The Journal of Hate Studies is published annually by the Gonzaga University Institute for Action Against Hate. The purpose of the Journal is to promote the sharing of interdisciplinary ideas and research relating to the study of what hate is, where it comes from, and how to combat it. The Gonzaga Institute for Action Against Hate is operated under the auspices of Gonzaga University in Spokane, Washington. The views expressed in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Gonzaga Institute for Action Against Hate, Gonzaga University, the institutions with which the authors are affiliated, or the editors.

The Journal welcomes unsolicited manuscripts (including essays and shorter pieces) and suggestions for improving the Journal. Manuscripts and other communications should be sent to: Director, Gonzaga Institute for Action Against Hate, Gonzaga University, Spokane, WA 99258-0043.

The annual subscription rate is $25. To order, please send name, mailing address, and check to: Gonzaga Institute for Action Against Hate, Gonzaga University, AD Box 43, Spokane, WA 99258-0043.

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Preface

The Truth and the Lie went down to the river to take a swim. It was a beautiful sunny day and the water was especially inviting; so they both jumped in to play. While the Truth was underwater, the Lie slipped out of the river, stole the Truth’s clothes, put them on, and ran to the marketplace, where he paraded as the Truth. Everyone at the marketplace assumed the Lie was the Truth, because he was, of course, dressed as the Truth. When the Truth realized that the Lie was gone from the river, he got out of the water, only to discover that his clothes were gone. At first he did not know what to do and he was ashamed. So he went to the marketplace as the Naked Truth and no one would look at him. Everyone thought the Lie (dressed as the Truth) was indeed the Truth, and preferred to look at what they thought was the Truth, and not the real, and Naked, Truth.

(Reference Tawna Pettiford-Wates, The Congress on Race Relations, Gonzaga University, April 30, 2003)

And so it is, so often, very painful to look at the Truth, let alone the Naked Truth. There are many people who would rather not look at the issue of hate, and cannot understand why there is a need for an Institute for Action Against Hate. In the struggle to combat hate, it must be identified—and named for what it is—before it can be prevented.

Gonzaga University’s Institute for Action Against Hate was founded in 1998 with the purpose of fighting hate through education, research, and advocacy. Its genesis derived from concerns surrounding the apparent increase in the phenomenon of hate—especially racial and religious hate—as it manifested itself on campuses and in communities throughout the country. The prevalence of hate crimes, organized hate groups, and hateful Internet sites prompted the University community to reflect on ways that Gonzaga—a Jesuit institution—might provide a more enduring and substantive contribution to the understanding of how hate afflicts campus life, community life, society in general, and the world.

By providing resources and a framework for a new discipline known as “Hate Studies,” the Gonzaga Institute for Action Against Hate hopes to complement the important work of a variety of human rights organizations, conflict resolution groups, and educators in the United States and abroad.

The Institute for Action Against Hate will host the International Conference on Establishing Hate Studies at Gonzaga University in March of 2004, co-sponsored by the American Jewish Committee and the Simon Wiesenthal Center. The objective of the conference is to bring together individuals with recognized expertise from complementary academic fields and human rights organizations to establish the field of Hate Studies. This will be a founding
scholarly event and the first international conference of its kind. The conference will provide opportunities for meaningful academic scholarship via presentations, round-table discussions, and scholarly papers (which may ultimately be published in this journal). An additional tangible result will be a published "blueprint" for the creation of the field of Hate Studies, put together from a synthesis of what is learned at the conference. The blueprint will also serve as a "call to action" to encourage other academic institutions to join in the effort to create this new field.

Volume II of the Journal of Hate Studies focuses on hate as it presents itself in religion and religious institutions, and includes several articles, including one by a student, and three book reviews. A brief summary of the articles follows.

Linda M. Woolf and Michael R. Hulsizer set the tone for this edition's theme of religion and hate in their article, "Intra- and Inter-Religious Hate and Violence: A Psychosocial Model." Their work explores the roots of violence within and among religions within the broader framework of a model of mass violence.

Woolf and Hulsizer begin by looking at the issue of religious hate through what they call "the internalized perceptions of group membership - the distinction between 'us' and 'them.'" By constructing an interactive model of mass violence, they attempt to assess the "risk for ingroup fomentation of hatred and outgroup directed violence" - in other words, what is thought about others and what is done to others. They identify three patterns common to cultures that have a propensity for mass violence: "the use of aggression as a normative problem solving skill, a perceived threat orientation, and an ideology of supremacy." Thus, they say, basic Christian tenets such as loving one's neighbor are contradictory to Christianity's long history of violence toward other religions being seen as "positive, righteous action."

Woolf and Hulsizer do point the way to a solution, which includes teaching respect for differences, adopting and respecting nonviolent and effective conflict resolution skills, supporting clear separation of church and state, and forming organizations that will help point the young away from culturally held positions of hate. But, as they state, "There are no easy answers."

Dr. Kimberly Flint-Hamilton takes her own slant on the differences between perception and reality in her article, "Images of Slavery in the Early Church: Hatred Disguised as Love?" According to Flint-Hamilton, Christianity—despite being a revolutionary religious movement in which "all were welcomed"—tended to treat slaves differently. By studying both the words of the early church fathers and early catechetical documents that instruct the faithful even on matters regarding household management, which included manage-
ment and catechesis of slaves, Flint-Hamilton demonstrates that “the attitudes of the early authority figures . . . often are laced with apparent contempt.”

Eric Getty takes us to Northern Ireland and describes the centuries-old problems facing the peace process in his article, “Building Peace in Northern Ireland: Christian Reconcilers in an Economy of Hate.” According to Getty, reconciliation and healing of this long-standing conflict will occur only through a painful process that forces Catholic and Protestant to “untangle their ideologies and cultural commitments and recast them in a constructive light.”

Furthermore, he maintains, it will require that justice be done, a necessity that includes holding criminals and terrorists accountable for their transgressions, if communities are to be rebuilt and economic decay is to be turned around. According to Getty, the first step involves untangling “the elements that reinforce the sectarian culture.”

South African native Jennifer Nelson’s article studies “The Role the Dutch Reformed Church Played in the Rise and Fall of Apartheid.” Her contention is that her native country’s “abhorrent policies of racial discrimination,” or apartheid, were made even more powerful because of the strong religious base around which they were formed. Nelson traces the roots of apartheid, from the religious underpinnings of the “Great Trek” of those Dutch-speaking Afrikaners to the formation of the laws a century later that made official the racist separation that left so many black Africans disenfranchised. Nelson leaves us, though, with the view of a new South Africa, one that has hopes for a new religious, political, and maybe even social unity.

Valerie Jenness takes us in a different direction in her article, “Engendering Hate Crime Policy: Gender, the ‘Dilemma of Difference,’ and the Creation of Legal Subjects.” While the term “hate crime” is generally applied to criminal acts involving race, ethnicity, or religion, more recently the term has been applied to include women. In the case of a double murder in a national park, the U.S. Attorney is prepared to argue “that the defendant’s killing of the two women was part of an ongoing plan, scheme, or modus operandi to assault, intimidate, and injure and kill women because of their gender.” As Jenness argues, the case brings up a plethora of problems that are as historic as they are paradoxical.

Julian Aguon gives us a student voice in his powerful first-person testament, “The Conquering Lion.” Aguon asks us to look past rhetoric and to the tradition of those “sung and unsung heroic voices” of the past that give real meaning to the struggle for civil liberties. Those voices include the likes of Harriet Tubman, Martin Luther King Jr., and the members of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party who in 1964 were denied seats at the Democratic national convention. He urges us “to stay in the struggle” and “be willing to sit with the agony of not having absolute certitude.” Only by being willing to sit
with that “unresolved tension” will we be able to address “the burden of our most pressing moral obligations.”

Book review editor Steven Baum leads off the book-review section with two critiques. In his review of James Waller’s book *Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing*, Baum shows how Waller addresses the “daunting task of explaining hate by focusing on the conditions under which many of us could be transformed into killing machines.”

In his look at David I. Kertzer’s book, *The Popes Against the Jews: The Vatican’s Role in the Rise of Modern Anti-Semitism*, Baum explores Kertzer’s contention that “alleged Catholic Church indifference to the Jewish genocide is not an act of omission, but occurs by quiet collusion and the politics of hate.”

The final book review has Beth Greenbaum looking at Eric Weitz’s *A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation*, which poses a theory that a “maniacal search for the utopian society” led to four major genocides of the 20th century (in Germany under Hitler, the USSR under Stalin, Cambodia under Pol Pot, and Yugoslavia under Milosevic). In each genocide, says Weitz, it was a ruling elite’s dehumanization of a portion of the population through law and language that led, ultimately, to “state-sanctioned sadism.” Yet for Weitz, there is hope in “a new international order in which the world community seems more willing to intervene in cases of massive violations of human rights.” “Perhaps,” Greenbaum tells us, “we are also moving toward a global community, full of diversity and difference.”

Moving toward a global community full of diversity and difference requires a universal effort. The *Journal of Hate Studies* and The Institute for Action Against Hate are venues for confronting hate, and ultimately, preventing it through education, research, and advocacy in collaboration with professionals of like mind. This is no small task in a world of competing cultures and ideologies, dwindling resources, and widespread poverty. It is the responsibility of educators, professionals, and people of good will everywhere to collaborate in the effort to combat hate with unyielding determination; we must see hate for what it is. We can never stop questioning acts of hatred, which are often initially expressed as bias, discrimination, and stigmatization of marginalized peoples. Our work offers a challenge to critically discern the difference between the Truth and the Lie and bravely face the challenge of confronting the Naked Truth as we search for the Sacred in all of humanity.

We are pleased to offer the second issue of the *Journal of Hate Studies*. We hope you will find it to be a relevant and meaningful addition to your personal and professional libraries.

Jerri Shepard
Director
Institute for Action Against Hate
Intra- and Inter-Religious Hate and Violence: A Psychosocial Model

Linda M. Woolf and Michael R. Hulsizer
Webster University

Man is the religious animal. He is the only religious animal. He is the only animal that has the True Religion—several of them. He is the only animal that loves his neighbor as himself and cuts his throat, if his theology isn’t straight. He has made a graveyard of the globe in trying his honest best to smooth his brother’s path to happiness and heaven.

— Mark Twain

Hatred, discrimination, and violence in the name of religion are certainly not new phenomena, but rather date back through the historical record. The persecution of early Christians by the Romans and of Jews/Muslims during the Crusades are but two examples from history. Today, terrorist attacks in Israel, violence in Northern Ireland, ethnic conflict and genocide in the former Yugoslavia, and a host of other headlines remind us regularly that hatred and violence under the flag of religion still exist. However, for most individuals in the United States prior to September 11th, 2001, such violence was thought to occur primarily elsewhere on the distant horizon of international affairs. Freedom of religion and religious tolerance are viewed by most in the U.S. as fundamental tenets of our society. Furthermore, any religious hatred and intolerance that exist in the U.S. are thought to occur only on the domestic fringe and are thus not major threats to the vast majority of Americans. Consequently, the attacks of September 11, given the belief that the attacks were grounded in Islamic fundamentalism as part of a Holy War, have raised questions for many about the foundation of religious hatred and violence.

Unfortunately, most of the discussion of religious hatred in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks has focused on the specifics of Islam. Religious responses from various theological perspectives have occurred along a continuum of dialogue. At one end of the spectrum, many theologians have stressed the beauty and peace-abiding nature of the Islamic faith. At the other end, well-known Christian evangelists have offered harsher opinions. For example, Franklin Graham, son of the Reverend Billy Graham, stated that he believed Islam to be a “very evil and wicked religion,” and Jerry Falwell called Mohammed a “terrorist.” While both have subsequently qualified their remarks, such comments exemplify a reciprocal foundation of religious intolerance that argues against a purely theological root for religious hatred, terrorism, and violence.

While theological rationales for the fomentation of intra-religious hatred
vary, there is commonality in the psychosocial roots of such enmity across religious boundaries. In this article, we will explore the roots of intra-religious hate and inter-religious violence within the broader framework of a model of mass violence. Examples from Christian anti-Semitism, groups associated with religious hatred and intolerance (for example, Christian Identity and Christian Patriots), the current upsurge of anti-Muslim hatred, and Islamic fanaticism will be provided throughout the analysis to highlight aspects of the model.

