, there is the fact that peace in the Middle East can be achieved only if people see the conflict as a territorial one (territory can always be divided), and not if one side trains its populace to see the other as demonic. Shouldn’t our government be paying more attention to this problem?

European countries have a particular challenge in this regard. Foreign countries fund foreign-born imams who preach genocidal messages to their congregants. This is both a diplomatic and an internal challenge. Yet not much has been done, and the few “answers” suggested to date have serious flaws and shortcomings.

The French have outlawed Muslim head scarfs in public schools, under the theory that this enactment will help reinforce secularism. But isn’t there also the danger that by focusing on a religious symbol, as opposed to hateful practices and teachings, the government will further radicalize its Muslim population? I can imagine if someone passed a law clearly targeting the religious symbols of any group, coreligionists who might not wear the symbol would feel as if they, their values, and their ability to practice their faith were under attack, and would be angered. History, social psychology, and other disciplines certainly would have something to say about the wisdom of this legislation.
Along these same lines, I had a conversation a few months after the attacks of September 11 with the justice minister of a Western European country with a significant Muslim population, some of whom had documented and well-publicized connections with Al Qaeda figures. I told him that before the Oklahoma City bombing, the FBI had very little interest in the militia movement, despite warnings of dangerous and illegal activity provided to the agency by AJC, the Southern Poverty Law Center, and other organizations. After the bombing, however, the FBI woke up and infiltrated agents into groups that had both the means and plans for acts of domestic terrorism. Many were shut down with successful prosecutions.

How, I asked the minister, did he plan to deal with the similar challenge in his country? While the post-Oklahoma City law enforcement model was an obvious answer, how could it be applied in the much more difficult venue of extremist mosques? After all, with the militias, law enforcement infiltrators looked like the people they were investigating and spoke the same language. What law enforcement strategy did he envision to get around the linguistic and cultural differences between law enforcement and Islamists planning acts of terror? He said they were considering legislation to compel prayer and other activity to be conducted in the main (official) language. I was stunned. Could you imagine what would happen in the U.S. if there were radical Jewish groups bent on terrorism, and the U.S. government dictated that prayer couldn’t be conducted in Hebrew, but only in English?

It seems to me that how we understand and deal with religion—and especially how government institutions do so—will be an increasingly important matter, and something in which an integrated field of hate studies could make a major contribution.

F. Political Science Observations

Next, a few thoughts about political science. All hate beyond the purely individual, has of course a political purpose. And hate has frequently been used for political ends. Look at the history of any country or any conflict to find countless examples.

But there are other matters that should concern us too. Let me illustrate by discussing one aspect of the political purposes of antisemitism. Antisemitism has three forms—religious, racial, and political. The first is sometimes known as anti-Judaism; the second is best evidenced by Nazism, Christian Identity, and other related hatreds. Neither, of course, can be divorced from its political utility and history. But antisemitism’s “political” form—anti-Zionism—is the least understood and in recent years probably the most resurgent. Zionism, by the way, means nothing more than the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish state. It says nothing about the country’s borders, policies or practices. It is merely an affirmation of the right of Jews (like the right of Palestinians or any other people) to self-determination in a land of their own.
Anti-Zionism is a belief that Jews (usually alone among the peoples of the globe) do not have that right to self-determination. It takes the discrimination practiced historically against the Jews as individuals and employs it against their collective identity. Of course, it is okay to criticize Israel, but only by the same standard that one would criticize the policies of the United States, Egypt, or any other country. Frequently this purely political type of antisemitism uses the same tropes as the older kinds—seeing Jews conspiring to harm non-Jews through devious means and control of key societal institutions.

I mention all this because it is clear that even people who have an anti-racist political stance can be hateful, as was evidenced at the United Nations’ World Conference against Racism in Durban in the summer of 2001. Representatives of human rights groups from around the world convened, and the language of human rights was hijacked in order to demonize Israel and the Jews within it. Groups that could be counted on to criticize white supremacist groups who peddled Mein Kampf and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion were conspicuously silent when these very volumes were distributed in Arabic. Groups that would be quick to pounce on promoters of an anti-gay or anti-woman agenda were blind to these policies among groups, such as Hamas, which also preach the need to destroy Israel. So even for some who know better, certain types of hate will matter less when political considerations trump values.

Let me add one more instance which has great resonance. You may recall that after the collapse of the Middle East peace process in 2000 there were many attacks on Jews and Jewish-linked property around the world, but in no place more than in France. French government officials told us that the “solution” to the attacks was for there to be peace in the Middle East.11 Now, of course, every well-meaning person wants that, but is that a credible answer when people are being stabbed, cemeteries desecrated, and synagogues burned? Would we have accepted that answer from the federal government in the 1960s—that the lynching of black folk would end when the races learned to live together? Political views sometimes even trump basic law enforcement principles, such as recognizing the danger to society itself when hate crimes run unchecked.

The most important political science questions involve governments. For example, the spring before the September 11 attacks I had asked a senior State Department official why the United States did nothing when the major newspapers of Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries frequently ran articles depicting Jews in the same dehumanizing way the Nazis did—describing them as vermin, accusing them of attacking non-Jews to steal their blood, and so forth. If the U.S. wants peace, I argued, you can’t make peace with the devil, and that’s what most readers of these papers will see Jews as. “What would you like us to do?” he asked. “Pull out the air bases from Saudi Arabia?” Clearly, there are things our government can do to extract a “cost” for promoting hatred short of
pulling out air bases (which were later closed anyway after the second war in Iraq began). Here was an example of how other policies—such as an energy policy that still leaves us dependent on foreign oil—limit our capacity to confront hate.

There are also lessons to be learned from Israel’s support of Hamas as a counterforce to the PLO and the U.S.’s support of Islamist groups in Afghanistan, armed and funded to fight the Soviet Union. You do not need a degree in hate studies to know that arming zealous religious/political movements for short-term reasons is not a good long-term strategy, because they have their own hateful agenda which sooner or later will come to the fore. But did those who were making the political calculations at the time—Americans wondering how best to cause trouble to the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the endgame of the “Cold War,” or Israelis wondering how to weaken a growing PLO through competition—even ponder the long-term countervailing considerations a historian, social psychologist, or religious studies expert might have put forward?

It has been said that the U.S. government had a good plan for toppling Saddam Hussein, but not much of a plan in the aftermath. Imagine if, before the shooting started, the government had fully consulted experts in hate to consider the possible impact, including the still-looming danger, evidenced recently in the former Yugoslavia, of the breakup of a country held together by a strongman, opening a Pandora’s Box of competing religious fundamentalists with guns.

Government on the local level could also be greatly improved by a field of hate studies. When a city is about to open a new park, it has to consider the environmental impact. Why shouldn’t it also be required to consider the intergroup impact? There is an opportunity here to bring together different communities in a constructive way—say through basketball games—to reduce tensions and improve understanding and cooperation.

If I had one pragmatic wish for the field of hate studies, it would be this: that it would institutionalize the review of proposed government policies to see how they might impact matters of hate. Government officials would routinely ask questions such as: “Will this proposed policy tap into the triggers that history warns us about, or worsen intergroup relations?” And, conversely, they’d ask, “Can this proposed policy be implemented in a way that can improve intergroup relations, marginalize haters, and reinforce ideas of community?”

G. The Impact of Law

Related to politics is the field of law. The rule of law, of course, is essential for freedom and democracy. Law regulates society and defines norms. What I worry about, however, is that “law” and “hate” don’t mesh as well as they should.
While hate crime legislation—both the counting of hate crimes and the increased sentence for those who select victims based on their race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, or disability—is very important, that shouldn’t be the sum total of how we look at hate through law.\footnote{12}

Law, I fear, is too frequently a “black hole” that sucks away other, perhaps more important, initiatives to combat hate—initiatives that other disciplines should be more aggressive in proposing.

In the late 1980s many college campuses in the United States promoted “hate speech codes.” This functional criminal law of the college campus would have outlawed hateful expression. Aside from their constitutional infirmities (violating the right of free speech enshrined in the First Amendment), these codes were also a subterfuge. Administrators could point to the new regulation and say they had addressed the issue of hate on campus. By doing so, they ignored important steps such as changing the curriculum, surveying students in order to understand their experiences, preparing students who would be mingling with people of different backgrounds perhaps for the first time, training staff, creating hotlines, and other labor-intensive initiatives.

Likewise, many countries that don’t have First Amendment-like guarantees of free expression have proposed banning hate sites on the Internet. Aside from the technical difficulty (read impossibility) of doing so, why shouldn’t the focus instead be on teaching children and others the skills necessary to identify and reject hate on the Internet? Countries require a certain minimal driver’s education before getting behind the wheel of a car, among other reasons, so that the driver will recognize anticipated dangers and be prepared to respond appropriately. Wouldn’t it make sense to insure that students are trained to navigate the Internet, with \textit{all} its dangers, rather than hope that a huge cyberspace delete switch will somehow magically take care of the problem?

Too often we default to thinking that the law is the only, or the best, answer to a societal problem. Passing a law is relatively easy and straightforward: Some legislative body votes, some executive signs a piece of paper, and the law becomes reality. A thriving field of hate studies would help suggest other options that might better address the underlying concerns, and in the process, make solutions proposed by social psychologists and educators seem not only logical, but also, as we learn to turn to these fields for answers, less challenging to implement.

The interdisciplinary approach of hate studies would, conversely, expand the appropriate uses of law. For example, hate crime legislation now requires the federal government to collect statistics annually and encourages the states to provide the data. But should data collection, as important as it is for spotting annual trends and for prompting once-a-year stories on the release of the statistics, be enough? What if the information were put on a Web site in a database, updated with new information regularly? Wouldn’t this provide an opportunity for religious institutions to find out about and “adopt” a particular hate crime in
their region, helping to make the victim whole and keeping attention on the case until a culprit is identified and convicted? What if the database were sortable, so that journalists, academics and others could see regularly if there were more of certain types of hate crimes in one area or another, or different rates of apprehension and conviction? What if the cases were tagged by state and date, so that if one was reported in the newspaper or otherwise came to light and wasn’t included in the database, it could be noted, thereby encouraging regions that don’t report hate crimes now to do so?

By taking the teachings of other fields, and considering the implications of this data on the individual, on the individual within the group, and between groups, this dry legal data could have a much greater utility.

H. The Role of Journalism

Final in our brief survey of academic areas tied to institutions is journalism. It is a major means through which people get their information. Regardless of the complexities of the situation and the fairness of the depiction, for example, I’m sure that when Al Jazeera shows pictures of an armed Israeli soldier together with a Palestinian youth, it has a huge impact.

But we also know that journalism can have a key role in combating hatred. You will recall that when the Jewish child in Billings, Montana, had his window shattered because it sported a picture of a menorah during Chanukah time, it was the local paper that printed pictures of menorahs and encouraged all the citizens of Billings to display them.

One of the best models of coverage of hate groups occurred right here in Spokane, Washington. Bill Morlin’s reportage of the militia movement was superb. He and his colleagues at the Spokesman-Review made the militia members seem human and understandable, and not, as in so many other papers, cartoonish. You could recognize them as your neighbors, but you also comprehended the danger they posed.

Journalists should be trained with the tools of hate studies in order better to report matters related to hate, and also to help translate the growing knowledge of hate studies experts to the general public in useful ways. Perhaps as hate studies becomes established, there could be journalists’ retreats for those who cover the “hate” beat to spend time with hate studies experts.

While I’m glad that others will amplify the possible contributions of the fields I’ve touched on in this address, I’m disappointed that we don’t have enough time at this initial conference on the establishment of the field of hate studies to have presentations from experts in other disciplines with much to offer, such as biology, anthropology, economics, and education.
I. The Role of Educational Programs

Education, I believe, is critical. It is the usual “default” method for dealing with hatred, and I have many questions and concerns.

A few years ago, before the collapse of the Middle East peace process, there was a series of attacks on immigrants and also on some Jews in Germany. My agency, which has produced an anti-bias curriculum called “Hands Across the Campus,” was considering exporting this product to Germany, and I was asked my opinion. I was also asked about the possibility of working with another U.S.-based educational organization, Facing History and Ourselves, to combat the problem of hateful youngsters engaging in violence against racial and religious minorities there.

My first question was whether educational programs that used the Holocaust as part of their lesson plan would be transferable to Germany, where the Holocaust was part of its national history. But then I asked an even more basic question: How do we know these educational programs work?

We had never conducted a long-term study to see whether the lessons learned from “Hands Across the Campus” actually stuck. Nor had there been such a study of the Anti-Defamation League’s “A World of Difference” program, nor of the Southern Poverty Law Center’s “Teaching Tolerance.” All of them had been evaluated to gauge what the teachers thought of them, but none to see whether they worked on the students over time.

The Carnegie Foundation, however, had funded one short-term study of “Facing History.” It looked during one school year at 212 eighth-grade “Facing History” students, and compared them with 134 similar non-Facing History students.

While the study focused mostly at the program’s impact on violence, it also included a scale on racism. Leaving aside some problems with the scale—it included opposition to affirmative action as an indication of racism (which it can be, but need not be)—its findings were intriguing. It found that girl students and those classified as “nonfighters” emerged from the program less racist, but the program made no difference for boys, and (as with the control group) those classified as “fighters” actually became more racist while going through the program. And, as I said, there was no follow-up to see if even the minimal positive effects on girls and nonfighters (clearly not the type who were causing Germans their problem, by the way) held over time.

If someone ran a pharmaceutical company that said, “I have this pill which will cure disease X. We haven’t actually done any long-term studies, but trust us,” there would be a legal word to describe such a statement: negligent.

Unfortunately, there are ample precedents for costly educational initiatives having no lasting impact. As Cookie Stephan noted in her paper, “The Evaluation of Multicultural Education Programs: Techniques and a Meta-Analysis,” the school-based anti-smoking campaign has been in place for over a quarter
century, and has been regularly praised. It uses puppet play about second-hand smoke in elementary school, role-play on saying “no” in middle school, and testimony from tobacco trials in high school. A fifteen-year study was conducted covering 8,400 students. The result? Those who went through the program were just as likely to smoke as those who did not.

Stephan also cited the DARE program, which stands for Drug Abuse Resistance Education, popularly known as “just say no.” The program started in 1983. Three-quarters of the elementary schools in the United States use it. Over $126 million has been spent on it. And it turns out, kids who went through this program were just as likely to use drugs as those who didn’t. As one commentator noted, what felt good didn’t do good.

Stephan conducted a meta-analysis of the small number of studies on antibias curricula. None of these were long-term studies, and her conclusion—that these curricula likely help reduce prejudice—is suspect because, as she herself points out, “It is almost certain that evaluations showing no or negative differences were conducted but did not see print.”

She also stressed that there was little data on the differences between the programs. Some use text, others experiential models, for example. Some are used in one grade, some in another. Even if these programs did work, there is too little data to direct which type of program, targeted to which gender at which age level, would be the best investment.

The goal of the creation of a field of hate studies is to understand how hate works, and how most effectively to combat it. Fighting hate is a zero-sum game. Money spent on one type of program—including educational programs—cannot be spent elsewhere. It is a priority for the field of hate studies to encourage long-term testing of the prescriptions we fund to combat hate, and to see if they, in fact, work.

III. IF NOT NOW, WHEN?

Finally, why is the creation of the field of hate studies critical now? There are many answers, but let me offer four.

First, isolated answers regarding hate tend to be incomplete. Consider Jerrold Post, whom I admire and enjoyed working with during the heyday of the militia movement. He heads the political psychology program at George Washington University. Post said:

A little skepticism is healthy, but a deep craving for enemies is a spiritual crutch. You start with alienated or unsuccessful people, feed them mind-numbing suspicions and rationalizations, and before you know it, you’ve got “patriotic resisters” who say government is an agent of the anti-Christ.14

That may describe some of the militia folk, but it hardly explains Osama
bin Laden or the suicide bombers who blew up themselves and many Israelis shortly after finishing a college exam.

Or, as I mentioned, there is Poussaint’s claim about “extreme racism,” arguing that by classifying it as a mental disorder more people can be treated. But he did not fully consider whether this would help violent criminals have a viable defense, or cause us to diagnose millions of people (such as 48 percent of Pakistanis who believe the antisemitic 9/11 conspiracy theories) as suffering from a mental disease.

Second, by the middle of this century—if you believe the demographic projections—the United States will be a country in which the majority of the population will be nonwhite. How many Americans will be fearful of this change, and how many of them will be drawn to racist and antisemitic theologies and ideologies, such as Christian Identity and Christian Patriotism, which are now fringe phenomena, but which offer them a sense of power and purpose? While Pat Buchanan, who played into some of these fears during the 2000 presidential election, didn’t get any traction, look at Jean-Marie Le Pen in France or Joerg Haider in Austria to gauge what problems may be in store for us in the decades ahead.

Third, the events of September 11, 2001, were a wake-up call on many fronts. First, they made clear the dangers of mass murder from terrorists driven by hatred. A handful of people died during the first Al Qaeda attack on the World Trade Center in 1993. Thousands died in the attack of 2001. Is this a progression? Will the next attack kill tens of thousands, or more? There is near certainty that, soon or later, there will be a biological, chemical, or nuclear attack by terrorists, who see a holy mission in mass murders, and past atrocities as goals to be surpassed. How do we better understand and reduce their ability to work and attract adherents? How do we make sure that, if we have to sacrifice some liberties for increased security, we make logical, useful, and not hysterical choices? These are not abstract questions. I think about them every time I ride the train over the Manhattan Bridge, peering out at the changed face of the New York skyline, sometimes recalling that the bridge—with thousands of people on it at any time in cars, trucks, buses, and subway trains—is itself a potential target.

And fourth, there is the growth of antisemitism. I have been working on a new book on antisemitism, which I started in the summer of 2000. Back then many people were saying that antisemitism was “dead.” And as if to prove their point, Senator Joseph Lieberman, an Orthodox Jew yet, ran as a vice-presidential candidate on a major American ticket, with no backlash. I wanted to write a book to make the point that, while antisemitism was clearly a lesser problem than it was a generation or two ago, it was foolhardy to think that a hatred that has had great utility for a variety of purposes over the last two millennia, and which in each generation seems to offer new and updated conspiracy theories on the same general themes, would somehow disappear.
I need not make that case anymore. The attacks on Jews worldwide after the collapse of the peace process—especially in parts of Europe—made the case. The virtual orgy of antisemitism at the World Conference against Racism in Durban, where the language of anti-racism was hijacked by human rights activists to argue that in to be a good anti-racist one must demonize and vilify Israel and the Jews who support its right to exist, made the case. The events of September 11, and the overnight belief by many around the globe that Jews/Israelis were behind this horror, made the case.

Stop and think about this for a minute: After the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, an identical theory popped up overnight: the claim that the federal government had bombed the building, proven by the “fact” that all federal law enforcement officials, including FBI agents and U.S. Marshals, had been warned not to go into the Murrah building that day. But only people in the militias believed this conspiracy theory. The conspiracy theory about the events of 9/11 is a mainstream belief in many parts of the world, echoed and amplified not only by the “man on the street,” but by religious, journalistic, and government leaders in many countries. Imagine the difficult situation we’d be in today as Americans if militia-think were a mainstream phenomenon shared by our leaders. That’s the situation regarding Jews in many parts of the world, and a reason that I’m thankful that there are so few Jews left in the various Arab countries that expelled them after the creation of the State of Israel, despite their having lived there for thousands of years. And it is also why I worry about the impact of antisemitism beyond its effect on Jews. History teaches that the level of anti-Semitism is a miner’s canary for the health of societies; and that while hateful movements frequently start with Jews, they never end there.

For all these reasons, and others, I’m concerned that the climate is amenable to the growth of hatred over the next decades, and that therefore now is a critical time for us to become much smarter about how we approach it.

IV. WHAT A FIELD OF HATE STUDIES MIGHT ACCOMPLISH

What might a field of hate studies do to help such a mission? It might provide better answers to the series of questions I asked toward the beginning of this paper. It might create a common vocabulary among the various academic disciplines, thus encouraging an integrated system of knowledge and research. It might help us gain a more complete understanding of the various components of hatred, and provide testable theories to guide the actions of individuals, groups, and institutions—including governments. It might spur woefully needed research on education, and not only help debunk myths on which we may well be wasting great resources and energy, but also help define the approaches that work and refine, improve, and institutionalize them. (For if some educational approaches work, it makes no sense for outside groups to bring them into schools here or there, any more than it would make sense to
trust the teaching of reading or math only to nonprofits, rather than have it as a core part of the school mission and curricula.)

An integrated field of hate studies might come up with new initiatives, such as a program of national service for high school seniors, perhaps taking kids during the last month of their senior year, which is generally party-time anyway, and sending them to different parts of the country to work with local communities. Imagine sending a Jewish kid from New York and an African American kid from Chicago and an American Indian kid from South Dakota and a Mexican American kid from Oregon to work together to help rural poor in the South build a new school or community center. This would be social psychology come alive—the superordinate goal from the Robbers Cave experiment institutionalized. Would America be a less hateful place if all eighteen-year-olds, no matter how impoverished or disadvantaged, shared an experience of helping others? Would there be less bigotry on campus if all incoming first-year college students had similar experiences working as a team with people of different backgrounds to improve America, far away from their homes?

My hope is that the removal of the blinders that afflict each of the different disciplines that touch on hate would expand our thinking, not only about what we know, but also about what we can do, to improve our world, to make it less hateful and dangerous.

For instance, the last time I checked, the FBI profiled serial killers, but made no effort to profile hate crime offenders. Would it make sense to have such knowledge, not only to increase the chances of apprehending those who commit hate crimes, but also to find out how to better identify people at serious risk for such behavior and help them beforehand?

Or, consider, that as a society we quantify almost everything, but I’ve never heard any statistic about the annual cost of hate. How does one compute such a thing? What should be included? Here is where the field of economics could play a valuable role. I wouldn’t be surprised if “hate,” however computed, costs Americans billions per year. If we could somehow quantify this and issue an annual report on this cost, it might be a very useful enterprise.

And shouldn’t we also encourage governments and other groups to assess the impact of important decisions on intergroup hate—both as to the possibility that their actions might exacerbate the problem and also to identify opportunities to pull people together in a way designed to break down stereotypes?

And why couldn’t a field of hate studies produce an annual report card on hate in America, incorporating important factors identified by each of the component academic areas?

Wouldn’t such a field also help guide important government policies, including those directed toward immigration, integration, and intergroup relations (let alone foreign policy, which too often has reaffirmed the law of unintended consequences)? You don’t need a degree in hate studies, for example, to
understand that it would be only a short period before most Iraqis no longer thought of Americans as “liberators,” and instead considered us “occupiers.”

On campus, a field of hate studies would allow in-house “case studies,” especially when hateful things are advocated by speakers, including faculty.

Most importantly, an integrated field would help spur research and new programs. Hate is clearly going to become an increasingly urgent issue—one impacting whether we live or die, not only how we live. We need to treat this problem with the seriousness it deserves.

V. HOW TO MAKE THE NEW FIELD OF HATE STUDIES A REALITY

So, how do we pull all this together? How do we better identify ways each academic area can better inform and improve the others? Here are some initial thoughts.

We can encourage faculty who deal with issues of hate on each campus to create forums—including classes taught from multiple disciplines—to address the issue.

We can encourage faculty from each discipline to help compile a checklist of questions and approaches that each academic area offers, and that might be useful to scholars from different disciplines—a “crib sheet,” if you will.

We can encourage universities to allow students to major in “hate,” and graduate with a degree in “hate studies,” in the short term, by taking courses in different disciplines with that central theme, and over the long term, by taking courses affiliated with such a department.

We can define urgent challenges and issues in need of research and scholarship, and encourage people from different disciplines to tackle the same topic, and then combine their analyses and findings.

As an institute launching this field, we could issue an annual prize to the institution or individual doing the most to help increase our understanding of hatred, thus helping recognize and publicize important achievements.

We—as academics and others supporting the creation of hate studies—could put together teams from different disciplines who, on an annual basis, could meet with leadership of various nongovernmental organizations and help them review their policy initiatives and concerns through the lens of hate studies.

We can help groups that see themselves as distinct—Jews, blacks, Latinos, women, gays, and others—increase not only their understanding of the interrelationship of the types of hate that afflict them, but also their knowledge about how better to construct systems that will fight this interlocked challenge.

And, perhaps the next time the U.S. is prepared to embark on a major initiative such as the war in Iraq, experts in “hate studies”—regardless of whether they support or oppose the plan of action—can help the government and the country (through academic forums, articles in journals and newspapers,
television programs, Internet sites, and other means) think through the consequences regarding hatred and terrorism, and better anticipate the challenges and how to deal with them most effectively.

In short, there is an overabundance of both questions to define hate studies, and urgent real-world needs that such a field can help address. I’m pleased to be working with you as, together, we—the Gonzaga Institute Against Hate, the American Jewish Committee, and all the people gathered here from around the country—start on this grand project.

NOTES

1. Kenneth S. Stern is the American Jewish Committee’s expert on antisemitism and bigotry. Mr. Stern is the author of three books on human rights: A Force Upon the Plain: The American Militia Movement and the Politics of Hate; Holocaust Denial; and the award-winning Loud Hawk: The United States vs. The American Indian Movement. A frequent guest on television news shows, Mr. Stern has argued before the United States Supreme Court, testified before Congress, and was an invited presenter at the White House Conference on Hate Crimes.


4. This is a phenomenon beyond that of contemporary suicide bombers. Many members of the American Indian Movement who were involved in protests such as the takeover of the Bureau of Indian Affairs building in Washington D.C. in the 1970s told me that they recited the Lakota saying about its being “a good day to die.”


9. A method I frequently use to gauge bigotry is to take a scenario, mix up the ethnicity, race, religion, gender or other attributes of the “players,” and see if the same rules apply. If they don’t, there’s usually a problem.

10. Kippahs and large crosses were also outlawed in school, but the head scarf was universally understood to be the target of the legislation.

11. More recently, the French government has taken some important steps to counter antisemitic violence.

12. Of course there are related aspects of how law deals with prejudice and discrimination—from matters of workplace harassment to affirmative action—that, as Renae Cohen suggested, might have some relevance to our consideration of hate. However, these are beyond the scope of this paper.


Religion as Hatred: Antisemitism as a Case Study

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The topic of religion as a source of hatred could be explored through several lenses. I first came to this topic through an analysis and evaluation of the studies done on prejudice in Catholic teaching materials undertaken in the sociology department of St. Louis University. This evaluation of ways in which Catholic textbooks covering literature, social studies, and religion generated stereotypes of religious and racial outgroups opened my eyes to the ways in which religion could become a force for social hatred rather than reconciliation. This initial research has grounded my subsequent work both as a social ethicist and as a scholar concerned about interreligious relations. It has convinced me that any effort to use religion as a source for social reconciliation must be preceded by a thorough examination of how religion has historically contributed to the birth of social prejudice.

Any comprehensive examination of religion as a source of hatred needs to probe religion’s often negative depiction of people of color, women, the Roma people (i.e. gypsies), aboriginal people, the disabled, gays and lesbians, and other minorities. For me the long history of Christian antisemitism provides an excellent window to an understanding on how religion can generate prejudice that leads to hatred. I have been especially interested over the years in how Christianity contributed to the rise and acceptance of Nazi ideology during the Holocaust. And recently I have begun to examine the crimes against humanity in Rwanda, where the role of Christianity, Catholicism in particular, in laying the seedbed for genocide has not yet been fully comprehended.

In this paper I will focus on the history of Christian antisemitism as an important case study of how religion can turn into a force for hate. I will then suggest ways in which religion might learn from this history of antisemitism, how it might overcome this instinct for fomenting hatred and become a strong force for human reconciliation.

Some scholars have in fact have posited a direct connection between this “longest hatred,” the title of a contemporary film on antisemitism, and subsequent forms of religio-based hatred. Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza in particular has argued that the subjugation of the Jews to an inferior status that led to their portrayal as sons and daughters of satanic darkness laid the groundwork for
Western Christianity’s defense of the fundamental inferiority of women and slaves. “Christian biblical theology must recognize,” she insists, “that its articulation of anti-Judaism in the N[ew] T[estament] goes hand in hand with its gradual adaptation to Greco-Roman patriarchal society.”2 This anti-Judaism conferred a religious legitimacy on the subjugation of certain groups of people. When Christianity became wedded to an Aristotelian philosophy, its original anti-Judaism, the pool of inferior people expanded to include women and slaves. In Fiorenza’s view this early anti-Judaism destroyed the far more egalitarian impulse of the Jesus movement, whose roots lay in the Pharisaic social revolution that promoted enhanced equality within Second Temple Judaism, as Ellis Rivkin and others have noted.3 So, following Fiorenza, we can posit an interest connection between anti-Semitism in the Christian churches and the wider question of religion and hatred looked at from the perspective of Christianity.

This centuries-long social disease of antisemitism has been described as a “shadow” over the cross. Recent Catholic documents have spoken in even stronger language. In 1989 the Pontifical Commission for Justice and Peace insisted that “harboring racist thoughts and entertaining racist attitudes is a sin.”4 Furthermore, it clearly included antisemitism in its list of continuing manifestations of anti-racist ideologies that are to be regarded as sinful. In point of fact, it terms antisemitism “the most tragic form that racist ideology has assumed in our century.”5 During a visit to Hungary in 1991, conscious of the post-Communist era resurgence of antisemitism in certain parts of Central and Eastern Europe, the Pope spoke of the urgent task of repentance and reconciliation. “In face of a risk of a resurgence and spread of antisemitic feelings, attitudes, and initiatives,” he said, “we must teach consciences to consider antisemitism, and all forms of racism, as sins against God and humanity.”6 And in his book Crossing the Threshold of Hope, the Holy Father repeats this theme as he calls antisemitism ”a great sin against humanity.”7

Recently the issue of a rising, new form of antisemitism, particularly in parts of Europe, has been widely discussed in the media. A recent volume by Marvin Perry and Frederick M. Schweitzer, two historians who have collaborated on the study of antisemitism over several decades, does an excellent job of bringing the historical reality of antisemitism, especially its Christian form, into the present day.8 This book is a welcome successor to the groundbreaking volume by the late Fr. Edward Flannery titled The Anguish of the Jews, which first appeared in the mid-sixties.9 This rising form of antisemitism in Europe has generated several strong responses from religious leaders. British Chief Rabbi Dr. Jonathan Sacks was joined by the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Rowan Williams, and the Cardinal, Cormac Murphy-O’Connor, in their capacity as joint Presidents of the Council of Christians & Jews, in warning of the potential danger of this new antisemitic trend.10 And in a late December 2003 interview with the prominent Italian newspaper La Stampa, Cardinal Roger Etchegaray, former President of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace,
expressed concern that “there is a return of antisemitism in our Europe. . .. Not to recognize it, not to call it by its name is an unwitting way of accepting it.” 11 The Cardinal urged constant vigilance and frank solidarity with Jewish communities to combat the trend. Clearly, antisemitism is a problem that continues to demand attention in our day.

We can now turn to an overview of Christian antisemitism as an example of how hatred can corrupt a religious tradition that in principle has the notion of love of neighbor as a central tenet. There is some scholarly dispute regarding the question of whether Christian antisemitism has its roots in the New Testament itself. I believe the issue is rather complicated, and I have addressed it in other writings. 12 Whatever the final scholarly determination of that question, and certainly there are some grounds for arguing for possible New Testament roots in passages in the gospel of John in which Jews are associated with the forces of darkness and with the devil, 13 it is evident that Christian leaders and preachers often interpreted New Testament text in an antisemitic fashion. When we come to the immediate post biblical era known as the Patristic period, there is little doubt that antisemitism becomes a core component of Christian identity. A number of Christian scholars, including Robert Wilken, David Efroymson, and Rosemary Radford, have uncovered a prevailing anti-Judaic bias at the core of the writings of the Church Fathers. While notable exceptions such as Clement of Alexandria can be found, 14 the great patristic writers such as Tertullian, Origen, Irenaeus, and Eusebius all made antisemitism an integral part of stating the fundamental meaning of the Christian faith.

In many of his writings, but especially in those directed against Marcion, who wanted to eliminate the Old Testament from the church’s biblical canon, Tertullian presented Jesus as the messiah who ought to have been recognized by the Jewish people but was not. As a result, he argued, the Jews were subjected to God’s wrath. For Tertullian, Jesus’ severity towards Jews was completely in line with the antagonism expressed by his Father, the Creator. As David Efroymson puts it,

> What seems significant here is not the negative picture of the Jews of Jesus’ time, which was, of course, already firmly embedded in the tradition. It is rather the heavy emphasis on the appropriateness of the opposition between Jesus and the Jews, or between Jesus and the Jews, or between God and Jews. . . . Not only was there an emphatic heightening of an anti-Jewishness ascribed to Jesus; there was the additional element, apparently now crucial against Marcion, of a God who for some time had “opposed” Israel and had wanted to rid himself of the “old” covenant in the interest of something new and better. 15

Origen’s approach was marked by a particular emphasis on what he called the “spiritual sense” of the scriptures. Reading the biblical texts in this way, he insists in On First Principles, is the solution to the problem of the “hardhearted
and ignorant members of the circumcision” (that is, Jews), who “refused to believe in our Savior” because they could not get beyond the literal sense of the text (4.2.1).

Irenaeus explained Jewish law as necessary for a time because of human sinfulness. But the coming of Jesus and the destruction of Jerusalem signaled that the time of the Jews and their law was over. According to Irenaeus, Jesus was attacking the Jewish claim to be able to know the Father without accepting the Son. He relied on the parables of the wicked tenants (Mt 21:33-34) and the wedding feast (Mk 22:1-14) to “prove” that God had destined the Gentiles to replace unresponsive Jews in the kingdom.

The most important and complete Christian document of the patristic era was Justin’s Dialogue with Trypho. It became a model for discussions about Judaism in the ancient church. Justin’s writings were the first real expression of the idea that Jewish social misfortunes are the consequence of divine punishment for the death of Jesus. As a result, Justin explains, Jews will never be able to escape suffering in human society. Having made references to the expulsion of Jews from Jerusalem, their desolate lands and burned out cities, Justin assures his rabbinic dialogue partner that these sufferings were justly imposed by God in light of Jewish responsibility for the death of Jesus. Here we have the seeds of an attitude that would come to dominate the thinking of the church by the fourth century and greatly contribute to the spread of antisemitism.

Finally, Eusebius, in his early fourth century Ecclesiastical History, confines the role of Jews to that of witnessing to divine justice. That was especially true in the first century, when Jews were being punished at the hands of the Romans while the Christian church was flourishing.