On a strictly theological basis, it is difficult to define what would be considered intra- or inter-religious distinctions. Within religions there are denominations and factions that may or may not view themselves as part of a broader whole. For example, is the violence in Northern Ireland between the Protestants and the Catholics an instance of intra- or inter-religious violence? If one perceives these to be simply denominations within Christianity as a religion, then this conflict would be identified as an example of intra-religious violence. However, if one identifies Protestantism and Catholicism as distinct religions, then this conflict would represent an instance of inter-religious violence. Therefore, for the purposes of the current analysis, definitions will be based on internalized perceptions of group membership—the distinction between “us” and “them.” The group with which an individual identifies is referred to as that person’s ingroup. Conversely, the group the individual does not identify with is referred to as that person’s outgroup. Consequently, intra-religious hatred consists of the negative attitudes formed by ingroup members about outgroups; inter-religious violence will be defined as aggressive behavior between ingroups and outgroups.

I. A Psychosocial Model

Staub, Rummel, and others have written extensively about the underlying root conditions and causes of mass violence. These theoretical models can be combined to create an interactive model of mass violence that can be utilized to assess the risk for ingroup fomentation of hatred and outgroup-directed violence. Factors included in this model are group cultural history, social psychological factors, situational factors, and the path of violence, including the role of stigmatization, dehumanization, moral exclusion, impunity, and bystander interactions. Each factor will be discussed more fully below in relation to intra-religious hatred and inter-religious violence.

A. Group Cultural History

All of us exist in a variety of cultures with distinct histories. These cultures shape our identity and perception of what is considered normative. In relation to cultures that have a propensity for mass violence, we find three common patterns: the use of aggression as a normative problem-solving skill, a perceived threat orientation, and an ideology of supremacy. Each can exist on the
broad cultural level within nation-states as well as within more localized cultures associated with smaller groups or organizations.

Aggression and violence are so much a part of everyday life in the United States that they are often assumed to be the natural order of life. Cultures and groups within a culture vary in the degree to which they accept aggression as a primary problem-solving skill. Jehovah’s Witnesses, for example, are highly pacifistic, and while interned in Nazi concentration camps were often selected for work in the homes of S.S. guards because of their eschewal of violence. Conversely, the major genocides of the twentieth century were all committed by or within states with a history of aggressive conflict and war.

Religions not only exist within the broader historical context, but also have historical contexts of their own. Many religions have within their histories a pattern of glorification of violence. Art, mythology, and oral history include representations of this glorification as a holy battle between the forces of good and evil. Christianity, for example, as a theology teaches peace and love of one’s neighbor. However, historically, the practice of Christianity has a long and bloody history, with the use of violence perceived as positive, righteous action. The Crusades, the Massachusetts witch-hunts, and the support of Nazi anti-Semitism within Protestant and Catholic churches (both officially and unofficially) are just a few of the examples in which the Church sanctioned violence as an appropriate means to achieve the greater good. In the light of 21st-century hindsight, these episodes of horrible violence appear quite distasteful. However, the legacy of shame associated with these episodes is not always acknowledged or discussed, as they raise questions about the fallibility of one’s religious organization.

Recently, large-scale efforts have been made to apologize to Muslims and Jews for the atrocities of the Crusades. However, others within Christianity today still identify the time of the Crusades as a righteous war against Muslim aggression. Remnants of this identification of Christianity with a holy war struggle can be seen today in hymns such as “Onward Christian Soldiers” and the structure of groups such as the Salvation Army. Of course, Christianity is but one example of an identified religious group that has within its history a record of violent action.

Correlated with this history of aggression is a perceived threat orientation, or what Staub refers to as an “ideology of antagonism.” In the absence of good intelligence or the free exchange of diplomatic information, states with a perceived threat orientation may assume that the other nation presents a risk, and therefore prepare for or initiate military conflict. For many decades, the former Soviet Union and the United States held each other at bay through the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The aforementioned military build-up was in response to an initial perceived threat, which then became a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Religions may also operate from a perceived threat orientation. This can
occur both in the absence of information and in the face of distorted knowledge. Following the attacks of September 11th, there was a concerted effort in many educational institutions to increase students’ knowledge about Islam. The motivations behind such efforts reflect a belief that if we know more about a particular religion, we are less likely to demonize that religion. Unfortunately, such efforts have not always had a positive outcome. The University of North Carolina recently selected *Approaching the Qur’an: The Early Revelations* by Michael A. Sells for its freshman reading program. The selection was met with a lawsuit, a bill before the North Carolina legislature, editorial condemnation, and public outrage. Bill O’Reilly, the national radio and talk show host, compared it to requiring students to read *Mein Kampf*. Public outrage was grounded in fear, distorted information, and the perception that Islam represents a threat to the American way of life, and in fact to life itself. Similar reactions to students’ reading the Bible in college courses have not occurred in the aftermath of terrorist attacks in the United States linked to self-described Christian, white supremacist militia groups (for example the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma and the 1995 derailment of an Amtrak train in Arizona). Because these instances of domestic terrorism occurred within the context of the dominant religion within the United States, it was understood that these acts represented the deeds of groups on the fanatical fringe. Therefore, the threat came from individuals and was not perceived to be associated with Christianity.

Christian anti-Semitism is also built on a foundation of perceived threat. The severity of this threat is exemplified by the portrayal of Jews as the killers of Christ. The depiction of Jews in art, literature, and folklore as demons, parasites on society, and sexual predators reflects the objectification of this perceived threat. The blood libel accusing Jews of killing young children so as to drain their blood for the making of Passover *matzot* ( unleavened bread) is a theme that recurs throughout history. It is hypothesized that the underlying root of Christian anti-Semitism is the fact that Judaism has not been subsumed within the new covenant with the Creator. In other words, Judaism is a threat to the validity of Christianity as a religious belief system precisely because Judaism continues to exist in both theology and practice. Either the “chosen people” who had the original covenant with the Creator have elected to now align themselves with the side of evil, or there may be a flaw in Christian ideology. Obviously, there are more than these two possibilities, but for many, anti-Semitism, in all of its manifestations, may reflect a perceived threat to Christian identity.

Mass violence also correlates with a group’s blind acceptance of an ideology of supremacy. Members of such a group view themselves as innately and fundamentally superior to the objects of their aggression. For example, the Nazis viewed themselves and all people of “Aryan race” as fundamentally superior to the “sub-races” (that is, Jews and Gypsies). The Hutu leaders and elite declared Hutus superior to the Tutsis (who were referred to as *inyenzi* or cockroaches) during the 1994 Rwandan genocide.
Religious theology can also harbor an ideology of superiority. The fundamental belief behind religious proselytization is the idea that one person's religious belief is better, truer, more fulfilling than the currently held religious belief of someone else. The unbelievers need to be converted to achieve salvation or be considered worthy of favor. Around the world, hybridizations of Christianity exist, as indigenous populations sought to meld their existing belief systems with Christianity. Only through such a blending could people retain the beliefs of their ancestors and still be eligible for the extra benefits associated with conversion, such as education, food, and health care.

Clearly, all of the aforementioned group cultural history variables interact to facilitate intra-religious hatred and inter-religious violence. However, the mere presence of these factors within a religious organization does not guarantee that the group will in fact adopt a doctrine of hatred or inter-religious violence. Religions with the following characteristics are at particular risk for inter-religious violence: 1) a culture and history of violence, 2) a theology that identifies itself as the one, true religion, and 3) an orientation that keeps it operating as if it were threatened. These factors, coupled with the variables discussed below, place a nation or group at risk for such violence.

B. Social Psychological Factors

The identification of group cultural history factors allows for a better understanding as to why a particular religious group gravitates toward hate and violence. However, there are several underlying social psychological factors, not specific to any one group, that serve to facilitate the development of intra- and inter-religious hate and violence.

1. Social Cognition

The means by which individuals think about themselves can influence the likelihood of intra- and inter-religious hate and violence. According to researchers, we tend to divide up the world into "us" and "them," or ingroups and outgroups. In addition, the ingroup we identify with is often an important component in how we define ourselves and is referred to as our social identity. According to Turner and Tajfel, it is advantageous for us to belong to groups that are held in high esteem so that our social identity is seen in a positive light. Consequently, people try to sustain their positive self-identity by assuring themselves that their ingroup is highly valued and distinct from other groups—a phenomenon referred to as the ingroup bias. Devotion to one's ingroup can produce outgroup-directed prejudice, discrimination, and, potentially, violence. However, this behavior is by no means automatic. Negative consequences of the ingroup bias tend to occur when people couple an extremely positive view of themselves with a very negative view of out-
groups. Consequently, individuals who are more balanced in their impressions of their own ingroup and outgroups are less prone to the negative ramifications of the ingroup bias. Although the aforementioned cognitive perspectives are important contributors to the development of intra- and inter-religious hatred and violence, they also suggest that an increased understanding of outgroup religions may in fact decrease feelings of enmity toward “them.”

The means by which we perceive the world around us can also aid in the formation of intra- and inter-religious hatred and violence. Specifically, we tend to use shortcuts or heuristics when processing information about the world. That is, we tend to avoid thinking very deeply about issues unless they directly impact our lives. Furthermore, we tend to seek out information that confirms our beliefs rather than material that disconfirms our views of reality—a phenomenon referred to as the confirmation bias. In addition, our tendency to form illusory correlations between unrelated phenomena further exacerbates the situation by providing seemingly credible evidence to support our beliefs. Once our beliefs are formed, we are extremely reluctant to modify them. This phenomenon, referred to as belief perseverance, can account for the tenacity with which religious groups hold onto their beliefs—even if these beliefs are shown to be without factual basis.

For example, prior to the attacks of September 11th, most individuals in the United States had little information and few strong beliefs about Islam. Given that Islam impacted very few individuals in the U.S., little attention was paid to it in the media or daily discourse. Unfortunately, after the attacks there was a rise in anti-Muslim bias, based in part on the media-fostered illusory correlation between a belief in Islam and violent behavior. As a result, many cities noted a rise in hate crimes directed toward Muslims. Sadly, the notion of belief perseverance suggests that these attitudes and beliefs will be difficult to challenge and change over time. It also means that the probability of inter-religious violence continues to remain high.

Another shortcut that we use when processing information is the fundamental attribution error—the tendency for individuals to attribute behavior to internal, dispositional causes, ignoring situational explanations. Thus, individuals are more likely to believe that Bin Laden or Hitler is just “evil” than to look for factors in the personal, political, and socio-economic environments that may have shaped their decisions. The tendency for individuals to make the fundamental attribution error, coupled with their desire to believe in a just world, leads people to blame the victim for whatever unfortunate event has befallen them. For example, following WWII there were some who questioned whether the Jews were partly responsible for the Holocaust. However, it is important to note that the tendency to blame the victim may not hold true when large numbers of one’s own ingroup have been attacked (for example, the September 11th tragedy). Instead, the ingroup is likely to further demonize the perpetrators. In summary, the typical manner by which people process informa-
tion can potentially lead to the propagation of hate and can aid in the formation of inter-religious violence.

2. Social Influence

The nature of group dynamics within a religious organization can aid in the formation of intra- and inter-religious hatred and violence. For example, religious groups are often characterized by conformity. In fact, the pressure to conform can be overwhelming. Ritualistic behavior, a hallmark in many religions, helps to perpetuate conformity. In addition, there are often very severe penalties for not conforming, ranging from ostracism and verbal aggression to physical violence and the threat of damnation. Thus, group members may feel pressure to engage in hatred and violence, knowing only too well the ramifications of not conforming.

This pressure becomes even more salient upon the introduction of an authority figure. Milgram’s obedience studies demonstrated the powerful effect an authority figure can have on our behavior. In these studies, participants were given the opportunity to deliver increasingly higher levels of electric shock to a protesting victim (a confederate who never actually received the shocks). The majority of participants obeyed, continuing to deliver electric shocks (up to 450 mV) even when the victim stopped responding. When asking participants to deliver shocks, Milgram took advantage of the foot-in-the-door effect. Participants were initially asked to give relatively low levels of shock (15 mV) to the victim. However, as the experiment wore on, participants were asked to give increasingly higher levels of shock to the victim. Thus, by starting low, the participants ended up giving much higher levels of shock than they normally would have delivered. The presence of a strong authority figure, coupled with the foot-in-the-door procedure, is a proven technique that has been utilized by leaders to facilitate intra- and inter-religious hatred and violence.

It is important to keep in mind that the Milgram obedience studies were conducted at Yale University using a man in a white lab coat as the authority figure. The impact of an authority figure can be much more pronounced in a religious organization with a leader conveying the Word of God. We will spend more time discussing the specific characteristics of leaders later in the manuscript.

Religious groups, not unlike other groups, tend to foster a sense of anonymity among members. That is, a sense of deindividuation is fostered through membership in a group. Unfortunately, deindividuation can facilitate violence. By stripping individuals of their identities through increased anonymity, deindividuation causes people to become less self-aware, feel less responsible for their actions, and be more likely to engage in violence if placed in a provocative situation. Consequently, tendencies towards intra- and inter-religious
hatred and violence are enhanced within religious groups that foster a sense of deindividuation.

Common sense suggests that two heads are better than one. However, when it comes to tight-knit groups, that adage is not necessarily correct. Group polarization can occur within groups composed of individuals with similar attitudes. Several research studies have demonstrated that group discussion tends to enhance the initial leanings of the group. For example, liberal groups become even more liberal in their decisions following group deliberations. Unfortunately, the same can be said of prejudiced individuals, who adopt much more negative views regarding outgroup members following group discussions. Very cohesive groups also cultivate a sense of groupthink. According to Janis, the mode of thinking in which people engage while in a very cohesive group tends to suppress realistic appraisals of the situation. Instead, in the spirit of maintaining group harmony, groups tend to agree with the leader and ignore possible alternative viewpoints. Thus, the potential exists within a very cohesive religious group for a leader to advocate a policy of hate without being met by significant resistance from group members. In fact, group polarization may occur, resulting in even more extreme viewpoints.

3. Social Relations

Paradoxical as it may seem, religion, prejudice, and violence are intimately tied. One of the most effective ways to maintain social inequities is to cite Scripture. The dominant group in most religions is men. Therefore, it is not surprising that women are typically in a subordinate position within the hierarchy of religious organizations. The same fate awaits ethnic minorities. Furthermore, previously discussed social cognition factors, such as the ingroup bias and social identity theory, dictate that other religious groups are held as inferior—promoting the formation of intra-religious hatred. For example, research has found that church members are more prejudiced than nonmembers. However, it is important to note that although mere church membership is related to prejudice, there does not appear to be a relationship between prejudice and individuals who have a true understanding of scripture.

As has been noted, there is a long history of inter-religious violence. Indeed, the history of humanity is replete with examples. Inter-religious violence can be understood by applying realistic conflict theory, relative deprivation, and scapegoating. Realistic conflict theory suggests that competition between groups for scarce resources results in prejudice. Although realistic conflict theory has primarily been applied to situations in which groups compete for land, employment, and other factors that impact the economy, it would also be appropriate to extend this conceptualization of resources to include cultural and spiritual needs. For example, this broad conceptualization of resources can be applied to the conflict between Israel and Palestine, in which land, economic resources, and holy sites figure prominently.
One of the means by which we assess our status in society is comparing ourselves to others. Interestingly, researchers have found that economically disadvantaged individuals are often satisfied with receiving few societal resources, whereas advantaged individuals tend to be dissatisfied with high levels of social resources. This phenomenon, labeled relative deprivation, suggests that it is the most advantaged group members who will engage in collective action because they are more apt to compare themselves with those groups that are better off. Indeed, individuals who are economically advantaged relative to others within the religious community, typically the leaders or religious elite, initiate much of the collective action.

Given that relative deprivation tends to lead to frustration, collective action by religious leaders or elite may involve displaced aggression or scapegoating. For example, Hovland and Sears reported that the number of southern African-Americans lynched in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries varied as a function of the price of cotton. When cotton prices were good, lynchings were down, whereas the opposite pattern held true when cotton prices were low. The researchers cited displaced aggression as the main culprit in this analysis. Groups that have a limited ability to defend themselves, such as women, children, and ethnic and religious minorities, tend to be the targets of aggression. For example, Jews in Nazi Germany were targeted based on their minority status and the existence of stereotypes consistent with the notion that they had a hand in Germany's economic downturn after WWI.

Most researchers agree that inter-religious violence is largely a learned phenomenon. That is, group members learn that violence is an acceptable means to assert the dominance of their religious group over those competing for the same hearts, minds, and purse-strings of the surrounding population. Furthermore, violence is often rewarded through increased publicity. This increased publicity can serve to draw attention to the religious group, attract potential converts, and serve as a catalyst for independent acts of violence in the name of that particular religion (that is, by lone wolves). This phenomenon was acutely observed when Buford Furrow repeatedly fired an automatic weapon into a Jewish day care center and killed a Filipino letter carrier in Los Angeles to bring attention to the Nazi-affiliated church called Christian Identity.

C. Situational Factors

While religious groups may carry the seeds for hate and violence within, other factors are needed to stimulate aggressive actions and the growth of enmity. Thus, one must look to the current situation in which a group and its members find the stimulus behind such growth. Various factors can be included in this discussion, but the two primary issues are destabilizing crises and authoritarian leaders.

If we compare the major genocides of the twentieth century, a pattern of
crisis appears in each case. Economic crisis, political crisis, and the effects of recent war were present in each of the following countries: the Ottoman Empire (the genocide of the Armenians), the Weimar Republic (the Holocaust), Democratic Kampuchea (the Cambodian genocide), the former Yugoslavia (the massacres in Bosnia), and Rwanda (the genocide of the Tutsis). Other factors that may destabilize a region include concerns over sovereignty of land and resources, third party dominance and interference (for example, colonization), disparate allocation of and access to power and resources, scarcity of resources, environmental crises, and threat of conflict or war. All of these factors increase the likelihood of intra- and inter-religious animosity and violence. Note that three of the genocides listed above included broad elements of religious division. Interestingly, in Rwanda, Hutus and Tutsis had a shared religion and language, and lived in relative harmony until the advent of colonization and the inequitable distribution of favor, based in part on the religious beliefs of the colonizers.

Crisis can be very destabilizing for individuals and results in threats to the individual such as loss of group pride, an escalation of fear, frustration of needs and wants, confusion regarding personal identity, and an increase in prejudice. The classic research of Miller and Bugelski demonstrated that adolescents in a summer camp, deprived of an evening at the movies, displayed a sharp increase in prejudice directed toward groups with whom they had no contact. In a crisis, groups can pull together and engage in remarkable constructive action. Unfortunately, groups can also respond by engaging in destructive actions. Religious groups are no different. Following the attacks of September 11th, many religious communities pulled together to assist not only their own congregations, but also their Muslim and Arab neighbors. Unfortunately, other religious groups responded by promoting hate and violence. Within the Christian Identity movement, articles such as “Ishmael, Edom and Israel and the Attack upon America” by Ted R. Weiland blame the September 11th attacks on U.S. involvement and support of the State of Israel. The rationale as to why support of Israel is problematic revolves around the notion that Jews are not the true Israel, but rather usurpers of the land and identity. According to the Christian Identity movement, the Celto-Saxon peoples are the true Israel. From a totally different perspective, there are many in the Arab world who believe that Israel and the Mossad are responsible for the September 11th attacks as part of a broader Jewish conspiracy. Such reports and similar anti-Semitic themes have increased dramatically in the Arab press in recent years.

It should be noted that personal crises can draw an individual to religious groups, cults, hate groups, and so on. These organizations can provide a sense of belonging and identity to someone in time of need. In the film Hate Groups USA, an interviewee states that he joined a white supremacist group while in prison simply because on his birthday, he received a card from every member of the group.

While crisis and the presence of destabilizing factors play a major role in
the initiation of group hatred and violence, a second major situational factor needs to be included: group leaders. According to Rummel, it is not coinciden-
tal that only non-democratic nations in the twentieth century committed geno-
cide or initiated a war.\textsuperscript{42} One key characteristic of genocidal states is the
presence of a totalitarian ruler, or, as Staub calls it, a monolithic culture.\textsuperscript{43} Such
cultures often have a strong history of obedience to the state and authoritarian
rulers. Each of the major genocides listed above occurred in a crisis period
following a failed attempt at democracy with a resulting rise to power of a
totalitarian form of government.

Religious organizations are also deeply impacted by the leaders of those
organizations. Leaders who demand unconditional belief and support are in a
position to manipulate not only the information received by their followers, but
also whether the group functions to promote religious tolerance and construc-
tive action or hatred and destructive violence. A quick scan of various Internet
websites for religiously based hate groups demonstrates that they focus on the
latter. These websites contain vile images of the outgroup (for example, Chris-
tian Identity websites include negative graphic portrayals of Jews and Blacks),
vigilance-based graphics (including swords and fire), and fear-producing,
inflammatory articles. Leaders can control the messages available to the group
via the Internet and accepted readings. Those in positions of power are in a
unique position to manipulate a host of social psychological factors that may
then play a role in the development of intra-religious hatred and inter-religious
violence.

Researchers have long been interested in the characteristics of individuals
that make them effective leaders. Unfortunately, there is no one characteristic
that seems to stand out. In fact, only modest correlations have been found in
this domain. Some of the variables researchers have found to be moderately
related to leadership success include (in no particular order) charisma, a desire
for power and dominance, self-confidence, self-direction, morality (and on the
flip side, immorality), and intelligence.\textsuperscript{44} However, Simonon collected infor-
mation on the personal attributes of all the U.S. presidents and found that only
three characteristics predicted effectiveness in office (as rated by historians)—
height, family size, and the number of books published prior to taking office.\textsuperscript{45}
In short, personality characteristics appear to be poor predictors of leadership.\textsuperscript{46}
Rather, it is more likely that successful religious leaders are simply the right
people in the right situation at the right time.

D. The Path of Violence

While all the factors discussed above may be present in a situation, the
question as to why some groups function peacefully with their neighbors while
others serve as a breeding ground for increasing levels of violence remains. As
noted above, leaders have systematically utilized the foot-in-the-door procedure
to facilitate various forms of violence, including inter-religious violence. This is key, as individuals and populations are reticent to commit extreme acts of violence without extensive provocation, but may engage in more innocuous acts of aggression with little difficulty. Therefore, leaders must promote increasing levels of violence over time, while simultaneously maintaining the ingroup’s positive sense of self. To accomplish this task, leaders often systematically remove the rights once enjoyed by the target group, thus making it very difficult for the target group to resist the increasing levels of violence. In addition, a series of parallel processes is often enacted to ensure that ingroup members are less willing to protest the treatment afforded to the target group. An understanding of the stages and processes necessary for increasing levels of violence can provide insight concerning the best point of intervention. The stages in the path to violence and the accompanying parallel processes can be visualized as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stages</th>
<th>Parallel Processes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loss of opportunity and privilege</td>
<td>Stigmatization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Loss of civil rights</td>
<td>Dehumanization</td>
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<td>Loss of human rights</td>
<td>Moral exclusion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Loss of existence</td>
<td>Impunity</td>
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1. Basic Stages on the Path of Violence

It is normative for ingroups to maintain stereotypes and negative attitudes toward an outgroup. Leaders within a group may promote or discourage such processes, depending on their own agenda and the interest of the group. Unfortunately, some groups may proceed down a path of greater violence that begins with loss of privilege and opportunity. Members of the outgroup may be denied access to certain services, excluded from organizations (for example, being denied membership in a country club based on race, gender, or religion), or limited in their ability to move past a glass ceiling in relation to educational opportunities or jobs. Unfortunately, these early actions are often easy and compelling rationales, for the “necessity” for them may be provided by leaders or existing stereotypes. If this first step toward violence is accepted by an ingroup or population, it is easier to move on to the next step, which is loss of basic civil rights. In this case, members of the outgroup may be denied citizenship or the right to vote, find that certain laws apply differently to themselves relative to the ingroup, and not be permitted to own land or a business. Again, if little protest is raised in regard to the loss of civil rights, it becomes easier to deny an outgroup basic human rights. Individuals in the outgroup may be
denied education and access to adequate food and shelter, and relegated to subsistence living. Finally, members of the outgroup may find their very existence threatened. It is the first steps in this path to mass violence that hold the greatest opportunity for intervention. This is why many have raised their voices expressing concern about the civil rights of individuals of Arab descent taken into government custody following September 11th.

During the Nazi era, Hitler did not begin his campaign against the Jews in Germany with genocide, but rather began with the organization of a small, one-day strike against Jewish businesses, and progressed to the passage of a law removing Jews from certain civil service positions. He closely watched the outcome of these actions, and since most Germans did not respond publicly in a negative fashion, he had his foot in the door. Later, the Nuremberg Laws were passed, which resulted in the loss of a large number of basic civil rights for Jews, including citizenship and the right to live where they chose. Jews were conscripted into forced labor and placed in ghettos. Basic human rights were subsequently denied, as necessities such as adequate food, health care, and sanitation services were absent in the ghettos, and finally the process of mass deportation to concentration camps and death camps began. Hitler of course did not invent this path to violence; rather, it is one seen often in history, from the destruction of the America’s indigenous populations to the genocide of the Armenians within the Ottoman Empire.