Over the centuries this original patristic adversus Judaeos tradition exercised a sometimes direct, sometimes more subtle anti-Judaic impact on Christian theological formulation of the meaning of Jesus’ ministry, death, and resurrection. But it also was the basis for increased social legislation against Jews. And the transfer of the adversus Judaeos tradition into Christian art, comprehensively depicted in Heinz Schreckenberb’s The Jews in Christian Art, further assisted the implantation of the negative image of Jews and Judaism into the prevailing ethos of Christian societies.

No century was more decisive for Jewish-Christian relations than the fourth. The Edict of Milan issued by Emperor Constantine in A.D. 313 granted freedom of worship to all religious groups, including Jews. But Christianity quickly was to become the chief beneficiary of this decree, while Jewish fortunes were to sink to a new low.

In A.D. 323 Christianity was granted a special position within the empire. Judaism theoretically continued as a legal religion, but it was frequently abused by Christian preachers and people without any action being taken by the imperial government. By the time Emperor Constantine converted to Christianity on his deathbed in 329, the imperial government had already begun to institute
restrictive measures against Jewish privileges. By the end of the fourth century, the civil status of Jews was in serious danger and their image had greatly deteriorated. The Jew was now seen as a semi-satanic figure, cursed by God, and specially set apart by the civil government.

It was in the fourth century that Christian preachers turned upon Judaism with great force. Foremost among these preachers was John Chrysostom. His denunciations of the Jewish people are found in six sermons he delivered in Antioch, where Jews were numerous and influential and where apparently some Christians were attending synagogues and visiting Jewish homes. He accused the Jews of all imaginable crimes and vices. The devil lived in Jewish homes, according to John Chrysostom, and the synagogue was an assembly of animals. This was so because of the Jews’ assassination of Jesus. God has always hated the Jews, John Chrysostom insisted, and they will forever remain without temple or nation.

In addition to the teachings of Christian preachers and teachers, the legislative measures taken by both the church and the empire, sometimes in concert, proved crucial for the situation of the Jews. Church councils in this period did everything possible to prevent any contact between Christians and Jews, fearing that the Christians’ faith would suffer as a result. The imperial legislation went even further and directly interfered with the life of the Jewish community through a series of new laws. The culmination of this process took place with the publication of the Theodosian Code in 438. Some of the laws in this code actually protected Jews from violence and asserted their basic rights and freedom. But the largest section restricted Jewish cult and activities.

As a result of this legislation Jews were generally forced out of agriculture and industry and into smaller trades and crafts. The pattern of Jewish life for centuries to come was being formed. Jews were also barred from public functions in the empire, and marriage to Jews was considered shameful; those who engaged in it were subject to the death penalty. All Jewish rights to govern their own communities were abolished by the beginning of the fifth century. While in some respects this imperial legislation tried to maintain the freedom of worship granted the Jews in older Roman law, it reflected the spirit and frequently the letter of the decrees of church councils.

The Christian picture of Judaism developed in the fourth and fifth centuries gave the churches for centuries a pseudo-religious basis for countless persecutions of the Jews. Misguided Christians considered themselves chosen to assist God in fulfilling the curse upon the Jews and felt they were free to engage in attacking Jews, as they had a divine seal of approval. As the ecclesial political power increased, a terrible cancer gnawed at its basic spirit. This caused many Jews to flee to Babylonia, which became the national and cultural center of Judaism.

Despite the Theodosian Code’s protection of Jewish rights in theory, these rights were often violated in the ensuing centuries. Matters were made worse
for Jews in the sixth century when Emperor Justinian I decided to redo the
Theodosian Code. His substantive revision, which came to be known as the
Justinian Code, basically eliminated many of the protective clauses regarding
Jews in the original version, including the provision that guaranteed Jews the
right to practice their religion. The Justinian Code imposed new restrictions on
the Jews in nearly all areas. The most critical restriction was the transfer of
power to the Emperor to regulate Jewish worship.

All was not total darkness for Jews in the Medieval society. In West
Europe the conquering peoples, such as the Goths and the Lombards, generally
accepted the protections accorded Jews in the original version of the Theodo-
sian Code. And Pope Gregory the Great (590-604), while intent on converting
Jews, added his public support for these articles in the Code. The so-called
Golden Age in Spain gave Jews unprecedented access to public life, even
though some restrictions remained in force. And subsequently in Poland, after
the collapse of the Golden Age, which occasioned extensive Jewish migration
to that country, Jews were accorded a measure of toleration and even political
freedom by Polish princes, despite opposition from some church leaders.
Charlemagne and his son Louis the Pious also committed themselves to the
legal protection of the Jewish community.

A strong reaction against these efforts at giving Jews a measure of equality
eventually took hold. St. Agobard (779-840) returned to the rhetoric of John
Chrysostom. The civil situation quickly worsened. With the death of Charles
the Bald, Jewish rights practically vanished in the quicksand of feudalism. The
ninth century produced new forms of Jewish persecutions. Jews were accused
of treason on a number of occasions. In addition, a custom developed whereby
on every Good Friday, in punishment for their supposed part in Christ’s death,
Jews received a facial blow.

In the Medieval period, the preaching associated with the birth of the
Crusader movement spelled even greater difficulties for the Jews. It seemed
unreasonable to the Crusaders to travel great distances to liberate the Holy
Land and not attack the people they held responsible for Christ’s death along
the way. The first Crusade in 1096 saw bloody attacks against Jews in various
parts of the Rhineland in Germany. Massacres of the Jews were part and parcel
of each subsequent Crusade.

During the years between the first and second Crusades, Jews were forced
into occupations distasteful or forbidden to the Christian community. Many of
these occupations were connected with finance. It would be false to suppose
that all Jews were money lenders. Yet Jews became identified with this occupa-
tion, a stereotype that has not completely disappeared even in our own time.
The identification of the Jews as money lenders led to a suppression of their
rights as time went on.

In the second half of the twelfth century there arose another libel that
fanned flames of hatred against the Jews—unverified accusations of ritual mur-
der. It was charged that each Holy Week Jews killed a Christian, usually a child, as a sacrificial offering for Passover. The murder of a young man named William in the English town of Norwich in 1144 was the first example of this accusation by Christians against Jews. Subsequently, the charge was widened to include other religious purposes for which Jews supposedly murdered Christians. Jews were also charged with attempts to profane Hosts in England, France, and Germany, where these false accusations led to the execution of Jews despite papal edicts denying such charges.

With the establishment of the Inquisition by the church in the thirteenth century and the ensuing struggle with heretics, Jewish writings were censored and suppressed. The Talmud was condemned and St. Albert the Great ordered the burning of all copies. During the thirteenth century, the wealth of Jews was often confiscated and their financial position became more and more precarious. By the end of the thirteenth century, the mass murder of Jews had become a common occurrence in Germany and France. It is estimated that some 100,000 Jews died as a result of persecution during that century.

The now-entrenched pattern of the marginalization and killing of Jews continued throughout the remaining centuries of the pre-modern era. Jews were blamed, among other things, for famine in Europe and for causing the Black Death. They were increasingly confined to specific areas of cities, a process that eventuated into the creation of formal ghettos. While there were some periods in which pressure on the Jewish community was relaxed to an extent as the result of protests by several popes and political leaders, the basic antisemitic framework remained firmly in place.

The coming of the modern era with its theme of social liberation did result in a measure of political freedom for individual Jews in certain countries, such as France and Germany, but not for the Jewish community as a body. Antisemitism was still widespread among the Christian masses and frequently surfaced in connection with performances of Passion plays, which were commonly held. And in Russia, home to about fifty percent of the Jewish population, the situation remained as it had been for the previous centuries. In fact, antisemitism in Russia was intensified with the appearance in 1905 of the so-called Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion. Written by Russian antisemites, it claimed the existence of a Jewish cabal that was plotting to take control of global society. The Protocols still circulate today in some countries.

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries antisemitism took on yet another form in many parts of Christian Europe such as France, Germany and Poland. The churches now felt themselves to be under attack from modernist forces, including the liberal social philosophies emerging from the French Revolution as well as the rising forms of socialism. To many Christians, the entire Christian-based social structures in Europe seemed to be in danger of collapsing. A scapegoat was needed, and once again Jews were selected.

Christian leaders now began to accuse Jews of being supporters of what
was termed freemasonry, which advocated religious freedom, a notion strongly condemned by the popes of the period. They were charged with being the source of immorality in society as purveyors of pornography.

The antisemitism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries took on a biological and racial dimension that moved it beyond the earlier forms of antisemitism. This new form of antisemitism reached its peak during the Holocaust. While I would want to maintain a certain distinction between classical Christian antisemitism and the Nazi variety, one cannot make the total separation between the two found in such documents as We Remember, the Vatican document on the Shoah issued in 1998. I continue to maintain that classical Christian antisemitism served as an indispensable seedbed for the indifference and even support that many in the churches gave to the Hitlerian attempt to annihilate the Jewish community in Europe and beyond.

It was only with the emergence of Nostra Aetate at Vatican II and the strong statements of Pope John Paul II during the course of his long papacy that the foundations for antisemitism have been decisively destroyed. But in light of this dark history of antisemitism at the center of Christianity for centuries, Christians cannot relax their guard on this matter. Any possibility that this grave sin will resurface must be firmly resisted.

This brief overview of Christian antisemitism demonstrates how hatred can take over a religious tradition and render it a force for violence rather than reconciliation. Once such hatred becomes embedded in a religious tradition it becomes difficult to root it out, as we know from the persistence of religiously-based antisemitism in our day. Symbolic gestures are an important component of cleansing a religious tradition of hatred. That is why the gestures of Pope John Paul II on the first Sunday of Lent in 2002, followed by his visit to Jerusalem and its Western Wall, assume such significance. On both occasions the Pope expressed penitence for the Church’s sinful attacks on Jews over the centuries.

We have also seen during the Holocaust somewhat of a validation of Elisabeth Schussler-Fiorenza’s point of a link between antisemitism and other forms of religiously-based hatred. To the extent that classical antisemitism provided a seedbed for Christian acquiescence or even outright support of the Nazi attack on the Jewish people, it also flowed over into support for the Nazi onslaught against other victims of its attempt at biological purification.

As we reflect on antisemitism as a primal example of religiously-based hatred, we need to ask how we might transform religion into an instrument of social reconciliation. The first requirement must be to follow the example set by Pope John Paul II and candidly acknowledge those situations, such as the apartheid period in South Africa and the genocidal era in Rwanda (the most Catholic country in Africa) and in Bosnia, where religion clearly was used to generate human violence.

If religious communities fail to cleanse their language and practice of
religious violence toward the other, they will eliminate themselves as effective agents of humanization and solidarity in the global era. Hans Kung’s often quoted dictum that there cannot be peace in the world without peace among religions remains as true as ever.

Violent religious language can greatly contribute to softening a society for genocide. Religion remains a powerful force in most present-day societies. If religious language in a given society continues to demean people who do not share the dominant faith system and even denies them full rights of citizenship, it certainly opens the door for physical assaults on such groups in times of social tension. On the contrary, positive religious language about the “religious other” can serve as a barrier against such assaults. It is especially needed in the complex national societies that globalization has produced.

Religion also has a role to play in insuring that groups in a society are not “neutralized” in terms of their fundamental humanity. The Holocaust scholar Henry Friedlander showed some years ago how the neutral language in reporting daily death counts in the Nazi extermination camps paralleled the language used by the United States military in reporting Vietnamese casualties during the Vietnam War. Religion must always fight against such neutralization, even of an enemy. For if neutralization of particular groups in society is allowed a foothold, it exposes these groups to the possibility of more violent attacks, which again, in times of social crisis, can turn into genocidal or near-genocidal actions against them.

For Catholics, the Document on Religious Liberty from Vatican II, inspired by Pope John XXII, can serve as a foundational resource. It argued for the basic divinity of every human person expressed in the freedom of conscience, even to the point of protecting the right not to believe in human dignity. Human dignity, not right belief, became the fundamental cornerstone of any just society. All other identities, though important, became secondary. They may be used as the basis for a massive assault on human life.

On the Catholic side, but with global impact, Pope John XXIII certainly began the process of removing violence from the Church’s expression. He did this both by text and gesture. In the face of a century of attack against the notion of human rights and religious freedom within the European Catholic community in particular, John XXIII proclaimed human rights and religious freedom as integral to the Catholic faith perspective in the Charter of Human Rights in his encyclical Pacem in Terris. In so doing he settled the dispute taking place at the II Vatican Council regarding the proposed document on religious liberty. Unfortunately, the current Catholic Catechism failed to include this powerful Charter in its text, and there are those within the Catholic leadership today who would love to relegate Vatican II’s Document on Religious Liberty to obscurity, something that must be strongly resisted by the global Catholic community. A religious institution that does not model concern for human rights both in its internal operations and as a fundamental global con-
cern cannot be a legitimate actor in the current struggle to humanize globalization.

Pope John XXIII also contributed significantly to the eradication of violence in Christian expression through gesture and language. He greeted those who a few years before had been labeled as heretics and systematics, as unbelievers, as Communists, with an outstretched hand. Even if he continued to have disagreements with them, even profound ones, he never failed to acknowledge their basic humanity. He demonstrated a keen sensitivity toward the impact of negative language by the religious community. His approach to the Jews is a prime example. He changed liturgical language that he regarded as dehumanizing. He initiated a fundamental change of perspective on Jews and Judaism, which his successors have enhanced both in text and gesture. He thus began one of the most profound turnabouts in interreligious understanding, one that I am convinced can serve as support and model for other historically antagonistic interreligious relations.

Following the example of John XXIII, an essential challenge for religions in the face of globalization is to continue to bring to the global community an example of the centrality of affirmation of the religious and secular “other” at a time when media, and even an increasing number within the religious communities, are adopting an attack mentality, an “in your face” approach to national and religious identity. This affirmation of the “other” must be done through text, language, and gesture.

In conclusion, I strongly believe that religion today stands at a decisive turning point in this age of ever-increasing globalization. Religious communities can withdraw into an isolated spirituality that cares little about what goes on beyond their self-defined borders. They can continue to be, as they have so often been in the past, sources of social tension rather than forces for social healing. But if religion follows such a path, it will squander its most precious gift—the power to transform hatred into love, the power to turn indifference into concern, that is at the heart of the Torah and Talmud, the Christian gospel, the Qur’an and the teachings of the other great world religions. What will energize our enhanced technological capacity in directions that lead to social harmony rather than oblivion? Religion, I remain convinced, is central to the answer to that question. It has the potential to penetrate hardened hearts in ways that secular ideology and mere technical competence cannot. It can combine commitment and knowledge in ways that will overpower the forces of exploitation and destruction. We have seen outstanding examples of that power in the lives of Dr. Martin Luther King, Pope John XXIII, Nelson Mandela, and Elie Wiesel.

But religion will not contribute in its fullness to global society unless it draws from the depths of its spiritual tradition, a tradition that is continually re-energized and refined in light of developing human understanding. Engagement with the world about us cannot become a substitute for a spirituality rooted in tradition. Rather, such engagement must always be the fruit of our spiritual
tradition and, above all, it must be concretely embodied in the people of that tradition. Tradition does not reside first and foremost in texts and sacred books, as important as these remain. We are the carriers of our respective tradition. We learn it in the classroom and in the library. It becomes the very fiber of our being in prayer and worship. We express it in our active concern and commitment to human dignity. None of these three elements of authentic religion can ever be separated from the rest without religion’s suffering a loss of its very soul. Become convinced that until the tradition is embodied in you, it remains text rather than a force for human transformation.

Let me close with a question. It is a question raised by a powerful film, partially based on the Holocaust, that I viewed at the Slovak Pavilion at Expo 2000 in Hanover, Germany. The film’s title asked a question that remains our question in this challenging time of increasing religiously based violence: Quo Vadis Humanity?

NOTES

1. I discuss the Rwandan genocide in a chapter in a forthcoming book on religion and genocide edited by Dr. Steven Jacobs, which will likely be published by Palgrave/Macmillan.

2. See also Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza and David Tracy, “The Holocaust as Interruption and the Christian Return to History,” in The Holocaust as Interruption, Concilium 175, ed. Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza and David Tracy (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1984), 86. Also see Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza, “The Bible, the Global Context, and the Discipleship of Equals,” in Reconstructing Christian theology, ed. Rebecca S. Chopp and Mark Lewish Taylor (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994).


5. The Church and Racism 23 (#15).


10. See also “Church Leaders to Condemn Attacks on Jews,” The Times (London), 1 December 2003, 4.


The Social Psychology of Hatred

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Abstract

Hatred has not typically been a topic of research in the field of social psychology, although several components which embody hatred have been studied extensively in this field. Social psychologists have traditionally considered prejudice, stereotyping, discrimination and intergroup aggression to be highly important and socially relevant topics for research, and thousands of studies by social psychologists have examined these and other issues related to hatred. There are three primary approaches social psychologists have utilized in studying prejudice and intergroup aggression. The first approach may be thought of as a general model of social influence in which a variety of situational factors have been found to increase, or decrease, laboratory subjects’ proclivity to engage in stereotyping or aggressive behavior. Particular types of situations may promote hatred, such as when individuals in mobs behave in ways they ordinarily would not. The second approach might be termed an interpersonal attitude approach, in the sense that individuals are measured in the degree to which they hold attitudes corresponding to authoritarianism and social dominance, which in turn relate to social hostility and prejudice. This approach, popular in the 1950s and 1960s, fell out of favor during the past quarter century, and is currently experiencing a revival of interest by researchers. The third approach focuses on social cognition or the way in which humans perceive the social world in a biased manner due to limits on the brain’s information processing capacity. The social cognition approach in turn gave rise to social categorization theory and social identity theory, both of which describe important aspects of intergroup processes that explain outgroup derogation and discrimination. Each of these three approaches describes aspects of what we may commonly think of as hatred.

Social psychologists have traditionally considered issues such as prejudice, ethnocentrism, intergroup hostility and aggressive behavior to be important topics of study in which theoretically based laboratory research could potentially help resolve serious problems humans encounter in their lives. Prejudice, ethnocentrism, intergroup hostility and aggressive behavior are cer-
tainly aspects of what we think of as “hatred,” though little research in this branch of psychology has focused specifically on hate. The concept of hate would be extremely difficult to operationalize and test under the scientifically controlled conditions preferred by social psychologists. Yet there is a vast literature developed by social psychologists that describes several aspects of what we call hatred. Social psychologists have frequently considered laboratory research an adjunct to illustrating issues that are deserving of social change. For example, Kenneth and Mamie Clark (1947) demonstrated with dolls the impact of racism on toy preferences of young children, showing that African-American children preferred white dolls over black dolls and considered white dolls to be superior. These laboratory findings were cited by Supreme Court chief justice Earl Warren in the landmark Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954.

There have been at least three major independent approaches used by social psychologists to investigate prejudice and intergroup hostility. In the social influence perspective, exemplified by the experiments of Stanley Milgram, researchers explore how the presence of others can change the way an individual thinks and behaves. While not specifically focusing on intergroup hostility or hatred, the social influence approach has been useful in explaining the behavior of individuals in groups or individuals given requests by important authority figures. Such classic social psychological theories as diffusion of responsibility (Latané and Darley 1968), deindividuation (Watson 1973), and obedience to authority (Milgram 1965) have been demonstrated to be linked to interpersonal aggression, particularly in crowd situations (Milgram and Toch 1968; Mullen 1986) or when important authority figures endorse violence and hatred (Staub 1989; Waller 2002). Additionally, social learning theory (Bandura 1973), where aggressive behavior becomes more likely after an individual observes “justified” aggression being modeled by another person (e.g., Berkowitz 1965), can be thought of as falling in this social influence branch of social psychology. The second approach, which I refer to as the social-political attitudes perspective, is best known for the research conducted by Theodor Adorno and his colleagues (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford 1950), published in a volume titled The Authoritarian Personality. Voluminous research on this topic was conducted in the quarter century after Adorno et al.’s influential publication, yet the topic of authoritarianism fell out of favor in the last quarter of the twentieth century. In recent years there has been a renewed interest in authoritarianism and its relationship to interpersonal aggression and intergroup hostility, largely because of the work of Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1996), who revised and updated the theoretical construct of authoritarianism as well as the scale used to measure it. A complementary social-political outlook known as social dominance orientation has been identified by Sidanius and Pratto (1999), wherein some individuals approve of social stratification and group-based power differentials. Recently, the constructs of right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation have been used in a model to explain nationalism and outgroup prejudice (Duckitt, Wagner, Du
Plessis, and Birum 2002). Altemeyer (2004) has identified a small cross-section who score high on both authoritarianism and social dominance, exhibiting the worst qualities of both. According to Altemeyer, these individuals are highly prejudiced and ethnocentric, as well as highly driven to dominate others, and they gravitate toward leadership positions. The third approach is known widely as the social cognition perspective. This approach grew from observations that the human mind is an imperfect information processing tool that frequently utilizes shortcuts in order to quickly and efficiently categorize information from our social worlds and draw conclusions from what we perceive. These shortcuts, or mental heuristics, allow for faster processing of information, but they also make us susceptible to a wide array of poor judgments. The social cognition perspective in turn gave rise to social categorization theory and social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979), which originated in the observation that merely placing individuals in random groups was sufficient to elicit ingroup preference. Recent research in this area has demonstrated that although ingroup bias occurs easily, outgroup hostility occurs under specific conditions of status differential in terms of group stability, legitimacy, and permeability (Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, and Hume 2001). Today, social categorization and social identity theory are largely independent of mainstream social cognition research, but they continue to share their origins in imperfect social perceptions, so I will group them together here. This is a grouping not all would agree with, but I believe their similarities are more than sufficient.

These three perspectives do not encompass all social psychological approaches to studying aggressive behavior, discrimination or prejudice, but they have been highly successful research programs, each operating independently and approaching these issues from a unique perspective. Social psychologists have developed research programs to explain how we think about and perceive the world around us, how we determine what our attitudes are, how we determine our emotions, and how we understand others, as well as many other issues. A number of these research paradigms can also be used to help explain certain elements of aggressive behavior, dislike of others, or even hatred. Not all of these research programs will be described here.

I. SOCIAL INFLUENCE

The early years of social psychology were marked by the formulation of grand theories that explained much of social behavior (Rosnow 1987). This early research often focused on group-based influence on the behavior of individuals. Some classic theories of social psychology focused on such important issues as the construction of social norms (Sherif 1937), conformity (Asch 1951), obedience to authority (Milgram 1965), the power of social roles (Zimbardo, Haney, Banks, and Jaffe 1974), and bystander intervention and apathy (Latané and Darley 1968). Several of these theories were developed specifically as explanations for aggressive behavior or intergroup conflict.
Muzafer Sherif, an early leader of social psychology, was born in 1906 in Turkey. When Sherif was 13 years old Greek soldiers invaded the Turkish village where he lived and proceeded to murder adult males villagers. The man next to Sherif was bayoneted to death, but Sherif was allowed to live because of his youth (Trotter 1985). As a result of this tragic event Sherif devoted his life to exploring the causes of international aggression and how it could be reduced. In a now classic study, Sherif (1937) placed subjects in a darkened room and asked them to estimate how far a dot of light moved across a screen. In fact the pinpoint of light was stationary. Under conditions such as these, an optical illusion known as the autokinetic effect makes it seem as if the light travels. Subjects were thus placed in a situation in which reality was ambiguous and in which they were asked to provide information about something that was indeterminate. Results showed that when subjects completed the task in groups, they frequently demonstrated the emergence of a social norm in terms of their belief about the movement of the light: After several trials the subjects would tend to conform and each subject in the group would provide a similar estimate. In other words, in this situation in which reality was ambiguous, subjects looked to each other for information about what was happening and developed a socially constructed reality regarding their belief about how far the dot of light was moving. Sherif believed that slogans and propaganda produce a similar mental process on a national or cultural level through the creation of cultural assumptions or interpretations of reality regarding international politics and relations with nations considered to be enemies. Chomsky (1989) has argued that in democratic societies, political and economic pressures on news organizations and the mass media result in cultural social constructions that tend to reflect a dominant world view, to the exclusion of alternatives. In Nazi Germany, propaganda and control of the media likely helped limit the potential resistance of non-Jewish German citizens to the Nazi genocidal agenda by presenting a unified anti-Semitic world view (Staub 1989). Presenting an alternative viewpoint is important for resistance to the dominant view for the very simple reason that it provides people with different ways to interpret the same situations. During the Nazi occupation of France the citizens of Le Chambon (who were Huguenots and thus “outsiders” in a sense in French society) saved several thousand Jews by adopting them into their families and hiding them from the Nazis who would transport them to Germany. Notably, the public statements by village Pastor Andre Trocme and by the village doctor appeared to persuade members of the Vichy police and even a German officer to help the villagers in their efforts (Staub 1989).

Solomon Asch (1951, 1956) also demonstrated group conformity, but rather than utilizing ambiguous stimuli as Sherif had done, Asch chose to make reality as obvious as possible in his conformity experiments. Asch arranged an experimental setting in which the subject was provided with a designated time to arrive at the laboratory. When he arrived (all Asch’s subjects in this experiment were males) he found that the experiment had already begun. In fact,
Asch arranged this on purpose. The experimental room had in it a long table at which a number of young men were seated, all facing in the same direction. These individuals were all confederates who pretended to be subjects but were actually working for Asch, while the one true subject was told to arrive late as a ploy to get him seated in the last chair at the table. Once the real subject was seated the experiment began, and all the men at the table were asked to observe a line that had been printed on a poster board. They were then asked to observe three comparison lines of differing lengths and make a judgment about which comparison line matched the original line. The task was designed to be extremely easy, and anyone with reasonable vision would be able to determine the correct answer. After making a choice, each person at the table was required to say out loud which line he thought was correct. In this way the real subject was placed in a position in which he knew the answers of the rest of the group, and they would know his. The first two trials went smoothly and all confederates picked the correct comparison line. However, as the experiment progressed, all the confederates began making the same wrong comparisons. The true subject was faced with a dilemma: Should he bravely go against the group and declare the correct answer (which was obvious)? Or should he play it safe and go along with the majority? Across 12 trials 76% of subjects went along with the group and gave an obviously incorrect response at least once (approximately one-third of the subjects could be considered frequent conformers by giving many incorrect answers). When asked to provide their answers by means of a secret ballot, subjects gave correct answers, demonstrating that they in fact knew the responses. When one confederate in the group went against the majority and gave the correct answer, the real subject (apparently emboldened by the rebellious confederate) also gave the correct answer more frequently. Asch believed these results indicated that people do not blindly follow crowds, but rather rationally weigh the amount of disapproval they expect to face. They conform when their anxiety (about looking foolish in front of others) becomes too great (Blass 2004). Norms do not by themselves persuade people to believe what they do is right, but norms may create deep tension in those who rebel against them.

Social norms, as Asch demonstrated, influence behavior powerfully and can be seen, for example, in the code of silence followed by police officers, who identify so strongly with their units that they refuse to bear witness against other officers’ transgressions (Skolnick and Fyfe 1993). Asch’s subjects felt distress at the thought of disapproval from total strangers. Members of groups who share a strong common identity likely feel tremendous pressure to conform to accepted norms, even when conforming means violating their inner beliefs and attitudes. Cults frequently use this approach in order to obtain outward conformity among their recruits as a requisite stepping-stone toward the goal of true persuasion. Zimbardo and Anderson (1993) argue that “mind control” is not an issue of force (i.e., norms) because it is possible to pressure people to say or do things they don’t believe, but it is not possible to force them
to believe what they know to be false (fictional themes such as the Manchurian Candidate notwithstanding). True persuasion as practiced by cults relies on a combination of the Asch-type of normative influence to accomplish behavioral conformity and the Sherif-type of informational influence to change inner beliefs, resulting in the conversion experience. Normative pressure may temporarily change behavior, but to change inner beliefs it takes the soft touch of informational influence (Zimbardo and Anderson 1993). Cults typically use a combination of outward pressure to obtain behavioral conformity from recruits, combined with restriction of outside information (in the form of television, radio, books, telephones) and intense and repeated exposure to the world view of the cult (Singer 2003). It should be noted that converts to cults frequently find that membership satisfies important self-esteem needs in their lives; thus they should be thought of not as passive recipients of “mind control,” but rather as active participants in the process (see, e.g., Bromley and Richardson 1983; Richardson 1999). Similar processes almost certainly play an important role in white supremacy groups catering to disaffected youths with free music, beer, and racist ideology (see, e.g., Blee 2002; Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997). Asch’s point was that those who stand out often find the experience to be anxiety-provoking and will frequently express attitudes consistent with those of the group in order to reduce this pressure. This type of behavioral conformity essentially opens the path for actual persuasion to occur. True persuasion or indoctrination comes later, after repeated exposure to persuasive communications, the creation of a social consensus, testimonials from trusted friends or authority figures, and perhaps half a dozen other persuasion techniques too detailed to describe here (Cialdini 2001; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Petty and Cacioppo 1996; Pratkanis and Aronson 1992).

In August 1961 social psychologist Stanley Milgram began work on what is perhaps the most well-known, and some would say notorious, series of experiments in all of psychology (Blass 2004). In 1955 Milgram was a graduate student and a research assistant to Solomon Asch and aided in Asch’s conformity experiment described above. As a junior professor at Yale, Milgram sought to find a way to replicate and extend Asch’s conformity research. Whereas Asch was interested in the power of the individual to resist the pressure to conform, Milgram was interested in whether individuals would comply with requests from authority figures that violated their ethical standards. Milgram’s idea came directly from the trial of Adolf Eichmann, who as a high-ranking Nazi officer was given responsibility for all Jews in Germany and was given control of the system of transportation that was used in the deportation of Jews both from occupied areas to work camps and to concentration camps. Eichmann was involved not only in the transporting of prisoners, but also in the development and administration of the various apparatuses of extermination used by the Nazis. It was Eichmann who ensured that the quotas of the death camps were regularly met. At the end of World War II Eichmann escaped Germany and fled to Argentina, where he was captured by Israeli secret police on
May 2, 1960 (Wistrich 1997). His trial was an international media event and Milgram made explicit references to Eichmann’s statements (that he had been following orders) when he designed his obedience experiments (Blass 2004).

In order to examine how far ordinary people would go in following the orders of an authority figure, Milgram invited ordinary people from the community to participate in an experiment involving a learner, whose task was to memorize various word combinations, and a teacher, who was to administer painful electric shocks when the learner gave wrong answers. The experiment was rigged so that subjects always were placed in the role of teacher and a mild-mannered middle-aged man (working for Milgram) always was placed in the role of learner. Subjects saw the learner strapped into a chair with electrical conductors taped to his arms in order to heighten the realism of the deception. In fact, no shocks were ever given to the learner. Very soon after the experiment began the learner would begin making errors, and the teacher (i.e., the true experimental subject) would be required to give electric shocks of increasing intensity by flipping switches on a highly realistic-appearing sham shock-box designed by Milgram. The learner, seated behind a partition in another room, would make verbal protests of increasing intensity as the intensity of the “shocks” grew. In fact, the learner’s screams and protests were tape recordings played in response to specific levels of shock triggered by the teacher. If at any point the teacher refused to continue, another actor pretending to be the experimenter (actually a local high school biology teacher) would say various phrases to the effect that the experiment required that he or she continue to administer shocks to the learner. If the teacher became concerned about the learner’s health, the experimenter would say that he would take full responsibility and that the teacher should continue with the experiment (Blass 2004).

Milgram conducted a number of variations on this theme, altering the distance between the teacher and learner, the perceived level of authority of the experimenter, the proximity of the experimenter to the teacher, and so forth. In the primary obedience condition described above, 65% of subjects were fully compliant with the demands of the experimenter, administering the maximum amount of shock (450 volts) to an unwilling and possibly unconscious victim (Milgram 1963). In another version of the experiment subjects were required to press the hand of the learner to a shock plate, thus placing them in direct proximity to their victims. Even in this intimate setting, 30% of subjects gave the maximum amount of shock to their victims. In a letter to a colleague describing this variation, Milgram expressed his concern: “It was a very disturbing sight since the victim resists strenuously and emits cries of agony” (quoted in Blass 2004, 96). Milgram observed that subjects appeared highly conflicted about complying with requests to provide high-level shocks to the learner. Subjects were observed to sweat, tremble, bite their lips, groan, and burst out in laughter at inappropriate times (Milgram 1965). Some were even described by Milgram as falling into uncontrollable fits or seizures. Toward the end of the series of obedience experiments Milgram filmed 14 subjects in one variation specifically
for use in the documentary film titled *Obedience*, which is now a standard teaching tool in introductory psychology classes. The responses demonstrated by subjects in that film are candid, since they did not know they were being filmed (Blass 2004). Only those subjects who gave permission after the experiment were shown in the documentary. Adolf Eichmann was executed May 31, 1962, four days after Milgram completed his experiments (Blass 2004).

Milgram believed his experiments raised serious questions about the type of hatred and violence exhibited by the Nazis. If these experimental results are to be believed, Milgram argued, then it is possible even in a democratic society to find citizens who will obey authority figures and comply with orders to commit immoral acts. Milgram (1965) concluded that human nature alone cannot be counted on to protect us from harm at the behest of malevolent authority figures. Examples of such malevolent authority figures abound, and they are not restricted to government officials. A cult leader, the head of a gang, or a religious leader would be expected to be able to obtain great levels of obedience, perhaps in proportion to the level of devotion or fanaticism exhibited by his or her followers. This certainly would be an explanation for the behavior of the followers of cult leader Jim Jones, who ordered the assassination of Congressman Jim Ryan (who was visiting the People’s Temple in Guyana) and then commanded his followers to commit mass suicide. Many of Jones’s followers refused to drink the cyanide-laced Kool-Aid prepared for them; these rebellious followers were shot to death by more devoted members (Chidester 2003). Obedience to authority has played a role in murder in a number of religious groups, including Mormons (Sasse and Widder 1991), Hare Krishna (Hubner and Gruson 1988), Branch Davidians (Robbins and Post 1997) and Aum Shinrikyo (Juergensmeyer 2000), to name a few. Obedience to authority figures among followers of the multitudinous reactionary Islamic religious factions likely figures largely in the current worldwide wave of terrorism (Juergensmeyer 2000; Post 2004). Paranoia among members of such groups, feelings of being trapped, a history of persecution, a sense of divine providence, psychological dependence of members on the group, and the belief that self-sacrifice benefits the collective good of their group will likely increase followers’ willingness to comply when leaders ask for murderous actions (Juergensmeyer 2000; Post 2004; Robbins and Post 1997).