2. Parallel Processes on the Path of Violence

While the path to violence is demarcated by the aforementioned stages, parallel processes operate to smooth both individual and community movement along the pathway. These processes serve to decrease the likelihood of ingroup members’ protests regarding the treatment afforded to the targeted group. In fact over time, these parallel processes may actually increase the ingroup’s commitment to the path of violence.

a. Stigmatization

One of the first steps along the path of violence is the process of stigmatization. Beginning with an increase in stereotypes and derogatory images of the outgroup, the process continues with the targeted group becoming further identified with negative attributes. This process of stigmatization may proceed through the use of identifying insignia or other means of classificatory processes. For example, during the Holocaust, Jews were forced to wear a yellow Star of David on their clothing or an armband, the letter J was stamped on their passports, and all had their first names changed to Israel or Sarah. Such measures increase the ease with which the targeted outgroup can move through the stages of violence.
b. Dehumanization

To facilitate movement along the path of escalating violence, leaders promote increasing levels of dehumanization. This process of dehumanization begins with increased promotion of stereotypes and negative images of the outgroup. This is often a necessary tool to reduce the cognitive dissonance that may occur when individuals behave negatively toward other human beings. Propaganda is a vital tool used by the ingroup elite to stigmatize and dehumanize the outgroup, as well as to present the outgroup as an imminent threat to the well-being or existence of the ingroup. Within religious groups, the outgroup may be presented as being in partnership with the devil or as a seductive evil seeking to steal one’s children. The history of anti-Semitism is replete with images of Jews portrayed as demons, predatory animals, and vermin. Hitler encouraged the public display of existing anti-Semitic imagery and tales, appointed a Minister of Propaganda, and commissioned the creation of films designed to further dehumanize the Jews. The Eternal Jew portrayed Jews as parasites on society with odd religious practices who spread like rats across the globe, disseminating plague in their path. This film combined the dehumanization theme with a call for the removal of this “cancer from the body of Germany.” Similar sorts of imagery and themes appear on many Internet websites associated with the Christian Identity movement and other online religious-based hate groups. Unwittingly, when individuals write of genocide as the extermination of an entire people, they retain the vermin metaphor used by the perpetrator.

c. Moral Exclusion

The process of dehumanization and the path of violence could not be taken without the underlying process of moral exclusion. Over time, ingroups begin to view the outgroup as excluded from the ingroup’s normal moral boundaries. In other words, certain moral principles that may be applied to one’s own group do not pertain to those outside of the group. For example, it is unfortunate but acceptable to kill an enemy during war when the soldier is identified as a member of the threatening outgroup. Inter-religious violence can also be excused or qualified when the targets of that violence are deemed to be outside the boundary of the Creator’s sanction and blessing. Thus, violence against the “heathens” or “infidels” may be described as a necessary evil or even a great calling, and the killing of doctors who perform abortions may be labeled righteous action.

d. Impunity

Whether a group or nation moves down the path of violence is decided in part by whether the aggression will be met with acceptance or punishment. An
atmosphere of impunity increases the probability of violence. In the late 1800s, the Ottoman Empire began a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Armenian population. World outrage and the threat of sanctions, particularly by Great Britain, halted the destruction. However, with the advent of WWI, the risk of sanctions became irrelevant and the Armenian genocide occurred unabated. So too, inter-religious violence can increase if left unchecked by forces outside of and within the religion. The Spanish Inquisition was able to happen precisely because it had the full support of Church and political leadership. This is why it is currently so important for leaders from various religious perspectives and governmental officials to speak out and act against anti-Muslim hate and violence in the United States.

E. Role of Bystanders

The final factor that influences the path of violence is the role of bystanders. There is substantial research that examines why bystanders often fail to take action in times of crisis. Rationales include diffusion of responsibility and pluralistic ignorance. In times of crisis, individuals in crowds are less likely to intervene, as personal responsibility to help becomes diluted. Additionally, we tend to look to others for assistance in understanding a situation and may decide that if others appear unconcerned, then there is little reason for intervention. These and other reasons may deter bystanders from acting or providing aid.

Bystanders have the ability to quell violence through action or by virtue of their presence. Unfortunately, they also have the ability to provide tacit approval for hatred, discrimination, and violence, through inaction. Would the Holocaust have occurred if the world community had responded to earlier aggressive behavior with direct involvement as opposed to appeasement? This question is difficult to answer, but most certainly fewer Jews would have died if some action had been taken. Simply opening the doors of immigration would have saved untold number of lives. After the Holocaust, the phrase “Never Again” resounded on the lips of Jews and Christians alike. Sadly, the words “Never Again” ring hollow in the face of subsequent mass violence and genocide. Lack of will, economic and political self-interest, national sovereignty, and prejudice have all stood in the way of action in the face of violence.

Unfortunately, many instances of large-scale inter-religious violence in various regions of the globe have been left unchecked or with little peacekeeping intervention. In part, these conflicts are a mixture of inter-religious dispute and other factors such as political concerns, access to resources, and land disputes. Thus, the conflicts in the Middle East, Sri Lanka, and Northern Ireland are in part religious, but extend beyond simply a religious explanation. Interestingly, the rationale often provided for lack of action among other nations and parties around the world is the fallacy that no action is possible, since these
groups have been fighting since the beginning of time. This is an interesting twist on the notion of diffusion of responsibility, because not only is responsibility diffused across nations, but it is also diffused across time.

Inter-religious aggression can take many forms. Furthermore, movement along the path of violence depends on the cultural status of the religious organization. Dominant religions within a culture can move further along the path of violence, as large ingroup biases may be at work. In other words, their actions may occur within a context of impunity, and little challenge may come from bystanders. Historically, state-sponsored forms of inter-religious violence have been exceptionally destructive. The targets of such violence have been religious groups traditionally discriminated against but experiencing the greatest level of current assimilation. Subordinate or marginalized religious groups are more likely to commit acts of terrorism, as impunity and bystander inaction cannot be assumed.

II. Toward Peace and Tolerance

At a conference following a talk on the psychosocial roots of genocide, one of the authors was approached by a person who stated, “I now know what you have to do to prevent mass violence: You have to change human nature.” While it may appear that mass violence, whether committed in the name of colonialism, fascism, imperialism, or religion, is an inevitable result of the human “survival of the fittest,” there are several steps that can be taken to reduce intra-religious hatred and inter-religious violence.

On the most fundamental level, pluralistic and democratic states are at lower risk for mass violence. One reason is that these cultures tend to be more individualistic and thus more willing to stand up to authority figures, as opposed to more collectivistic societies. Consequently, bystanders and ingroup members from individualistic societies are more likely to speak out against actions that they view as wrong, and in turn are less likely to be swept up in the tide of groupthink. Concomitantly, a media free from governmental restraints is essential. Such freedom of speech and press maintains pluralistic dialogue and discourse.

A clear separation of church and state is imperative. The power of the state and a dominant religion are significant forces in a culture. In the United States, these forces have provided a balance. The state has worked to keep the role of religion within society in check, and religious people push for what they consider to be moral decisions by the government. When these two forces become combined, however, there can be great risk. As noted above, state-sponsored forms of inter-religious violence through the centuries have left in their wake untold millions of individuals oppressed or dead. While Congress’s singing of “God Bless America” on the steps of the Capitol Building brought hope to many Americans on September 11, 2001, this action also sent a message that
these attacks could be considered as part of a Holy War between a Judeo-
Christian and an Islamic God.

Education regarding diversity is imperative. Continued efforts need to be
made both within religious communities and in the larger society to teach
respect for and understanding of difference. Numerous organizations already
participate in or coordinate such efforts. For example, diversity materials can
be acquired on-line through http://www.tolerance.org, a web project of the
Southern Poverty Law Center. This website is particularly useful, as it has
information and materials for children, teens, parents, and teachers. The Anti-
Defamation League’s A World of Difference program has been used around the
United States to teach an appreciation of diversity and tolerance. More pro-
grams such as these need to be taught within our schools, religious institu-
tions, and communities.

While there is a correlation between religion and prejudice, it is important
to note that this relationship exists only if religion is measured at a very superfi-
cial level (for example, by church attendance). In fact, Allport and Ross
demonstrated that individuals for whom religion is an important component of
the self evidenced less prejudice than those individuals who attend church for
more secular reasons (such as socializing). Other researchers have reported
similar findings across a variety of situations. Therefore, it follows that one
potential means to reduce intra-religious hate and inter-religious violence is to
increase knowledge about one’s own religion and that of people across the
world. As Gordon Allport concluded, “The role of religion is paradoxical. It
makes prejudice and it unmakes prejudice.”

Additionally, inter-religious cooperation and involvement is essential.
Research demonstrates that familiarity with outgroups assists in reducing nega-
tive outgroup biases. However, familiarity alone is not enough to reduce
prejudice and violence in instances in which inter-religious violence has
already occurred. Groups that work together on projects that require the coop-
eration and commitment of each group are most likely to experience prejudice
reduction. While significant efforts have been made over the years to repair
Christian and Jewish relations, similar activities need to be undertaken to repair
relations with Muslims.

While teaching tolerance and respect for diversity is important, it is
equally important to educate our children and ourselves in nonviolent, effective
conflict resolution skills. When one of the authors asked a group of well-edu-
cated, upper-middle-class junior high school students in a religious class what
you should do if someone calls you a derogatory name, the consensus was that
you should hit the name-caller. Clearly, we have taught the lessons of violence
well. However, our children need to be taught the differences between winning
or the attainment of power, and effective conflict resolution. These are not
synonymous terms. They need to learn the fundamentals of congruent problem
solving as opposed to avoidance, submission, compromise, or aggression in
situations of conflict. Many organizations provide information, training, and assistance with conflict resolution and peacebuilding.\textsuperscript{56}

Finally, is there a means to eliminate or reduce the number of religious-based hate groups? Unfortunately, there are no easy answers. These groups are founded on hate and intolerance. Leaders within these groups are unlikely to change, given that this action would necessitate forfeiting their leadership and all the benefits that accompany that position. As such, they are also unlikely to tolerate change within their followers. For example, in the Middle East, with each step Israelis and Palestinians take toward peace, the level of violence escalates. This may be due in part to fundamentalist religious beliefs. However, it is also likely the case that the leaders of associated terrorist organizations are resisting peace because it will necessitate that they relinquish power and perhaps face punishment. In addition, hate organizations target youth for recruitment. To challenge the growth of religious-based hate groups, we need to examine the needs that are met by these organizations. Whether it is a need to belong, to be valued, or to find oneself, it can be met in a constructive environment. Resources need to be allocated to organizations aimed at steering at-risk children, adolescents, and young adults away from hate.

For it isn’t enough to talk about peace. One must believe in it. And it isn’t enough to believe in it. One must work at it.

\textbullet\ Mediterranean Roosevelt

\textbf{NOTES}

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35. Originally the Germans, who ruled indirectly through the existing feudal structure, colonized Rwanda. Following WWI, Belgium was granted control over Rwanda. Belgian colonizers gave social, political, and economic favor to the Tutsis because, as a tall, pastoral people, they were thought to be descendants of the lost tribe of Ham. The agriculturist Hutu majority rebelled against such favor, and a seven-year period of civil unrest followed. Eventually, as part of the process of Rwandan independence, favor switched to the Hutu majority. The region including Rwanda and Burundi has witnessed escalating levels of violence since that time.
42. Rummel, *Death by Government*.


50. One of the primary rationales for an International Criminal Court is to end what has been termed the “age of impunity.” For more on this topic see Kenneth Roth, John R. Bolton, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Ruth Wedgwood, *Toward an International Criminal Court? Council Policy Initiative* (New York: Council on Foreign Relation, July 1999).


56. A listing of organizations related to peace, nonviolence, and conflict resolution can be found at http://www.webster.edu/~woolfm/peacelinks.html.
Images of Slavery in the Early Church:  
Hatred Disguised as Love? 

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Keith Bradley points out that, in many ways, Christianity was a revolutionary religious development. Its members acquired spiritual fulfillment as well as salvation and eternal life. And all were welcomed. Bradley describes in some detail the social reform that the Church prompted. In fact, he states that the Church at Rome supported more than 1500 widows and beggars by the middle of the third century, successfully blending belief and social action. But those in positions of authority never fully accepted that slaves were equals, either socially or religiously, and therefore worthy of love, and for some reason, Christianity brought about little or no change for slaves. And, in place of the love that Christianity advocated, oftentimes the writings of the early fathers of the Church contain words of disdain or even hatred.

According to Bradley, Christianity did not make life better for slaves. Instead, it made life worse. In his words:

To pious slaves the teachings on obedience and submission automatically foreclosed all possibility of agitating for freedom, of seeking material improvements, of resisting servitude. Freedom of spirit and hopes of eternal life, they were repeatedly told, were all that mattered. . . . Christianity brought change, therefore, but from the servile perspective it was change not for the better but for the worse (151).

It is difficult to determine to what extent Christianity actually impacted slavery and the lives of slaves. Since we have so little documentary evidence reflecting the voices and experiences of the slaves themselves, we cannot truly know how the slaves felt about and reacted to this new dimension in their lives. We do, however, have the words of the early fathers of the church. While they rarely commented directly on slaves or the institution of slavery, there are occasional references that help to shed some light on their attitudes regarding the slaves in their congregations and slavery in general. We also have early catechetical documents that instruct the faithful on matters regarding household management, including management and catechesis of slaves. It is in these documents that we find the attitudes of the early authority figures, which often are laced with apparent contempt.

This paper seeks the answers to four basic questions. First, to what extent did the early fathers concern themselves with the slaves in their congregations, and what were the views of the early fathers, particularly Ignatius and Tertullian, regarding slaves’ place in the early Church? Second, how were slaves represented in early catechetical documents, particularly The Didache, The
Shepherd of Hermas, and The Apostolic Constitutions? Third, what evidence do early church councils provide us regarding slaves and their treatment within their households and their congregations? Finally, at what point did the fathers of the church begin advocating for slaves as equal members of their congregations?

When slavery is mentioned in early church documents, including letters and homilies of the church fathers themselves, early catechetical documents, or the records of councils, it generally is framed as one of the following sentiments:

1) An emphasis on the fact that slaves should accept their station in life and fulfill their roles;
2) An acceptance of the social stereotype of slaves as deceitful, lustful, and conniving;
3) Rarely, an argument made against slavery as an institution.

It is in the context of these three sentiments that the answers to the above questions can be found.

I. Slaves Should Accept Their Station

The first sentiment is demonstrated in the Epistles of Paul, early catechetical documents such as The Didache, records of local church councils or synods, and the writings of Augustine and Gregory the Great.

A. The Epistles of Paul

In the epistles of Paul, both slaves and free are invoked as members of the Church. In no fewer than four places he calls slaves together in Christ, and exhorts them to be obedient to their masters. He also warns masters not to treat their slaves too harshly. He asks Philemon to take back his runaway slave Onesimus and criticizes the Corinthians for humiliating those poorer members of the congregation who come to worship while hungry.

Although the authorship of the admonitions to slaves and owners in Paul has been called into question, and it has been shown that they are in fact later intrusions and not the real words of Paul, the nature of the rhetoric is still relevant to this discussion. In Paul, slavery is used as a metaphor for our relationship with God; it is better, for example, to be slaves to righteousness and goodness than to be slaves to earthly pleasures. This metaphorical image recurs throughout the writings of the early fathers. An important distinction, however, between the references in Paul and those in other early documents is the fact that in Paul’s work slaves are addressed directly. In most cases, the early documents contain the metaphorical image alone, without any direct invocation to slaves.
Early catechetical documents, particularly *The Didache*, *The Shepherd of Hermas*, and *The Apostolic Constitutions*, can give us many insights on the manner in which early Christians are instructed to manage their households, including household slaves. In *The Didache*, slavery seems to be accepted as an appropriate station in life. *The Shepherd of Hermas* and *The Apostolic Constitutions*, however, challenge this view, as will be shown later.

The wording of *The Didache*, a composite Christian document for catechetical instruction composed sometime in the second century, supports the sentiment that slaves should accept their stations. In section 4, verses 10-11, *The Didache* appears to echo Paul’s sentiments on the manner in which slaves and masters should behave.

You shall not give a command in bitterness to your slave or your maid, those who hope in the same God [as you], lest they stop revering the God who is over both [you and them]. For he comes not to call [people] according to their personal status but [he comes] upon those whom the Spirit has prepared. As for you [pl.] who are slaves, with respect and reverence you shall be subject to your masters as replicas of God.³

It is the last phrase, verse 11, that is most relevant to this discussion. The Greek of this segment reads: “ὑμεῖς δὲ οἱ δοῦλοι ὑποταγήσασθε τοῖς Κυρίοις ὑμῶν ως τῷ θεῷ ἐν αἰσχύνῃ Καὶ φόβῳ.” This sentiment clearly originates with Paul (Ephesians 6:5-6): οἱ δοῦλοι, ὑποκούετε τοῖς Κατὰ σάρκα Κυρίοις μετὰ φόβου ἔν ἀπλότητι τῆς Καρδίας ὑμῶν ως τῷ Χριστῷ . . .” (Slaves, be obedient to those who are your masters according to the flesh, with fear and trembling in singleness of your heart, as to Christ.)

The statement in *The Didache*, however, casts Paul’s message in a slightly different light. The key distinction rests on the manner in which slaves are instructed to carry out their duties to the master. Paul instructs slaves to be as obedient to their masters as they would be to Christ. *The Didache*, however, instructs slaves to think of their masters as the *tupos* of God. Niederwimmer comments that verse 11 of *The Didache* was written in the context of classical household tradition. “[I]n the earthly *kurios* the slave encounters the type of the heavenly *Kurios*, namely, God.”⁶

In early Greek literature, *tupos* means a striking or beating, like the beat of a horse’s hoof. It may refer as much to the sound of the hoofbeat, however, as to what is left afterward, for example, the hoofprints of the galloping horse.⁷ Eventually the word came to mean a stamp or impression. A *tupos* is produced when pressing a signet ring into wax or clay.⁸ By the second century AD, roughly contemporary with *The Didache*, the word had come to mean statue or replica,⁹ something very physical and very tangible. A statue is made in the
physical image, the *tupos*, of the person who commissioned it. Furthermore, a child is referred to as the *tupos* of the parent.\textsuperscript{10}

The meaning of *tupos* has important implications for our understanding of *The Didache*’s instructions. It seems to mean more than a simple representation. Rather, it conveys the sense of a physical replica, calling to mind a statue of the Roman emperor, or of Zeus. When a Roman citizen gazed upon it, what emotional reaction might have been elicited? Consider, for that matter, the reaction of a modern Christian in the presence of a crucifix. Is the master meant to elicit the same response when in the presence of his slaves? According to *The Didache*, slaves are to consider the master *tupos* of God. When they are in the presence of the master, they are to consider themselves in the physical presence of God. When they look at the master, they are to think of God.

\textbf{C. Church Councils}

Records of local church councils, or synods, occasionally carry references to slaves. In such cases, we might be able to glean something of the attitudes of the church aristocracy toward slaves. In the early fourth century a synod was convened at Elvira in southeastern Spain. Three canons regarding slaves resulted from this council:

Canon 5: If in anger a woman should strike her slave, so that the latter should die at the end of three days, the guilty woman shall undergo a seven years penance if she struck so violently on purpose, and a five years penance if she did not do so on purpose to kill. She shall not be received into communion until after this delay. If she should fall ill during the time of her penance, she may receive the communion.\textsuperscript{11}

Canon 41: It is forbidden for masters to allow their slaves to have idols in the master’s house. If however the master truly fears the servants because of their number, he must keep them at a distance and watch against every approach to idolatry (154).

Canon 80: It is forbidden that freedmen whose patrons are heathens to be ordained (171).

These three canons tell us a great deal about the church of Spain. First, it seems that the church aristocracy regarded slaves in much the same way as did their Greek and Roman predecessors. In Greek and Roman law, similar legislation existed regarding the relative value of slaves and free. In the Law Code of Gortyn (early fifth century BC), for example, it is written that, if a woman divorced from her husband is convicted of exposing her child before presenting it as required, she must pay a fine of 50 staters if the child is free, but only 25 staters if the exposed child is a slave.\textsuperscript{12} The Twelve Tables, the fifth-century BC Roman law code, calls for a penalty of flogging for a free man caught in the act of stealing, but for a slave, flogging is to be followed by execution. In both
cases, a distinction is drawn between the value of a free person and the value of a slave.\textsuperscript{13} This attitude infected the Church and persisted through the centuries. Canon 5 demonstrates this, particularly when juxtaposed with Canon 54, the penalty for adultery. Bloch cites an example from the ninth century, when Regino of Prum asked the bishops to pay attention to the conduct of slave owners. Those who had killed slaves without a trial were to be excommunicated for a period of two years. Mistreatment less severe than death, however, apparently did not occupy the minds of the aristocracy, whether lay or ecclesiastical.\textsuperscript{14}

Canon 41 implies that it was not contrary to church law, at least in Spain, for Christians to own non-Christian slaves, as long as idols were not brought into the house. This canon calls to mind verse 10 of The Didache: “You shall not give a command in bitterness to your slave or your maid, those who hope in the same God [as you].” In fourth-century Spain, slave owners possessed Christian as well as non-Christian slaves who owned idols. If this was true for the Christian slave owners of the second century, it suggests that the authors of The Didache were concerned more with the treatment of Christian slaves than of non-Christians. Perhaps the milder treatment of the Christians was thought to encourage conversion to Christianity of heathen slaves.

Canon 80 makes it clear that even all former slaves were not completely free within the church. Freedmen owed special obligations to their former masters who acted as their patrons following manumission. If their patrons were heathens they could not take orders. So even the free members of the Church were not completely equal. The status of first-generation freedmen depended rather heavily on the religious status of their patrons.

According to Bloch, the question of the eligibility of slaves for ordination seemed not to occupy the minds of the fathers before the fourth century. When at last the matter came under discussion, the Church remained singularly opposed to the ordination of slaves, the rationale being that a man who was under the control of another represented a conflict of interest for the Church. Apparently, however, the ordination of slaves continued to take place from time to time. Bloch writes:

Concern for the dignity, if not a horror of some original blemish attached to servitude, was so much the true motivation for the prohibition that we can see it equally applied in the Merovingian kingdom to coloni, who were juridically free men (13).

D. Augustine

Early in the fifth century, shortly after Chrysostom and Gregory of Nyssa (discussed below), a new voice rose in the Western Church. Written shortly after the sack of Rome by the Visigoths in 410, Augustine’s City of God was
circulated. In this book Augustine reasons that slavery is the result of sin, and God’s just punishment of humankind.

For justly was the burden of servitude laid upon the back of transgression. And therefore in all scriptures we never read the word servant, until such time as that just man Noah laid it as a curse upon his offending son. So that it was guilt, and not nature, that gave origin unto that name.¹⁵

Augustine concludes that how one falls into slavery is of no consequence, even if as a result of an unjust war in which the blameless side lost. God must have had good reasons for enslaving the conquered:

For in the most just war, the sin upon one side causes it; and if the victory fall to the wicked (as sometimes it may) it is God’s decree to humble the conquered, either reforming their sins herein, or punishing them (xix.iv).

There would be no slavery without sin, so all slaves must be sinners. God is just, and his punishments are just:

Sin therefore is the mother of servitude, and first cause of man’s subjection to man; which notwithstanding comes not to pass but by the direction of the Highest, in whom there is no injustice, and who alone knows best how to proportionate His punishment unto Man’s offences. He Himself says: “Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin” (John 8:34) (xix.iv).

In fact, slavery is a kindness. In his benevolence, God has given slaves the easiest route into the kingdom of heaven.

And it is a happier servitude to serve man than lust, for lust (to omit all other passions) practices extreme tyranny upon the hearts of those that serve it, be it lust after sovereignty or fleshly lust. But in the peaceful order of states, wherein one man is under another, as humility does benefit the servant, so does pride endamage the superior (xix.iv).

The lowly position of the slave does as much good as the proud position of the master does harm: “Until they be installed in (heaven), the masters are to endure more labour in their government than the servants in their service” (xix.iv). Therefore slaves need to accept their position in life, for a number of reasons. First, it is the new order of fallen humanity. The slave also has much to gain in the way of Christian character by his station in life. And, finally, Christian slaves should be content with their slavery and not worry about manumission. By doing so they blaspheme the name of God (xix.iv).

If any be disobedient, and offend this just peace, he is forthwith to be
corrected with strokes or some other convenient punishment, whereby he may be readjusted into the peaceful stock from whence his disobedience has torn him (xix.xvi).