Zimbardo, Haney, Banks, and Jaffe (1974), in what has come to be known as the Stanford prison experiment, placed an advertisement in a newspaper to recruit subjects for an extended study of the effects of prison life. Over 70 people answered the notice and were given extensive psychological tests to determine their eligibility for participating in the study. After eliminating those with mental illness or a history of crime or drug abuse, Zimbardo and his colleagues had a sample of 24 college students who were randomly assigned to be prisoners or guards in what was intended to be a two-week role-playing experiment of prison conditions. Subjects quickly adopted their new roles. Those assigned as prisoners became docile, compliant and depressed, while guards
took on an air of authority and some became willing to mete out punishments to their prisoners. Concerns about the brutality of the guards and the mental well-being of the prisoners caused the cessation of the experiment after six days. Some guards were respectful of prisoners, but others sought to humiliate them. Several guards attempted in extreme ways to degrade and dehumanize prisoners by using threats, insults, and deindividuating comments, and by forcing prisoners to stand at attention for hours, do push-ups and jumping jacks, and clean toilet bowls with their bare hands (Zimbardo et al. 1974). Guards even forced prisoners to engage in simulated acts of sodomy (Zimbardo 2004a). Prisoners responded by becoming withdrawn, depressed, and submissive. Zimbardo, in explaining the brutality of the guards, observed a downward spiral in which the silence of the respectful guards reinforced the behavior of the brutal guards. Zimbardo reasoned that the brutal guards were exploring the boundaries of acceptable normative behavior and took the silence of the respectful guards as a sign of approval for the punishments they were devising. (Zimbardo had never provided guards a set of rules for how to interact with prisoners.)

Such a pattern may be at the root of such events as the beating of motorist Rodney King by four Los Angeles police officers: Many officers were present at the scene, yet none told the four arresting officers that they were going too far in their use of force. The Los Angeles police inhabited a social environment that might have contributed to the level of aggression used against King. Chief of Police Daryl Gates had a lengthy history of angering the public in Los Angeles by repeatedly making racially insensitive remarks (Skolnick and Fyfe 1993). While on patrol the officers involved in the beating communicated with each other from their squad cars using a computer messaging system; examination of the transcripts of these messages reveals that these officers used derogatory ethnic labels such as “gorillas in the mist” to refer to African-Americans (Mydans 1991). These officers worked in a social setting where they were primed to expect to need to use force (Skolnick and Fyfe 1993) and their superiors joined them in using derogatory ethnic labels; finally, the use of excessive force may have been approved tacitly by other officers through their silent presence at the beating. In an editorial in the Boston Globe, Zimbardo (2004a) draws a parallel between the Stanford prison experiment and the behavior of guards at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Guards in Iraq operated under conditions of secrecy, with no rules regarding permissible or forbidden behavior, no clear chain of command, and encouragement for breaking the will of their captives. Certainly some guards were respectful of their prisoners’ rights and humanity, but their unwillingness or inability to voice their opposition to the cruelty of other guards helped create a situation that encouraged the worst behavior in others. Zimbardo and his colleagues (1974) were unable to predict from psychological tests which guards would become brutal, and he attributes this to the various situational forces that encourage otherwise good people to
perform acts of brutality in prison settings as well as other places (Zimbardo 2004b).

Another important theory from the social influence perspective for understanding hatred and violence is that of bystander apathy. Forty years ago, in the summer of 1964, Catherine “Kitty” Genovese was attacked by a stranger as she returned home from work around 1 a.m.; she was stabbed as she fled from her parked car to her apartment in a residential area of Queens, New York. In the resulting melee her screams alerted her neighbors that something was amiss, and at least one man opened his window to yell at the attacker to “let that girl alone!” (Gansberg 1965, 37). Mosley, the man convicted of the crime, reported that the noise created by the neighbors did nothing to deter him because, he said, he was convinced they would do nothing. And indeed nothing was done. Mosley fled the scene briefly. Ms. Genovese, having already been stabbed several times, struggled to the vestibule of her apartment house and collapsed, but Mosley returned 15 minutes later and attacked again, this time killing her. Newspapers picked up the story when a police captain told a reporter that 38 witnesses either saw or heard the attack and none offered to help or even call the police (Rosenthal 1999; Sexton 1995). In an investigation of the witnesses, one reported that she had tried to call police but was “gasping for breath and unable to talk into the telephone” (Gansberg 1965, 37). Another witness reported that her husband wanted to call police but she told him not to, saying “there must have been 30 calls already” (Gansberg 1965, 37), and they proceeded to watch the attack for 20 minutes. The characterization by the media of these witnesses as uncaring and indifferent city dwellers opened a heated national debate regarding the alleged deleterious effects of urban life on the human psyche and our willingness to help those in need. Social psychologists immediately became interested and sought to investigate the phenomenon in the laboratory, and their results quickly made headlines (“One Witness Better than 38” 1966).

Rather than ask what was wrong with New Yorkers, social psychologists Bibb Latané and John Darley sought to create an experiment that would reveal the situational forces behind the behavior of these witnesses (Latané 1987). Latané and Darley (1968) created a simulated emergency in the laboratory by staging a situation in which subjects believed they were talking with other students isolated in separate rooms over an intercom (in fact, the words were scripted and the voices played from a tape recorder at appropriate moments; subjects were run through the experiment one at a time and each heard the same scenario from the intercom). After a few minutes of staged conversation over the intercom system, the subject heard one of the other students fall down and lapse into an epileptic seizure. The researchers would then watch to see if the subject attempted to get help. Their results replicated what had happened in the Genovese case: The greater the number of other students supposedly listening in on their own intercoms, the smaller the likelihood that the real subject would try to obtain help. Latané and Darley called this phenomenon diffusion of
responsibility, theorizing that the greater the number of people witnessing an
emergency, the less responsible any single individual will feel for helping.
These results match closely the experience of the witness to the Genovese mur-
der who persuaded her husband not to call police because she was certain many
others had already called.

Latané and Darley (1970) continued in this line of research with another
experiment, in which students were seated at a table in a room waiting for the
experiment to begin when smoke began pouring into the room from a vent.
Some of the students were confederates who were instructed to keep sitting as
if nothing unusual were happening. Results indicated that when more students
sat and acted as if nothing were happening, the real subject was less likely to
seek help. Latané and Darley reasoned that the real subjects looked at the
impassive people around them and decided that because no one else appeared
to believe there was an emergency, everything must be all right. The research-
ers labeled this tendency pluralistic ignorance: When trying to decide whether
an emergency is actually happening, people will often look to each other for
information, and if other people are behaving as if nothing is happening, then
they may conclude that nothing is out of the ordinary. Bystander apathy can
thus be the result of either or both of these two processes:

1) Bystanders who in fact recognize that an emergency exists may not
   help because they believe others will.

2) Bystanders who are unsure whether an emergency exists may look to
   others and, seeing their passivity, conclude that there is no emergency.

Staub (1989) argues that bystander apathy, in the form of diffusion of
responsibility and pluralistic ignorance, is an important factor in the genesis of
mass violence and genocide. When crowds of onlookers did nothing to stop
Nazi thugs from beating Jews in the streets of Germany, it both made the
behavior seem normal to the onlookers and allowed the thugs to feel as if they
could do what they wished with impunity. People in groups feel less respon-
sible, which explains why those in large groups are less likely to help and also
why people in large groups can commit acts thinking that there will be no
repercussions.

Being a member of a large crowd also produces a state of deindividuation,
in which the individual is less likely to attend to his or her inner values. Alco-
hol, wearing uniforms or masks, nighttime, and being a member of a large
crowd all help produce a psychological state of deindividuation (Duval and
Wicklund 1972; Mullen, Migdal, and Rozell 2003; Watson 1973), whereas
placing an individual in front of a mirror helps produce a state of self-focused
attention in which inner attitudes and values will become more pronounced
(Scheier and Carver 1983; Deiner, Fraser, Beaman, and Kelem 1976). Watson
(1973) found in a cross-cultural survey of tribal societies that warriors who
wore masks or painted their faces were more likely to kill, maim, or torture
their enemies than were those who did not. Silke (2003) examined 500 violent
attacks in Northern Ireland and found that 206 were carried out by offenders wearing masks, and that the wearing of masks was associated with greater levels of violence and/or vandalism. Deiner, Fraser, Beaman and Kelem (1976), in a study carried out at numerous residences on Halloween, found that anonymous trick-or-treaters took more candy than they should (a note placed above the bowl asked them to take just one piece) and that placing a mirror in front of an unattended candy bowl reduced the amount of candy taken. Analyzing the ratio of victims to offenders in photographs taken at 60 lynchings, Brian Mullen (1986) found a greater level of atrocity committed by offenders when larger crowds were involved. Mullen reasoned that as crowd size increases lynchers become more deindividuated and less attentive to self-regulatory cues. (Surprisingly, numerous photographs exist of lynchings [see, e.g., Allen, Als, Lewis, and Litwack 2003]).

Being in a deindividuated state does not reliably produce a willingness to follow the crowd, but rather appears to make individuals more sensitive to cultural or group-based norms that may be present. For example, Johnson and Downing (1979) dressed subjects either in Ku Klux Klan-type outfits (white hoods and overalls) or in nurse uniforms and placed them in a situation in which they were required to give electric shocks to a victim. Those wearing KKK outfits gave greater intensity shocks, but those dressed as nurses did not. The nurse uniform produces a deindividuated state, as uniforms tend to do, but this type of outfit is associated with a norm of caring, which apparently influenced the subjects. This indicates that deindividuation alone is not sufficient to cause a mob to commit violence, although if members of the crowd begin to behave violently it may foster the creation of a norm that others will follow if they also believe that violence will achieve a desired goal for the group. Milgram and Toch (1968) argued that riots occur not as a contagion effect wherein people blindly follow the violent crowd, but rather because members of the crowd share concerns about past injustices to which they are giving voice. Postmes and Spears (1998), in a meta-analysis of deindividuation research, found that deindividuation does not produce behavior antinormative to society in a general sense (which is what deindividuation theorists had previously believed was the case). Postmes and Spears found rather strong evidence that deindividuation leads to an increase in behavior that is normative to the specific situation. Under deindividuating circumstances individuals become more responsive to immediate social norms, as illustrated by Johnson and Downing’s (1979) study using KKK uniforms.

When diffusion of responsibility, pluralistic ignorance, and deindividuation are considered together, they offer a compelling explanation for collective violence. An example of a temporary group norm resulting in collective violence occurred at the annual Puerto Rican day parade in New York City in June 2000. Normally an exuberant but peaceful event that moves down Fifth Avenue and ends inside Central Park, the parade that year was marred when dozens of men began dousing women with water, tearing at their clothes, and groping
them. Over 53 women were “groped, stripped, or otherwise abused” (Newman 2000, B.3), some had all of their clothes torn off while a crowd of bystanders stood and watched, and many victims were later found by police cowering on the ground or under carts in fear that they would be gang-raped (Chivers and Flynn 2000; Rashbaum and Chivers 2000). Newspaper reports reconstructed the timeline of the 35-minute event through eyewitness accounts and videotaped recordings. It was a hot, sunny day, and one man carrying a large bag of ice poured cold water on a woman whom he did not know. Photographs show she reacted positively to this, which apparently encouraged other men nearby to do the same (Barstow and Chivers 2000). As some men began grabbing at strangers’ clothing, there were no authority figures to tell them to stop (the police were strangely absent from this section of Central Park and did not respond to repeated requests to move to the scene of the melee) and no male bystanders told the offenders to stop. (The offenders apparently did not listen to their victims’ protestations or take them seriously.) In this way a temporary norm was established for the males in the crowd, informing them through example that it was acceptable to rip the clothes off of women. In spite of the size of the crowd, several eyewitnesses (both females and males) left the scene to locate police officers to report the ongoing crimes. Mysteriously, although reports were given to a number of police officers, none of them left their posts on Fifth Avenue to venture into the park to investigate. Is it possible these officers suffered from diffusion of responsibility due to the size of the parade and the fact that hundreds of police were watching it? Videotapes were later used by the police to locate the men involved in the attacks; most had no arrest records or histories of violence, and several described feeling swept up in the tide of events and unable to stop (Chivers 2000; Rashbaum 2000; Rashbaum and Chivers 2000).

II. Social-political attitudes: Authoritarianism and social dominance

The concept of the authoritarian personality can be traced more or less directly to research inspired by the Nazi rise to power in the early 1930s (Stone, Lederer, and Christie 1993). What would eventually become a project for identifying the qualities of a “prefascist” personality structure began as an attempt to explain European workers’ political preference for capitalism over socialism after World War I (Samelson 1993). One of these researchers was Wilhelm Reich, a member of Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic circle who was politically active. An avowed Marxist, Reich sought to “provide health care as well as political and sexual enlightenment to the workers of Vienna” (Samelson 1993, 24). In the Mass Psychology of Fascism, originally published in Germany in 1933, Reich outlined what amounted to a parallel interpretation of Freud’s Oedipal complex in which he hypothesized that “the tie to the authoritarian family is established by means of sexual inhibition; that it is the original bio-
logical tie of the child to the mother and also of the mother to the child that forms the barricade to sexual reality and leads to an indissoluble sexual fixation and to an incapacity to enter into other relations” (Reich 1970, 56). Reich believed that repressive child-rearing, as practiced in Germany at the time, caused children to be sexually inhibited during puberty, a time when Reich felt sexual exploration was natural and healthy. Failure to cross this hurdle in puberty would cause a Freudian-style neurosis to develop, the outcome of which was excessive nationalism in the adult and hostility to outsiders. Reich’s open criticism of Freudian theory led to his being thrown out of Freud’s circle, and his criticism of prominent Nazis led to his being forced out of Germany (Christie 1991).

Reich’s book describing authoritarianism in psychoanalytic terms would have been read in Europe, but not in America because it was not translated until after the war. American psychologists at the time appear to have been completely unaware of these ideas (Christie 1991). However, this line of research continued from other directions. Erich Fromm fled from Germany to New York before the war, and in his 1941 book *Escape from Freedom* he offered a more traditional psychoanalytic explanation for authoritarianism. Fromm argued that true personal freedom is difficult to maintain because of the tension associated with the responsibility it entails, and that puritanical and punishing child-rearing practices prevent people from being able to cope with true freedom, thus causing them to yearn for submission to authority figures. European psychoanalysts were quite interested in pursuing this idea of an authoritarian personality as an explanation for the tragedy of the Nazi rise to power. American psychologists, on the other hand, were more likely to look for mental illness among the Nazis as an explanation for their behavior, and there was a public perception that a “mad Nazi” thesis would be supported (Waller 2002). During the Nuremberg trials in 1945 American psychologists and psychiatrists administered Rorschach inkblot tests to Nazi prisoners, but several attempts to interpret their responses failed to yield any overt signs of serious pathology. At the same time, interviews with rank-and-file prisoners of war caused some Allied psychologists to suspect that German soldiers were unusually submissive and had poorly integrated personalities. (Of course, this could have been a result of having been captured.) There was a sense that something was different about German soldiers, even if they did not exhibit greater levels of psychopathology (Waller 2002).

Building on Fromm’s (1941) thesis that harsh parenting creates submissive yet hostile adults, a team of researchers located in Berkeley, California embarked on a project (with a small grant from the American Jewish Committee) to create a scale measuring the “pre-fascist” personality structure (which they called the California F-scale). In 1950 Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford published the results of their investigation in a volume titled *The Authoritarian Personality* (TAP). Although TAP had not been subjected to scientific scrutiny it was warmly received, perhaps because it allowed for a
relatively fast and clear assessment of prejudice and narrow-mindedness by asking questions which were seemingly unrelated to anti-Semitism or other undesirable attitudes (Christie 1991, 1993). Psychologists used the scale extensively; Meloen (1993) found 2,341 publications on authoritarianism and dogmatism between 1950 and 1989.

By the 1980s there was a sharp decrease in research on authoritarianism. There were several reasons for this. First, the theory was embedded in psychoanalytic concepts wherein prejudice (and aggression in general) was the result of either displacement or projection. In Freud’s model, anger at unacceptable (strong) targets must be displaced toward safer (weaker) targets. Also, unacceptable impulses directed toward parents would be suppressed, only to emerge later as aggression projected toward scapegoated outgroups. As psychologists built other, more parsimonious theories of aggression and prejudice, the theoretical underpinnings of authoritarianism began to seem dated (Taylor and Moghaddam 1994), and scientific research did not support the psychoanalytic approach to authoritarianism (Duckitt 1989, 1992, 2003). A second criticism focused on the psychometric properties of the F-scale itself. All the items on the scale were forward-coded so that anyone who was agreeable in his or her responses would score high. Research methodologists had by this time recognized that there is serious risk of biased results whenever items on a scale are all coded in the same direction (Christie 1991). An additional psychometric problem was that the F-scale seemed to be measuring a number of factors that were not related to the hypothesized construct of authoritarianism (Altemeyer 1981). This called into question all results obtained using the F-scale since, because it was uncertain whether the scale actually measured what it was supposed to. These problems, combined with the rise of the social-cognitive model to studying prejudice, resulted in a dramatic decline in interest in research on authoritarianism.

University of Manitoba psychologist Bob Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1996) reconceptualized, revised and resuscitated the authoritarianism construct by creating a scale with good psychometric properties that measures what he called right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). Through extensive tinkering and testing with the RWA scale, Altemeyer identified three of Adorno et al.’s (1950) original nine components that worked well together: authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism. Unlike the F-scale, Altemeyer’s RWA scale is balanced with items both forward and reverse coded and has high reliability ratings. Those who score high on the RWA scale tend to be submissive to authority figures (they don’t like to take charge), they are punitive toward those who are unconventional and those who are members of minority groups, and they are more conventional in their attitudes and behavior regarding such issues as sex, religion, and social customs. The existence of a reliable and valid measure of authoritarianism has rekindled interest in the topic, and recent years have seen advances in research relating authoritarianism to prejudice and discrimination.
A few of Altemeyer’s many research findings will help illustrate the authoritarian style. To begin with, authoritarians are more obedient to authority. Regarding submission to authority, Elms and Milgram (1966) found that obedient subjects scored higher on the California F-scale, and in 1973 Altemeyer ran a replication of Milgram’s obedience study and similarly found that following orders to give electric shocks was correlated with high RWA scores. In 1990 Altemeyer showed students the film of Milgram’s experiments, *Obedience*, and asked them to assign responsibility to the players in the drama. Authoritarians were less likely to hold the experimenter responsible and more likely to blame the teacher (i.e., the subject) (Altemeyer 1996). Authoritarians are more accepting of illegal acts by government officials such as wire-taps and searches without warrants, and in one survey many authoritarians indicated that they believed Nixon was innocent of any wrongdoing (Altemeyer 1981). Authoritarian aggression may sound contradictory to the submission aspect of the construct but, as Altemeyer (1981) demonstrated, authoritarians are more punitive in mock jury experiments, giving out longer sentences and getting more personal satisfaction from punishing offenders. They are particularly punitive when asked to punish unconventional people such as hippies or vagrants, and they are more lenient to offenders who are “establishment” types such as businessmen or police officers. The hostility shown by authoritarians appears to be directed primarily toward those who are members of outgroups, that is to say non-mainstream or unconventional. They are more ethnocentric and prejudiced, showing greater antipathy toward members of most ethnic groups to which they do not belong (Altemeyer 1988, 1996). They are also anti-homosexual: Despite being generally in favor of law and order, they tend not to condemn gay-bashing (Altemeyer 1996). Altemeyer (1996) also found that authoritarians are generally anti-feminist, scoring high on a variety of scales measuring rape myth acceptance, acceptance of interpersonal violence toward women, likelihood of forcing sex, and so forth. Authoritarians are also more conventional: They endorse traditional sex roles, are more sexually and politically conservative, and are more religious.

Authoritarianism is a strong predictor of prejudice, but it is not the only predictor. In more recent years Jim Sidanius and Felicia Pratto (1999) have identified a complementary social-political style they call social dominance orientation. Social dominance theory (SDT) begins with the observation that all cultures have within them group-based social hierarchies in which dominant groups hold a greater share of wealth, power, and status, which Sidanius and Pratto refer to as positive social value. True, some cultures are more egalitarian than others, and SDT is rooted in the observation that arbitrary social hierarchies tend to be more pronounced in those societies that have greater levels of economic surplus. Put in another way, as societies achieve the means to produce economic surplus, they also devise hierarchies to justify unequal sharing of positive social value. Social dominance theory rests on three primary assumptions. First, arbitrary social hierarchies inevitably develop in the pres-
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ence of economic surplus. Second, most forms of intergroup conflict (e.g., racism, sexism, nationalism) are natural outgrowths of our attempts to create social hierarchies. Finally, SDT views the history of social hierarchy as one in which there is a give-and-take between hierarchy-enhancing forces that promote inequity, and hierarchy-attenuating forces that seek to reduce inequity.

Social dominance orientation (SDO) refers to the degree to which an individual endorses the myths that legitimize social hierarchy, or the extent to which an individual desires and supports social hierarchy. Desire or support for social hierarchy may manifest because the individual is already at the upper strata of society and wishes to justify that position, or because the individual aspires to attain such a position. Social hierarchy may be supported ideologically by individuals within a society, but it is also the product of public and private institutions within a society. Legitimizing myths are seen by Sidanius and Pratto (1999) as the central element bridging the sociological and psychological aspects of their theory because legitimizing myths serve to justify social hierarchy while orienting the social perceptions of people within society. Racism, sexism, classism, nationalism, and negative stereotypes are examples of legitimizing myths that justify unequal distribution of wealth, power, and status. These in turn promote “behavioral asymmetry” or group-based differences in the behavior repertoire for individuals at different levels of the power continuum. Social dominance orientation thus refers to the degree to which an individual endorses the various myths that legitimate social hierarchy. This orientation is both the cause and the product of social hierarchy. Those who score high on the SDO scale tend to think of the world in terms of a competitive jungle in which the strongest succeed to reach the top, a world in which group-based power imbalance is seen as a failure of group members and not as a result of institutional factors. Not surprisingly, those high in SDO tend to oppose social welfare programs, but they also oppose civil rights policies and rights for gays and lesbians. Sidanius and Pratto (1999) have repeatedly found strong links between SDO and political conservatism, although SDO has only a small correlation with authoritarianism (Altemeyer 2004; Duckitt 2003).

Duckitt, Wagner, Du Plessis, and Birum (2002) constructed and tested a structural model in which right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation were related to a variety of world views (such as “dangerous world” and “competitive world”) and then measured in terms of how well RWA and SDO predicted prejudice and nationalism. Results indicated that social conformity and seeing the world as a dangerous place were associated with high levels of authoritarianism, which in turn was strongly related to both prejudice and nationalism. Interestingly, a second and relatively independent path emerged in which being tough-minded was strongly associated with thinking of the world as a competitive jungle, which in turn gave rise to social dominance, and SDO in turn was strongly related to both prejudice and nationalism. In this study authoritarianism and social dominance clearly operate independently of each other, perhaps in response to different types of encounters that give rise to
different world views (i.e., seeing the world as dangerous versus seeing the world as highly competitive), but both RWA and SDO make substantial contributions to both prejudice and nationalism. These are two pathways to prejudice: In the first, seeing the world as a dangerous place increases authoritarianism (and vice versa). These individuals desire greater social cohesion and conventionalism, and thus come to be suspicious of outgroups. On the other hand, viewing the world as a competitive jungle increases social dominance (and vice versa). These individuals view various social hierarchies as legitimate and seek to enhance themselves and their group at the expense of others (Duckitt 2003). These are two very different motivations for prejudice, which explains the non-significant relationship between RWA and SDO in Duckitt et al.’s (2002) model.

Combining these two lines of research, Altemeyer (2004) set out to locate people who scored high on both authoritarianism and social dominance. Ordinarily, authoritarians are submissive to authority figures, while social dominators seek to dominate others, so it was unclear how “double highs” would behave. Altemeyer has typically defined scoring high on his RWA scale by using a quartile-split in which the upper 25% of subjects are considered authoritarian (Altemeyer 1996). Creating a cross-section of the upper 25% of scores on the RWA scale with the upper 25% of scores on the SDO scale gave Altemeyer (2004) a group of “double highs,” which would be roughly 5-10% of the total sample. (It’s fairly rare to find a person who is an authoritarian-social dominator, but it happens.) Social dominators want to dominate; authoritarians want to submit. Social dominators are not terribly religious, are not dogmatic, are self-centered, and know they are prejudiced. Authoritarians are very religious, are highly dogmatic, are fearful, and often do not realize they are prejudiced (Altemeyer 2004). Both align themselves with conservative political parties. What would “double highs” look like? Altemeyer found, essentially, that those who are authoritarian-social dominators have the most negative characteristics of each group.

Authoritarian-social dominators were found to have higher ethnocentrism scores than did high-SDOs or high-RWAs (Altemeyer 2004). This was true of both college students and their parents. The same was true of their hostility toward homosexuals, women, and French Canadians (Altemeyer’s subjects were Canadian college students and their parents). In terms of drive for dominance, “double highs” share the typical SDO’s wish to dominate, but they do not share the typical RWA’s wish to submit. In terms of religiousness, “double highs” were somewhat more religious than the typical SDO, who has a take-it-or-leave it attitude, but not as much zeal as is usually seen among authoritarians, who attend church almost every week. Finally, using the Exploitive Manipulative Amoral Dishonesty scale, “double highs” were rated as just as exploitive as the typical SDO, significantly higher than the typical RWA. Authoritarian-social dominators have enough religious zeal to be considered one of the ingroup for regular authoritarians, who are looking for a leader to
submit to. Authoritarian-social dominators have the drive to dominate, and like regular social dominators they are willing to lie, cheat, and steal to do it. They are thus well-positioned to take charge of conservative religious groups or antifeminist, antiabortion, anti-gun-control groups (Altemeyer 2004).

III. Social Cognition

The social-cognitive approach seeks to describe how the mind manages social information. The mind attempts to operate as efficiently as possible, as it should, considering the massive amount of perceptual information it encounters from minute to minute, not to mention the complex decision-making behind all social interactions. In order to facilitate the collection and evaluation of this massive flow of information, the mind has developed two channels to learning. First, the hippocampal learning/memory system operates very quickly and enables us to form relatively transient perceptions of stimulus events. Patients with damage isolated to the hippocampus make more errors when attempting to identify words and faces encountered only seconds or minutes earlier (Schacter 2001). Second, the neocortical learning/memory system consists of general knowledge built up over time, it is highly resistant to change, and it provides a sort of foundation which we rely on to provide us with a stable conception of the world we live in (Macrae and Bodenhausen 2000; McClelland, McNaughton, and O’Reilly 1995). When you encounter a particular type of stimulus event, the hippocampal system allows you to make immediate perceptions of the event and you may draw on information from the neocortical system to help you decide what it means. If you encounter a particular type of event often enough it may become part of your neocortical-based general knowledge system, in which case it would be resistant to change (Macrae and Bodenhausen 2000).

It would be overwhelming if we had to consciously analyze every piece of sensory data, decide what it is, and then decide what to do about it. If our minds operated this way we would be lucky to ever get past breakfast. Instead, very often we rely on a sort of automatic processing of information in which the things we encounter (including other people) are quickly categorized and compared with exemplars we have in our neocortical memory system. These exemplars are called schemas (Markus 1977); they are essentially templates created out of past experiences that provide us with information about what to expect from that category of stimulus we are encountering. This type of automaticity in social perception gives us a tremendous advantage, allowing us to move quickly and efficiently through our social environments without paying too much attention to what we are doing (Bargh 1996; Macrae and Bodenhausen 2000). Schemas also allow us to make inferences about unspecified or unknown aspects of stimuli or situations (Bodenhausen, Macrae, and Hugenberg 2003). This system permits sufficient flexibility to allow us to adjust to novel situations when needed, while also allowing us to often drive on
One major problem which results is that the mind is not a perfect device for analyzing information. From this perspective stereotypes are errors in evaluation of social information, and they are difficult to change precisely because the neocortical system is resistant to quick alterations. Once a stereotype belief is embedded in a person’s world view, there are a variety of cognitive errors which make it persistent and highly resistant to inconsistent information.

Errors in judgment sometimes occur simply on the basis of schema activation. One particularly dramatic example of how a schema can distort our perceptions occurred in Montana when two hunters shot at what they believed to be a brown bear. They had been out all day and were very tired, it was starting to turn dark, and they saw a shape moving in the distance. After they fired they moved in to examine their kill. When they got closer they saw that the “bear” had in fact been a tent with a man and a woman inside who had been making love. The woman was killed by one of the shots (Loftus and Ketchum 1991). In this case the men were not operating out of any form of prejudice. Their fatigue and the poor lighting undoubtedly allowed their minds to automatically process the visual information they encountered rather than to effortfully process the information and then actively decide whether the target was a legitimate one.

Police officers frequently face similar situations, not with bears, but with ambiguous social situations in which they must make snap judgments about whether a suspect is armed. Unfortunately, it is in precisely this type of situation, in which fast processing of information is required, that mistakes are more apt to occur because the mind depends more on automatic or schema-based processing of information. This may be what happened when four New York City police officers shot and killed Amadou Diallo, a 22-year-old West African immigrant who was attempting to reach for his wallet when the officers opened fire and shot him 41 times. Naturally, we cannot know the mental processes of these officers, but it is known that the shooting happened at night, that the officers had been searching all night for pedestrians carrying illegal handguns, and that Diallo was in a semi-enclosed place which limited their visibility of him. These officers apparently had primed themselves by their search for handguns. Of course, they should have been more cautious in their approach so that they would have had time to be more deliberative in their thinking. But what would have happened if Diallo had been White? Would the officers have taken more time to process the information instead of concluding he was reaching for a gun?

This question was explored by Correll, Park, Wittenbrink, and Judd (2002), who created a simulation in which White subjects viewed photographs of Whites or African-Americans who were holding either handguns or innocent items such as wallets, cell phones, or sodas. Subjects were also asked to press a button to “shoot” those suspects who held guns. Results across four experimental conditions indicated that when faced by an unarmed suspect, subjects were more likely to shoot at African-Americans than at Whites. Also, subjects shot
unarmed African-Americans more quickly than they did unarmed Whites, indicating a different deliberative response when facing White suspects. Shooter bias was more pronounced among subjects who believed African-Americans to be dangerous (illustrating the effect of a schema). However, prejudice failed to predict shooter bias. Simply believing that African-Americans are dangerous was sufficient to lead subjects to interpret an ambiguous stimulus as a gun, and this effect did not require subjects to dislike African-Americans. The researchers also administered Altemeyer’s (1988) right-wing authoritarianism scale, but RWA was found to be unrelated to shooter bias (though high-RWAs were again found to be more prejudiced). In this simulation, overt prejudice did not alter shooter bias, but knowledge of the schema of dangerous African-Americans did.

The availability heuristic, identified by Tversky and Kahneman (1973) explains why people tend to overestimate certain classes of events. When a memory for a certain type of event is easy to bring to mind, we tend to overestimate the prevalence of that type of event. It is easier to remember a dramatic plane crash than it is a car crash, so people often overestimate the risk of death in planes and underestimate the risk of death in cars. This also explains why people who watch news programs and read newspapers tend to overestimate local crime rates: They learn of more examples of crime than do people who do not watch the news, and thus find it easier to recall examples of crime events and subsequently overestimate their own level of risk (Glassner 1999; Lowry, Nio, and Liétnier 2003; Romer, Jamieson, and Aday 2003). Researchers studying the content of local television news crime coverage in Pittsburgh (Klein and Naccarato 2003), Chicago (Linton and LeBailly 1998), Los Angeles (Dixon and Linz 2000), and Philadelphia (Romer, Jamieson, and deCoteau 1998) have found that local television news reporting is biased in overrepresenting African-Americans as perpetrators of crime and Whites as victims. Interestingly, this is not true of national level network news (Dixon, Azocar, and Casas 2003), perhaps because African-Americans accused of crimes are usually shown on national news only if they are already famous (e.g., O.J. Simpson, Michael Jackson, Kobe Bryant). Nor was this bias in reporting found in the Orlando, Florida local news coverage (Chiricos and Eschholz 2002), raising the prospect that cultural stereotypes operate more in some localities than others. Local news coverage showing African-Americans in a predominantly negative light, usually as criminals, may foster the schema of African-Americans as dangerous, which, through the availability heuristic, leads to overestimates of risk of victimization by African-Americans. Furthermore, Dixon and Linz (2002) found that African-Americans and Latinos standing trial for crimes were more likely to be subjected to potentially prejudicial discussions of their cases in the local media, raising concerns about damaging pretrial publicity and bias among jurors.

It is important to note that none of what has been described thus far regarding schemas and the availability heuristic was predicated on overt
When we consider prejudiced individuals encountering biased reporting on local television news, we can see that there are additional social-cognitive issues at work. When people evaluate information from their social worlds they tend to accept without much hesitation that which supports what they already believe, a finding termed confirmation bias (Lord, Ross, and Lepper 1979; Nickerson 1998). They essentially say to themselves that this new piece of information simply confirms what they already knew to be true, so they don’t feel the need to be critical of it. A prejudiced individual, encountering biased television news reporting, is likely to have his or her prejudicial beliefs confirmed. A corollary of this is disconfirmation bias (Edwards and Smith 1996), the act of trying to disconfirm information which doesn’t fit with what we believe. Edwards and Smith (1996) found that subjects spent more time deliberating over arguments that didn’t fit with what they believed. People essentially think more carefully about the new information as they find ways to discount or discredit it. When we consider some of the preposterous themes advanced by conspiracy theorists (Berlet and Lyons 2000; Harrington 1996) it is clear that those who believe these stories must be accepting them relatively uncritically because they are in some way consistent with beliefs they already hold. In line with this, Goertzel (1994) found that people who believe in one conspiracy theory tend to believe in others as well.

Confirmation and disconfirmation bias can alter our interpretations of social interactions. A classic example of this was provided by Darley and Gross (1983), who told laboratory subjects that they would view a film of a girl named Hannah. Some subjects were told that Hannah came from an impoverished background, while others were told that Hannah came from a relatively wealthy family. All subjects in the experiment viewed the same film of the girl engaging in several tasks, which subjects were asked to evaluate. The subjects who believed the girl came from a wealthy family rated her performance on the tasks significantly higher, demonstrating that the information about Hannah that was given to the subjects served to activate schemas that in turn altered the subjects’ evaluations of her. Subjects appeared to attend to schema-consistent information and ignored that which was schema-inconsistent. Darley and Gross reasoned that subjects used the information given them prior to the film to form a hypothesis about what to expect (schema activation) and consequently attended to information that confirmed their hypothesis. Similarly, Murray (1996) found that subjects evaluated the performance of a Black child lower than that of a White child, even though the performances were identical. This effect occurs in memory as well, leading people to recall more accurately information that is consistent with their schemas. Cohen (1981) asked subjects to view a videotape of a woman who was described as either a waitress or a librarian, though in both cases the videotape was the same. Subjects were then asked to recall as much as they could about what they had seen. Cohen found that subjects who were told the woman was a waitress tended to recall information consistent with that schema (e.g., a bowling ball), while those who were
told she was a librarian recalled other information consistent with that schema (e.g., drinking wine). The confirmation and disconfirmation biases clearly help explain why stereotypes are persistent and resistant to change.

At times our inaccurate beliefs about people may cause them to literally change their behavior to conform with what we believe. Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) gave all grade-school children at a school a bogus intelligence test and then randomly assigned them to be “bloomers” or ordinary learners. The experimenters notified the teachers at the school which students were “bloomers” and told them they could expect these children to perform much better in the near future. In fact, the “bloomers” were not different; they had been randomly selected. By the end of the school year the performance of the bloomers had improved substantially, and their scores on a real IQ test had gone up. There were several reasons for this: Teachers called on bloomers more often, gave them more extensive feedback in class, and in other ways gave these children a greater share of their attention. This pioneering research on the effects of expectancy inspired hundreds of similar experiments, and the effects have been found to be frequently replicated and substantial in magnitude (Rosenthal 1994). Efforts to demonstrate the effects of negative expectancies are limited, due to obvious ethical concerns. It would be highly unethical to deceive teachers into believing that some children were intellectually stunted, although such erroneous beliefs certainly are held quite often as a result of racist and sexist prejudices. While it is difficult to perform such experiments with children, negative expectancy effects have been demonstrated in the form of the negative placebo effect, what we now call the nocebo. More than 20 laboratory studies have demonstrated that negative expectations about health are sufficient to produce reports of physical symptoms by subjects under laboratory conditions (Harrington 1999). By way of analogy, we might assume that negative expectations caused by racist stereotyping would similarly have dramatic effects on academic performance in the form of self-fulfilling prophecies, which then would sadly confirm the racists’ stereotypes.

There are numerous other examples of cognitive biases in processing information (Bodenhausen, Macrae, and Hugenberg 2003; Jones 1997; Nickerson 1998), but the ones described here are among the most useful when considering stereotypes and racism. Any psychological discussion of beliefs related to prejudice, stereotyping, or hatred ought to take into account how these cognitive errors function. Errors of social cognition occur among all people, yet not everyone develops stereotyped beliefs. Taking the time to rationally consider evidence from our social environments is often sufficient to avoid the most common cognitive errors.

Social identity theory grew out of the social-cognitive tradition from an attempt to explain perceptual distortions that accompany categorizations of social groups (Huddy 2003). What sets social identity apart from most social-cognition research is the motivational drive for positive self-evaluation that
underlies the process (Huddy 2003; Oakes 2002; Tajfel and Turner 1979). Social competition was one of the primary approaches to the study of prejudice used by social psychologists of the 1950s. Sherif and Sherif (1953) described what they called realistic conflict theory, which was rooted in the assumption that competition for scarce resources increases intergroup hostility. Based on observations made of children competing for prizes at summer camps, Sherif and Sherif found that competitive tasks increased social distance and hostility between groups, whereas cooperative tasks reduced hostility and encouraged friendships between groups. Children in these summer-camp groups had created formidable group identities before they were even exposed to each other, and these identities became more pronounced after competition began. In response to realistic conflict theory, Henri Tajfel sought to find the minimal conditions under which members of groups would exhibit ingroup preference and outgroup hostility (Oakes 2002). Tajfel and Turner (1979) did this by creating stripped-down social groups with the minimum requirements for group categorization (arbitrary assignment of subjects to one or the other of two groups) and adding components to observe their impact on ingroup identification and outgroup hostility (Oakes 2002). Similar to social cognition researchers, who were observing categorization processes used by individuals to make sense of their social worlds, Tajfel and Turner found that individuals appear to be primed to categorize themselves in order to make meaningful social comparisons that would reflect on their own identities. Tajfel’s surprising and famous (Huddy 2001) finding was that schoolboys placed in meaningless, non-interacting groups showed favoritism toward their group at the expense of a different group, even when they were aware that the groups were totally arbitrary.

Tajfel and Turner (1979) referred to their experimental manipulation as the “minimal group situation” because they had stripped the groups of all meaning. In the typical minimal group experiment, subjects would be asked to estimate the number of dots projected on a screen, or whether they preferred a painting by Klee or one by Kandinsky, or they were simply assigned to groups based on the flip of a coin (Tajfel 1982; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament 1971; Tajfel and Turner 1979). Regardless, assignment to one group or the other was random and devoid of any real meaning for the subjects. Subjects in these experiments were then asked to distribute points, which were worth small amounts of real money, to members of the groups. Subjects preferred to assign points to members of their own group rather than to members of the other group, even though they had no meaningful connections with their own group members. In a similar way, these researchers were able to achieve a variety of forms of ingroup preference. These results have become well-known for the implication that simply randomly assigning people to one group or another is enough to provoke hostility or discrimination between them. The question Tajfel and Turner sought to answer was why subjects should find any meaning in the categories imposed by researchers (Oakes 2002). Contrary to the common interpretation of these results, Tajfel and Turner did not believe that mere
categorization was sufficient to instill discrimination between groups (Oakes 2002). Turner wrote: “Social categorization per se. . .is not sufficient for ingroup favoritism” (1978, 138). Preference for the ingroup isn’t simply a matter of flipping a coin and assigning people to one group or another. In order to achieve these results, subjects must internalize or identify with the group. The reason subjects in the minimal group situation preferred to assign points to members of their own group was that there was nothing else that was meaningful in the social situation that they could focus on. Mere categorization did not produce group behavior unless and until the categorization was internalized by the subject (Oakes 2002).

Tajfel and Turner (1979) believed that sociological categorizations, such as ethnicity and gender, would not gain significance for an individual unless they became internalized. Moreover, social identity theory presents a fluid model in which the individual may internalize differing sociological categories from moment to moment in response to social situations. A particular social setting may make one type of social category distinctive, whereas a different social setting would focus attention on a second category, and so forth. This fluidity does not negate the possibility of a relatively stable social identity, but from this perspective there are many social identities that an individual may internalize, and different types of social encounters will bring different identities to the surface at any moment. Social identity theory is interactionist in perspective and describes how people create meaningful self-identities through the categorization process (Oakes 2002).

Internalization of a group identity does not automatically cause individuals to become hostile toward outgroup members, though it may happen under particular conditions. A great deal of research has focused on the conditions under which group social identity is important for outgroup hostility and derogation. Groups may be defined along a number of dimensions, such as stability (whether the status of the group can be changed), legitimacy (the perceived legitimacy of status hierarchy relative to other groups), and permeability (the ability of group members to switch groups), and these variables will be important in increasing or decreasing ingroup favoritism and outgroup hostility (Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, and Hume 2001; Tajfel and Turner 1979). If permeability is high, a member of a low status group may simply leave and join a more successful group, thereby avoiding the need for outgroup hostility; but if group permeability is low, then an alternative strategy would be to emphasize positive aspects of the ingroup or negative aspects of the higher status outgroup. If differences between groups are seen as illegitimate, the result may be an increase in tension and hostility between groups. White supremacy groups, for example, may view group differences as impermeable and, if they compare themselves with more successful ethnic minority groups, they may see status differences as illegitimate. Social identity theory predicts that when group status differences are seen as unstable and illegitimate, low-status groups should favor competitive strategies and ingroup bias. When status differences are seen
as stable and legitimate, high-status groups may have no reason for added outgroup hostility, though they may consider outgroup members to be lower in ability.

Bettencourt and her colleagues (2001) conducted a meta-analysis of all research examining the conditions under which groups practice ingroup favoritism. The resulting analysis included 145 independent samples with 278 high-status versus low-status comparisons. Overall, high-status groups displayed greater ingroup bias than did low-status groups as measured by both status-relevant and status-irrelevant dimensions, and they evaluated outgroups more negatively. Low-status groups evaluated their ingroups more positively, perhaps in an attempt to compensate for their lower position in the social hierarchy, but they did not display negative evaluations of higher-status outgroups. Low-status groups appeared to recognize the relative merits of both groups, but high-status groups appeared to recognize only those aspects which were relevant to their own success. High-status groups identified more with their ingroups compared with low-status groups when status differences were seen as legitimate and when group boundaries were impermeable. When status differences were viewed as illegitimate, low-status groups appeared to value status-irrelevant dimensions, perhaps in an effort to improve their group standing. Overall, results of the meta-analysis indicated that intergroup conflict is most “likely when the status structure is perceived as illegitimate and unstable (i.e., insecure) and group boundaries are impermeable. Under these circumstances intergroup attitudes among both high- and low-status groups may be particularly biased” (Bettencourt et al. 2001, 539).

IV. CONCLUSIONS

Research in social psychology is highly relevant to the study of hatred, particularly in regard to those aspects of hatred that are related to overt aggressive acts committed by groups of offenders, socio-political attitudes and styles of interaction, stereotype formation and perseverance, and intergroup hostility. “Hatred” per se has not been a focus of research in social psychology, but aspects of what we call hate have been studied extensively by researchers in different branches of social psychology. While diffusion of responsibility may seem on the surface to be unrelated to hatred, when viewed in the appropriate socio-political context it becomes apparent that diffusion of responsibility may contribute to the expression of hatred, murder, and genocide. Similarly, information processing errors are fairly common in everyday life and are often benign in nature, but they all too frequently contribute to hatred through the creation and maintenance of stereotypes. The literature reviewed here indicates a number of pathways leading to hatred. What becomes clear from this body of research is that not all who engage in hateful behavior will see it as such (some will see their hostility toward outgroups as justifiable and perfectly reasonable). Secondly, it is clear that the situation itself can elicit both the best and the worst
types of behaviors from individuals who often have a very poor understanding of the power of the situation to influence them. This is not to say that individuals are helpless in the face of group pressure, but they may be unaware on a conscious level of the pressures that encourage them to act as they do. Do these actions still constitute hate? Consider the Puerto Rican Day parade described earlier. Young men were swept up in events that ultimately harmed over 50 women. It is doubtful that all the offenders harbored hatred toward women, yet the situation elicited from them behaviors that can be seen as hateful. This example points out the importance of examining not just the personality of the offender, but also the type of situation in which the offense occurred.

The tradition in social psychology of laboratory-based empirical research may not appeal to all who seek to study hatred, prejudice, and discrimination, yet the empirical approach outlined here has been very successful at generating and testing theories related to hatred. Theories such as deindividuation, diffusion of responsibility, and conformity help explain how groups become aggressive. Authoritarianism and social dominance theories help us understand the individual differences in socio-political styles that people have, as well as their implications for prejudice and nationalism. Social cognition research helps us understand how stereotypes are formed and why they persist in spite of contradictory information. Social identity theory provides insight not only into the fact that people frequently prefer their ingroup, but also into what conditions are most likely to cause intergroup hostility. Knowledge of this type of research may have important real-world ramifications for public policy, law, and education.

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IDENTITY-DRIVEN VIOLENCE: RECLAIMING CIVIL SOCIETY

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ABSTRACT

The increase in identity-based violence both domestically and internationally is focusing attention on the need for proactive approaches to reconciliation. The rise of militia movements, and the associated phenomenon of malicious racial harassment in the Pacific Northwest, demonstrates the dangers arising from identity-driven violence. The broad scale success of an anti-affirmative action initiative illustrates the wider significance of discriminatory attitudes. This article addresses those dangers by illustrating the convergence of two kinds of theories about identity-based violence. We will demonstrate how individual-level explanation taken from empirical work in the field of developmental psychology fits with social movement theory to provide a powerful analysis of the causes, and the cure, for identity-based violence and racial discrimination. Specifically, we focus on the relationship between identity formation and political violence, on the one hand, and residual racism among economically and culturally dispossessed whites on the other.

Social movement theory tells us that there are dispossessed whites who are likely to seek status by targeting minorities. Identity theory tells us that it is the disjunction between the certainties of identity socialization for this group, and their present sense of dispossession, that transforms group “interest” into authoritarianism and potential violence. The key empirical link is between identity “foreclosure” and forms of authoritarianism that rationalize violence.

In using the analysis as a guide to solutions to racial violence, we highlight the actions that can be taken to pre-empt violent behavior through a political emphasis on developing constructive developmental choices. We examine the requirements for the development of democratic personalities that avoid the pathologies of violence associated with interpersonal domination and authoritarianism. The direction given by social movement theory points toward solutions based on democratic discourse around objectives derived from identity theory: namely, the recognition and validation of community worth, the improvement and affirmation of participatory competence, and practical steps toward sustaining commitments on an interpersonal basis. These kinds of communication have to be worked out at the non-elite level, and in practical steps that build confidence between communities.
The article builds on the work reported in Hoover’s recent book, *The Power of Identity: Politics in a New Key* (Chatham House 1997), and on work by Johnson on race and American national identity.

I. Introduction

Identity-based violence has, in the post Cold-War World, become the major preoccupation of domestic and international efforts to assure peaceful coexistence among peoples of differing backgrounds. In the U.S., the steady resurgence of the far right over the last 20 years provides a case study for an analysis aimed at prevention and remediation. Many of the most violent elements of the far right have gathered in the Pacific Northwest over the last generation. This article is an attempt to suggest the viability of wedding developmental psychology and social movement theories in an analysis of the reasons for a marked propensity for violence among certain elements of the far right. Our purpose is to propose a strategy for resisting the advance of identity-driven harassment and violence.

A brief review of the historical context will set the stage for our analysis. The election of Ronald Reagan to the Presidency in 1980, with his reactionary feel-good rhetoric about going back to a traditional America, was the most dramatic national indicator of the backlash against social welfarist liberalism and the counterculture of the 1960s and ’70s. White supremacists, laissez-faire capitalists, fundamentalist Christians, and neoconservatives coalesced under the Republican Party umbrella. Reagan revived the pre-New Deal alliance between conservatism and capitalism. A host of conservative Republican Congressmen were elected for the first time in 1980 and began to dismantle the liberal consensus of the Kennedy-Johnson years.

Even before Reagan’s ascendancy, some white supremacist fundamentalist Christians had decided that the population centers of the United States were lost to morally depraved race-mixers. In the 1970s Richard Butler moved from California to northern Idaho and established the Church of Jesus Christ Christian. Butler’s group was part of the Christian Identity movement, which believes “that the white, European conquerors of North America are God’s true ‘chosen people,’ that Jews are Satan’s offspring and that people of color are a subhuman species.” In rationalizing his move to Idaho, Butler averred that the Pacific Northwest, the part of the United States with the fewest people of color, should be defended as the last bastion of the white race in North America.

Another important strain of the violent far right was the Posse Comitatus (power of the county). The Posse began in the late 1960s and advances the doctrine that county sheriffs are the highest legitimate law enforcement officers, because they are the only ones who are elected. Posse proponents tend to oppose practically all state and federal regulation of individual freedom and private business activity. They have also reinvigorated all the old views about an international conspiracy of Jewish bankers, multinational corporations, and
world government to destroy American sovereignty and the way of life it protects.

In 1979 Richard Butler began to hold an annual Aryan Nations Congress in Hayden Lake, Idaho. The Congresses brought together a diverse range of new and older far right elements, including the Ku Klux Klan and neo-Nazis. In those volatile environs great pressures were mounted for an ever more aggressive stance in defense of God, country, and the white race. Posse Comitatus organizing had already benefited from the farm crisis in the 1980s. A Jewish-dominated international banking system was blamed for the failing agricultural economy, especially in the Midwest. One Posse extremist, Gordon Kahl, was imprisoned for encouraging people not to pay taxes in 1976. Kahl violated his parole upon release by continuing his anti-tax activities. Forced into hiding, he was found by the FBI on an Arkansas ranch early in 1983. He died in an ensuing gun battle. Aryan Nations member Robert Matthews was deeply affected by the death of Gordon Kahl. He formed a splinter group from the Aryan Nations called “The Order.” This group embarked on a campaign of bank robberies and murders, until it was broken up following the death of Matthews in a shootout with the FBI in 1985.³

Kahl and Matthews became martyrs of the racist, anti-government far right. Elements of this group were noticeable across rural and small-town America, but were particularly pronounced in the Pacific Northwest, where adherents continued to move, attracted by Butler’s notion of the region as a white enclave in North America. In 1992 one of their number, white supremacist Randy Weaver, took flight from entrapment over his alleged sales of illegal weapons.⁴ The Weaver family sequestered themselves, heavily armed, at their Northern Idaho homestead. In a series of exchanges of gunfire, Weaver lost his wife and thirteen-year-old son. This was seen by the far right as an excessive use of force and convinced many of them of the immorality and insensitivity of national government. Those sentiments were heightened following the incineration of the Branch Davidian Compound in Waco, Texas by Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms officers on April 19, 1994 under questionable circumstances. A year later to the day the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City was bombed, claiming 168 lives.

In the aftermath of the Oklahoma City massacre, a shocked country learned of the breadth of a patriot/militia movement that saw over 850 cells operating in all fifty states. The authors’ own region of the Pacific Northwest has continued, along with the Midwest, to be a hotbed of patriot/militia activity.⁵

II. REACTION AND RESISTANCE

The conventional response to this pattern of harassment has taken the form of heightened enforcement of laws directed against racially-motivated violence.
There has also been a mobilization of community-based movements to counter right-wing political activity. These steps have been effective in dramatizing the problem and mitigating some of its most disturbing manifestations. However, viewed from a broader political perspective, these maneuvers have also marginalized the struggle as a duel between militant malcontents, on the one hand, and human rights activists, on the other.

The advent of a systematic campaign to eliminate affirmative action through state initiatives has revealed the broader dimensions of identity-driven discrimination. In 1998, a Washington state anti-affirmative action initiative passed overwhelmingly, and voting was sharply divided on racial lines. Consequently, it is imperative that a fresh analysis be undertaken aimed toward political action on a broader front. The “mainstreaming” of identity-based discrimination calls for a re-examination of the strategy for combating harassment and violence.

In a rough sense, the anti-harassment forces have received divided counsel from analysts of political behavior. Individual level theories suggest that particular personalities need to be selected and dealt with by a variety of means, from therapy to detention to punishment. Social level theories, on the other hand, point to conditions of deprivation arising from inequities of class, among other factors, that are thought to foster a sense of dispossession. The displacement of alienation onto aggression against identifiable “others,” whether different by virtue of gender, race, or sexual orientation, is a staple of this analysis. The problems with these diverging remedies are obvious: therapy is complex and chancy, detention accomplishes little, and punishment contributes to recidivism. Yet these remedies seem simple compared with the task of remedying social inequalities and reducing alienation arising from the nature of capitalism.

What falls between the cracks in this bifurcation of theory is the possibility that individual and social level theories can be seen to converge around a more effective remedy for identity-driven violence. The key lies in understanding the dynamics of identity formation and defense. While there has been a half-century of empirical research on this subject, that work is largely ignored in contemporary discussions of the political meaning of identity. Identity is taken to be whatever people think it is. The term identity is defined only descriptively, and almost never with reference to any form of systematic behavioral research. The means of acquiring identity are left unexamined, other than as social constructions of a presumably arbitrary nature.

Yet a review of what is known about identity formation opens the way to breaking through the artificial division between individual-level and socially-based theories. With that breakthrough, we can begin to see the way toward a democratic resolution of discriminatory behavior.
III. Identity Relations: A Behavioral Analysis

The common meeting ground of all citizens, no matter how factionalized by issues of race, class, and gender, is, paradoxically, identity. If asked: Who are you?, most of us reply by indicating what we do, what communities we are part of, and whom we are with. Fifty years of empirical research have confirmed that identity is made of three sets of relations: competencies, communities, and commitments. Research in developmental psychology by Erik Erikson, Carol Gilligan, and James Marcia, among numerous others, reveals that, while these relations take a multiplicity of forms in different settings, the underlying structural similarities are pervasive and striking.

Each element of identity involves relations between individual characteristics and social processes of legitimation, recognition, and validation—or the reverse: denial, discrimination, and censure. It is difficult to claim to be a poet without the imprimatur of publication, or a member of the “elect” or the “chosen” without signs of divine preference, or a committed partner without visible evidence of a bond beyond self-interest. A secure identity builds on a triad of relations: work that is validated economically and socially, communities that are recognized as intrinsically valuable, and enduring personal commitments to families, friends, and associates.

In the theory of identity formation, stage development plays a central role in setting the agenda for these emerging relationships. As we move from dependency as children toward the possibilities of autonomy, the crisis of identity looms and the struggles of the late teens and twenties are undertaken. Women and men encounter these struggles differently, but with the common goal of reaching a sense of identity, and a capacity for intimacy, by the commencement of full adulthood. Subsequent stages involve the evolution and defense of identity against the challenges of maturation and old age.

For our purposes, what matters as much as the content of these stages—whether validation is received through membership in a gang or in the Rotary Club—is just how we come to acquire these relations. What social psychologists have documented with striking consistency is that there is no substitute for working through to a satisfactory set of relations by a personal process of testing and negotiation in a developmentally responsive environment. This requires a period of “moratorium” in early adulthood as these relations take shape in the struggle between internal promptings and social responses.

The opposite of such a moratorium is identity “foreclosure”—the adoption of relations of identity not by growing into them, but by imposition or by acquiescence in the absence of choice. Foreclosure involves the adoption of roles and values held by significant others without the exploration of alternatives on one’s own terms. Identity may appear to be settled, but its foundations are insecure. Here lies the link to authoritarianism and incipient violence. James Marcia, the leading analyst of identity research, notes that:
One of the most consistent findings in identity status research has been that male and female Foreclosures, especially relative to Moratoriums, score highly on measures of authoritarianism and socially stereotypical thinking (Marcia 1966, 1967; Marcia and Friedman 1970; Matteson 1974; Schenkel and Marcia 1972; and Streitmatter and Pate 1989). They show preference for a strong leader over a democratic process, obedience over social protest, and the “pseudo-speciation” described by Erikson (1987): firm conviction that “their” group and “their” way are right. A possible consequence of this position is the somewhat chilling finding by Podd (1972) that, more than any other in a Milgram obedience task who had delivered what they believed to be maximum electrical shock to a “victim,” it was the Foreclosures who were willing to do it again; in fact, all Foreclosures who administered maximum shock levels were willing to repeat their performance.10

This is where the bridge to social-level explanations becomes visible. What appears to characterize the militias, the extremists, and the practitioners of identity-driven harassment and violence is a form of identity foreclosure. The rigid notions of superiority and virtue associated with one’s own community, the denigration of the communities of others, of their claims to competence, and of their forms of commitment, are the stuff of discriminatory behavior. But the disposition to act on these identity convictions comes out of a particular kind of developmental experience.

The symmetry between the experience of foreclosure and the power-driven imagery of supremacist rhetoric is consistent with this analysis. For those raised in a culture of clear and predictable roles, of those who are superior and those who are inferior, of a “right” that rationalizes force and abuse, the pressure toward foreclosure is dominant and difficult to escape. Protestations of loyalty, fidelity, and solidarity are at the heart of these experiences.

IV. IDENTITY AND VIOLENCE

What triggers the move from chauvinism to violence? This becomes the question for social theory to address. Social explanations of alienation and dispossession typically center on the impersonal processes of industrial capitalism. What is needed here is a more specific application of these insights to the generational experience of particular groups. Clearly the decline of the small farmer in the face of industrial agriculture has left behind a dispossessed rural population. No doubt the transition from a manufacturing to a service economy with lower paid, and less secure, employment has provided the urban counterpart.

However, by the terms of this theoretical convergence, it is just as significant that cultural relations of identity have been undermined as that economic forces have been adverse. The verities of conventional lifestyles have, from this perspective, been undermined by a cosmopolitan multiculturalism which is
seen to be enforced through laws on equal opportunity and affirmative action. What is suggested here is that the trigger that moves “foreclosures” from authoritarianism to action, involving a spectrum from overt discrimination to harassment to identity-driven violence, is the cultural and economic dispossession of a generation of poor white males.

Strategies of remediation for the economic predicament and for the cultural misperceptions that fuel these reactions are clearly called for. However, remediation of this sort can hardly be expected to succeed against the continuing pressure arising from forces of cultural and economic change. What is needed is a positive strategy of preventive action.

What our convergent perspective suggests is the necessity of helping people work their way out of the foreclosure that constrains the maturation of identity development. A positive strategy would focus on building legitimate forms of competence, a sense of community that does not require chauvinism, and a capacity to sustain interpersonal commitments.

Mixed forms of community action that combine cultural and economic dimensions offer a greater chance of success than do purely political activities. The distinguishing feature of civil society in America, at least, is the prevalence of voluntary organizations such as clubs, lodges, churches, and even political movements that support a range of cultural and economic possibilities for their members. An understanding of identity makes it clear that this is where the main front is in the battle for a more tolerant society.

State enforcement can prevent the worst abuses. State regulation and social service provision can provide better developmental choices for people. But the will to enforce, and to provide for healthier forms of development, is captive to sentiments of the larger society. It is in the various sectors of civil society that the battle is being waged by the forces of the right—the churches, the conventional political parties, the voluntary associations. And it is here that progressive action is badly needed. Just as identity-driven harassment has been mainstreamed by the anti-affirmative action movement, so does the progressive resistance need to be mainstreamed through a broader array of tactics in civil society.

It is here that the social psychological emphasis on competencies, communities, and commitments converges with an emergent social movement literature on multiculturalism. The pre-1965 definition of American national identity as white meant that the nation was governed by ways of life in civil society and practices of state that sustained white supremacy. In that social milieu to be a person of color meant to be the “other,” and therefore, not worthy of serious consideration in social relationships. Consequently, white Americans’ sense of community did not have to embrace people of different races, and the vast majority of whites certainly had no serious involvement in efforts to correct racism. The community element of identity has been undercut for those who depend upon racial exclusivity for security in a changing world.
Of equal or greater significance, in the last generation, white vocational competencies in everyday life have been challenged by the presence of people of color in schools, workplaces, and even neighborhoods and social gatherings. Racist and insensitive comments and acts, once accepted in closed company, are now frowned upon and are even a cause for embarrassment. With the enforcement of anti-discrimination and affirmative action laws, this behavior can result in the loss of jobs and status. Corporate programs aimed at recruiting from a multiracial talent pool have increased the pressure on whites who are marginalized by economic changes.

The societal tensions arising from the mass entry of people of color into mainstream settings have broader and deeper manifestations than political violence, which is the focus of this paper. A generation after the civil rights revolution, white Americans continue to be collectively insecure regarding a revised multiracialist understanding of American history. Far too many whites have had little or no personal experience with people of color away from work, and they often arrive in the workplace with stereotypical attitudes acquired during their socialization in white communities. After work, America remains a very segregated society. Thus, no meaningful sense of community exists between whites and non-whites in most of the country.

The correlates of occupational and social disruption, familial instability and economic insecurity, make personal commitments of all kinds hard to sustain. This makes it extremely doubtful that whites or minorities would acquiesce in a multiracialist hegemony in their community lives. In summation, for many white Americans, identity formation with respect to race has been collectively foreclosed by developmental shortcomings stemming from mass miseducation in homes and in schools, compounded by a lack of experience, or tension-ridden experiences, with non-whites in civil society.

What was already a contentious, racially divided society became even more so with secular developments in advanced capitalism. De-industrialization and the flight of capital overseas, increasing automation in production, and the farm crisis were part of a scenario causing the steady decline of real wages and deteriorating standards of living for large sectors of the most vulnerable populations since the 1970s. In the face of this capitalist globalization, fewer and fewer of us of any race are, in fact, sufficiently competent to succeed in the global marketplace. The violence of the patriot/militia movement emerges from those sectors of white society possessing less capacity for dealing with the convergence of the forces of legal racial equality at home, and capitalist integration globally. The relationships between legal racial equality, economic globalization, and a greater propensity toward violence among culturally and economically dispossessed whites are demonstrated in Figure 1.
Legal racial equality/
Increased competition between races

\[ \text{Consequences for Marginalized Whites} \]
Foreclosure on racial identity elements

+ 

Propensity for violence among culturally and economically dispossessed whites

Economic globalization;
Declining living standards

V. TOWARD A MULTICULTURAL CIVIL SOCIETY

In order to make multiracial communities possible, an alternative to the cultural and political project of the right needs to be mounted in American civil society. But American civil society is a far-reaching and pluralistic site. The deepening of populism following the fall of communism is accompanied by calls for decentralization of power and the fragmentation of states. These popular-democratic urges have become salient from time to time throughout American history and are resurgent today. America must achieve a new cultural consensus, but it cannot be elite-driven. “The new America must be a popular nation in the sense that it must be what the people say it is, and what they want it to be.” But the regionalism so heralded by Madison, because it prevented consistent majorities, confounds efforts at building a national hegemonic consensus. As Johnson has observed elsewhere,

Westerners, Easterners, Southerners and Midwesterners have different historical forces, and different mixes of baggage to resolve to reconstruct their Americas. Besides, people have to learn to live together where they live. The conundrum presented is one of whites promoting Confederate symbols in southern state capitols and universities, anti-immigrant fervor in the southwest, anti-Indian sentiment throughout the West, and the enduring presence of the black under-class in rust-belt cities. Each reflects an enduring ideology of white supremacy, but also a different array of forces to be addressed.
The emphasis in terms of organizing here is clearly regional, with particular focus on local issues. The myriad institutions of civil society must be mobilized to develop competencies for working in multiracial communities where citizens can engage in face-to-face relations to resolve conflict. Job programs and familial support activities are essential ingredients, along with cross-racial community building.

The human rights movement in the Pacific Northwest has been an example of the kind of regional-local network we are talking about. For many years the Northwest Coalition Against Malicious Harassment offered an umbrella for communities mobilizing against the Aryan Nations, neo-Nazis, and militia groups. At the same time the Coalition for Human Dignity provided critical intelligence regarding the worldview and strategies of the far right. A third organization, the Western States Center, trained progressive activists, office-holders, and other politicians in electoral politics and other techniques for pressuring government. The Northwest Coalition’s annual symposia brought together activists and intellectuals from around the region and country to discuss their experiences and strategies for confronting the far right. After several years, participants began to frame the movement in terms not only of what it was against, but also what it was for. Although there was not total agreement on this score, an inchoate consensus emerged that the movement was for “multiculturalism.”

Local groups in the region provided the backbone for efforts toward “tolerance for difference” and “promoting diversity.” Together, the three organizations mobilized churches, labor activists, and other local constituencies around a multiculturalist project that addresses the issues of community and, having established that, can increasingly take on issues of competence and commitment, as well.

Efforts such as these, multiplied from locale to locale, and region to region, can replicate on the left what the far right achieved in the churches and the corporate world over the last generation. Progressive forces need to re-take the initiative. The message needs to be about respecting competencies among the dispossessed, broadening communities by reaching out to the marginalized members of society, and acting on substantive policies that enable people to keep their familial commitments. Coalitions of activists, churches struggling with a sense of mission, unions seeking a broader base of public approval, companies that want the benefits of talented workers of differing races, voluntary organizations that assert community values against the depersonalization of globalization—all of these are the sites for engendering a multicultural identity that counters the parochialism and exclusionism of far right identities.

The institutions of government are strongly implicated here. We said that in the twenty-first century the nation must be popular-democratic, or what the people want it to be. In determining what the aggregate of social forces interacting out there want for their communities, democratic institutions of government would seem to be indispensable. Taking seriously the frustrations of those who may presently be anti-government, and establishing a format for dialogue
between them and the rest of the community based upon a common value for the place, is what we are calling for here. This is not a utopian scheme. There will always be people who are unwilling to participate in such a community dialogue, or who may participate, but not be willing to accept a consensus reached by the majority. But government must play a central role in discerning the will of the community, because it is the only institution that by its very mission represents us all. This positive vision is about a world in which individual identities can be realized, while being nurtured in the associational life of civil society as well as being nurtured and regulated by the state, without dependence on denigration, denial, and violence.

NOTES

3. Ibid., 260, 267-68.
6. In Kenneth Hoover, James Marcia, and Kristen Parris, The Power of Identity: Politics in a New Key (Chatham, N.J.: Seven Bridges/Chatham House, 1997) ch. 2, 3, 4, the empirical and theoretical basis for this form of analysis is developed. In this article, we use the term community, rather than Erik Erikson’s term integrity (integral-ity), to describe the component of identity that has to do with the affiliations and loyalties by which we place ourselves in a world of meaning. Similarly, for the sake of clearer communication, we use the term commitment rather than mutuality to denote the familial, filial, and marital relationships that provide the third key element of identity.
11. Cf. James Morone, The Democratic Wish rev. ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). Morone points to the cycle in American political history from populist arousal to movement mobilization to bureaucratization and an increase in the power of government. Our prescription here suggests that, by aiming for localized mobilization across a spectrum of community activities, this familiar cycle can be rendered more productive of constructive change.
13. Ibid., 97.
14. We switch here to the term multiculturalism, which includes considerations of race, gender, sexual orientation, religion, class, and even environmentalism.

15. The Northwest Coalition Against Malicious Harassment and the Coalition for Human Dignity merged in 1999, and after a series of internal crises, the new organization collapsed. However, the Western States Center still exists. And across the region two statewide organizations, the Montana Human Rights Network and the Rural Organizing Project (Oregon) continue to do similar work. In addition, a number of local organizations continue to exist in the state of Idaho and throughout the region.

Positioning Hate

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I. Introduction

A year after the publication of my book on women in the contemporary organized racist movement, Inside Organized Racism: Women in the Hate Movement (2002), I received a series of emails from a woman I will call Jenny. The study of racist activists in this book was based in part on my interviews with women in the Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazi and white supremacist skinhead groups, and Christian Identity communities. Although Jenny was not among those I had interviewed or even met in the course of the study, she had heard about my book—although not read it, as I later discovered—and contacted me to complain. Jenny insisted that I had inaccurately characterized people in the racist movements as motivated by hatred. In her experience, the movement, at least in the past, had been composed largely of “well-meaning” and “fair-minded” people. Only recently had it attracted less savory characters who were just “looking for a home for their hate”—people, Jenny concluded, who were making the racist movement less comfortable for the good people like her.