Rupprecht argues that this is probably the most offensive observation Augustine could have made.\(^1^6\)

Augustine’s attitude toward slavery was not entirely consistent. In spite of his rationale that God enslaves only those who deserve it, Augustine spent much of his personal fortune freeing those who had been unjustly enslaved—kidnapped and enslaved by pirates. He spoke against the rampant piracy along the coast of North Africa in Epistulae 10, describing the enslavement of whole villages.\(^1^7\)

Augustine’s logic concerning the legitimacy of slavery had a tremendous impact on later church policy. This becomes apparent in the canons laid down at local councils, as well as in the writings of Augustine’s successors. At the Council of Jena in Gaul near Lyon (AD 517), for example, it was decreed that slaves who had been bestowed on monks by their abbot were not to be emancipated, on the grounds that it would be sinful and inappropriate for slaves to enjoy the idleness of freedom while the monks were engaged in daily work cultivating the land (canon 8. Mansi 8, 560).\(^1^8\) Augustine also clearly had an influence on the policies of Pope Gregory the Great.

E. Pope Gregory the Great

Pope Gregory the Great of the late sixth and early seventh centuries, in his document on pastoral care, lays out the manner in which church leaders should teach and admonish their subjects. Gregory treats his subjects as diametric opposites: rich/poor, wise/dull, joyful/sad, as well as subjects/superiors. Certainly in some cases this treatment makes sense. But in other instances, we can see very clearly the influence of Augustine, especially in the following passage, in which Gregory explains that subjects are not to criticize the ways of their masters, even when the masters are obviously wrong, because God has placed masters above and subjects below:

\[
\text{Indeed, the deeds of superiors are not to be smitten with the sword of the mouth, even when they are rightly thought to be deserving of reproof. And if sometimes the tongue in criticism of them slips in the least degree, the heart must be overwhelmed with penitential grief. It should reflect upon itself, and when it has offended the power set over it, it should dread the judgment passed against it by Him who appointed superiors. For when we offend those set over us, we oppose the ordinance of Him who set them above us.}^1^9
\]

Like Augustine, Gregory warns that slaves who oppose their position in
life offend God, and masters are to understand that their station in life is a gift from God.

Slaves are to be admonished not to despise their masters, lest they offend God by their proud opposition to His ordinance. Masters are also to be admonished that they offend God by priding themselves on His gift to them (102).

Gregory provides tangible evidence that the early church fathers had the same feelings toward slaves as did the Romans before them. Perhaps they felt their own superiority even more vividly than did the Romans, since their station in life was a gift from God, just as the status of slaves was a punishment from God. Before Gregory made the point clear, we might have assumed that, since slaves were thought to be inferior and worthy of punishment, they must have been treated accordingly. But Gregory was the first who actually spelled this out. Their treatment seems not to have been any better in this period. Pierre Dockes reported that, in a local council of AD 675, it was mandated that clergy stop mutilating their slaves, suggesting, of course, that mutilation of slaves had become problematic enough among the clergy that it had become an agenda item.

The first sentiment, the acceptance of slavery as a proper station in life, appears on the surface to be an innocent and harmless one. In fact it paves the road to the second, more odious sentiment. By accepting that masters are the image of God, by accepting, even encouraging the violent beating of slaves so long as they do not die immediately afterwards, and by acknowledging that slaves must accept their lot because it is a just punishment for sin while being a master is a reward from God, it becomes easy to accept that slaves are less worthy of humane, fraternal treatment than non-slaves. It becomes even easier to embrace the image of slaves as lazy and ignorant, deserving of ill treatment.

II. Social Stereotype of Slaves as Lazy and Deceitful

The second sentiment, acceptance of the stereotypical image of the slave as deceitful, lazy, and conniving, while implicit in the work of Augustine and Gregory, is best demonstrated in the writings of Ignatius and Tertullian.

A. Ignatius, Bishop of Antioch

In his letter to Polycarp, Ignatius, third bishop of Antioch, instructs masters in the proper treatment of slaves. There are some clear similarities between Ignatius’ instructions and those from Paul. But there are also some notable differences.
Paragraph 4

Let widows not be neglected, for after the Lord, you (Polycarp) are their guardian. Let nothing take place without your approval; nor do you do anything without God, which indeed you do not; stand firm. Let meetings be held more often; seek out all individually; do not despise slaves, male or female, but neither let them be puffed up; rather let them serve all the more to the glory of God, that they may attain a greater freedom from God; let them not desire to be set free out of the common fund, that they may not be found slaves of lust (δοῦλοι ἐπιθυμίας).

Paragraph 5

Avoid evil arts (κακοτεχνία); better yet, preach sermons against them.21

Like the invocation in Paul, Ignatius advises against ill treatment of slaves. Ignatius, however, cautions masters against allowing their slaves to become “puffed up.” According to Ignatius, widows require the attention of the faithful, and it is the obligation of the church to ensure that they are not neglected. But it is inappropriate to use the common fund for corporate manumission of slaves. Indeed, Harrill suggests that Ignatius is advocating for the support of widows out of the church’s corporate fund, while advocating against using the same funds for manumission.22 To do so is to run the risk of making them slaves of their desire (160).

The phrase doulai epithumias, “slaves of desire,” has been variously interpreted. Schoedel translates the phrase as “slaves of lust.” He suggests that this is a reference to sexual license, commenting that freedmen often found themselves in such dire financial difficulties that they frequently resorted to prostitution (271). Glancy supports this view also:

The sexual availability of slaves to their masters (and those to whom their masters chose to provide access) was a peculiar aspect of the lives of enslaved females and young males that may have affected their participation in the Christian body. Even if we assume that Christian masters did not pressure their slaves sexually, pagan masters would not have shared such scruples about bodies they owned.23

The fact that slaves were sexual property created a stereotype of slaves and freed-people as sexually loose. As Finley points out: “The ethical position was summed up by the elder Seneca, with reference to the passive partner in buggery: ‘Unchastity (impudicitia) is a crime in the freeborn, a necessity for the slave, and a duty (officium) for the freedman.’”24 Schoedel, therefore, suggests that Ignatius here is advocating against manumission of slaves in principle.

Harrill, on the other hand, interprets the meaning of doulai epithumias as an en-slaving desire for what they do not have (e.g., access to the church’s
money)"(167). He suggests that Ignatius may be discouraging corporate manumission, advocating instead that they continue to serve in the role of slaves so that they might attain a spiritual freedom. In this context, then, the "slaves of desire" refers not to sexual activity of slaves, but instead to those who may be insincere in their new faith, more concerned with freedom than with Christianity.

Others, however, disagree with this interpretation. Manumitted slaves were required to show public displays of respect toward their former masters. Harrill tells us that

for the eastern Mediterranean and other regions influenced by Hellenistic norms, ex-slaves were regularly bound to their former masters by paramone contracts. Paramone obligated the ex-slave to "hang around" (παραχείνει) the former master for a specified period, frequently "as a slave," before the manumission contract became valid (162).

Indeed, the practice of salutio—the lining-up of freedmen/women outside their patron's house at dawn to beg in ceremonial fashion for food and handouts—could easily be perceived as creating a line of "slaves of desire," which Ignatius may be trying to discourage (163).

Similarly, the first phrase in paragraph 5 has also been interpreted in various ways. Lake translates the phrase as: "Flee from evil arts, but rather preach against them."25 His interpretation of the word kakotechnia as "evil art" is consistent with its connotation as magic or trick, especially as concerned with the so-called trickery of the heretics. But, while not inconsistent with first-century usage of the word, there are alternative connotations. Strabo, for example, uses kakotechnia to describe behaviors, techniques, or tricks used to acquire vices and sensual pleasures.

There may be another explanation as well. During the Classical period, kakotechnia was used to refer specifically to falsehood. For example, in the middle of the fourth century BC, Demosthenes used kakotechnia to refer to perjury or false testimony.26 In Plato's Laws, kakotechnia was used to refer to conspiracy.27 In his discussion of the phrase "slaves of greed," Harrill proposes that the rhetoric of Ignatius was influenced as much by Greco-Roman culture as by early Christian tradition (166). This may be the case with respect to kakotechnia. Ignatius may have been warning Polycarp that slaves would invent lies and falsehoods in order to manipulate the use of the common fund for their manumission. If this is the case, perhaps we should translate the first phrase of paragraph 5 as: "Avoid [their] lies; rather, speak against them." Is Ignatius here demonstrating a greater concern for the slaves who match the Roman stereotype of the scheming and untrustworthy than for those who might genuinely want to be freed from a particularly unpleasant, perhaps severe bondage? While, on the one hand, he advocates for widows, he does not, on the other hand, warn against the scheming of widows who might have other rela-
tives of means, and who might not need to use the common fund. His disdain for and distrust of slaves becomes very clear.

B. **Tertullian (c. 160-c. 240)**

The jurist and ecclesiastical writer Tertullian produced a great many epistles and doctrinal documents that discuss proper Christian behavior. He often uses the imagery of slavery to elucidate a point. In his *Treatise on Penance*, for example, he uses the image of the lazy, thieving slave to make his point about penance and absolution.

[I]t will, I suppose, be clear that we are amended when we are absolved. By no means; (but our amendment should be manifested) while, pardon being in abeyance, there is still a prospect of penalty; while the penitent does not yet merit—so far as merit we can—his liberation; while God is threatening, not while He is forgiving. For what slave, after his position has been changed by reception of freedom, charges himself with his (past) thefts and desertions? What soldier, after his discharge, makes satisfaction for his (former) brands?[^28]

In his *Treatise on Marriage and Remarriage*, he reminds his wife of the traditional Roman custom of forbidding one’s slaves to marry slaves from other households. Christian women should marry Christian men for reasons similar to those of slave owners who insist that slaves marry within the same household: Slaves slip into debauchery and become neglectful of their duties too easily to allow such latitude.

Is not true that, even among the heathen, masters who are strictest and most careful to preserve right order forbid their slaves to marry into other households? This is because they do not want them to break bounds in their debauchery, to neglect the performance of their duties and give over their master’s property to strangers. Is it not also decreed that persons (women) may be claimed as slaves who continue to cohabit with the slaves of another, after he has formally forbidden them to do so? And are we to regard earthly laws as more severe than those of Heaven? Are pagan women who marry strangers to lose their liberty, while Christian women who unite themselves to the slaves of the devil suffer no change in the status they enjoy?[^29]

In section 7 of *ad Nationes*, Tertullian writes that domestic slaves, by peeping through cracks and holes in doors and lurking about, spread damaging gossip about their Christian masters to the authorities. Tertullian questions the trustworthiness of the slaves, and the wisdom of the authorities who put faith in such reports.
Well, then, it is more in keeping with the character of strangers both to be ignorant (of the true state of a case) and to invent (a false account). Our domestic servants listened, and peeped through crevices and holes, and stealthily got information of our ways. What, then, shall we say when our servants betray them to you? What is the value of such evidence?\textsuperscript{30}

It seems that Tertullian mentions slaves only when he has something bad to say about their character. The images he presents to the readers suggest that, rather than the children of God whose souls are a matter of concern for the community, he considers slaves the kind of people whose behavior set a bad example. His contempt for slaves is very clearly revealed.

Aside from Ignatius and Tertullian, the church fathers seem not to have been occupied with thoughts about slavery and the condition of slaves. Slaves are rarely mentioned in the early documents. While it remained convenient to use slavery as a metaphor, the real-life slaves were virtually ignored.

Those proponents of the second sentiment, then, characterize slaves as burdensome and deserving of their fate and victimization. It excuses, albeit indirectly, any mistreatment of slaves by their masters, for, according to the first sentiment, slavery is a just institution and slaves should accept their station in life.

III. CHALLENGING THE STATUS QUO AND ADVOCATING FOR FREEING SLAVES

The third sentiment, which challenges the justice of slavery as an institution and encourages Christians to free their slaves, stands in antithesis to the first two and helps pave the road, albeit slowly, for the liberation theology movement. It is clearly demonstrated in two early catechetical documents (The Shepherd of Hermas and The Apostolic Constitutions), and the writings of Gregory of Nyssa and John Chrysostom.

A. Early Catechetical Documents: The Shepherd of Hermas and The Apostolic Constitutions

The Shepherd of Hermas, an early Christian document composed in the late first/early second century and known to early Christian writers, including Tertullian, who cites it three times, instructs the faithful to use the common fund for liberating prisoners and freeing slaves.\textsuperscript{31} The Shepherd of Hermas gives quite a different impression of slaves and the Christian community’s responsibility toward them than encountered thus far.

In Parable I, the shepherd enjoins Hermas, “So instead of lands buy suffering souls, as each one can, and take charge of widows and orphans and do not neglect them” (157). In Parable 10, he explains the responsibility the Christian has to those in distress.
But I say that everyone ought to be rescued from adversity. The one who is in need and suffers adversity in daily life is in great torment and deprivation. Whoever rescues such a person from deprivation acquires great joy for oneself. The one who is troubled by this kind of adversity suffers the same torment as one who is tortured in chains. For many bring death on themselves because of these kinds of calamities when they are not able to bear them. So the one who knows the calamity of such a person and does not come to the rescue commits a great sin and incurs blood guilt (259).