It is not hard to dismiss Jenny’s comments. People in organized racist groups tend to be disingenuous, especially when it comes to describing their racial commitments and activities. Not surprisingly, they want to present themselves and their groups in the most favorable light and thus are loath to accept pejorative terms such as “hate.” Even if a racist activist wished to be candid, it is difficult for someone to accurately describe what motivates his or her behavior. Events and commitments of the present shape not only how people tell stories from their lives, but also how they know or remember these experiences (Fielding 1981; Goldberg 1990; Somers 1994). Subsequent events cloud perception of what prompted actions in the past, a process evident in my study of racist women. When asked to explain what led to their current racial activism, many described it as the outcome of a sudden, dramatic racial “conversion” through which they radically revised their earlier, naïve ideas about race and racial politics. The actual biographical events that led these women to racial groups, however, give a very different picture: one of gradual recruitment through a personal contact rather than dramatic ideological transformation. The seeming memory of racial “conversion” that these racist women relate as
their route to racist groups was thus a post hoc reconstruction, grounded in their current racist commitments, rather than an accurate recounting of their original motivation to join.

Given the difficulties of assessing motivation, even for people of goodwill, should we assume that complaints by avowed racists about how their motivation is portrayed by outsiders can simply be dismissed? Perhaps not. In this article, I want to suggest that it might be valuable for those of us who are committed to antiracist work to think about Jenny’s remarks. My purpose certainly is not to rehabilitate the image of racist group members. Rather, it is to reconsider how we understand the “hate” of racial hatred. In this article, I examine the relative merits of considering racial hatred as an individual motive or as an outcome of social action. I ask whether it might be worthwhile to re-examine the common presupposition that racist groups necessarily attract haters and that all those who enlist in racist groups are necessarily motivated by hate. And I evaluate the implications for scholarship and anti-racist politics if we consider that people like Jenny may not be personally filled with hatred or did not join the racist movement because of hatred toward other racial or ethnic groups.

The argument of this paper draws on recent theorizing in the sociology of emotions and sociological studies of racial hatred and ethnoviolence, as well as my empirical work on racist activists in the 1920s Klan (Blee 1991), the contemporary organized racist movement (Blee 2002), and what are commonly known as “hate crimes” (Blee n.d.). I begin by describing how intergroup hate like that exhibited in racial hatred is generally understood, focusing on studies and public discussions of racist groups and racial violence and the limitations of this conceptualization. I then propose an alternative approach, considering intergroup hate as a social outcome rather than an individual motivation for actions, and explore the utility of this reconceptualization for the study of racist groups and various types of ethnoviolent incidents.

II. Hate as an Individual Phenomenon

The role of hate in practices of intergroup conflict and tension is generally regarded, at least implicitly, as a matter of individual psychology. Intergroup hatred is understood as a complex of emotional states, cognitive views, and affective sentiments within an individual who is negatively focused on a social group other than his/her own. As such, intergroup hatred typically is understood to be embedded in a complex of other traits of perception and personality, such as prejudice, discrimination, displacement, and identity. Although not all people exhibit or experience hatred toward members of other social groups, there is an assumption that the psychological building blocks of group hatred are universal. Prejudice and discrimination, for example, are seen to stem from the need to reduce and organize the welter of information that is received in complex social situations by pre-judging information received from other peo-
ple and sorting it into a limited number of pre-formed categories. Displace-
ment and identity, too, are regarded as rooted in basic and perhaps innate 
human desires for status, power, and social connection such that people tend to 
displace their frustration onto people seen as dissimilar and to value people 
regarded as similar to themselves (Aronson 1992).

Although the psychological foundation of group hatred is considered to be 
universal, this does not mean that all persons feel hatred toward members of 
other social groups. For many, perhaps most people, such intergroup hatred is 
never activated. In some people, however, particular sets of social, economic, 
political, or psychic conditions may trigger animosity toward those of other 
social groups. The conditions of its provocation will shape the groups to which 
such intergroup hatred is directed. For example, interracial competition for val-
ued resources like jobs, housing, education or political power may shape inter-
group hatred in a racial direction. Aggression displaced from a female target 
may shape hatred toward all women. Even deficits or needs of personality may 
play a part in directing intergroup hatreds. Jean-Paul Sartre’s (1992/1946, 37) 
famous discussion, for example, depicts anti-Semitism as a passion, a disgust, a 
revulsion, “an involvement of the mind so deep, so complete, that it extends to 
the physiological,” that is, a twisted religion embraced by those who wish to 
avoid the burden of reasoned action and to displace anxiety through hatred of 
an entire group of people.

This understanding of hate as a matter of individual psychology and per-
sonality is evident in scholarship and public policy as well. This is particularly 
evident in two contemporary phenomena associated with intergroup hatred: 
hate crimes and organized racist groups. Hate crimes are criminal offenses 
judged to have been motivated by animus toward a defined class of persons. 
Although the class of persons protected under hate crime statutes varies among 
states and between state and federal statutes, these laws typically apply to 
crimes prompted by prejudice on the part of the perpetrator based on the vic-
tim’s race, ethnicity, or religion; less often they extend to crimes motivated by 
animus on the basis of sexual orientation, disability status, or gender (Perry 
2003, 496-7; Green, McFalls, and Smith 2001). There is considerable contro-
versy about the utility of such laws in curbing intergroup violence, especially 
the efficacy of heightened punishment as a deterrent; the constitutionality of 
punishing a perpetrator more for an offense motivated by racism, homophobia, 
religious intolerance, and so forth than for a comparable offense without such 
motivation; the limited reach of the law across potential classes of victims, 
especially women; and the level of enforcement of such laws (Bourne 2002; 
Jacobs and Potter 1998; Jenness 2002/03; Jenness and Grattet 2001; Wang 
1997).

The second area in which hatred of other groups is often analyzed as an 
individual-level phenomenon is that of social movements organized to oppose 
social progress, such as collective resistance to the social advancement of
women, racial minorities, gays and lesbians, the disabled, and so forth. I focus on here racist organizing, but the explanatory dynamics are similar for other oppositional movements. Racist activists, as Jenny complains, are typically regarded by commentators and scholars as haters, a characterization that assumes that people seek out racist groups in order to express their antipathy toward members of racial, ethnic, or religious minority groups. From the post World War II collaborative project of German critical theorists who came to the U.S. to escape Nazi persecution and published their exploration of the psychological roots of fascism as The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al. 1950), to present day journalist accounts of racist leaders, there is a preoccupation with explaining why certain people are predisposed to hate others enough to join racist groups. Although Theodore Adorno and his colleagues were careful to link authoritarian dispositions to the particular constellation of family and social configurations they saw as characteristic of early twentieth-century Germany, more recent commentators often provide little explanatory connection between individual personality attributes and the actions of racial hatred. Instead, accounts of racist activists often describe a welter of factors that are assumed to condition someone to a life of racial activism: economic marginality, perceived harm by someone of another race, or blocked avenues for expressing aggression. Yet these factors tend to be assumed rather than demonstrated to cause a particular person’s decision to become a racial activist.

There is no doubt that considering hate as rooted in attributes of individual personality has been useful for analyzing why certain people become involved with various forms of violence or organized resistance to the advances of other social groups. It helps clarify why two persons, situated in similar social, historical, and even familial contexts, can arrive at very different positions with regard to issues of race, gender, sexual orientation, and so on. Further, the focus on individuals helps clarify the deep and passionate feelings that tend to accompany acts of intergroup violence or movements to oppose the rights of those seen as different from oneself. But such an individualistic focus also has limitations. It tends to strip individual action away from a social context, thereby assuming as universal certain sentiments, emotions, and ways of thinking that might, in fact, be variable across time and place. And it leaves unanswered the nagging question of Jenny’s complaint: Should all racist activists be considered to be “haters”?

III. HATE AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON

To broaden the understanding of hate, especially in the context of intergroup conflict and violence, it is useful to consider hate as a social, in addition to an individual, phenomenon. Such a social conception considers four analytic qualities of the experience and expression of hatred: hate as relational; hate as socially constructed; hate as accomplished; and hate as organized.

The notion that hate is relational, rather than simply an expression of an
inner psychological state, is based on recent developments in the sociology of emotions as well as in efforts to develop a comprehensive theory of the expression of racialized and sexualized hatred across the globe (Eisenstein 1996; also Card 2002; Roy 1994). This understanding of hate focuses not on the origin of hatred in the individual psyche, but on how hate is expressed and the consequences of that expression. Zillah Eisenstein (1996, 23) links this way of thinking of hate to more psychological understandings in her assertion that:

I do not view hatred as natural, or timeless, or homogenized, and yet it is something more than contextually specific. As a politics of “otherness,” hatred calls forth the imaginings of unconscious fantasies. But the fantasies are changeable.

For Eisenstein, hate is a politics of “otherness,” of “other-ing” groups of people as different from and more threatening than the self. Hatred is thus a boundary mechanism, sealing borders between the self (or the group seen as similar to the self) and those seen as different. Hatred, in this sense, is exclusionary. It creates social boundaries that mold or intensify a sense of commonality within the self-group (the “us”), even those that may not have been experienced before. The intensification of nationalist hatred in the former Yugoslavia, for example, shaped a sense that there was a commonality to being Serbian or Croat, even among those who had lived very inter-ethnic lives in the past (see Brubaker and Laitin 1998; Nirenberg 1996; Oberschall 2000). Similarly, racial hatred operates to create a sense of whiteness as a commonality that bridges such cross-cutting differences as those of ethnicity, location, social class, or gender (Essed and Goldberg 2002; Horowitz 2001). Further, the social boundaries created by intergroup hatred create a singular sense of the “Other,” (the “them”), against which one’s own group is defined and posed. Hatred erases the internal differentiation of the Other, bringing to the fore its common antagonistic qualities. There can be no recognition of heterogeneity among the Other. All Serbs or Croats, all African Americans, all gays and lesbians, all women are rendered similar and non-distinct through this hatred.

In this view, hatred is an interactional rather than a purely psychological process. It arises in the course of social interactions in particular social, cultural, political, and historical contexts, and it shapes the possibilities for future social interactions (Parkinson 1996). Through interaction, Serbs learn to think of themselves as Serbian and to hate Croats. As a consequence, they take actions that make peacable interactions across these lines of national identification difficult or impossible in the future. Considering hate, like other emotions, as an interactional phenomenon also highlights its communicative function. Emotions, according to Ian Burkitt (1997, 40; italics in original) are “expressions occurring between people and not expressions of something contained inside a single person.” The implication of rendering emotions as relational rather than intrapsychic is to shift attention from the background of
individuals who express emotions to the relationships among people in which specific sets of emotions arise. It is to focus on how emotions are learned in social settings; how emotions are related to power relations, including those of race, gender, sexuality, and class; and how they are tuned to specific intended audiences, even if expressed privately (Parkinson 1996, 679).

Relatedly, it is useful to consider how hate is socially constructed. This understanding of hate is based on a theory that at least some emotions are historically and culturally situational; that is, they are dependent on the definition of a situation, as well as the availability of emotional vocabularies and sets of emotional beliefs, rather than being invariant, automatic, patterned responses (Thoits 1989, 319). Social theorists of emotion vary in the extent to which they regard emotions as socially constructed, with some insisting that all emotions are products of social life and others arguing that some emotions are the product of an interaction between innate drives and social life. The middle ground position, expressed in a statement by T.D. Kemper (1987, 276, cited in Thoits 1989, 321), is that “physiologically grounded primary emotions become elaborated ‘through the attachment of social definitions, labels and meanings to differentiated conditions of interaction and social organization.’” This suggests that, although there may be physiologically based primary emotions, social norms dictate when certain emotions are correct or even mandatory. Applied to the emotion of intergroup hate, this implies the importance of understanding the conditions under which such group hatred is likely to be expressed. Here, the observation of emotion theorists that negative feelings are more often directed down the status hierarchy (Thoits 1989) is particularly useful, suggesting that the emotion of group hate is most likely to be expressed by socially dominant groups (whites, men, heterosexuals, for instance) against those who are socially subordinate (persons of color, women, gays and lesbians).

According to the view that regards emotions as at least partly a product of social construction, it is possible to find patterns in the expression of emotion. These patterns, known in the sociology of emotion as “emotion cultures,” are historically variable. Thus, the contemporary United States can be characterized as a “love culture” because of the cultural pressure to define a wide range of emotional situations as representing emotions of love. Similarly, at the time of its breakup, the former Yugoslavia might be considered a culture of ethnic hate. Not only the expression of racial hatred, but also the actual experience of emotions such as hatred toward racial others, reflect the patterned nature of social construction. Racial hatred is not arbitrary, but rather is constructed or muted by distinct social influences.

Hatred might also be understood as something that is accomplished. This focuses on hatred as a process rather than an attribute. In scholarship on intergroup hatred, there is considerable evidence that hatred can exist as an outcome of a particular sequence of social events. James Aho’s (1994) work on the sociology of enemies uses the theories of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann to suggest a process whereby hatred toward racial enemies is
accomplished. In Aho’s explanation, the process of intergroup hatred begins when a group of people is identified and labeled in a negative way. Negative labels impose a constant and a primary identity on a group of persons who may see themselves as having little in common. People of a variety of races, sexualities, and ages who have the HIV virus take on the master status of “AIDS victims”; gay men of varying occupations, lifestyles, and political inclinations all become “fags” or “queers.” If intergroup hatred is to be accomplished, such labels tend to be legitimized by those who are presented as authorities or experts. Sociologists whose studies suggest genetic differences in intelligence by race, psychologists who assert that homosexuality is a disorder, and religious leaders who pronounced AIDS victims as deserving of their fates are examples.

The next stage in accomplishing intergroup hatred, according to Aho, is that of myth-making. Accounts are created that purport to demonstrate the inevitability of the negative label now attached to a group. Such fables as The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a mythologized description of Jewish conspiracies, work to justify the negative evaluation of other groups. As these myths persist over time, some take on the character of common sense, a process known as “sedimentation.” The racist depiction of African American violence toward whites in the early twentieth-century film “Birth of a Nation” comes to be regarded over time by some whites as a factual historical account of southern life after the Civil War. Similarly, as knowledge of the original fabrication of the myth fades from memory, vicious legends like the Protocols can take on the character of taken-for-granted knowledge. And the process of accomplishing intergroup hatred, in Aho’s terms is completed through ritual. The group to which negative qualities have been attached are treated with caution, secrecy, cruelty, or violence (Nirenberg 1996). If they react in kind, their negative qualities are confirmed. If they do not react, they are seen as weak or cowardly.

Literature in the sociology of emotion also suggests that emotions like intergroup hate might be understood as organized sentiments, what Gordon W. Allport (1992, 31) refers to as “an enduring organization of aggressive impulses,” rather than as inner traits. Considering the organization of intergroup hatred underscores how such emotions tend to be provoked by enduring social relationships; that is, how these emotions are embedded in larger social relations such as those of race, ethnicity, sexuality, and social class.

Finally, emotions like intergroup hatred are socially and politically encouraged (or forbidden). In addition to overt forms of encouragement or sanction, such as expressions of vilification or support of minority groups by politicians, media, schools, and other social agencies and institutions, emotions can be engendered by more subtle social forms, including the organization of the physical and cultural world (Parkinson 1996). Racial segregation in housing or schools, for example, encourages feelings of dislike, even hatred, across racial lines as racial groups are spatially arranged as different, often competing,
groups. Cultural displays of a group’s superiority over other groups may similarly provoke the feeling and expression of intergroup hate.

IV. APPLICATIONS TO RACIAL VIOLENCE AND RACIST ORGANIZING

How does a sociological stance on intergroup hatred help explain phenomena like racial violence and racist organizing? I suggest several possibilities, based on my research on racial hate crimes and organized racist groups.

Hate crimes, as mentioned above, generally require evidence that a perpetrator’s criminal actions were motivated by animus toward a legally protected group of persons. For an act to be counted as a hate crime, a criminal offense must have characteristics that would suggest the motive of group animus, such as the perpetrator’s membership in a racist group, possession of racist literature, or use of racial epithets during the crime. However, as Lu-In Wang (1999; 2001; 2002) and other legal scholars point out, there are problems when the definition of a hate crime focuses on individual motivations of hate. Since the definition of hate crimes “recognizes no motivation other than pure animus, it tends to identify as ‘real’ hate crimes only the most extreme and dramatic cases [and] to consider the bias crime perpetrator and his culpability in isolation from the social context, characterizing the perp as a deviant, hate-filled extremist who acts on his own deeply-held hostilities toward the victim’s social group” (Wang 2001, 215). This casts the perpetrator in the role of a social deviant whose actions are prompted by irrational emotions of intergroup hatred. It also obscures the possibility that motives of racial hatred may be mixed with more mundane goals like personal gain or status enhancement in crimes such as assault or robbery.

If we consider intergroup hatred as a social, in addition to an individual, phenomenon, it is possible to understand the acts of violence that are regarded as hate crimes in a broader and more accurate fashion. Such acts are not always the product of individual emotional states like hatred, but can reflect broader social institutions and cultural norms. Social divisions of power and resources and cultural ideas about those regarded as Other make certain groups of people more vulnerable, more targetable, than others even in the absence of particular animus by an individual perpetrator (Wang 1997). Thus acts of violence against members of socially and culturally subordinate groups by members of privileged groups—acts that are made possible, even likely, by the social structure of privilege and subordination—might well be considered conceptually equivalent to hate crimes even when individual perpetrators are not immediately motivated by emotions of intergroup hatred. This of course may broaden the notion of hate crimes beyond individual, intentional inflictions of harm to include also institutional, collective harm against subordinate racial groups such as racial inequities in access to prescription drugs, as well as acts of violence motivated by the opportunity to victimize a vulnerable person even when the immediate and proximate motive for violence is not racial.
Our understanding of racist groups, too, may well be enhanced by incorporating a social as well as an individual notion of intergroup hatred. Returning again to Jenny’s comments on my book, it is important to acknowledge that there is variability in emotions like intergroup hatred, both among members of racist groups and even within one person, across the course of their lifetime. Carol Heimer’s (2001, 3) critique of social institutions that “tend to assume the constancy of the subject” is a caution against analyses of racist groups that regard their members as all and constantly hate-filled and motivated by racial hatred. Indeed, it may be more productive for scholars, as well as more fruitful for antiracist activists, to differentiate carefully among racist group members and among phases in the lives of individual racists. My work on racist women (1991; 2002), as well as studies of racist men by Raphael Ezekiel (1995) and of adherents to right-wing Christian Patriotism by James Aho (1990), suggests considerable variability in the motives of individual racist activists. Social camaraderie, a desire for simple answers to complex political problems, or even the opportunity to take action against formidable social forces can co-exist with, even substitute for, hatred as the reason for participation in organized racist activities.

A social understanding of intergroup hatred will not replace the need to pay attention to how individuals experience and express hatred toward those they perceive as different. But it may provide new avenues for understanding situations—like those of hate crimes and racist groups—in which the link between motivations of hate and acts of racial hatred is complex, and sometimes tenuous.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Teaching a General Education Course on Hate Crimes: Challenges and Solutions

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I. INTRODUCTION

Almost ten years ago, I began teaching a course on hate crimes. This course was originally created as an upper division elective for undergraduate Criminal Justice majors. In the years since, the course has been adapted slightly so that it now serves to satisfy our General Education “Multicultural” requirement. The course is a popular one—in the fall of 2003, I had 62 students—and one I enjoy teaching. However, teaching this course has also presented several challenges. In this paper, I describe some of the challenges I have faced, as well as the approaches I have taken to meeting these challenges. I also briefly discuss what I believe are some of the primary benefits of offering this class.

II. CHALLENGE ONE: DECIDING ON THE SCOPE OF THE CLASS

My hate crimes course was originally created as a criminal justice elective. From its inception, however, I took a multidisciplinary approach. In part, this reflects my own academic background (which is in law and social psychology), and, in part, it reflects the diverse nature of criminal justice itself. Moreover, I strongly believe that hate crimes cannot be studied adequately without the inclusion of materials from many fields.

When the course became a G.E. class, it became even more important that it cover materials from a variety of disciplines. Not only did I want to encompass the breadth of the subject of hate crimes, but also I wanted to make the course as relevant as possible to students with a wide range of interests, majors, and career goals.

My hate crimes course now incorporates perspectives and materials from a variety of disciplines, including criminal justice, law, psychology, sociology, economics, political science, history, biology, anthropology, and gender studies, among others. Because a significant number of my students intend to become teachers, I also make sure to introduce them to things such as the Healing the Hate curriculum (McLaughlin and Brilliant 1997) and A Teacher’s

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Guide to the Holocaust (http://fcit.coedu.usf.edu/Holocaust/). We discuss not just hate crimes per se, but also related topics such as, for example, the concept of race, the effects of stereotypes and prejudice, and causes of homophobia.

I have found that the benefits of a multidisciplinary approach are many. Such an approach does the broad subject of hate crimes much better justice than a narrower approach would. Students find the class more engaging when it includes materials from their own disciplines, and they also tend to be more comfortable participating in class discussions. A side benefit is that students are exposed to information from fields that are new to them, and sometimes this sparks a new interest for them. For example, several years ago I had a psychology major in this class who found he enjoyed both the criminal justice and law components. He added a minor in criminal justice, and eventually went on to law school, where he has since earned both a J.D. and an LL.M.

III. CHALLENGE TWO: FINDING APPROPRIATE TEXTS

When I started teaching this class, there were no appropriate textbooks, and there was relatively little scholarship available on the topic. For several years, I compiled a packet of readings taken primarily from journal articles and court decisions. Not only was this time-consuming for me and unwieldy for both me and the students, but it didn’t offer the type of synthesis of information that a textbook would.

Eventually, texts on hate crimes started to appear. Although some of them were very good, none quite suited my needs. For example, Levin and McDevitt’s (1993) book was engaging for students to read, but contained neither the depth nor breadth of information I was looking for. Perry’s (2001) book offers an excellent sociological perspective, but again doesn’t address all of my areas of concern. Other good books that lack the dimensions I was seeking or that are inappropriate for this particular group of students include those written by Jacobs and Potter (1998), Lawrence (1999), Herek and Berrill (1992), and Hamm (1994). For several years, I chose one or another of these books, but supplemented very heavily with other readings. Unfortunately, the already-arduous task of assembling a reader gradually became even more difficult as the quantity of scholarly work on hate crime continued to grow.

Having been granted a sabbatical in the fall of 2002, I finally took what I felt was the inevitable step of writing a hate crimes textbook myself (Gerstenfeld 2004). I also co-edited an accompanying anthology (Gerstenfeld and Grant 2004).1 Obviously, in my own books I was able to adopt the scholarly, broad approach to hate crimes that I wanted. I believe that my books fill a need, and I hope that others find them useful as well. However, I suspect that many instructors who adopt them will still want to supplement to some degree with materials that are pertinent to their own interests, or that are too recent to have been included in my books.
IV. CHALLENGE THREE: DEALING WITH STUDENTS’ DIFFERING ACADEMIC BACKGROUNDS

Because this course fulfills a General Education requirement, the students have a variety of majors. A large portion are generally criminal justice students, but the rest may be majoring in anything from business to physical education. This presents a particular challenge because many of the students in the class have had no previous background in some of the fields we cover in the class. Most of the non-CJ students, for example, know little about criminal law concepts such as mens rea and motive, and few of the non-CJ students have ever read a court decision before. Only the psychology majors are generally familiar with judgment heuristics, another topic we discuss.

This means that whenever I introduce a new subject, I have to present a certain amount of background material so that it will be understandable to everyone. Obviously, though, I don’t want to spend too much time on the background material, as we already have ample ground to cover on the primary subject.

I deal with this dilemma in a number of ways. First, I encourage students to create study groups that are composed of students with a variety of majors. Second, when I wrote the text I attempted to present all the necessary background information in terms that were as clear and simple as possible. Third, I give the students leads on where they can obtain additional information, should they so desire. Fourth, I present materials from enough different fields that all students understand at least some of it. Fifth, I supplement the main text with more in-depth readings on a number of subjects. This allows students with some fluency in a particular subject area to study some topics in greater detail. And finally, I encourage any student who feels confused to meet with me after class or during my office hours, or to email me. These tactics seem to work. Students from all majors do equally well in the class, and when I have informally asked students whether they felt they were able to adequately understand all the information, they have said yes.

V. CHALLENGE FOUR: ENCOURAGING CLASS DISCUSSION

In any course on hate crimes, the discussion will turn many times to topics that are sensitive, and that most students are not used to discussing openly in class. When a group of students is of diverse ethnicities, religions, and sexual orientations, individuals might feel especially uncomfortable voicing their thoughts in class. This effect is multiplied when the class has a large number of students.

An exercise we do on the first day of class helps alleviate this problem. The class generates a list of stereotypes about several different groups (women, African Americans, Latinos, etc.). All students list the stereotypes on a piece of
paper (without their name on it), which they then give to me. I make posters of these, and hang the posters on the walls along with those created by previous classes. I then read each and every stereotype out loud. This exercise is pedagogically useful when we discuss stereotypes, but it also serves as an ice-breaker. I find that students feel more comfortable discussing things once they are out in the open.

I use other techniques to encourage discussion as well. One particularly effective method is the frequent use of small groups for discussions and activities. Because some students still feel uncomfortable speaking in class, I also give frequent journal assignments. Student comments in the journals are often interesting and insightful; they sometimes recount the students’ own experiences (e.g., one student this fall had a grandfather who was lynched; another student told about being ostracized because of her sexual orientation) and provide me with ideas for future discussions.

A related issue that sometimes arises is the need to keep discussions open and honest while being respectful of all. In my class, this usually becomes most problematic when we discuss gay and lesbian victims of hate crimes. Students who had been proudly proclaiming their lack of bigotry all semester will express fairly homophobic thoughts. I do not want to alienate anyone, but I certainly cannot let these expressions go unchallenged. Without personally belittling anyone, I do try to help these students question the sources of their feelings, and I also try to help them understand how such thoughts can provide an environment that nurtures hate crimes. I do not know that I have “cured” anyone of bias, but I do believe I have at least made many students think about it. I also purposely save this topic for nearly the end of the term, when we are all quite a bit more comfortable with one another.

VI. CHALLENGE FIVE: FINDING ASSIGNMENTS AND ACTIVITIES

Throughout the semester, I use a variety of assignments and activities to pique student interest and to consider topics in novel ways. Some of these are internet-based. For example, this last fall several students told me that the most enlightening experience for them was when I required them to take measure of their own biases with a couple of the Implicit Association Tests (available at https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/research/ and http://www.tolerance.org/hidden_bias/). Some years, I have also had the students create web pages of their own (http://cjwww.csustan.edu/hatecrimes/).

Other exercises take place in class. One of my favorites is Barnga (Thiagarajan and Steinwachs 1990), a simple card game that simulates intercultural communication problems. On the last day of class, we have a potluck to which students bring dishes representative of some part of their own family or ethnic history.

Some of the exercises and assignments I use have been adapted from ideas
from the Southern Poverty Law Center’s Teaching Tolerance project (http://www.tolerance.org/teach/); some have come from other organizations such as the Anti-Defamation League (http://www.adl.org); some were inspired by exercises in social psychology texts; and others I have devised myself. I am always happy to share ideas with others, and some of my ideas are in my textbook as well.

I also use various audiovisual materials, including Powerpoint presentations. There are many, many relevant videos available. Sound clips can be useful as well. This last semester, for instance, I played a few short selections of white power music when we discussed extremist groups, Billie Holiday’s “Strange Fruit” when we discussed lynchings, and some Turkish-German rap when we discussed ethnic conflict in modern Germany. I have an audiotape of an interview a student conducted with a local Klan leader several years ago, and I often play part of that as well.

In general, I find that these activities make the class more interesting and help students understand and remember the material better. They can have additional benefits as well. Several students have found the game so interesting that they have later used the game themselves with groups to which they belong, such as fraternities and sororities.

VI. BENEFITS OF THIS COURSE

While this course does present a number of challenges, I believe that the benefits to the students and to me are worth it. It is one of my favorite classes to teach, and my students consistently tell me that they have enjoyed it and learned a great deal.

Students in this class learn about hate crimes, a topic about which they were previously mostly either uninformed or misinformed. But they also learn about many related topics, such as the causes and effects of prejudice, the Holocaust, the history and biology of the concept of race, the history of government-sanctioned racism in the United States, current ethnic conflicts abroad, and so on. They are exposed to ideas from many disciplines that are new to them. They get the opportunity to recognize and explore their own biases. They meet students in other majors and get to hear those other students’ perspectives. And they gain experience working in small groups.

Since most of my other classes consist almost entirely of criminal justice majors or minors, this class allows me to meet new students and to hear their thoughts. The course forces me to devise creative ways of meeting challenges and interesting ways to introduce new material. Because the field of hate crimes is rapidly changing, and because the scope of my course is broad, I can constantly tinker with the class. I get to teach subjects that I don’t have the chance to discuss in my other classes. I am never bored with it.

In sum, although teaching this course entails many challenges, I believe it
is well worth it. I would encourage others to consider teaching such a course as well.

NOTES

1. Perry’s (2003) reader was published at almost the same time as the one I co-edited. I believe either reader might be appropriate as a primary text or as a supplement.

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The Genetic/Evolutionary Basis of Prejudice and Hatred

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Paper presented at the Conference to Establish the Field of Hate Studies,

I believe that prejudice underlies the development of hatred toward various outgroups. Hence, in order to understand the origins of hatred, it is essential to understand the origins of prejudice. Our genetic/evolutionary heritage provides the initial push toward prejudice. My essential argument is that three sets of genetic/evolutionary processes that lead to prejudice and discrimination evolved in hunter-gatherer tribes. They were appropriate and necessary for that subsistence mode, which characterizes 99% of human existence. These three sets of processes—inclusive fitness, authority-bearing systems, intergroup hostility—are put into motion in nonhunter-gatherer contexts because they have been incorporated into our epigenetic systems. A fourth set of processes, outgroup attractiveness, which is based on the necessity of gene flow, to some extent counteracts the above processes and may lead to the reduction of prejudice and discrimination.

The theory of inclusive fitness leads to the prediction that members of a breeding community will show preferences toward their relatives (Wilson, 1980). In primate evolution, “close relatives” is nearly synonymous with “members of the subsistence group.” That is, in general, a primate, including the human hunter-gatherer, has more close relatives in his or her subsistence group than in other groups. Thus, primates are evolutionarily predisposed to show ingroup favoritism. A scarcity of resources may, in addition, lead to outgroup antagonism.

Owing to the great complexity of tribal cultures, humans developed authority-bearing systems for readily transmitting information to the young (Waddington 1960). These systems are probably based on the primate group characteristic of dominance hierarchies, but extend into the realm of concepts and values. In authority-bearing systems, we not only accept as valid what authorities tell us, but also internalize this information. There may be a developmental trend in decreasing authority acceptance that is related to the increasing autonomy associated with adolescence. Obviously, authority acceptance is one major basis for the cultural transmission of prejudice and discrimination (Braine, Pomerantz, Lorber, and Krantz 1991; Damon and Hart 1988; Turiel 1983). In all likelihood, it is probably the main genetic/evolutionary source for hatred of many outgroups.
Primate intergroup relations, including those of human hunter-gatherers, are usually tense and frequently hostile (Wrangham 1987). The evolutionary bases of this hostility are closely linked with protecting the young and females from harm by outgroup members, and secondarily with controlling food resources and maintaining group cohesion. Close examination of intergroup relations among the African apes and human hunter-gatherers suggests that males may be predisposed to develop stronger outgroup prejudices than females. There is also a suggestion that pre-adolescents will develop weaker prejudices than adolescents.

Owing to the often deleterious effects of genetic drift and inbreeding, there is a necessity for gene flow into the tribe to occur in order for the tribe to maintain its viability, especially in times of marked environmental changes (Lamb 2000). The most likely source of gene flow is migration from other tribes. In order to psychologically support this migration, processes must have developed that made aspects of the outsider seem attractive to the host tribe. This led either to acceptance of the outsider into the tribe, or occasionally, to incorporation of specific attributes of the outsider into the tribe. The net effect of outgroup attractiveness is to mitigate outgroup hostility and likely outgroup hatred.

Thus, prejudice and discrimination have an evolutionary basis, rooted in the nature of primate and human subsistence groups. Although the existence of cultures is also evolutionarily based, the particular culture in which individuals grow and mature plays a significant role in determining the values assigned to various groups. Members of some of these groups become the targets for prejudice and discrimination. As with other cultural values, norms, and beliefs, prejudice and discrimination have to be learned. This is often a long process and depends on the developmental status of the learner, the nature of the prejudice and discrimination to be learned, and the cultural importance of the learning. It is possible that hatred may be learned in a similar fashion, especially if encouraged by the authorities in the culture.

As noted above, certain outgroups are more likely than others to be the recipients of prejudice. Prejudice toward them becomes expected and normative. However, culture is not static or stagnant, but rather evolves and undergoes historical change. For example, the television portrayal of African Americans, women, or mentally retarded, for example in 2004, may not be reflective of long-standing, relatively permanent attitudes and values. The latter do change over time; and it is important to document that change in order to accurately assess where we are today.

A consensus has emerged among social psychologists concerning the bases of prejudice and discrimination. All believe that there are multiple causes that can be construed as falling somewhere on a continuum, with individualistic or psychological causes at one pole, and cultural/historical causes at the other pole. The initial motivating force for the development of prejudice
and discrimination is the attempts of dominant groups within a culture to continue holding the power and privileges they have (Fishbein 2002).

Nearly all definitions of prejudice have in common the idea that it is a negative attitude toward others because of their membership in a particular group. Following the lead of Allport (1954) and Milner (1983), an additional component seems necessary to distinguish prejudice from another type of negative attitude—unreasonableness. Allport refers to this component as “faulty and inflexible” attitudes, and Milner as “irrational” attitudes. This inflexibility leads prejudiced individuals to resist modifying their prejudices in the face of contradictory information.

Discrimination is defined as harmful actions toward others because of their membership in a particular group. Discrimination may or may not be based on prejudice, although when children are freely interacting without adult control, it is likely that the two go hand in hand. Recent theorizing suggests that prejudice and discrimination feed on and enhance each other (Frederickson and Knobel 1980).

The relationship between prejudice and behavior is complex. Research shows that when there is no direct contact between people, as in voting situations, there is a fairly strong relationship between prejudice and behavior. However, when people interact with each other, the relationship is weak. Prejudice is just one factor among many that mediates behavior; for example, other personal attitudes and motives and situational conditions are also influential (Fishbein 2002).

One potential consequence of prejudice is stigmatizing others. Stigmas are characteristics of people—for example, being a member of a particular ethnic group, having a particular disability, being an ex-mental patient—that spoil or discredit them. Some likely reasons for stigmatizing others are: scapegoating, justifying our failures to help particular groups, enhancing our own status. But as Katz’s (1981) research shows, we are frequently ambivalent about the groups we stigmatize. The ambivalence often leads us to exaggerate either our negative or positive responses to them. One exaggerated negative response may be hatred.

The development of prejudice and discrimination is tied to the development of a group identity. The psychological literature suggests that a group identity emerges between the ages of 3 and 4 years and increases for at least several years. The social psychological study of intergroup relations in preadolescents and adolescents indicates that identification with a group, as measured by ingroup preferences, can occur merely through random assignment of individuals to groups that have no function. Intergroup hostility, however, is based on the existence of unfair competition. An equity model seems to capture the essential features of this phenomenon and leads to valuable insights into the nature of prejudice and discrimination (Fishbein 2002). Per-
ceived inequities, in addition to hostility, may lead to hatred toward outgroup members.

Based on the fact that prejudice and discrimination are determined by multiple factors (genetics and evolution, culture and history, and social development), and moreover, that these factors may have different effects on different targets, interventions based on any one of them should have a limited impact. Additionally, the broader social context in which any interventions occur can have a strong moderating effect on the success of these interventions (Taylor 2000). For example, Taylor pointed out that historically, and currently, racial housing segregation and employment discrimination have had powerful effects on racial prejudice and discrimination. These and other important contextual influences, such as educational opportunities, can most readily be changed through political processes and not psychological ones. Yet, as psychologists, we strive to induce change, but usually are unable to influence the broader social context, and may be seriously hampered by this inability. I believe that if prejudice and discrimination can be reduced, then reduction of hatred will follow.

Fishbein (2002) has summarized and evaluated much of the available psychological research on the issue of remediation for children and adolescents. Data from 23 studies concerning the effects of desegregation on prejudice and discrimination yielded some interesting conclusions. Desegregation is largely ineffective in decreasing either prejudice or discrimination. The results, however, tend to be more positive for Black children than for Whites. In general, there were no systematic differences in outcomes between boys and girls, and there were no age effects noted in the experiments. The absence of equal status between students and lack of community support (e.g., the authorities did not support the integration efforts) appear to be important factors in determining the outcomes of these studies.

Fourteen studies dealt with the effects of mainstreaming on prejudice and discrimination of nondisabled children toward the disabled. Mainstreaming does create more positive attitudes toward all types of handicaps, but is less effective on prejudice toward the moderately to severely mentally retarded. There are differences based on the age of the nondisabled children, with older children (ages 10 and up) developing more positive attitudes when compared with younger ones (ages 8 and below). Mainstreamed girls tend to be less prejudiced than their male peers. The effectiveness of mainstreaming is due, in part, to the positive sanction of school authorities.

Cooperative interaction implies positive goal interdependence for children working or talking together. Twenty studies dealt with the effects of cooperative interaction (predominantly cooperative learning) on prejudice and discrimination toward different racial and ethnic groups, the opposite sex, and the disabled. There were lasting effects on discrimination (9 months) but not on attitudes. Cooperative interaction does affect both opposite-sex and racial/ethnic prejudice and discrimination, with the effects for the former groups being
stronger than for the latter groups. The discriminatory behavior of nondisabled children toward their disabled classmates decreases as a result of cooperative interaction. The positive effects of cooperative interaction occurred through a decrease in intergroup hostility and the positive sanction of school authorities. It is also possible that outgroup attractiveness played a positive role.

Five studies were found that measured the effects of media, particularly television and movies, on attitude change. Television and film do influence prejudice in children and adolescents. The films were effective in reducing prejudice regardless of the age of the subjects; however, conclusions are restricted to prejudice toward the disabled and other racial/ethnic groups. No studies were found that examined the effectiveness of films for changing opposite-sex prejudice or for changing discrimination toward any group. Authority acceptance and outgroup attractiveness probably played a role in the success of these interventions.

There is evidence that role playing is an effective way to change attitudes; but no research was found on discrimination. Examination of the literature revealed five studies that investigated race prejudice and prejudice toward the handicapped. No studies were found that examined the effectiveness of simulations for changing opposite-sex prejudice or for reducing discrimination toward any group. In order to be effective, simulations must be as real as possible. Discussions before and after the role play are important both for engendering attitude change and for alleviating any stress felt by the participants during the experience. The diminution of outgroup hostility probably underlies some of these positive changes.

Individuation is the process of differentiating people from one another and can apply to the self (self-acceptance) and to others. Nine studies dealt with the relationship between self-acceptance and prejudice, but no experiments on discrimination were found. Non-prejudiced people are high in self-acceptance, whereas prejudiced individuals have low self-acceptance. Manipulations designed to increase self-acceptance result in decreased racial and ethnic prejudice, as well as decreased prejudice toward the disabled. Four experiments dealing with the connection between individuation of others and prejudice were found, but no data were available on discrimination. Teaching children to differentiate among disabled people and among individuals from other racial/ethnic groups causes a decrease in prejudice toward the differentiated group. The role of the four evolutionary factors is not clear in understanding these positive changes.

Based on these findings, I suggest that multiple approaches be used to combat prejudice and discrimination in children and adolescents. Importantly, some of them can be used in nonintegrated settings. These approaches attempt to utilize in positive ways, some of the genetic/evolutionary factors that often lead to prejudice, discrimination, and hatred. Due to the consistent access to large numbers of children, the school system is the ideal situation for interventions.
designed to reduce prejudice and discrimination. We saw that desegregation by itself had limited effects in changing attitudes and behaviors. However, cooperative learning has been shown to have strong, widespread effects on reducing discrimination. I believe that this form of teaching should become an integral part of the educational system, especially in racially integrated and mainstreamed settings. An added benefit of this approach is that it gives students the impression that the community, especially authority figures, supports the importance of changing attitudes and behaviors toward members of other groups.

Mainstreaming has been shown to be a moderately effective approach for reducing prejudice and discrimination toward the disabled. Recall that the effects are limited when the disabled student is moderately to severely mentally retarded. Therefore, cooperative learning in these cases should be done cautiously.

In that individuation of self and others is effective in reducing prejudice, I believe that teaching methods that promote self-acceptance and valuing differences among people should become an integral part of the normal education process. This fits well with local and national efforts to promote the valuing of diversity, and is consistent with the evolutionary factor of outgroup attractiveness. Aboud (1988) suggested the use of psychological tests that reveal personal profiles to help individuals discover unique aspects of self. These profiles can then be compared with those of others to look for similarities and differences. Finally, films and role-playing simulations are effective tools in reducing prejudice, and therefore should be used intermittently throughout the academic year. Stephan and Finlay (1999) showed that empathy training, independent of role-playing simulations, can have a positive effect on reducing prejudice. It would also serve to enhance other interpersonal relations. Other than cooperative interaction, there are no known methods for reducing opposite-sex prejudice.

These proposed changes are quite dramatic. Many might question whether they are feasible. However, there are school systems in the United States that have successfully instituted cooperative learning programs. Additionally, many schools throughout the country are including individuation and valuing diversity programs in their curricula. It is clear that the social, educational, and emotional problems created by prejudice and discrimination will not be resolved if we continue with the status quo. We need strong, viable interventions to resolve the issues. The proposed changes may go a long way toward alleviating these problems, as well as toward reducing prejudice-based hatred.
NOTES

1. Portions of this paper were adapted from Fishbein, H.D., Peer Prejudice and Discrimination, 2nd ed. (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002).

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Our Ancestral Shadow: Hate and Human Nature in Evolutionary Psychology

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I. INTRODUCTION

In some unique ways, each of us is like no other human being. In other ways, each of us is like some other human beings. And, in yet some other ways, each of us is like all other human beings. The question of the nature of human nature is captured in this final statement. In what ways are we like every other person that has gone before us and will come after us? This question is particularly relevant to the emerging field of hate studies. Is there an endowment with which each of us begins our life that is important in understanding how, and why, people hate?

Many philosophers, social thinkers, and psychologists assume that human nature is intrinsically neutral and has no predisposing inclinations. In this view, we are a blank slate, virtually free of content until written on by the hand of experience. Others more optimistically maintain that our basic predisposition is toward goodness. Still others argue for a more pessimistic conception of humans as essentially evil, dangerous, or impulse-ridden—a recognition of our basic natural proclivity to turn ugly. Finally, many thinkers maintain the existence of both good and evil inclinations in humankind and focus on the eternal struggle between these two universal aspects of human nature.

How do modern social scientists respond to the question of the nature of human nature? Most are hesitant to engage the topic directly. There is something too personal and subjective about it that makes it seem out of bounds. It is mistakenly assumed to be a question of metaphysics that cannot be addressed using the methodology of the social sciences. In reality, though, all social scientists have, and regularly employ, conceptions of human nature. It is precisely these underlying assumptions that must be faced as we begin to establish the interdisciplinary field of hate studies.

THE NATURE OF HUMAN NATURE IN MODERN SOCIAL SCIENCE

Rene Descartes, the noted French philosopher and mathematician of the seventeenth century, argued that humans alone are capable of rational thought...
and reflective reasoning. Descartes, and most thinkers after him, conceived of human nature around the belief that we, as humans, act out of our own volition; that we think about and will our behaviors. Conversely, so-called lower animals are mere machinelike automata whose every response is controlled and directed by instinct. In other words, humans are something more than animals. We are animals plus. There is a gap that contains some kind of special human essence that has been added to the baseline of our animal nature. This Cartesian gap between humans and animals was fundamentally challenged by the rise of evolutionary thought in the mid-nineteenth century.

Charles Darwin was not the first to advance the idea of evolution—that is, changes over time in organic structure. His important contribution was to offer a compelling and lucid explanation, a causal mechanism, of how evolution works—his theory of natural selection. Nowhere within Darwin’s *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection* (1859) is natural selection applied to understanding the nature of human nature. The concluding paragraph of the volume promised only that the theory of natural selection would be important in securing a foundation for the new field of psychology and would shed light on human origins. Twelve years later, however, with his publication of *The Descent of Man*, Darwin explicitly depicted human beings, along with all other animals, as shaped by natural selection. His theory of natural selection unified all living creatures, from single-celled amoebas to multicellular mammals, into one great tree of descent. With the Cartesian gap between “lower animals” and humans obliterated, a new avenue was opened for understanding the nature of human nature.

Darwinian evolution insisted upon the assumption that much of human behavior was dependent upon the very same thing that drove much of animal behavior: instinct. In other words, if humans were simply now one species of animal, and if animal behavior was motivated in large part by instinct, then much of human behavior could now be understood in instinctual terms as well. The notion that humans are driven by an instinctual legacy from our animal ancestry may well be the most radical component of the most revolutionary theory in modern history. At the turn of the twentieth century, the emerging field of psychology—steeped in the confidence of Darwin’s theory of evolution—welcomed the advent of instinct theory in explaining the complexities of human behavior.

William James, the father of American psychology, gave a central place to instinct theory in his seminal book, *Principles of Psychology*, written in 1890. Instinct, James contended, drawing directly from Darwin, was common to both animals and human beings. Where others saw humans ruled by “reason” and few instincts, James argued that human behavior is more intelligent than that of other animals because we have more instincts than they do, not fewer. James’ peers judged his emphasis on instinct in accounting for human behavior as a fundamental insight of the emerging science of psychology. His work set the
stage for a proliferation of instinct theories and catalogues—some dubious at best—throughout the social sciences.

Of all the instinct theories at the turn of the twentieth century, however, it was that of Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, which most fundamentally revolutionized our understanding of human nature. For Freud, instincts were the pent-up forces within the mental apparatus, and all the "energy" in our minds comes from them alone. Although Freud admitted that we could distinguish an indeterminate number of instincts, he believed that they all were derived from a few fundamental instincts. Freud’s influential, and controversial, work on the instinctual bases of human nature guaranteed that the nature of human nature had a foothold as a useful concept in the emerging social sciences.

That foothold, though, would be swept out by the behaviorist revolution of the early 1920s. Behaviorism, which dominated social science for the next fifty years, spoke of a formless human nature given form by reward and punishment. It threw out the assumption that much of human behavior was dependent on instinct. The behaviorist revolution replaced the notion of a human nature with a focus on environment, and culture, as the underlying causes of human behavior.

In psychology, the concept of “instincts” was driven underground, to be replaced by other, more “scientific,” explanations for human behavior, like “motivation,” “drive,” or “reinforcement.” By the mid- and late 1930s, instinct theory and evolutionary thinking had all but disappeared from most psychological and social scientific journals. Through the 1950s and 1960s, the popularity of B.F. Skinner’s theories of environmental conditioning kept the idea of human nature outside the boundaries of social science. There is no inherent human nature driving human behavior; rather, our essential nature is to be driven by rewards and punishments. This paradigm shift in American social science was reinforced by broader changes in social and political thought that downplayed an instinctive or biological basis for human behavior.

In sum, these trends led to the general development of what came to be called the Standard Social Science Model (SSSM). The SSSM, pervading all of the social sciences from the opening of the 1930s through the end of the 1960s, rested on the twin beliefs that (a) all humans have similar potential and (b) the only thing that separates us is culture, not biology. In other words, the nature of humans is that they have no nature; culture is the fundamental determinant of human behavior. Human nature is essentially an empty container waiting to be filled by socialization. Why study paper (human nature) when what is interesting is the writing on it and the author (socialization)? Such a belief system—indulging our methodologies, theories and interpretations—left generations of social scientists blind to the role of human nature in shaping our thoughts, feelings, and behaviors.

At the beginning of the 1970s, however, the discussion of the nature of
human nature returned to the social sciences. The work of ethologists, such as Nikolaus Tinbergen’s *Study of Instinct* (1951), Konrad Lorenz’s *On Aggression* (1966), and Desmond Morris’ *The Naked Ape* (1967), about instincts in animals—and human beings—led many social scientists to rethink the SSSM. We began to revisit Darwin and his insistence on the continuity between human and animal nature. Subsequently, three decades of research in cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, psycholinguistics, evolutionary biology, paleoanthropology, and neuroscience have legitimated the study of evolution-produced instincts in humans and “other animals.” We have been reminded that no longer can we grossly underestimate the impact of what we are upon who we are; no longer can we relentlessly insist that everything about us is attributable to something that happened in school, in our relations with our parents, or in some other aspect of our environment or culture.

To be sure, there remains a gulf between humans and animals that is far from closed. The edges of this gulf, though, continue to move closer to one another. As they do, the concept of a human nature has returned to the front of the academic conversation in the social sciences. Leading this charge into the twenty-first century is the field of *evolutionary psychology*—a hybrid of the natural (evolutionary biology) and social (cognitive psychology) sciences. What is EP and what does it have to say about the nature of human nature?

### II. EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY

Evolutionary psychology (EP) is a multidisciplinary approach within the Darwinian paradigm that seeks to apply theories of evolutionary biology in order to understand human psychology. The specific goal of EP is to discover and understand the design of the human mind in terms of Darwinian evolution. EP is really engineering in reverse. In forward-engineering, we design a machine to do something. In reverse-engineering, we figure out what a machine—in this case, the human mind—was designed to do.

The research of EP, in describing the psychological mechanisms that give rise to our natural instincts or tendencies, cuts straight to the heart of the nature of human nature. In EP—as conceptualized by psychologist Leda Cosmides and anthropologist John Tooby, two pioneers of evolutionary psychology at the University of California at Santa Barbara—human behavior is driven by a set of *universal reasoning circuits* that were designed by natural selection to solve *adaptive problems* faced by our *hunter-gatherer ancestors.*

We can unpack this statement by discussing its four central components.

#### A. Universal Reasoning Circuits

*Universal reasoning circuits* are best thought of as a set of information-processing machines, or mini-computers, in the brain. Just as a computer has circuits, our brain has circuits. The essence of a computer, however, does not
lie in the materials from which it is made, but in the programs it executes. Correspondingly, just as a computer’s circuits determine how it processes information, our neural circuits determine how our brain processes information. The brain–our wet computer–is composed of a large collection (hundreds, perhaps even thousands) of these circuits, with different circuits specialized for solving different problems. Our brain’s neural circuits are designed to generate behavior that is appropriate to our environmental circumstances. In so doing, these universal reasoning circuits organize the way we interpret our experiences, place certain recurrent concepts and motivations into our mental life, and give us universal frames of meaning that allow us to interpret the actions and intentions of others.

Universal reasoning circuits are one specific example of a general category known as “adaptations.” Adaptations are inherited mechanisms that are here because they have, in the past, increased the likelihood of survival and reproduction among our ancestors. There must be genes for an adaptation because such genes are required for the passage of the adaptation from parents to offspring. To say something is an adaptation is not to say that it is unchangeable. Adaptations will change in time because the environment is changing all the time.

B. Designed by Natural Selection

Where did these universal reasoning circuits, or “instincts,” come from? EP maintains that these circuits were designed by natural selection. The word “design” is not implying that the process is purposeful or forward-looking. Natural selection is not intentional and cannot look into the future to foresee distant needs. Rather, “design” is shorthand to refer to the adaptive product of the evolutionary process–an inanimate process, devoid of consciousness.

By virtue of natural selection, species undergo changes in their adaptations over time. Most adaptations designed by natural selection are physiological—for example, changes in beak structure, neck size, and so on. These changes evolve because they help the individuals who possess them to survive and reproduce. EP proposes that–just like physiological structures–cognitive structures also have been designed by natural selection to serve survival and reproduction. EP is firm in its belief that there is no fundamental or qualitative difference between these psychological adaptations and any other type of physiological adaptations. Thus, EP sees natural selection as the principal guiding force in the creation of complex, functional, problem-solving mechanisms such as universal reasoning circuits.

C. Adaptive Problems

Natural selection designed universal reasoning circuits to solve adaptive
problems. What is an adaptive problem? Adaptive problems have two defining characteristics. First, they are the problems that crop up again and again during the evolutionary history of a species. Second, they are problems whose solution impacts the survival and reproduction of individual organisms within a species.

At their most concrete, adaptive problems have to do with how an organism makes its living—what it eats, who it mates with, who it socializes with, who it aggresses against, how it communicates, and so on. Simply put, they are problems that an organism needs to solve in order to survive and reproduce. The only kinds of problems that natural selection can design circuits for solving are adaptive problems.

D. Hunter-Gatherer Ancestors

Finally, these adaptive problems for which our universal reasoning circuits were designed are, unfortunately, problems most relevant to our hunter-gatherer ancestors. It is important to realize that well over 99% of our species’ evolutionary history has involved living as foragers in small nomadic bands. In their lifelong camping trip, our Pleistocene ancestors faced some daunting adaptive problems. Among others, these included problems such as detecting and avoiding predators and other dangerous animals, gathering and eating the right foods, forming friendships, developing alliances to defend oneself against aggression, helping children and other kin, communicating with other people, and selecting mates—all, ultimately, having an impact on the survival and reproduction of our species over time.

Our ancestral history must be coupled with the reality that natural selection is a slow, and imperfect, process occurring over many generations. In physical evolution, it takes a long time to change a leg into a wing or a flipper. Likewise, there will often be a lag in time—very substantial in the case of human evolution—between a new adaptive problem and the evolution of a mechanism designed to solve it. As a result, there just haven’t been enough generations for natural selection to design universal reasoning circuits that are well-adapted to all aspects of our modern environment.

Fewer than 10,000 generations separate everyone alive today from the small group of ancestors who are our common ancestors—the blink of an eye in evolutionary terms. In other words, most of our human nature evolved during the hunter-gatherer period of our ancestral history. Too little time has elapsed since then for substantial evolution of human nature to take place. In Cosmides and Tooby’s words, “our modern skulls house a stone age mind.” They continue: “In many cases, our brains are better at solving the kinds of problems our ancestors faced on the African savannahs than they are at solving the more familiar tasks we face in a college classroom or a modern city.”

For example, automobiles kill far more people today than do spiders or
snakes. But people are far more averse to spiders and snakes than they are to automobiles. Why? Because for most of our ancestral history, spiders and snakes were a serious threat to our survival and reproduction, whereas automobiles did not exist. Thus, it was possible—not to mention advantageous for our survival and reproduction—for us to evolve an innate aversion to spiders and snakes, but not to automobiles. While natural selection continues its glacial process of building circuits that are more suited to a modern environment, our ability to solve other kinds of more modern problems is best seen as a side effect or by-product of circuits that were designed to solve the adaptive problems of our hunter-gatherer ancestors.

EP makes clear that our universal reasoning circuits inject certain motivations into our mental life that directly influence our behavior. There is a universal, evolved psychological architecture that we all share by virtue of being humans—a human nature. This human nature includes hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of universal reasoning circuits that are domain-specific and functionally specialized to facilitate our survival and reproduction. In other words, instead of having a single, central general-purpose reasoning machine, we have a massive collection of special-purpose modules, each one designed to solve a specific adaptive problem. Famously, Cosmides and Tooby compare the massive modularity of our mind to a Swiss-Army knife with lots of gadgets, each one designed for a specific task.

III. HOW CAN EP HELP US UNDERSTAND HATE AND HUMAN NATURE?

To begin, we must remember that competition lies at the heart of the natural selection that designs the universal reasoning circuits used to solve adaptive problems faced by our hunter-gatherer ancestors. We must also recognize that not only do individuals compete with other individuals in the same group, but groups also compete with other groups.

In our Pleistocene environment, it is likely that we were gathered into small groups numbering no more than a couple of hundred people. Most of those we lived among were relatives. What happened to them, happened to us. What we did to others, we did to ourselves. Our increasing mobility, however, meant that we occasionally found ourselves among strangers—other groups with whom we were not familiar and against whom we competed, probably fiercely, for scarce resources. The results of this competition were significant because the winners not only obtained material benefits, but in some cases, also got rid of their competitors.

In this context, hurting individuals in other groups solved adaptive problems faced by our group and, ultimately, was selectively advantageous. Organisms survived and reproduced, to some extent, at one another’s expense. In short, competition—often escalating into intergroup conflict—was a major fact of life for many of our ancestors. In a sense, each of us today owes our
existence to having “winners” as ancestors, and each of us today is designed, at least in some circumstances, to compete.

What are some of the psychological adaptations that enhance the fitness of individuals within a group? These likely include love, friendship, cooperativeness, nurturance, communication, a sense of fairness, and, even, self-sacrifice—the things that hold society together. Our adaptations also include, however, some darker ultimate motives: intergroup competition for dominance, boundary definition, and fear of social exclusion. People in all cultures feel that they are members of a group (a band, tribe, clan, or nation) and feel animosity toward other groups. These realities can foster a hostility to, and even hatred of, other groups that often tears society apart.

Human minds are compelled to define the limits of the tribe. Knowing who is kin, knowing who is in our social group, has a deep importance to species like ours. We construct this knowledge by categorizing others as “us” or “them.” We tend to be biased toward “us” and label “them”—those with whom “we” share the fewest genes and least culture—as enemies. We have an evolved capacity to see our group as superior to all others and even to be reluctant to recognize members of other groups as deserving of equal respect. A group of the !Kung San of the Kalahari call themselves by a name that literally means “the real people.” In their language, the words for “bad” and “foreign” are one and the same. Similarly, the cannibal inhabitants of the delta area of Irian in Indonesian New Guinea call themselves the Asmat, which means “the people—the human beings.” All outsiders are known very simply as Manowe—“the edible ones.”

Biologist Lyall Watson calls our tendency to divide the world into “us” and “them” one of the few true human universals. Anthropologist Donald Brown likewise includes in his characteristics of Universal People (features all people have in common) the following: “Important conflicts are structured around in-group—out-group antagonisms that characterize the UP. These antagonisms both divide the UP as an ethnic group as well as set them off from other ethnic groups. An ethical dualism distinguishes the in-group from the out-group, so that, for example, cooperation is more expectable in the former than with the latter.”

For us, the critical question is not whether every human in every culture hates, because they certainly do not. Rather, the more illuminating question is whether every human in every culture comes endowed with psychological mechanisms that leave us capable of hatred when activated by appropriate cues. For the emerging field of hate studies, the central question becomes: What set of universal reasoning circuits were designed by natural selection to solve the adaptive problems of intergroup relations faced by our hunter-gather ancestors?

Of the many adaptations we could explore, I believe there are two foundational, innate, evolution-produced tendencies of human nature that are most
relevant to understanding our capacity for hate: ethnocentrism and xenophobia. Studies worldwide show not only that these tendencies are universal in people, but also that they start in infancy. These are the powerful, innate, “animal” influences on human behavior that represent evolved social capacities lying at the core of human nature. They are the underlying, distant capacities that, in concert with other immediate and proximal influences, help us understand our capacity for hate.

First, ethnocentrism refers to the tendency to focus on one’s own group as the “right” one. Anthropologist W.G. Sumner first coined this term in 1906 and defined it as “a differentiation that arises between ourselves, the we-group, or in-group, and everybody else, or the others-group, out-groups.” The insiders in a we-group are in a relation of peace, order, law, government, and industry to each other. . . Ethnocentrism is the technical name for this view of things in which one’s own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it. . . Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders.”

Ethnocentrism is a universal characteristic of human social life and, as often as not, it is fairly harmless. From an evolutionary perspective, there is an advantageous reinforcement of communal identity and “we-ness” when groups consider their ideas, their cultures, their religions, or their aesthetic standards to be either superior to those of others, or at least in certain ways to be preferential or noteworthy in comparison to other groups. As R.A. Hinde writes: “It is not unreasonable to entertain the possibility that natural selection acted on individuals to enhance this identification with groups and to augment the (real or perceived) superiority of the group with which they identified.”

Ethnocentric loyalties show themselves early in life. The importance of both the caretaker-infant bonds and stranger anxiety reactions of the first year of life demonstrate a universality of the us-them differentiation process. By age six or seven, children exhibit a strong preference for their own nationality—even before the concept of “nation” has been fully understood. Experimental social psychologists have even demonstrated that classifying individuals into arbitrary groups in the laboratory (for example, giving one group red labels and the other group green labels) can elicit ethnocentric reactions. Other recent social psychological experimental evidence suggests that the concepts “us” and “them” carry positive emotional significance that is activated automatically and unconsciously. Once identified with a group—even in the complete absence of any links, kinship or otherwise, among individuals in that group—individuals find it easy to exaggerate differences between their group and others.

Complementing ethnocentrism is a second universal adaptation: xenophobia, the tendency to fear outsiders or strangers. It can even be said that in forming bonds we deepen fissures. In other words, defining what the in-group
is also requires defining what it is not. As psychologists Tajfel and Forgas put it, “we are what we are because they are not what we are.”

The widespread rise of domestic violence seems, at first glance, to go against our evolutionary instruction to favor “us” and oppose “them.” Upon closer analysis, however, psychologists Martin Daly and Margo Wilson of McMaster University in Canada found that, once the urge to kill exists, genetic factors come into play in the choice of a victim. In cases of domestic homicide, family members who are not blood kin—such as spouses—are eleven times more likely to be killed than are family members who are blood kin. Even in cases where the victim is blood kin, there are very often factors involved that make biological, if not moral, sense.

On a broader societal level, governments, propaganda, and militaries can easily evoke our evolved capacities for ethnocentrism and xenophobia. At the extreme, these capacities may even translate into a territorial imperative as they are used to forge in-group solidarity and undermine the normal inhibitions against killing out-group strangers. As anthropologist Michael Ghiglieri of the University of North Arizona writes: “Xenophobia and ethnocentrism are not just essential ingredients to war. Because they instinctively tell men precisely whom to bond with versus whom to fight against, they are the most dangerously manipulable facets of war psychology that promote genocide.”

In short, we have an innate, evolution-produced tendency to seek proximity to familiar faces because what is unfamiliar is probably dangerous and should be avoided. More than 200 social psychological experiments have confirmed the intimate connection between familiarity and fondness. This universal human tendency is the foundation for the behavioral expressions of ethnocentrism (focusing on our group as the “right” one) and xenophobia (fearing outsiders or strangers).

IV. Conclusion

As we have seen, the conventional wisdom in the social sciences has historically been that human nature is a blank slate—simply an imprint of an individual’s background and experience. The emerging field of EP has, however, led social scientists to rethink the nature of human nature. EP says that human nature is not blank at all; it consists of a large number of evolved psychological mechanisms. EP reminds us that we are part of the natural world and, like other animals, have our own particular psychological tendencies that animate many of our behaviors. We are obligated to examine the impact of what we are upon who we are in understanding how, and why, people hate. To not seek such evidence is like failing to search a suspect for a concealed weapon.

At first glance, some of the evolved psychological mechanisms posited by EP appear to affirm our capacity for cooperative, caring, nonviolent relations—for example, love of kin; preferential altruism directed toward kin; recip
local altruism; enduring reciprocal alliances or friendships; compassion; and so forth. In many ways, we owe our success as a species to these pro-social instincts. Ridley has even argued that it is our instinctive cooperativeness that is the very hallmark of humanity and what sets us apart from other animals.

But EP also warns us that self-congratulation about our human nature is premature. In British zoologist Matt Ridley’s words: “We have as many darker as lighter instincts. The tendency of human societies to fragment into competing groups has left us with minds all too ready to adopt prejudices and pursue genocidal feuds.”12 In other words, beneath our social surface is a seamy underside of human nature that is much less flattering. We have a hereditary dark side that is universal across humankind. Acts of hatred are not beyond, beneath, or outside ordinary humaneness.

Should we really be surprised by the unflattering depiction of human nature that EP provides? In some ways, probably not. We already know that we have such nefarious capacities because history provides so many examples of their actualization. Perhaps as a result of our history of brutal inhumanity to each other, this view of human nature certainly has the weight of intellectual tradition on its side. Theologians beat evolutionary psychologists to the discovery of the “animal in humans” by several centuries. Indeed, the idea that human nature contained innate drives similar to those in animals is a central element of the traditional Christian view of human nature, often captured in the doctrine of original sin. As historians Kari Konkola and Glenn Sunshine conclude, “the hottest field in modern science [evolutionary psychology] is just in the process of discovering the part of human nature which Christianity used to call ‘original sin!’”13 Others agree that, regarding the nature of human nature, religion and evolutionary psychology converge to a surprising extent—though members of both fields fiercely refuse to acknowledge such a convergence.

EP, in spite of its youth, is lending substantial credibility to the perception of a fundamental unity among human beings. While the roots of hatred cannot be distilled solely to natural selection, we can no longer dismiss as an unsupportable theological or philosophical assumption the idea that human nature has a dark side. No longer can we evade the possibility that there is an essentialist trait underlying our inhumanity to each other that makes each of us, ultimately, capable of hatred. We must at least partially ground hatred in our evil human natures and recognize that while an impulse to hate may not be the defining characteristic of human nature, such an impulse certainly qualifies—at the very least—as a human capacity. It is only in understanding the human nature of hate that we will begin to understand hate as a normative part of our history and, ultimately, begin to construct social structures and institutions that responsibly address the problem of hate.
NOTES

3. Ibid., 12.  
4. Ibid.  
The Last Uncomfortable “Religious” Question?  
Monotheistic Exclusivism and Textual Superiority in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam as Sources of Hate and Genocide

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ABSTRACT

This paper is a preliminary examination of some of the texts of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—Hebrew Bible, New Testament, Qur’an—that appear to affirm such exclusivism, and, at the same time, a reflection upon the meanings and implications of those texts coterminous with their historical realities.

The first part of this paper is an examination of representative texts from these three great monotheistic traditions which affirm, each in their own way, the exclusivistic nature of their understandings of (1) the singular reality of the God of Israel/Allah as the Only True Divine Reality (i.e. the Christ being here understood as an expression/manifestation of that Oneness), and (2) the self-perceived privileged nature of the relationship each of these three religious traditions has with and to that Reality.

The second part of this paper is a reflection by one trained in reading, analyzing, and understanding classical Jewish texts (i.e. Torah, Midrash, Talmud, etc.), and theological thinking upon the meanings and implications of such texts as they do or do not reinforce certain potentially hateful and pre-genocidal orientations of these three groups in relation to each other and other groups.

The concluding section of this paper, encompassing the three questions to be shared with those in attendance, is one of praxis: What, in concrete terms, is to be done with such information to bring about a future potentially devoid of hate and where genocide is but a historical memory?

I. INTRODUCTION: A STUDENT’S TROUBLING PAPER

Among the courses I teach at The University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa,
my capacity as the holder of the Aaron Aronov endowed Chair of Judaic Studies and Associate Professor of Religious Studies is “Religion 224: Introduction to the Judaic Experience,” wherein we survey the historical experience of the Israelites/Jews from the Biblical period to the present moment, the dominant philosophical and theological motifs of Judaism, the festival and life-cycle calendars as they historically and contemporarily manifest(ed) themselves, and issues of contemporary Jewish concern (e.g. the Holocaust and antisemitism, and Israeli and American Jewish survival). In addition to attendance and class participation, the students’ graded responsibilities include a reaction paper to any book of their own choosing addressing the Judaic experience, a take-away final examination, and a brief (7-10 page) research paper, again on a topic of their own choosing addressing the Judaic experience. While, in the aggregate, the overwhelming majority of my undergraduate students are not Judaically knowledgeable or sophisticated, they continue to be fascinated by Jews and Judaism (primarily, I believe, because of the more “public face” of a more conservative fundamentalist-oriented Christianity in the American South).

This past fall semester (2003), one of my students turned in a research paper entitled “Judaism and Anti-Semitism: A Cycle of History.” With his permission and agreement (but without identification), I quote from his work:

[The persecution of Jews has occurred more often than not as a result of Jewish action or change. . . . The faith of Judaism in itself, with its dogmatically distinct views and beliefs, sparked religious persecution that spilled over into a multitude of varying degrees and forms throughout history. . . . The key dogmas of Judaism would lay the foundation for a chain reaction that would birth a multitude of beliefs which wholly (sic) define anti-Semitism. . . . It seems that, before and after the Holocaust, anti-Semitism is rooted in the same illogical roots—the myths and fear spread by Christianity, and, unfortunately, the beliefs of the Jews themselves. . . . Judaism has been the ultimate victim throughout history as its own faith and practices seem to work against the Jewish people. . . . It is not exactly fair to say that the Jewish people created the system of hate which has caused them turmoil for thousands of years; [but] Judaism, with its unique practices and frequent inter-faith conflicts, has led to the creation of many forms of persecution and prejudice that haunt its followers throughout time.