*The Shepherd of Hermas* makes it the responsibility of all Christians to care for those in severe distress. According to Osiek, the theme of this parable is stated in verse 9: “That is why the Master has made you wealthy, in order to carry out these ministries for him” (157, 160). Wealth is not to be used selfishly. The afflicted souls of Parable I, and the distressed souls of Parable 10, therefore, are to be bought or ransomed by the good Christian. Failure to do so renders Christians guilty of grave sin.32

*The Shepherd’s* instructions represent a divergence from those of Ignatius. The Shepherd does not caution the reader regarding slaves of desire. It seems that by the late first/early second century, there were at least two trains of thought on the issue of the downtrodden of society and our responsibilities toward them as Christians. The distrust and perhaps even hatred of slaves does not permeate the writings of *The Shepherd*.

Toward the end of the fourth century, another catechetical document appeared. *The Apostolic Constitutions* is a composite document that, like *The Shepherd of Hermas*, instructs the faithful on Christian behavior. Also like *The Shepherd*, this document encourages Christian congregations to offer communal aid to the needy.

Therefore, maintain and clothe those who are in want from the righteous labor of the faithful. And such sums of money as are collected from (the faithful), appoint to be laid out in the redemption of the saints, the deliverance of slaves, and of captives, and of prisoners and of those that have been condemned by tyrants to single combat and death in the name of Christ. Do not go to any of those public meetings, unless to purchase a slave and save a soul or to buy things as needed.33

Christians are being advised to go to the slave markets and purchase slaves with monies, presumably from a common fund. Harrill comments that the souls of the slaves purchased by the Christian would be saved because they would be converted to Christianity (180). Like *The Shepherd of Hermas*, the *Apostolic Constitutions* represents a clear divergence from Ignatius’ cautions regarding corporate manumission. Again, here is an example of slaves’ being regarded as worthy of the help of the more fortunate, and hatred and disdain are absent from *The Apostolic Constitutions*. 
B. Fourth Century Church Fathers

It was in the fourth century that slavery finally became fodder for the minds of Christian intellectuals. Three leaders of the early Church, Gregory of Nyssa, John Chrysostom, and Augustine, raised questions regarding slavery as an institution. But all did not reach the same conclusions. While we have already seen how Augustine regarded slaves and the institution of slavery, the views of Gregory of Nyssa and John Chrysostom act as a breath of fresh air in the stagnant atmosphere of disdain for slaves.

The first anti-slavery text of the patristic age was written by Gregory of Nyssa in AD 385. Gregory points out the hypocrisy of owning a fellow human being who has the same body and soul as the slave owner:

“I have owned slaves, both men and women.”

You condemned a person to slavery whose nature is free and independent, and you make laws opposed to God and contrary to His natural law. For you have subjected one who was made precisely to be lord of the earth, and whom the Creator intended to be a ruler, to the yoke of slavery, in resistance to and rejection of His divine precept. Have you forgotten what limits were given to your authority? Your rulership has been limited to the extent, namely, that you may only have ownership over brute animals . . .

How is it that you disregard the animals which have been subjected to you as slaves under your hand, and that you should act against a free nature, bringing down one who is of the same nature as yourself, to the level of four-footed beasts or inferior creatures? For the only proper slaves of mankind are the animals devoid of intelligence. “Grass must grow for cattle; those faithful servants of man must have their fresh feed” (Psalm 103:14). But you have abused the nature of service and ownership, and have made service into slavery and have obtained ownership over the owner.

“I have owned slaves, both men and women.”

Tell me, what price did you pay to acquire them? What is the equivalent in goods for the cost of human nature? How much, in terms of money, is the value of intelligence? What price did you pay, in obols, for the image of God? For how many staters did you buy a human nature made by God? . . . . For One who has known human nature said that not even the whole world is a sufficient price for a just payment for the soul of a man. . . .

Is there any difference in any respect between slave and master? . . . . Do they not both preserve their nature by eating the same food? Is there not the same structure of internal organs? Do not both become the same dust after death? Do they not have the same judgment? Do they not go to the same heaven or the same hell? You who are equal in all respects, why should you be superior such that while you are only a man you think you can be the owner of a man?”34
While Gregory very eloquently pointed out the hypocrisy of slavery, his concerns were largely ignored. One wonders to what extent his views were influenced by the work of Greek antecedents of the Classical period. In several of his tragedies, for example, Euripides explores the concept of slavery and freedom. He shows in many instances that slave and free are the same, differing only in social construct but not in virtue. Consider for example Ion, in which he puts the following words into the mouth of a loyal slave:

If there is aught that causes slaves to blush,
    It is the name; in all else than the free
The slave is nothing worse, if he be virtuous.\textsuperscript{35}

In this same period as Gregory of Nyssa, John Chrysostom emerged. His homilies are filled with references to slaves. Like Ignatius and Tertullian, many of Chrysostom's comments reflect a negative stereotype. In Homily 16 on I Timothy, for example, he states that masters do more good for slaves than slaves do for masters:

Masters contribute greater benefits to their servants than servants to their masters. For the former furnish the money to purchase for them sufficient food and clothing, and bestow much care upon them in other respects, so that the masters pay them the larger service . . . they suffer much toil and trouble for your repose, ought they not in return to receive much honor from you, their servants?\textsuperscript{36}

Like Tertullian, Chrysostom’s image of slaves is that of quarrelsome individuals, which he uses to illustrate his point in Homily 51 on John 7:37-44. He comments on the meaning of the phrase “Vengeance is mine: I will repay, says the Lord” (Romans 12:19):

Now, if we have slaves and if, when they quarrel with one another, they do not submit their differences to us for judgment and punishment, but take care of them themselves, even if they submit to us a thousand times over, we are not requited but even are offended. “Runaways and knaves,” we say, “you ought to have submitted everything to my judgment. But since you have anticipated and taken revenge, do not bother me in the future.”\textsuperscript{37}

In his nineteenth homily, he interprets Paul in I Corinthians 7:21-24 to mean that slaves should not try to obtain their freedom. Chrysostom suggests that there are some advantages to remaining in bondage.

Astonishing! Where has he put slavery? As circumcision profits not, and uncircumcision does no harm, so neither doeth slavery, nor yet liberty. And that he might point out this with surpassing clarity, he says “But
even if thou canst become free, use it rather;” that is, rather continue as a slave. Now upon what possible ground does he tell the person who might be set free to remain a slave? He means to point out that slavery is no harm but rather an advantage.\textsuperscript{38}

But in other homilies, Chrysostom presents an alternate view of slavery. He encourages Christian masters to free their slaves. He makes his point elaborately in Homily 40 on I Corinthians:

For, why hast thou many servants? Since as in our apparel we ought to follow our need only, and in our table, so also in our servants. What need is there then?

None at all. For, in fact, one master need only employ one servant; or rather two or three masters one servant. But if this be grievous, consider them that have none and enjoy more prompt attendance. For God hath made men sufficient to minister unto themselves, or rather unto their neighbor also. And if thou believe it not, hear Paul saying “These hands ministered unto my necessities, and thou them that were with me” (Acts xx.34). . . . For to that end did God grant us both hands and feet, that we might not stand in need of servants. Since not at all for need’s sake was the class of slaves introduced, else even along with Adam had a slave been formed; \textit{but it is the penalty of sin and punishment of disobedience}. But when Christ came, He put an end to this. . . . So that it is not necessary to have a slave: or if it be at all necessary, let it be about one only, or at the most two. What mean the swarms of servants? For as the sellers of sheep and the slave-dealers, so do our rich men take their round, in the baths and in the forum. However, I will not be too exact. We will allow you to keep a second servant. But if thou collect many, thou dost it not for humanity’s sake, but in self indulgence. Since if it be in care for them, I bid thee occupy none of them in ministering to thyself, but when thou hast purchased them and hast taught them trades whereby to support themselves, let them go free. But when thou scourgest, when thou puttest them in chains, it is no more a work of humanity.

I know that I give disgust to my hearers, but what must I do? For this I am set, and I shall not cease to say these things, whether anything come of them or not (248, emphasis mine).

This is a remarkable document. Chrysostom links slavery to our fall from grace and considers slavery to be the result of sin. But he also sees the coming of Jesus as \textit{absolving} that sin. He exhorts his congregation to avoid having slaves, or at least more than one or two. And the good Christian will teach slaves a trade and then set them free. Most importantly, slaves should not be used for their owners’ selfish purposes. The implication here is that slaves are to be bought precisely to teach them a trade and eventually grant their liberty. And John instructs his congregation not to beat their slaves or put them in chains.
John admits that he is probably annoying his congregation, and that nothing might happen. And nothing did, at least not in the big picture, for a long time. But now, in nearly the same generation, we have two documents by church fathers condemning slavery. Both documents come from the Eastern Church. Perhaps, at this point, the Church was moving closer to realization of the oppression that slavery represented.

IV. CONCLUSION

It seems that images of slavery and slaves in the early Church were often conflicting and confusing. The images presented to the early Christians through the eyes of Tertullian call to mind negative social stereotypes, while Ignatius warns masters not to allow slaves to become "puffed up" and advises against corporate manumission. Both speak not to slaves but to slaveholders. And the words of both are laced with contempt for slaves. The early canons reinforce this negative image, and support the idea that slaves are subordinate to masters in terms of their value.

Early catechetical documents, however, reflect negative images of slaves as individuals as well as criticism of slavery as an institution and the responsibilities of Christians toward slaves and their liberation. The Didache reflects the stereotypical image of Tertullian and reaffirms the master's role as head of household and τυπος of God. But The Shepherd of Hermas and The Apostolic Constitutions, while still purporting to address the slaveholding population, instruct the masters that it is their duty to free slaves. John Chrysostom and Gregory of Nyssa attack social convention and advocate for manumission of Christian slaves. But Augustine reinforces social convention, teaching that slavery comes from God and is a just punishment for sin. This level of contempt for slaves, as well as for former slaves who had been freed and their descendants, permeated not only the early Church, but extends even to modern society. And it is no small wonder that the clergy and laity of the later Church reflected this confusion and contempt in their attitudes regarding enslavement of Africans.

NOTES

1. Special thanks to the following individuals and institutions for helping to make this work possible: Dr. Hugh Page, for reviewing an early draft of this manuscript and for his unfailing encouragement; the Black Catholic Theological Symposium for allowing me to present this as a work in progress at an annual meeting and for the insightful comments and suggestions that were offered during the discussion that followed; Mr. Robert Bartlett, for his moral support; Stetson University’s Department of Sociology & Anthropology and the University of Notre Dame for their support; and especially to the Journal of Hate Studies reviewers whose excellent suggestions helped me to fine-tune this manuscript. While I made
every attempt to ensure accuracy, any errors that might remain are solely my own responsibility and not the fault of the JHS editors or the reviewers.


5. I Corinthians 12:20-22. In James 2:1-4 we see a similar theme.


11. Carolus Josephus Hefele, *Apostolic Fathers* (Tubingae: Early Christian Collection, 1872), 140. Note that, in this same synod, parents of a betrothed man or woman who fail to keep their promises are excommunicated for three years [canon 54]. First-time adulterers are excommunicated for five years.


17. Bradley, 37.


26. 47.1; 49.56.

27. *Laws*, 936d.


32. Harrill, 179.
33. Harrill, 179.
34. Maxwell, 33.
Building Peace in Northern Ireland:  
Christian Reconcilers in an Economy of Hate

Eric Getty

The Ardoyne neighborhood is not a place a tourist would want to visit. Its streets today are the front lines of what some would classify as a religious holy war, and are the regular backdrop for violent scenes of masked demonstrators, burning cars, and heavily armed soldiers and riot police. Guard towers, walls topped with barbed wire, armored cars, and helicopters are part of daily life in this area, but this neighborhood is not in the Middle East. Rather, it lies far to the north in Belfast, Northern Ireland, part of industrialized Western Europe. Here, row upon row of run-down brick tenements intertwine in a rusted-out, crumbling, crime-ridden tumor in the north end of the city. The people who live here are largely poor, unemployed, inadequately educated, and suffer from widespread drug and alcohol addictions. All of these ingredients create a dangerously volatile mix, but what makes the Ardoyne a particularly tense place is that its streets have been divided and subdivided between Catholic and Protestant zones, and the slightest provocation can become the spark that sets off an explosive chain-reaction of communal violence.