While it would, perhaps, be too easy to dismiss this writing as the work of a naïve undergraduate falling into the all-too-common contemporary manifestation of “blaming the victim,” or, worse, someone with an anti-Jewish or antisemitic agenda, his use of and quotation from such solid sources as Joshua Trachtenberg’s classic (1983) work The Devil and the Jews: Medieval Conceptions of Anti-Semitism; Peter Schaffer’s important (1997) text Judeophobia: Attitudes toward the Jews in the Ancient World; and Marvin Perry and Frederick M. Schweitzer’s recent (2002) book Antisemitism: Myth and Hate from
Antiquity to the Present bespeak otherwise, and, therefore, raise, for me, the troubling question of whether there is something inherent in Judaism and the historical experiences of the Jewish people which has thus engendered this ongoing antisemitic response of the larger communities wherein Jews have lived and continue to live. And because I have been trained in reading, analyzing, and interpreting classical Jewish texts (Torah, Midrash, Talmud, etc.), and work in the cross-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary field known as “Religious Studies,” with a specialization in Holocaust and Genocide Studies and Post-Shoah Biblical (Hebrew Bible and New Testament) Re-interpretation, I wonder whether this question is equally applicable, however modified, to both Christianity and Islam as monotheistic religious traditions, both of which exist in tension rather than harmony with Judaism. I believe it is.

II. MONOTHEISTIC EXCLUSIVISM IN JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY, AND ISLAM: REPRESENTATIVE PASSAGES

While continually disharmonious and divisive amongst and between themselves, the one thing that unites the religious traditions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam is their public expression of and commitment to One God, announced either as Adonai (Jews hesitant to speak the Ineffable Name of the Tetragrammaton), Father/Son [Christ]/Holy Ghost or Spirit, and Allah. We know this from the sacred or holy texts each tradition regards as central to its identity, also understood as the very revelation of that same Deity not only to its own community but to all humanity: the Torah or Hebrew Bible of the Jews, the Old and New Testaments of the Christians, and the Qur’an of the Muslims. While each community may raise and has raised serious questions regarding the full authenticity of the other’s texts, collectively, none deny the Oneness of their God, while, at the very same time, dismissing (or worse) any other understanding of what I choose to call the “divine-human encounter,” and, therefore, by extension, equally dismissing (or worse) any group presenting an alternative view.

A. Judaism

The Torah’s rejection of other gods, or, better, the “gods of others,” for the people of Israel, occupies a prominent position in the two places where the misnamed and mis-understood Aseret Ha-Dibrot (the so-called euphemistically named “Ten Commandments”) occur: Exodus 20:3 and Deuteronomy 5:7—“You shall have no other gods in My Presence!” Earlier, in the “Song of Moses” or “Song at the Sea,” Exodus 15:11, the very superiority of the God of Israel to all others gods is affirmed: “Who is like You, O Lord, among the gods?” [The late great Israeli biblical scholar Yehezkel Kaufmann (1889-1964) reminds us here that the movement in the thought of Ancient Israel, reflected in the texts themselves, was from monolatry (i.e. the acceptance of the reality of
other nations’ gods but the superiority of Israel’s own) to that of monotheism (i.e. the understanding that the One God of Israel is, in fact, the Only Existent God).  

Thus, we find the idea that the One God affirmed in Psalms 50:1 (“The Mighty One, God the Lord, speaks and summons the earth from the rising of the sun to its setting”), and that God’s unique and special relationship with Zion/Israel in verses 2 (“Out of Zion, the perfection of beauty, God shines forth”) and 4 (“His people”), 5 (“My faithful ones, who made a covenant with Me”), and 7 (“My people”). According to the prophet Malachi, that same One God is, indeed, God over all, according to 2:10: “Have we not all One Father? Has not One God created us?”

That the God of Israel is, ultimately, the Only God, is also reflected in the text. For example, Psalm 86:10 affirms this same God of Israel as the Only True Divine Reality (“For You are Great and do wondrous things, You Alone are God”), though two verses prior a seeming recognition of other divine realities is expressed (“There is none like You, among the gods, O Lord, nor are there any works like Yours”). Might we not see in this apparent contradiction a not-so-subtle lip service to the false understanding of others?

According to the prophet Jeremiah, 18:15, for example, when the people of Israel deviate from their covenantal responsibilities and obligations, they do so in response to a delusion (“But My people have forgotten Me, they burnt offerings to a delusion”)–in defiance of the Only True God who exists, 10:10: “But the Lord is the True God, He is the Living God and the Everlasting Ruler. At His wrath the earth quakes, and the nations cannot endure His indignation.”

Thus, summarily, these few representative examples, and there are many, many others, paint a portrait of the God of Israel–the God of the Jews–who is the Only Existent God, Alone and True, the One who will not tolerate any semblance of other divine realities, be they false or delusionary, on the part of His selected and elected and chosen covenantal community. How Jews (and others) have responded to this understanding will be addressed below.

B. Christianity

The controversies surrounding the current moment of Mel Gibson’s movie epic The Passion of the Christ notwithstanding, the “translation” of the “Word” of the Parent God into the human person of the Son God, Jesus the Christ, textually displaces the Parent and makes the Son the central bridge and connection back to the Parent, and, in so doing, equally displaces the original covenantal relationship of the Jews with their God from its initially-perceived first position into a demeaned second position, and, for some, a now-abrogated if not nullified non-existent position as well (e.g. Gospel of John 14:6: “I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life. No one goes to the Father except through Me.” Gospel of John 10:9: “I am the Gate. Whoever enters by Me will be saved.”)
This same Gospel account affirms the Onliness of God (5:44: “How can you believe when you accept glory from one another and do not seek glory that comes from the One who Alone is God?”), as does 1 Timothy 1:17 (“To the King of the Ages, Immortal, Invisible, the Only God. . .”) and Jude 1:25 (“to the Only God our Savior through Jesus Christ our Lord, be glory, majesty, power, and authority, before all time and now and forever”).

Only this God though this Christ, then, possesses the power to grant eternality: John 17:3 (“And this is eternal life that they may know You, the Only True God, and Jesus Christ whom You sent”), and Romans 16:27 (“. . .the Only Wise God, through Jesus Christ. . .”).

This same God, according to 1 Thessalonians 1:9, is a “Living and True God,” equally and importantly affirmed in 1 John 5:20-21: “And we know that the Son of God has come and has given us understanding so that we may know Him who is True; and we are in Him who is True, in His Son Jesus Christ. He is the True God and Eternal Life.”

As is the case with the Hebrew Bible, there are many, many texts throughout which could be cited in support of this understanding of the Onliness of this Parent God and the path to “salvation” and eternality through His Only Son Jesus the Christ. The uses to which these texts have been put–how they have been read, understood, interpreted, and used–will also be discussed below.

C. Islam

Whatever else the tragedy of September 11, 2001, and this country’s questionably labeled ongoing “war on terrorism” has done, it has focused our ignorance on the third great monotheistic religious tradition, Islam, its history and its texts. More courses are presently being taught, more experts and non-experts are benefiting from the various media spotlights, and a plethora of publications, creditable and suspect, are being issued and/or republished on a regular basis. My focus here, however, is on the texts of the Qur’an rather than, at the outset, socio-political or religio-theological realities. (Parenthetically, I would urge, however, on all those in attendance, a serious study not only of relevant and related history and politics, but of the Qur’an as well. An excellent place to start would be ‘Abdullah Yúsuf ‘Alî’s (1991) The Meaning of The Holy Qur’an: New Edition with Revised Translation and Commentary or Michael Sell’s (1999) Approaching The Qur’an: The Early Revelations.)

Like its predecessors the Hebrew Bible/Torah and New Testament, the Qur’an, too, equally affirms both the Onliness and the Oneness of the God/Allah in its various suras. 3:62 (The Family of Imran): “Most surely this is the true explanation, and there is no god but Allah; and most surely Allah–He is the Mighty, the Wise.” 37:35 (The Rangers): “Surely they used to behave proudly when it was said to them: There is no god but Allah.” 38:65 (Suad): “Say: I am only a warrior, and there is no god but Allah, the One, the Subduer
(of all).” 47:19 (Muhammad): “So know that there is no god but Allah, and ask protection for your fault and the believing men and the believing women; and Allah knows the place of your returning and your abiding.”

God’s Oneness is explicitly stated in 2:133 and 2:163 (The Cow): “. . . One God Only, and to Him do we submit”; and “And your God is One God! There is no god but He; He is the Beneficent, the Merciful.” 4:171 (The Women): “Allah is the Only One God; far be it from His glory that He should have a son, whatsoever is in the heavens and whatever is in the earth is His, and Allah is Sufficient for a Protector.” 5:73 (The Dinner Table): “Certainly they disbelieve who say: Surely Allah is the third person of the three; but there is no god but the One God, and if they desist not from what they say, a painful chastisement shall befall those among them who disbelieve.” 16:51 (The Bee): “And Allah has said: Take not two gods. He is [the] Only One God; so of Me Alone should you be afraid.”

So, too, other relevant suras could be cited. Also central and fundamental to our understanding are two of the “Five Pillars of Islam”: Faith and Prayer (the other three being Zakat or charity, fasting during Ramadan, and Hajj or Pilgrimage to Makkah). The Shahada or “Declaration of Faith” of the pious Muslim is the simple formula “There is no god worthy of worship except God [Allah], and Muhammad is His messenger.” The Salat or “Call to Prayer” (dawn, noon, mid-afternoon, sunset, and nightfall) offered by the muezzin is:

God is most great. God is most great.
God is most great. God is most great.
I testify that there is no god except God.
I testify that there is no god except God.
I testify that Muhammad is the messenger of God.
I testify that Muhammad is the messenger of God.
Come to prayer! Come to prayer!
Come to success (in this life and the Hereafter)!
Come to success!
God is most great! God is most great!
There is no god except God.9

III. THE UNFORTUNATE AND TRAGIC USES OF SACRED TEXTS

Depending on whose ox is doing the goring—an allusion to Exodus 21:28-3210—the fundamental question, at least initially, is not that of the religio-theological and socio-political (and militarily violent) uses to which a text is put secondarily, but, rather, how one, either individual or group, reads or understands or analyzes a text, and then and only then, the behaviors or actions which flow from those readings and affirmations.

Judaism, Christianity and Islam are all what I call literate religious tradi-
tions, regardless of whether their own communities are themselves everywhere and at all times themselves literate. By this I both mean and understand that each attributes to its sacred texts power superior to that which might be ascribed to other writings even by adherents and leaders of their respective traditions. And because these sacred texts, both oral and written, at least initially, are perceived and affirmed as coming directly from God/Allah—what all three regard as the act of “revelation” (the Divine revealing [making known] Himself to His specially-related human communities)—their initial reception, however these texts are presented to us (original language or translation), are accepted literally, that is, the texts are read, comprehended, analyzed, and accepted based upon a supposedly accurate reception of the words themselves and their grammatical constructions. That is to understand, a text says what it says and means what it means and not what we would wish it to say or mean. And, coupled with the turn from oral to written transmission (scribal, printing, computer-generated), and our psychological too-easy acceptance of that which is written down and presented to us (i.e. the all-too-common “fallacy of the printed word”—that which is written is obviously true, for were it not true it would not be written), sacred texts, perhaps more than any other literary genre, leave other texts far, far in the distance.11

Thus, Judaism and Christianity and Islam continue to do harm to themselves and to others stemming from their literal views of their understandings of God based upon their relationships to their sacred texts. Some Jews have taken a hard-line and, at times, violent position with regard to settlements throughout the Land of Israel and against those who would oppose them and settle in the same spaces or present alternative understandings, out of their literal readings of the Hebrew Bible. Some Western Christians have, at times, violently evolved a theology of triumphalist supercessionism with regard to Jews over the last two thousand years, tragically successful because of the collusion of Christianity with the various governmental structures that have made their appearances throughout Europe and elsewhere, out of their literalist readings of the Old and New Testaments. Some Muslims have justified violence against non-Muslims—suicide bombers in Israel, September 11th attacks in the United States—based upon a literalist understanding of jihadism external to the personal struggles within oneself to become worthy of Allah, out of their literalist readings of the Qur’an. Thus, the very sacred texts of all three monotheistic religious traditions continue to be used to justify hateful and pre-genocidal acts and behaviors based upon those readings and consequent understandings.12 Indeed, one could cite many other examples within each of these three monotheistic religious traditions.

IV. WHAT, THEN, IS TO BE DONE?

At this moment on the world scene, the voices of the literalists appear to be shouting the loudest, to the disadvantage of us all. In addition, calls for
calmness, civil and reasoned discourse, tolerance and respect for diverse and divergent points of view and perspectives result in hateful and violent, if not pre-genocidal, acts across and within these three religious communities. Israel has yet to come to grips with the religious significance of the tragedies of Orthodox Jew Baruch Goldstein’s murder of Muslims at prayer at the mosque in Hebron, and of the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by Orthodox Jew Yigal Amir. While the Roman Catholic Church has made significant and important strides and admissions in its relationship with Jews, and the Lutheran Church also has begun the always-painful task of self-examination, too many, both officially and otherwise within the various Protestant Christianities, have yet to truly begin the task of discerning whether both historical and contemporary teachings continue a pattern of denigrating the other who is not like themselves. Within the different strains of Islam, the urgent need to re-examine both teachings and texts as to whether those who do violence can and do derive their justifications for their behaviors from their readings/comprehensions/analyses appears to be too-slowly forthcoming. Indeed, Jonathan Kirsch writes in his newly-released book *God Against the Gods: The History of the War Between Monotheism and Polytheism*:

> When Arab suicide bombers carried out “martyr operations” in Haifa, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, and when a Jewish physician opened fire on Muslims at prayer at the Tomb of the Patriarchs, each one was acting out a kind of zealotry that was inspired by a tragic misreading and misapplication of ancient texts.13

When, then, is to be done? Specifically, for all three great monotheistic religious communities, is there another way (other than literally) to read, comprehend, and analyze these sacred and holy texts of each tradition and still accord them the power and authority historically ascribed to them, as well as to acknowledge their primary position as the inter-connection between the human and the Divine? At the very same time, can such a different reading espoused by others within these communities empower those who wish to both remain within and reach out beyond, religio-theologically as well as socio-politically, to begin the arduous journey toward curbing the hate and the violence? Intellectually, I do believe that can be the case, drawing upon the long-honored though too-often ignored Judaic reading tradition of what I now call “The Midrashic Way,”14 that is, a 2,000-year-old non-literal interpretive commentary tradition and conversation of and by the rabbis with the Hebrew Scriptures and now encompassing both New Testament and Qur’an.15 The idea is not initially mine, but rather that of Orthodox Jewish feminist and author Blu Greenberg, though her specific frames of reference were the Shoah or Holocaust and only the Gospels.

In her (1989) article “The Holocaust and the Gospel Truth: Christian Con-
frontations with the Holocaust,” published in the journal Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Greenberg wrote:

In as much as I believe, like many others, that the Shoah is not a freak event vis-à-vis Christian Gospels but, rather, the expressed culmination of a suppressed rage against the Jews embedded within its words, I shall proceed to take the liberties that ecumenism vests in us.

The conclusion I draw from the Holocaust and from the four decades following it, is that Christianity needs a Talmud and a Midrash that deal with the foundation documents of its faith; that Christians of the next two thousand years ought not to be able to read or teach or understand first century Christianity without these hermeneutical texts of quasi-canonical status; that in the year 2500 a Christian child standing at any point along the religious denominational spectrum will not and need not know where the Scripture leaves off and quasi-Scripture begins.

Why do I use terms such as Talmud and Midrash, so particular to the Jewish tradition? In order to precisely convey the notions of power, authority, and sacredness, as Talmud and Midrash have done for Jewish for so many centuries unto this very day. Or, to present this in a more ironic fashion—it is not too late, eighteen hundred years later, for Christianity to do what Judaism of the other Jews did in the first century: to become a religion of the “two Torahs.”

Such is the conclusion drawn by a twentieth-century post-Holocaust Jew who has been informed by more than two decades of the Jewish-Christian encounter. In fact, I have arrived as this conclusion as much through a series of encounters and experiences as through academic study (pp. 273-274).16

Ms. Greenberg’s radically innovative idea for the Christianities, and my expansion of it to include the Islams, has not yet been given the attention it now needs in our increasingly violent world. Nor have the calls for more “midrashic readings” of the Hebrew biblical text been heard or affirmed in Israel by her non-Orthodox political leadership, or here in the United States (or elsewhere) by those who are among Israel’s most vocal supporters and willing defenders. I would also add that, for this process to succeed, and here I am indebted to German Catholic thinker Johannes Baptist Metz and the late French Jewish philosopher Emanuel Levinas, the time has now come for all three great religious traditions to begin to read their own sacred scriptures in the presence of the other. How fitting, then, in conclusion, to paraphrase the words of the Second Century Talmudic sage Rabbi Tarphon in the Jewish ethical tractate known as Pirkei Avot/Sayings of the Fathers:

The day is short and the task is great and the workers are sluggish, and the reward is much, and the Master of the house is urgent. It is not incumbent upon you to finish the task, but neither are you free to desist from it. (2:19)
NOTES

1. (1) If the assumptions of this paper are reasonably accurate and reasonably correct, how do we educate Jews, Christians, Muslims to re-think their understandings of their sacred texts in conversation with their own communities and across their communities (i.e. the question of the “other”), to, ultimately, lessen the ongoing potential for hate-related and genocidally-related activities?

(2) Does the recognition of the power of these sacred texts and the exclusive authority associating them with God/Allah, ultimately require a total re-thinking of our collective understanding of these texts and their place(s) within their own communities and in relationship to those outside their own communities?

(3) What are the practical implications of such re-thinking in seminary and congregational and communal curricula, liturgical expressions, and the like? How, in concrete terms, is this work to be accomplished?

2. I also teach an upper-level seminar, primarily for juniors and seniors: “Religion 347: Jewish-Christian Relations,” the course description for which reads:

   In this course, we will critically examine the 2,000 year-old relationship between Jews and Christians, both historically and contemporarily, by focusing our microscopes on such areas as the following: (1) Rabbinic Judaism or Jewish-Gentile Christianity, (2) Hebrew Bible or Old/Testament/New Testament, (3) Jewish Messiah or Christian Jesus, (4) Jewish Mission or Great Commission, (5) Antisemitism or Anti-Judaism, (6) Holocaust or Shoah, (7) Land/State of Israel or Holy Land, and (8) Jewish Movements or Christian Denominations. Class format will consist of lectures, discussions, reactions to readings, student presentations, and, where appropriate, video materials.

   Note: The use of the word “or” in the course description is intended to suggest what I maintain are the ongoing “tension points” of this relationship that refuse to go away. (The actual syllabus and other information are available on our departmental website, www.as.ua.edu/rel).

An additionally relevant course, also for upper-level students, is “Religion 490: Religion and Genocide,” whose course description is as follows:

   This course seeks to explore the phenomenon of genocide by examining its relationship to the phenomenon of religion in both its institutional and theological frameworks, beginning with scriptural passages (Hebrew Bible, New Testament, Qur’an) classified as having genocidal intent. Both historical examples (e.g. Armenian Genocide, Soviet Collectivization, Holocaust) and contemporary examples (e.g. Rwanda, Bosnia) are likewise examined to ascertain whether or not there are religious components to each genocide. The concluding part of this course will address the question “What positive role can religions play to mitigate against future genocides?” Format of this course will consist of lectures, discussion of readings, student presentations, and, where appropriate, video materials.

   Note: A somewhat different version of this syllabus was first published in Joyce Apsel and Helen Fein, ed., Teaching About Genocide: An Interdisciplinary Guidebook with Syllabi for College and University Teachers (Washington, DC: American Sociological Association, 2002), 116-118. It is the only syllabus which addresses this question of the interface between religion and genocide.

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5. A most serious and important study of this question is to be found in David Novak, The Election of Israel: The Idea of the Chosen People (Cambridge, UK/New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

6. It is important to note at the outset that no parity whatsoever is implied regarding the various uses and abuses of these texts by the Jewish, Christian, and/or Muslim communities and those who choose to read and understand them literally and act upon their understandings.


8. Significant Jewish parallels here are (1) Tzedakah or “righteous fiscal (and other) obligations”; fasting, primarily on Yom Kippur or the Day of Atonement; and the three Sh’losh regalim or “Pilgrimage Festivals” of Pesach (Passover), Shavuot (Weeks), and Sukkot (Booths). The Shahada may be said to parallel Deuteronomy 6:4: “Hear O Israel: Adonai is our God, Adonai alone”; and the notion of Prayer is the obligation incumbent on religiously devout Jews three times a day (morning, afternoon, evening).


10. 21:(28) When an ox gores a man or a woman to death, the ox shall be stoned, and its flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall not be liable. (29) If the ox has been accustomed to gore in the past, and its owner has been warned but has not restrained it, and it kills a man or a woman, the ox shall be stoned, and its owner shall be put to death. (30) If a ransom has been imposed on the owner, then the owner shall pay whatever is imposed for the redemption of the victim’s life. (31) If it gores a boy or a girl, the owner shall be dealt with according to this same rule. (32) If the ox goes a male or female slave, the owner shall pay to the slaveowner thirty shekels of silver, and the ox shall be stoned.


14. The brevity of this paper does not permit a further fleshing out of this idea, complete with “midrashic readings” of Hebrew Bible, New Testament, and Qur’an, but only its introduction in this context.

15. Two interesting examples of this midrashic approach are Henry F. Knight’s Confessing Christ in a Post-Holocaust World: A Midrashic Experiment (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000); and James F. Moore’s Christian Theology After the Shoah (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993).

Hate, Oppression, Repression, and the Apocalyptic Style: 
Facing Complex Questions and Challenges

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mission of the author.

ABSTRACT

As we build the field of Hate Studies we need to scrupulously inspect our own work. Blee and Ferber have already suggested a number of complex ques-
tions for scholars to answer. This paper argues that understanding the interre-
lated dynamics of hate, apocalyptic dualism, institutionalized oppression, and political repression is crucial to increasing the accuracy and effectiveness of our research and answering these questions.

Organized hate groups defend unfair power and privilege by promoting collective action frames and constructing narratives that use dualism and apoca-
lypticism to demonize scapegoats and allege sinister conspiracies. These dynamics, however, are modeled on pre-existing prejudice and bigotry that exist in muted forms in the larger society. Individuals who commit hate crimes often appear to have internalized scapegoating frames and narratives, but seldom are they members of organized supremacist groups. We need to place the study of organized hate groups in the context of the larger study of systems of oppression that generate hate. As Buechler observes, issues of class, race, and gender are “omnipresent in the background of all forms of collective action” as both overlapping and distinct forces. Apocalyptic dualism takes systemic oppression and mobilizes it into hate.

At the same time, systems of social oppression exist along with systems of political repression by state agencies. Activist groups such as the Audre Lorde Center and the American Friends Service Committee have suggested the emphasis on enhanced criminal penalties and incarceration in most hate crimes laws is misguided. Not all members of hate groups violate the law, and sometimes organizations or movements are labeled hate groups using less than rigorous criteria. At a time of increased government surveillance of dissident political groups, it is important for scholars to avoid demonization and apocalyptic rhetoric. We must balance our demand for civil rights with a defense of civil liberties.
I. Introduction

Establishing the field of Hate Studies will increase the quality and quantity of research on the reality of hate crimes, prejudice, discrimination, organized supremacist groups, and ideologies and institutions that promote inequality. Blee (2002) and Ferber (2004) have already challenged us to broaden our field of vision; and we must be willing to inspect our own work for weaknesses. We also face a number of critics, including other scholars and academics, progressive activists, civil libertarians, political libertarians, and even apologists for supremacist ideology.

While it is important to stand up against apologists for supremacist ideology, their arguments are overwhelmingly specious. Political libertarians oppose most state action through legislation or regulation, and while we need to craft answers to their complaints against hate crimes laws, our responses will be based on a fundamental ideological disagreement that is largely irresolvable. Our work will be improved, however, if we pay attention to the arguments of critical scholars (from a variety of political viewpoints), progressive activists, and civil libertarians.

This paper starts by examining how our language shapes our focus; and how the idea of “hate” needs to be imbedded in the study of systems of oppression. It then discusses the dynamics of demonization, scapegoating, and conspiracism generated by apocalyptic dualism—a stylistic tool used by social movement leaders to recruit and motivate followers. Finally, it explores the relationship between oppression and repression. I have expanded the bibliography to point out interesting research currents. Some will find this paper provocative, but I seek to be a constructive critic.

Dynamics, Boundaries, and Terminology

How we describe an area of study and the ideas and actions of various groups and individuals under observation can shape the subsequent scholarship. Some analysts even suggest that instead of using the term “hate crime,” we should call acts of violence and intimidation based on prejudice and hate “ethnoviolence” (Prejudice Institute [1997] 1999; Erhlich 1999).

There are different types of ethnoviolence, with variations related in complex ways to the perceived identity of the target; the location of the incident; the demographics of the perpetrators; and whether the perpetrator acts alone, in a group, or alone at the behest of a group. We also need to determine whether an incident is a symbolic crime or an actuarial crime, the role of uncertainty in the event, the combination of expressive and instrumental motives, the extent of premeditation involved, and the role of initial causes or proximate causes or their blending (Berk, Boyd, and Hamner 1992).

The vast majority of acts of ethnoviolence are carried out by persons who
do not appear to be directly associated with organized supremacist groups. How do these perpetrators pick their targets?

According to Ehrlich, ethnoviolence can occur as:

- a way to defend turf, territory, or property;
- a defense of what is seen as sacred;
- a way to affirm or reject a status as being “normal”;
- an indication of affiliation to a group or ideology;
- a form of conformity and submission to peer pressure or the demands of the state or a religion (1992, 108-109).

Ethnoviolence can also be a form of destructive youth “recreational” violence, committed primarily by teenage boys (Harry 1992). This is an attempt by young people to “shock” adults in general and authority figures in particular; to generate a “thrill;” or to gain “bragging rights” (Levin and McDevitt 1993; 2002). Even “shock” ethnoviolence involves at least the subconscious understanding that the target is demonized in some way by some segment of the society. Ethnoviolence and vandalism that is intended as a “shock” crime has the same effect on the target group and the surrounding community as crimes motivated by intentional ideological hate, yet these dynamics and motives are understudied and undertheorized.

Organized supremacist groups utilize and amplify the same elements of prejudice, supremacy, demonization, and scapegoating that already exist in mainstream society. The ideologies, styles, frames, and narratives used by organized supremacist groups are drawn from pre-existing systems of oppression buried in mainstream society. Perpetrators of ethnoviolence are influenced to varying degrees by both the rhetoric of organized supremacist groups and normative societal systems of oppression.

A. Systems of Oppression

Ehrlich explains that patterns of prejudice “are normative, the result of social and historic processes.” He adds that even “most violence is instrumental, that is, a habitual pattern of behavior adopted to achieve a set of personal needs or ends” (1992, 107-108).

Because of this, we need to place the study of ethnoviolence and organized hate groups in the context of the larger study of systems of oppression that generate prejudice, demonization, and hate. Buechler observes that issues of class, race, and gender are “omnipresent in the background of all forms of collective action” as both overlapping and distinct forces (2000). Felice adds that we must recognize that the successful assertion of “collective human rights” or “group rights” depends on the “linking of ethnicity/race, class, gender, and sexuality,” because this linkage “mutes supremacist tendencies by
denying the right of any one group to assert supremacy over a different group” (1996, 1-4).

These ideas challenge older theories of hate and ethnoviolence. An academic school of thought popular in the 1950s and ‘60s—called the “classic” or “pluralist” school—shaped the study of prejudice. Proponents of this model tended to study prejudice as primarily an individual psychological malady; and they tended to see social movements as a form of irrational collective behavior. The idea of the ideal center besieged by “extremists” of the left and right was a core precept of this model, which has been dubbed “centrist/extremist” theory by its critics (Berlet and Lyons 1998; 2000, 13-17).

The use of the centrist/extremist paradigm to analyze hate groups by major human relations organizations has not “abolished the movement, nor diminished racism in general, and may, in fact, unwittingly support racist beliefs,” suggests Ferber (1996, 121). “While the focus is on the fringe, mainstream, everyday racism remains unexamined.” Ferber argues that a discussion is needed on the “points of similarity between white supremacist discourse and mainstream discourses,” especially since any discursive narrative used by white supremacist groups gains its power “precisely because it rearticulates mainstream racial narratives” (1996, 121; see also Ferber 1998, 9-12, 156; 2004).

Ezekiel agrees, noting that organized white racism exploits feelings of “lonely resentment.” It does this by weaving together ideologies already present in mainstream culture: “white specialness, the biological significance of ‘race,’ the primacy of power in human relations” along with “the feeling of being cheated” (1995, 321). Aho did field research in the Pacific Northwest and rejects the idea that racial or religious bigotry is caused by people who are stupid or crazy. He found that most of the racists and bigots he studied seem to be within the bounds of normal psychological health typical of the community in which they lived (1989; 1990).

The centrist/extremist model actually impedes anti-racist efforts and other struggles against oppression, because it dramatically focuses on individual and psychological explanations at the expense of institutional and systemic dynamics. This is not to suggest that psychological factors are not involved. As Young-Bruehl argues, however, there are diverse types of prejudice and bigotry, and to understand them we need to explore the “interplay of psychological and sociological factors” (1996, 23, 460).

The rhetoric of some human relations groups—”extremists of the left and right,” “religious political extremists,” “lunatic fringe,” “wing-nuts”—undermines civil liberties, civil rights, and civil discourse by demonizing dissent and veiling the complicity we all share in institutionalized forms of oppression in our society: racism, sexism, heterosexism, antisemitism, and many more. Increasingly we can add Arabophobia and Islamophobia to this list.

The Rev. Martin Luther King at first bristled at being labeled an “extremist” in the 1960s by a group of clergymen upset with his activism. In his “Letter
From Birmingham Jail’ King wrote that he thought for a while, and then realized that in their respective days, the Biblical Amos, Abraham Lincoln, and Thomas Jefferson had all been thought of as extremists by mainstream society. King responded, “So the question is not whether we will be extremists, but what kind of extremists we will be. Will we be extremists for hate or will we be extremists for love? Will we be extremists for the preservation of injustice—or will we be extremists for the cause of justice?” (1963).

Two issues are raised by King’s clever reversal of the attack on him as an “extremist.” First is that the term “extremist” has only relative meaning in terms of how far outside the “mainstream” norms of society a particular idea or act is located by some observer who claims a “centrist” position. Second, King suggests it is important to determine whether any non-normative idea or action defends or extends justice, equality, or democracy—or whether it defends or extends unfair power or privilege.

Ultimately, the concept of “extremism” is of little value in studying prejudice and ethnoviolence. Himmelstein argues the term “extremism” is at best a characterization that “tells us nothing substantive about the people it labels,” and at worst the term “paints a false picture” (1998, 7). Often, analysts use the term “extremism” in a way that implies that ideas and methodologies are always linked. This is not the case. We need to separate ideology from methodology. King’s ideas may have been outside the mainstream for his day, but he promoted non-violence; and while civil disobedience often involves a minor criminal act, it is not the same as an act of terrorism. Given the way the term “extremist” is sometimes used, it can serve as a justification for state action that is repressive and undermines Constitutional guarantees. We need to use terms that are more precise. We are studying people and groups that promote supremacy, prejudice, discrimination, bigotry, and hate. We are studying people and groups that use intimidation and violence against a targeted group or individual based on their perceived identity. This language teaches people to see the dynamics of societal oppression, rather than allowing them to dismiss acts of ethnoviolence as caused by not-like-us “extremists” from hate groups.

B. Ideology, Frames, and Narratives

Members of organized supremacist groups are not the primary perpetrators of ethnoviolence, but they do help exacerbate and spread prejudice in a society. People (including supremacists) construct social movements to help them gain attention for their ideas and increase their cultural and political influence through collective action. While there are psychological factors involved, most sociologists now reject the idea that people who join social movements are irrational or psychologically dysfunctional. Instead, they look at movement members as people with a grievance who are strategic and instrumental in the way they mobilize resources, exploit political opportunities, develop their own
culture, frame ideas, and create slogans (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). Aho (1990) found these dynamics at work in his study of Christian Patriots in Idaho, as did Dobratz and Shanks- Meile (1997) in their study of white separatists, and Blee (2002) in her study of women in organized hate groups.

Until the late 1970s, most scholarly studies of social movements focused on the political left. Scrutiny of right-wing social and political movements accelerated with broad studies such as those of Eatwell ([1989] 1990), Diamond (1995), and Bobbio (1996); as well as those with a more narrow focus—Aho (1990), Hamm (1994), Ferber (1998), and Blee (2002), to name but a few. The increased attention to the political right prompted criticism that some scholars were using less than rigorous criteria to label the groups and movements they studied (Durham 2000; Berlet and Lyons 2000; Berlet 2004). Even more critical are Kaplan (1997) and Chermak (2002), who are especially skeptical of research by “watchdog” groups. On the other border of the debate, attempts by scholars to use more nuanced approaches are often met with the skepticism that greeted “White Power, White Pride!” The White Separatist Movement in the United States, by Dobratz and Shanks-Meile (1997). What Dobratz and Shanks-Meile, Durham, Lyons, and I are arguing is that it is important to pay attention to the distinctions and boundaries that exist in right-wing social movements. Different groups frame their ideologies and ideas in different ways. The stories (or narratives) they tell to educate and mobilize their followers reveal who is to be the scapegoat, and what actions against them are considered heroic.

In sociology the idea of studying “frames” has allowed scholars to better understand how social movements gain the attention and loyalty of groups of people in a society (Goffman 1959, 1974; Snow and Benford 1988, 1992; Johnston 1995). Frames help translate ideologies into action by crafting culturally-appropriate perspectives from which to view a struggle over power (Zald 1996; Gamson 1995; Oliver and Johnston 2000). According to Klandermans, the “social construction of collective action frames” involves “public discourse, that is, the interface of media discourse and interpersonal interaction; persuasive communication during mobilization campaigns by movement organizations, their opponents and countermovement organizations; and consciousness raising during episodes of collective action” (1997, 45). Frames can be constructed to appeal to different audiences, including leaders, followers, potential recruits, and the public (Snow et al. [1986] 1997; Johnston 1995; Gamson 1995). Brasher has suggested that apocalypticism is a master frame used by a variety of groups.1

In the same way, the study of “narratives” reveals much about how heroes and villains are identified by a social movement (Polletta 1998; Davis 2002). The way narratives are constructed can either assist in unraveling systems of oppression or merely replicate existing paradigms of dominance (Ewick and Silbey 1995). Narratives can be used to demonize a target group and facilitate scapegoating. During the last century, for example, frames and narratives
involving anticommunism often spilled over from political criticism into near hysteria in American society (Kovel 1994). Antisemitic groups have a long history of using frames and narratives that portray Jews as wicked, evil, greedy, and parasitic (Cohn [1967] 1996; Postone 1986; Billig [1989] 1990; Smith 1996).

By analyzing the ideologies, styles, frames, and narratives used by overt supremacist groups, we can look for their precursors in the mainstream society, and study how they help maintain systems of oppression.

II. Dualism and the Apocalyptic Style

Organized hate groups defend unfair power and privilege by promoting collective action frames and constructing narratives that use a dualistic form of apocalypticism to demonize scapegoats and allege sinister conspiracies. Apocalyptic dualism takes systemic oppression and mobilizes it into hate. How does this work?

The word “apocalypse” refers to an approaching confrontation, cataclysmic event, or transformation that marks the end of an epoch and signifies significant changes in a society. A handful of people have been given a warning so they can make appropriate preparations. Apocalyptic (and millennialist or millenarian) social movements sometimes combine demonization, scapegoating, and conspiracism with a sense that time is running out so that quick action is needed (Boyer 1992; Barkun [1994] 1997a; O’Leary 1994; Kovel 1994; Strozier 1994; Fuller 1995; Lamy 1996). Many scholars are unfamiliar with these terms and concepts as applied to ethnoviolence and organized supremacy.

Thompson argues that the conspiracy theories Hofstadter described as the “paranoid style” in right-wing movements are really derived from apocalyptic beliefs (Hofstadter 1965; Thompson [1996] 1998, 307). Apocalyptic social movements are sometimes called millenarian (Worsley 1968) or millennialist, especially if they feature a reference to a one-thousand year time span (Cohn [1957] 1970; 1993). In Western societies millenarianism—even when secularized—is based on prophecies in the Christian Bible, especially the book of Revelation (Boyer 1992; O’Leary 1994). One reading of Revelation sees it as warning of global conspiracies by political and religious leaders to build a One World Government to assist Satan and his henchman, the Antichrist, in the End Times that precede the return of Jesus Christ (Fuller 1995).

Dualism (or Manichaeanism) is a form of binary thinking that divides the world into good versus evil, with no middle ground tolerated. There is no acknowledgment of complexity, nuance, or ambiguity in debates; and hostility is expressed toward those who suggest coexistence, toleration, pragmatism, compromise, or mediation. Dualism generates three related processes: demonization, scapegoating, and conspiracism (Allport 1954, 243-260; Fenster 1999; Berlet and Lyons 2000; Goldberg 2001).
Anthony and Robbins describe how some persons may be able to rebuild a fractured self-image through their participation in a “totalist movement” such as an ideological or religious group with “highly dualistic worldviews” and “an absolutist apocalyptic outlook,” where they can engage in the “projection of negativity and rejected elements of self onto ideologically designated scapegoats.” Anthony and Robbins identify a form of apocalypticism they call “exemplary dualism.” In this worldview, “contemporary sociopolitical or socioreligious forces are transmogrified into absolute contrast categories embodying moral, eschatological, and cosmic polarities upon which hinge the millennial destiny of humankind” (Anthony and Robbins 1997, 264, 267, 269; see also Anthony and Robbins 1996; Neiwert 2003).

Apocalyptic dualism facilitates the targeting of a scapegoated “Other.” The “effect of the scapegoat is to reverse the relationship between persecutors and their victims,” writes Girard (1986, 44). Persons in scapegoated groups are often described as having brought attacks on themselves because of their alleged bad behavior (Noél 1994, 129-144). According to Allport, scapegoating evokes hatred rather than anger, as the “hater is sure the fault lies in the object of hate” (1954, 363-364). Ruth Benedict explains that people who are frustrated, angry, and desperate “easily seize upon some scapegoat to sacrifice to their unhappiness; it is a kind of magic by which they feel for the moment that they have laid [down] the misery that has been tormenting them” (1961, 151).

Not all apocalypticism is dualistic, or even socially destructive. All social movements are to some extent apocalyptic in the sense that they seek relatively rapid social transformation. Apocalypticism, especially the dualistic variety, can be a powerful force in generating support for dramatic, even revolutionary, changes in a society (Katz and Popkin 1998; Robbins and Palmer 1997). For instance, apocalyptic dualism is evident in the most militant branches of the anti-abortion movement (Herman 1997; Mason 2002). A racialized version of apocalyptic dualism is employed by antisemitic sectors of the Christian Identity movement (Barkun [1994] 1997a; 1997b). Fascism has been described as a form of millenarianism or apocalypticism (Rhodes 1980; Fenn 1997; Ellwood 2000). Griffin defines fascism as a palingenetic form of revolutionary populism, using the term palingenesis in a way that is almost identical to the concept of apocalyptic dualism (1991, xi).

Scapegoating often appears in the form of allegations that the “Other” is engaged in a vast sinister conspiracy against the wholesome community of “Us.” Goldberg traces the concept of conspiracy thinking back to the “Latin word consipirare—to breathe together,” which implies some type of dramatic scenario (2001, 1). Conspiracism is a particular narrative form of scapegoating that frames demonized enemies as part of a vast insidious plot against the common good, while it valorizes the scapegoater as a hero for sounding the alarm (Berlet 1998; Berlet and Lyons 2000, 9). Fenster (1999) argues that persons who embrace conspiracy theories are trying to understand how power is exercised in a society that they feel they have no control over. Often they have real
grievances with the society—sometimes legitimate—sometimes seeking to
defend unfair power and privilege. Conspiracism evolves as a worldview from
roots in dualistic forms of apocalypticism. Conspiracist thinking has appeared
in mainstream popular discourse as well as in various subcultures in the United
States throughout its history (Davis 1971; Mintz 1985; Goldberg 2001; Barkun

On the political left, conspiracist theories are the avenue by which
antisemitism is introduced into internal discussions and debates (Berlet and
Lyons 2000). This sometimes emerges into public statements by persons on the
left who make hyperbolic and stereotypic claims about manipulation of U.S.
foreign or domestic policies by Jews, Jewish institutions, the state of Israel, or
the Israeli government (Kaplan 2002). At the same time, some have implied
that criticism of Israel, or its policies, or Jewish institutions, is a new form of
antisemitism, when this is not always the case. This is an area that needs more
discussion and debate.

On the political right, conspiracy theories are a common element in dual-
litic narratives of good and evil. In the contemporary United States, these right-
wing conspiracist theories can be found in the Christian Right, the Patriot
Movement, and the Ultra Right (Extreme Right), but they use different frames
and point to different primary targets (Berlet 2004). Apocalyptic conspiracism
across the political right, however, shares a masculinist narrative that engenders
confrontation (Quinby 1994; Ferber 1998; Kimmel and Ferber 2000; Berlet
2004).

Conspiracism is often used to construct frames and narratives in right-
wing populist groups. Populism is a rhetorical style that seeks to mobilize “the
people” as a social or political force. It can be employed by groups across the
political spectrum. Populism can challenge or defend the status quo. It can pro-
mote or undermine democratic civil society (Canovan 1981, 3-16, 46-51, 289-
301; Brinkley 1982, 165-168; Berlet and Lyons 2000, 4-6). The central motif of
many historic right-wing dissident movements is a form of populist anti-elitism
that portrays the current government regime as indifferent, corrupt, or traitorous
(Betz 1994; Kazin 1995; Junas 1995; Berlet and Lyons 2000). These episodes
of right-wing populism are often generated by economic, social, or cultural
stress that assists right-wing organizers in the mass mobilization of alienated
cross-class sectors of a population (Laclau 1977; Berlet and Lyons 2000).

Populism plays different chords in each sector of the right—but the recur-
bring melody is a particular form called producerism. Producerist narratives por-
tray a noble middle class of hard-working producers being squeezed by a
conspiracy involving secret elites above and lazy, sinful, and subversive para-
sites below (Canovan 1981, 54-55; Kazin 1995, 35-36, 52-54, 143-144; Stock
1996, 15-86; Berlet and Lyons 2000, 4-6). Producerist white supremacy helped
fuel the attack on newly gained Black rights after the Civil War (Kantrowitz
2000, 4-6, 109-114, 153). Producerist antisemitism was central to the success
of German Nazi ideology in attracting an alienated audience for a mass base (Payne 1995, 52-53; Postone 1986). The idea that right-wing populism is an ingredient of fascist social movements is an argument that has a long pedigree (Ferkiss 1957; Laclau 1977; Germani 1978; Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1988; Fritzsche 1990; Griffin 1991; Eco 1995; Berlet and Lyons 2000).

The use of populist rhetoric by right-wing groups in the U.S. and Europe increased in the early 1990s (Mozzochi and Rhinegard 1991; Phillips 1992; Betz 1994; Kazin 1995; Betz and Immerfall 1998). With the collapse of Communism in Europe, the U.S. political right turned more attention to generating populist resentment over federal government policies (Marsden 1991; Junas 1995; Berlet and Lyons 2000). Hardisty calls this process “mobilizing resentment” (1999). This includes some sectors of the Christian Right where issues of gender such as sexism and heterosexism are obvious, but where subtexts of white supremacy and antisemitism also appear (Herman 1997; Berlet and Lyons 2000; Burlein 2002).

When studying organized supremacist groups in the U.S., it is useful to understand the role of right-wing populism and apocalyptic dualism in framing issues and scripting bigoted narratives that employ demonization, scapegoating, and conspiracism. We can then look at “mainstream” society and see—in less dramatic and more muted forms—similar frames and narratives that operate to sustain systems of oppression. This helps us probe differences and similarities in the actual underlying ideologies in both organized supremacist groups and mainstream society.

III. HUMAN RIGHTS:
DEFENDING CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

Systems of social and cultural oppression exist along with systems of political repression. We must balance our demand for civil rights with a defense of civil liberties. Not all members of hate groups violate the law, and sometimes organizations or movements are labeled hate groups using less than rigorous criteria. Kaplan, for example, argues, “The right wing talks a better revolution than it is prepared to fight” (1997, 170).

Levitas (2002) and some other progressive activists imply that the neonazi, Christian Identity, Christian Patriot, white nationalist, armed citizens militia, and Patriot movements are merely variations of a terrorist-prone extremist radical right. Stern (1996) made a strong case for the relationship between militias and hate groups in his book, A Force Upon the Plain: The American Militia Movement and the Politics of Hate. These relationships exist; but are all militia units accurately described as hate groups? I argue that this is an overly broad assertion (Berlet 2004). Certainly there are white supremacy and antisemitism woven into militia narratives; and in some cases leaders of organized hate groups have helped organize some militia units or influenced their ideology. The central focus of the militias, however, is not racial antago-
nism, but a distrust of the government rooted in right-wing populism (Berlet and Lyons 2000; Berlet 2004).

Other studies of paramilitary culture and the Patriot/militia movements have emphasized the intersection of class and race (Gallaher 2002), gender (Gibson 1994), apocalypticism (Lamy 1996; Berlet 1998), the potential for fascism (Rupert 1997), and the way in which economic and cultural issues influenced the formation of militia units (Van Dyke and Soule 2002).

A. Repression

Repression is a form of oppression in which governments or paramilitary units use force in a systematic way against a target group based on their perceived actions, ideas, or identity. At a time of increased government surveillance of dissident political groups, it is important for scholars to avoid demonization and apocalyptic rhetoric. We hear the assertion that law enforcement agencies need increased surveillance and infiltration of right-wing dissident groups to reduce hate crimes. There is no evidence to support that claim.

David Cole writes that given the spate of hate crimes in 1999, it is easy to “understand why Abraham Foxman, president of the Anti-Defamation League, would write an op-ed for The New York Times, calling for increased FBI surveillance of hate groups.” Cole noted that the ADL also took out a full-page ad in the newspaper making a similar call. “But as comprehensible as the turn to the FBI may be, it is a wrong turn. In fact, the history of FBI political spying suggests that the last thing we need to do is expand FBI power in this area,” wrote Cole (1999).

Bruce Fein, an Associate Deputy Attorney General in 1981-82 under Ronald Reagan, was concerned enough to respond to Foxman in a letter to the New York Times:

Abraham H. Foxman ignores Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter’s observation that the history of liberty is the history of procedural safeguards against investigatory or prosecutorial abuses. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s history of spying against citizens without cause to suspect criminality confirms Frankfurter’s words. Thick dossiers were compiled that served political blackmail more than law enforcement. Mr. Foxman urges relaxation of balanced restraints on the F.B.I. with the goal of shadowing every government-perceived “hatemonger” without evidence of a threatened crime. He warns that “hatred can still destroy.” Yes, but the F.B.I. has destroyed as well when it has snooped around as thought police (Fein 1999).

Back in the 1960s, a few months after King’s “Letter From a Birmingham Jail” was released, a dynamite bomb killed Denise McNair, Addie Mae Collins, Cynthia Wesley, and Carole Robertson while they were in a Birmingham
church. At the time the FBI was busy assembling its dossier on King, a known “extremist.” A former attorney general of Alabama, Bill Baxley, accused the FBI of hiding evidence against the bomber, who was finally convicted in 2001. “How can the F.B.I. justify this to the families of four precious girls? I don’t know. I do know that rank-and-file FBI agents working with us were conscientious and championed our cause. The disgust I feel is for those in higher places who did nothing,” wrote Baxley (2001).

In Birmingham in the 1960s some local police officers worked closely with the KKK, even to the extent of cutting a deal whereby white supremacists would have free time to savagely beat civil rights activists arriving on a 1961 Freedom Ride. The FBI knew of this plan and chose not to act on the information in order to protect its informer inside the KKK. In 1965 that same informer watched silently as his fellow Klansmen murdered civil rights worker Viola Liuzzo (Cunningham 2003).

This is not a blanket indictment of federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel, many of whom can and do play an important role in investigating incidents of ethnoviolence. It is a caution that scholars need to be aware of the potential that some law enforcement personnel may be part of the problem rather than part of the solution, and that civil liberties issues need to be acknowledged.

In the same way, not all “experts” in the private sector are actually experts. This is especially true in the field of terrorism, with a glaring example being the rush of talking heads on television declaring—as did Vincent Cannistraro and Steven Emerson—that the Oklahoma City federal building bombing had the hallmarks of Middle Eastern groups or Islamic radicals. In a similar fashion, we need to be careful of claims by scholars such as Daniel Pipes and Samuel Huntington, whose work on occasion slides into stereotyping of Arabs and Muslims.

### B. Prejudice, Tolerance, and Respect

Early studies of prejudice were an attempt to promote tolerance in a world that had just witnessed the horrors of the Nazi genocide of Jews and others designated enemies of a totalitarian state (Allport 1954). In recent years, authors such as Noël (1994), Guillaumin (1995), and Young-Bruehl (1996) have revisited the concepts of prejudice and intolerance and expanded the scope of the discussion. There has even been a study that revised and extended our understanding of the authoritarian personality (Altemeyer 1996). The relationship between power and ideology, and the intersectionality of race, class, and gender have also seen exciting new work (Guillaumin 1995; Wing 2000; Buechler 2000; Bonilla-Silva 2001; Ferber 2002, 2004).

The interaction between social movements and policy is important to watch. Bias crimes became hate crimes, and this language change helped gen-
erate calls for special legislation in the 1980s as part of the social movement strategies of various identity groups (Finn and McNeil 1987; Jenness and Broad 1997). By the year 2000, hate crimes statistics had stabilized to an extent (despite chronic underreporting), and sociologists had studied the issue enough to issue a summary report on hate published by the American Sociological Association (Jenness, Ferber, and Grattet 2000).

Libertarian critics of hate crimes legislation generally argued that hate crimes legislation was an example of identity politics forcing the government to intrude too far into private and personal realms (Jacobs and Potter 1998; Sullivan 1999). Defenders of hate crimes legislation offered detailed rebuttals (B. Levin 1993; 1999; J. Levin and McDevitt 1993; J. Levin 2002).

Between these two diametrically opposed positions are progressive critics who recognize the reality of hate crimes—and the need for government intervention—but who fear the methodology for punishment is flawed. Activist groups such as the Audre Lorde Center and the American Friends Service Committee have suggested the emphasis on enhanced criminal penalties and incarceration in most hate crimes laws is misguided. This critique emerged primarily from progressive activists in the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender (LGBT) community.

An example of this is the work of Katherine Whitlock. Based in Montana, Whitlock authored a report for the national American Friend Service Committee (AFSC), *In a Time of Broken Bones: A Call to Dialogue on Hate Violence and the Limitations of Hate Crimes Legislation*. The report led to AFSC stating that it “believes that most hate crimes laws are seriously flawed by their emphasis on penalty enhancements, which produce consequences antithetical to the good intentions of their proponents” (Whitlock 2001, viii).

Carolina Cordero-Dyer, a board member of the Audre Lorde Project (a New York City LGBT resource center), articulates three major objections to current hate crimes legislation:

- Enhanced criminal penalties rely on a criminal justice system that is racist and is increasingly punitive and there is no assurance that this legislation would not be used against traditionally marginalized groups.
- There is no evidence that enhanced penalties will prevent hate crime.
- Supporting enhanced criminalization of hate crime allies the LGBT movement with tough-on-crime advocates and drives a wedge between LGBT activists and social justice/prison reform movements. Our movement is divided and weakened by adopting tough-on-crime strategies (2001).

Other critiques have appeared in the feminist publication *Sojourner* (Jakobsen 1999) and the liberal *Nation* magazine (Kim 1999), as well as other publications on the political left.
Another provocative trend is represented in the slogan used by some progressive activists: “In Tolerance There is No Respect.” This is an argument that we need to tolerate ideas different from our own, but should respect cultures different from our own—a small but important distinction. As Perry suggests, embracing a “positive politics of difference” involves “much more than efforts to assimilate Others or merely ‘tolerate’ their presence” (Perry 2004, 95).

IV. CHALLENGES

Loretta Ross of the Center for Human Rights Education in Atlanta argues that we should see ourselves as part of the global movement to assert, defend, and expand basic human rights. This is a movement that transcends many political and ideological boundaries, and participation should not pose serious ethical quandaries for scholars. At the same time, as we are not only critics of prejudice, bigotry, and hate, but also scholars, we need to discern the complexity, nuances, and distinctions in the groups and individuals we study. If we condemn demonization, scapegoating, conspiracism, and apocalyptic dualism in the organized supremacist groups and perpetrators of ethnoviolence we study, then we have a special obligation to consider the possibility that we may be tempted to fall into the same rhetorical traps we criticize.

Along with challenging ourselves, we should challenge those in law enforcement who claim terrorists and other criminals are imbedded in dissident social movements and ethnic communities rather than spinning off the periphery of these movements in hard-to-penetrate cells. We should challenge researchers, watchdog groups, and scholars to debate the value of Centrist/Extremist theory and defend their use of the term “extremism” when many social scientists have abandoned both the concept and the term. We should challenge liberal groups to explain why it is ethical to use a term such as “religious political extremist.” This term was selected after focus groups said it covered both conservative Christian evangelicals and armed neonazi terrorists. This term conflates First Amendment protected political ideas and activities with the violent criminal activities of organized hate groups.

We can guard against terrorism without gutting the First Amendment. We can defend our society against violence without spies peering over our shoulder taking notes. We can respect diversity without ransacking democracy. We can challenge hate and systems of oppression by adopting a human rights framework that balances civil rights and civil liberties.

V. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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paragraphs in this paper, especially in the section on Dualism and the Apocalyptic Style, are adapted from material that has previously appeared in print, most recently in Berlet (2004), which is a chapter in Ferber (2004).

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NOTES

Finding Light in the Darkness?
The Historical Treatment of Genocide as a Template for the Field of Hate Studies

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It is one of the tragedies of writing about tragedy that the weight and texture of words matter unduly, for suffering needs a measure of grace to be bearable to others.

—Jonathan Spence

I. INTRODUCTION

Near the conclusion of his book Voices from S-21, a case study of the secret prison in which Cambodian Khmer Rouge state security forces tortured and murdered some 14,000 men, women, and children between 1975 and 1979, historian David Chandler confesses to an overwhelming sense of personal and professional inadequacy:

I have tried my best to . . . bear witness to the victims, to grasp how S-21 could come to be, and to consider how similar institutions have come to life in the past and might reappear again. To perform these tasks, I have had to overcome my reluctance to move in close, my reluctance to share responsibility for what happened, and my eagerness at all costs to maintain my balance. I need to find the words that fit, and what happened at the prison continually overwhelms the words. As a historian and a student of literature I have tried, over the years, to control the data I deal with and to comprehend the writings that I read. When I have immersed myself in the S-21 archive, the terror lurking inside it has pushed me around, blunted my skills, and eroded my self-assurance. The experience at times has been akin to drowning.

Chandler’s admission of intellectual and moral enervation enjoins extreme humility at the outset of this reflection on the historical study of hatred—a topic so vast and so infused into the core of the human condition that it threatens to defy coherent explanation. Chandler continues, ‘Why, then, do so many authors persist in trying to write about it? There is something unsettling about ‘fine writing’ about pain. As [Jean] Améry has remarked. . . . ‘the howl of pain [in torture] defies communication through language.’ In spite of or perhaps because of such warnings, writers and readers alike are drawn inexorably
toward a subject that is ugly, frightening, seductive, and ultimately inexpressible.”4

Why, indeed, study the inexpressible? What is the essence of this attraction? To what end ought we to pursue the field of hate studies? And what can historians contribute of distinct, if not unique, value? This essay offers a few modest reflections on these issues. My intention is simply to provide a starting point for future discussion and elaboration, both among fellow historians and between disciplines.

A brief personal note regarding my motivations and approaches may be helpful to understand what follows. To bring focus to the universal breadth of hate as an elemental aspect of the human experience, my comments will be drawn from my own specialized entryway into the field of Hate Studies, namely more than ten years of experience teaching and mentoring research on Nazi Germany and the Holocaust. Recently I have expanded my teaching interests to encompass genocide in a global, comparative perspective, and I have recently co-taught an upper-level undergraduate course on this topic for the first time. But although my teaching has become increasingly centered on the study of hatred in its rawest form, my primary research specialization lies in the social history of religion. Reflecting on the interplay between the study of genocide and religion, of the construction and effects of ideologies of evil and systems of religious belief and practice, has challenged me to reexamine the motives that drive my teaching and the purposes I hope to achieve through it.

I am discovering that to teach about the history of Nazism, the Holocaust, and genocide is to enter into a profoundly spiritual experience. By this I mean that in engaging with these subjects, students of history must come to terms with some of the most elemental, existential qualities of the human potential for radical destruction and limitless hatred. The topics force us into a direct confrontation with the concept of ultimate evil: its manifold attractions; its power to deceive and destroy both perpetrators and victims; and yet at the same time, appearing in the midst of the reign of death, the possibility of overcoming evil with good. They therefore demonstrate how the critically informed historical study of extreme evil provides a template for equipping students with the intellectual, emotional, and ethical tools they require to more effectively recognize and overcome manifestations of such hatred in their own, contemporary world.5

II. ARGUMENT

The historical study of genocide offers a model for identifying those issues fundamental to an understanding of the formulation and expression of hatred in history. What follows is a synopsis of the building blocks of a coherent, historically informed study of genocide. I will define and discuss the utility of six (6) of these core issues as fundamental contributions toward a theoretical matrix for the emerging field of Hate Studies. Note that although I refer specifically to
genocide for simplicity and consistency of expression, the model is meant to be applied in a much broader sense, to systematized hatred in its many forms.

I begin with the premise that an informed understanding of genocide extends far beyond documenting the actual act of killing. Rather, it must encompass both the multiple factors of justification, mobilization, and implementation leading up to the decision for extermination, and the personal, social, and political after-effects on perpetrators and victims alike. Historical analysis thus aims to create a depth of context, and a coherent ordering of intertwining political, social, economic, and cultural variables, that together enable understanding of the seemingly boundless capacity of ordinary humans to commit acts of unspeakable hatred.6

A. Introduction to Hatred

To understand genocide, or any act of mass hatred, historians must first determine the roots, contexts, and exacerbation of animosities (whether defined by race, ethnicity, religion, class, or gender) which underlie the explosion of destruction at a given, historically contingent time and place. Consideration of political, economic, or cultural power relationships (real or perceived) and their shaping or manipulation over time is central to establishing the framework in which a given incident can be comprehended.

B. Ideologies of Destruction

In spite of the massive sense of irrationality and confusion that often accompanies actions of genocide and mass hatred, understood as historical phenomena these processes are neither random nor chaotic. They require a guiding set of beliefs and values that justify, necessitate, and fuel the targeting, persecution, and/or physical and cultural annihilation of a target group. Typically, these involve a volatile mixture of a mythical past depicted in terms of lost power and purity; a corrupt present in which the very survival of a given race-nation-people-culture is perceived as being in extreme danger; and grandiose promises of a utopian future, equivalent to a political, cultural, or racial rebirth of this people, contingent upon the implementation of extreme measures of political, economic, and social revolution. Chief among the latter is the identification of a target group blamed for the current crisis conditions, and whose humiliation, expulsion, or elimination is a precondition for the restoration of power and purity. The ideology of mass hatred and genocide is thus comprised of a toxic cocktail of fantasies and fears with regard to both perpetrators and victims. Within this fantasy world, however, arguments for brutalization leading to annihilation follow along internally logical and ennobling lines.8
C. Imagining the “Other”

Ideologies of hatred require the identification of a target group and its removal from the political, cultural, and moral community of the perpetrators through persecution, propaganda, and the manipulation of popular perception. This process depends heavily upon the dehumanization and demonization of the target group—in short, an act of imagining and (re)constructing this group to portray it as a mortal danger to the perpetrator community. The target group is usually presented in biological terms: that is, as possessing inherent, unchangeable negative qualities that makes it a source of simultaneous contempt and fear, an object of ridicule for its weakness and degeneracy and inspiring awe at its purported powers of camouflage, conspiracy, and control. Thus the imagined “Other” is portrayed as both vulnerable and formidable, an easy target and one whose defeat can be achieved only through a war of annihilation, a “war without mercy.”

D. Initiation of Terror

Through a comparative framework, historians can discern the warning signs of mass hatred and genocide. What are the factors that turn hatred into love, death into life, and genocide into glory? Historical research illuminates recurring patterns that distinguish states and societies that have committed actions on the sliding scale toward genocide. Theoretically, these findings can serve as guidelines toward predicting which regimes are most likely to commit acts of mass hatred, even genocide, and under what conditions. As noted above, the principle factors leading toward genocide include a profound sense of crisis, involving the loss of stable, legitimate rule; deeply felt national or group humiliation; and a fear for the group’s very survival, especially in a Darwinist international arena. These “trigger situations” establish the crisis conditions that make the extreme claims of perpetrator ideologies plausible to broad segments of the perpetrator society.

E. Implementation

This concept treats the organization and mobilization of resources necessary for hate crimes on a massive scale, culminating in attempted genocide; the methods and technologies of persecution and killing; and the rationalizations/justifications employed by perpetrators. In most, although not all cases, centralized, state-led state organization is required for the scale of destruction required by genocide. This aspect, probably most notably exemplified in the case of Nazi Germany’s assault on the European Jews, highlights the rational, abstract, bureaucratic, and thoroughly modern quality that frequently typifies genocidal actions. A related but distinct issue concerns that mobilization of broadly based active support, or at least passive acquiescence, from the larger
society. Studies of propaganda, indoctrination, the chilling effects of a terror system, and societal and cultural dehumanization of the victims, cutting them off from the community of moral obligation, are central to this theme.\textsuperscript{11}

Secondly, historians look for the modes and levels of destruction. This is important beyond a technical comparison of killing techniques—say, death marches or machetes versus open-air executions with small arms fire versus gas chambers. The modes of physical destruction chosen speak much about the organization, mentality, and objectives of the perpetrators: What is the balance between humiliation and efficiency, between the subjective degradation of the victims and the quest for objective, rational processing of the target group? In addition, genocide encompasses elements of identity that go beyond the physical to encompass the annihilation of the culture, the memory, and the existential being of a target group. Henry Huttenbach has termed this facet of genocide “an act of anti-creation, which aims at a totality of extinction so extreme that even the very act of genocide might be denied . . . an act of radical, absolute erasure of every aspect of existence.”\textsuperscript{12}

Finally, and of central significance, historians attempt to reconstruct the hearts and minds of the perpetrators to address the haunting question, “How can a human being do this?”\textsuperscript{13} Through the techniques of social history, the history of mentalities, and micro-history, especially, historians can delve into the motivations and justifications that enable perpetrators to commit mass murder. Often embracing techniques drawn from social psychology and cultural anthropology, studies of individuals, units, and institutions involved at all levels of the genocidal process have provided a fascinating range of explanations.\textsuperscript{14} Fervent ideological belief, apparently, is a useful, but by no means necessary factor in facilitating genocide. Other important considerations include the radicalization of conventional warfare; careerism; segmentation and distancing of responsibility; group pressure; hardening and routinization; and psychological compartmentalization.\textsuperscript{15} Although the explanations vary and provoke fervent debate, comparative studies overwhelmingly have shown the universal potential of ordinary humans to commit extraordinary evil. Christopher Browning concludes his seminal study of the “ordinary men” who perpetrated the Holocaust with the damming question, “If the men of Reserve Police Battalion 101 could become killers under such circumstances, what group of men cannot?”\textsuperscript{16} Chandler, writing on the Cambodian genocide situated thirty years and a continent away, similarly ends his work: “To find the source of the evil that was enacted at S-21 on a daily basis, we need look no further than ourselves.”\textsuperscript{17}

F. Impact

Finally, and very importantly, historians must present the targets of mass hatred and genocide as more than passive objects. Establishing or restoring
historical agency to victims is historically requisite to avoid unwittingly adopting the perpetrators’ perspective of their targets as two-dimensional, dehumanized stereotypes devoid of intelligence, feeling, power, or cultural resources. Victims were not the helpless objects of vast forces beyond their ken; rather, historical study can unveil the complexity of their responses and experiences. Key issues include victims’ attempts to comprehend their situation and devise rational solutions; recognition of moral gray zones created by the impossible conditions imposed by the perpetrators; and finally, issues of memory, history, and the long-term legacies of the experience of individual and collective victimization.18

III. Conclusions

The set of core issues identified above provide the tools for a broad comparative study of genocide. With minor modification, they can usefully be applied to the study of hatred and its historical expression throughout history. The question remains, With what approaches can historians best employ these tools to create works that speak in a focused, yet comprehensive manner? A few suggestions as to methods and ultimate goals conclude these reflections.

First, as the noted Holocaust historian Omer Bartov has suggested, studies of mass hatred and genocide must be conducted in both breadth and depth. That is, broad, macro-scale studies are required to provide the comparative, global reach that is necessary to understand the roots and commonalities of modern genocides as they relate to “some of the most crucial and pervasive aspects of modern society, political organizations, and ideologies.” But Bartov goes on to argue for the simultaneous pursuance of “precisely the opposite perspective . . . the need to focus on the local level so as to grasp the sociocultural dynamic that makes for outbreaks of violence within communities that have often existed in mutual interdependence for centuries.”19 Bartov argues that local studies are necessary to put a human face onto the abstract issues covered at the macro-level:

I feel that much of what we have been unable to grasp when looking at the “big picture” can be much better understood when seen at the local level where the personal interaction between people, their prejudices, needs, and urges, as well as their memories, traditions, and perceptions, would all have to be taken into account. The devil, I would say in this context, is in the local.20

Bartov’s call for a globally framed, locally rooted approach to the history of genocide resonates with a theme sounded above, namely the need to recapture the humanity, or the loss thereof, of perpetrators and victims alike. For it is the human response to the temptations and terrors of hatred that speak to us most profoundly, as fellow humans seeking to understand ourselves and the
strengths and flaws of our humanity. It is the quest to comprehend these responses that provides at least a partial answer to Jean Arméry’s rhetorical question posed at the outset of this paper. Awash in a sea of statistics and numbed by either overwhelming evidence of terror or the cold abstractions necessary to order critical analysis, historians do well to recall the admonition of the pioneering French social historian Marc Bloch, who regarded history as above all the reconstruction of the human condition: “It is men that history seeks to grasp. Failing that, it will be at best an exercise in erudition.”

Finally, I believe that for the historical study of hatred to be meaningful, we must seek to move beyond both the initial emotional shock of encountering a given event, and the simple assembly of facts. Ultimately, students of this terribly fascinating genre of history should be able to understand the causation and consequences of evil—its allure, its rationalizations, its corrupting effects, and its potential limitations—from multiple perspectives and apply these insights critically, intellectually, and morally to present-day situations both at home and abroad.

Understanding, scholars of hatred have repeatedly emphasized, does not mean condoning. Rather, it is the foundation for any hope for the amelioration, and possibly even the prevention, of hatred in its innumerable institutional, cultural, and political guises. This paper has shown a few of the ways in which historians might contribute to this quest. That there are many others is a certainty. Let the discussion begin.

NOTES

1. This article has its origins in a paper presented at the Conference to Establish the Field of Hate Studies, Gonzaga University (Spokane, WA), March 18-20, 2004. The author thanks his colleague in teaching the history of comparative genocide at Washington State University, Roger Chan, and the members of the Visible Knowledge Project working group at Washington State—Susan Kilgore, Michael Delehoyde, Lydia Gerber, and Carol Sheppard—for their suggestions and support in entering this challenging field.


4. Ibid., 111.


7. In the term “mass hatred” I encompass actions of inter-communal violence: extreme warfare that targets non-combatants and/or seeks to destroy the economic, social, cultural, and political foundations of an enemy group; ethnic violence or “cleansing” actions; and terrorism are but the leading examples.


18. A model study of a target group’s attempts to assert agency in the face of looming destruction is Marion Kaplan, *Between Dignity and Despair: Jewish Life in Nazi Germany* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). Out of the vast literature on the memories and legacies of genocide, one of the most eloquent sources is Peter Balakian’s coming-of-age account of his encounter with his family’s experience in the Armenian genocide, *Black Dog of Fate: A Memoir* (New York: Broadway Books, 1997).


20. Ibid., 87.