What may seem even more surprising to the outsider is that this is a description of the Ardoyne almost four years after the Good Friday Peace Agreement was signed in 1998. It is almost as if news of the agreement had never reached this place, and while British security operations have been scaled back over the last few years, violence in the form of recreational rioting, punishment beatings, shootings, and “kneecapping” still occurs regularly. On one level we have witnessed comparative success in the realm of political negotiations and government institutions—before the 1990s few thought they would ever see Sinn Fein sit down at the same table with the Democratic Unionists. At the street level, however, it is apparent that the peace process has had little impact.

In January 2002, when the initial research for this article took place, it appeared that the peace process was in danger of unraveling in spite of the basic optimism of diplomats and political leaders. Christian leaders who had dedicated themselves to peace building voiced concern that the politicians had not truly committed themselves to a comprehensive plan of reconciliation. They had only to point to the results of government policies: Statistics published in the Belfast Telegraph (Front page, 4 January 2002) show that 66% of people “now live in an area where the resident population is either 90% Protestant or 90% Catholic.” This is an increase from 63% ten years ago. Sixty-eight percent of people between the ages of 18 and 25 have never had a meaningful conversation with a person of the opposite community, while 62% say that they have been victims of physical or verbal sectarian abuse since the IRA declared
cease-fire in 1994. Only 5% of Catholics and 8% of Protestants work in an area dominated by the other group.

It was apparent even at the beginning of 2002 that radical changes had to be made—while the political institutions had been integrated, nothing had been done to fundamentally alter the fabric of the economy or the society. Most importantly, politicians proved again and again unwilling to engage in the process of communal healing that was absolutely essential to creating a normal society. Atrocities had been committed, and family members had been murdered by their neighbors, leaving no person in Northern Ireland untouched, yet the mood of politics was to just try to forget these things had ever happened. It is no wonder that people were left feeling wounded, ignored, and resentful: Their wounds were still raw and painful, and every new day without healing just reopened them. As in the Biblical parable, the house built on the sand came crashing down in October 2002, though perhaps the event was mercifully more of a whimper than a bang.

Now that the peace process is on ice, policy makers have an unprecedented opportunity to reexamine their priorities and start afresh, this time with a renewed understanding of their history, culture, and values. History is important in Northern Ireland, as are economics and religion, and all three of these elements have become interwoven to create a society based on sectarian hatred. If reconciliation and healing are to occur, people will have to undergo painful heart surgery to untangle their ideologies and cultural commitments and recast them in a constructive light. Justice will also have to be done. This means that those responsible for crime and terrorism must be held accountable, and this also means communities that have fallen victim to economic decay need to be rebuilt. There is a huge amount of work that needs to be done, but the first step is to untangle the elements that reinforce the sectarian culture.

Christians are in a unique position to carry out this work because such a large part of Northern Irish ethnic and cultural identity is derived from the Protestant and Catholic confessional histories. The only way to constructively reexamine sectarian ideologies is to critique them from within their own traditions, showing how a truer expression of Christianity pushes boundaries and seeks peace. In this regard, both Protestants and Catholics have tremendous theological resources at their disposal should leaders be willing to challenge their own cultural assumptions and make use of these resources to speak to their cultures. In the same way, radical Christians in Northern Ireland have demonstrated that faith can have real power in breaking down barriers and transforming broken communities through practical service. The path to true reconciliation in Northern Ireland will be dependent on Christians choosing to become part of the solution rather than maintaining the status quo.

In order to proceed properly with the work of reconciliation, peacemakers need to work from a balanced understanding of the sectarian system and how it came into being. Northern Ireland did not come into existence until 1921, when Ireland was partitioned as part of the peace settlement that ended the two-year
rebellion against British rule. Partition gave independence to the predominantly Catholic Republic of Ireland in the South, while the North was created as a Protestant state that would remain loyal to the Crown. This nevertheless left a large Catholic minority within Northern Ireland, a minority that aspired to see all of Ireland united as part of the Republic. Protestants feared losing their cultural identity and religious freedom should they become a minority within a Catholic state, a fear that became a reality for those Protestants who remained in the South after partition and saw their community wither away. They had also enjoyed centuries of economic and political dominance under the British Empire, which they were loath to surrender.

While contemporary Northern Ireland came into being in 1921, the sectarian divisions that plague it began in the sixteenth century. The English Crown, in its efforts to solidify political hegemony and extend its economic interests after the Protestant Reformation, sought to convert and fully integrate Catholic Ireland into its dominions, as it was considered a back door through which France could easily threaten England. By the 1600s, the Counter-Reformation and native resistance had made it impossible for a peaceful integration to take place, and the Crown resorted to coercive means in order to establish a loyal landowning class in Ireland. In a program of planned settlement known as the Ulster Plantation, the Crown gave large plots of land to English landlords, which were then parcelled out and settled by English and Scottish peasants. Irish Catholic landholders were forcibly dispossessed in the process, and by 1641, 41% of the land in Ulster was Protestant controlled (Ruane and Todd 1996, 20).

Out of this process a three-tiered religious class system emerged. Anglican landlords, as members of the established church, possessed all political rights. In the middle were Scottish Presbyterian settlers, who composed the bulk of the Protestant population. As dissenters from the established church, Presbyterians were barred from public positions until 1780, although political inequality continued until well into the nineteenth century. They would, however, gain economic prominence as the Industrial Revolution swept through Britain. Nevertheless, their status as second-class citizens in Ireland has made Presbyterians a more natural bridge community between Anglicans and Catholics in the twentieth century. The United Irishmen movement in the 1790s saw many bourgeois Presbyterians, inspired by the ideology of Revolutionary France, ally themselves with Catholics in a failed effort to gain reforms from the Anglican-dominated Dublin Parliament (See 1986, 44).

Catholics occupied the lowest place in the pecking order. They were completely excluded from the political structure until 1828, and they were restricted mostly to areas outside of Protestant population centers (MacDonald 1986, 47-49). Among these Catholics were landowners of Old English and Gaelic ethnicity, who maintained a loyalty to the Crown that became increasingly tenuous with time, breaking into open rebellion in the seventeenth century. The English
colonial process largely destroyed the Catholic elite, who tended to emigrate as
their lands and political positions were threatened. The result of this was that
Catholic identity came to be seen as synonymous with disloyalty and back-
wardness, while to be Protestant was to be loyal to the Crown and compar-
avtively privileged.

During the centuries between the Plantation and Partition, Protestants
played a delicate game of dominance, dependence, and inequality with the
Crown. In fact, the relationship between Protestants and the Crown has always
been an uneasy one. Protestants, as the established rulers of Ireland for the
British, depended on the backing of the Crown to maintain their security
against the Catholic majority. However, Protestants have never hesitated to
threaten to withdraw their loyalty and strike out on their own when it seemed
that the Crown was unwilling to act in their interests.

The arrival of the Industrial Revolution greatly enhanced Protestant fort-
tunes. While Catholics had seen some gains throughout the nineteenth century,
industrial growth was confined almost totally to the Protestant Northeast. It was
during this period that Belfast became a leading producer of linen and shipping
for the British Empire. Due to sectarian hiring practices, Protestants held a dis-
proportionate percentage of skilled labor positions, while Catholics were
shunted into low-paying, unskilled work. Industrialization brought modern Ire-
land into existence, an Ireland characterized by highly uneven development
between North and South and the creation of two highly segregated, antagonis-
tic working classes. Partition in 1921 merely made these demographic dispari-
ties a political reality by drawing a border between the agrarian South,
dominated by inward-looking Irish nationalists, and the industrial North, domi-
nated by British-oriented Protestants ruling over a large Catholic minority.

The history of Ireland has thus been driven by powerful economic forces.
Scholars have proposed a number of models to explain sectarian divisions in
economic terms, which can be very helpful in pointing to the material basis for
the culture of hate that pervades the streets. One of these is the uneven develop-
ment model, in which a politically dominant core state controls most or all of
the upper-level occupations and resources, relegating other groups to a poorly
developed peripheral economy. This social and economic environment sets the
stage for nationalist solidarity on the part of marginalized populations (See
1986, 13). This model also supposes that the economic integration of the
peripheral group will cause a corresponding decline in this type of ethnic or
nationalist identity. The uneven development model has traditionally been
applied to Northern Ireland in terms of its relationship to the United Kingdom
and the Republic of Ireland, while others have begun to view Northern Ireland
as the periphery of an increasingly unified European bloc (Probert 1978, 146).
As we shall see, understanding Northern Ireland within the European context
has increased importance for making sense of the peace process in the 1990s,
and for making sense of its failure in 2002.

The weakness of the uneven development model is that it considers ethno-
centrism to be a product of material factors, and fails to consider ethnocentrism as an independent force. Because of this, it could not have predicted the outbreak of the Troubles in 1968, which occurred in spite of a long period of unprecedented socioeconomic advances for Catholics. Furthermore, support for the militant Sinn Fein party has only increased with time, which shows that Catholics have continued to be radicalized even as their economic lot has improved with time, a trend that is opposite of what the uneven development model would predict (McGarry 2001, 301-302).

Another important theory, called the split labor model, adds further understanding to the uneven development model by taking ethnocentrism into account as an independent force. According to this model, class alliances form along ethnic lines when a politically dominant worker population with a monopoly on the labor market is able to prevent capitalists from hiring from a cheap labor pool of subdominant workers. Thus, segregationist labor practices are maintained through grassroots pressure in spite of strong economic incentives for capitalists to abandon the practice.

Put together, these models illustrate how economics and ethnocentrism together drive sectarian divisions in Northern Ireland. In this particular context, ethnocentrism manifests itself in the emphasis on Anglican English and Scottish Presbyterian identity versus Irish Catholicism. As the age of modernist nationalism swept Europe in the nineteenth century, ethnic identity became increasingly a zero-sum conflict in a way that it had not been previously, resulting in increased consolidation of Protestant identity into one group. This ethnocentrism escalated into open conflict as the two groups competed for scarce resources—land in the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, and skilled jobs in the industrial sector in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (See 1986, 31).

Within the context of European integration, culturally triumphalist ideologies like Orangeism and Paisleyism thrive, in part, on resistance to global capitalism in defense of home-grown, Protestant-controlled industries. At different times the Orange Order has been a vehicle for both Protestant workers and elites to maintain their economic and political privileges. Workers have “played the Orange card” when they felt that the split-labor market was endangered, while elites have done so to protect their political ascendancy against outside influences (See 1986, 162, 165).

From this we can see that at the broadest level of understanding, ethnicity and material factors work in conjunction with each other to produce division in Northern Ireland. Protestants have defined an ethnic identity to protect their communal ties and territory, while Catholic identity became unified in response to coercive colonial domination. Elites of both sides have forged nationalisms for the advancement of their class interests.

There are several more strands to define in this picture that can give us an even more accurate understanding of the culture of sectarianism in Northern
Ireland. Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd have written an invaluable book that reflects more contemporary thinking on sectarianism. They identify five “dimensions of difference” that encompass both material and cultural dynamics: religious (Catholic vs. Protestant), ethnic (Gaelic Irish, Old English vs. New English, Scottish), colonial (native vs. settler), uneven development (civility vs. barbarism), and political (Nationalism/Republicanism vs. Unionism/Loyalism). For Ruane and Todd, the synthetic effect of all of these dimensions of difference is a power dynamic of dominance, dependence, and inequality based on differential access to political and economic resources (1996, 10-12). While there are many overlaps among these dimensions, they all individually function to separate the “us” from the “other” in such a way that “even if an individual stressed only one dimension of difference, he or she could still identify fully with his or her community in opposition to the other” (30).

As we have seen above, religion is the most obvious dimension of difference in Northern Ireland, and many uninformed observers are led to believe that because of this, the violence that has occurred there is fundamentally ideological or theological. Indeed, there are many who stress doctrinal heresy as a reason to separate themselves from the opposite community, even while acknowledging that “conversion” would enable reconciliation. By stressing religious difference, even the most politically passive fundamentalist contributes to the organic whole that constitutes the sectarian superstructure. There is thus a connection between sectarian theological discourse and violent confrontation on the street level, although rioters are overwhelmingly unchurched. Doctrinally, many uneducated or unchurched Protestants have remained suspicious of the Catholic hierarchy and sacramental system, which appears to be monolithic, superstitious, and subversive to democracy and constitutional politics. Political and religious demagogues such as Rev. Dr. Ian Paisley have been able to play on these fears, and political rhetoric has made liberal use of out-of-context scripture passages. Thus, even those who have never set foot in a church generally have a vocabulary of religious slogans at their disposal. To further complicate the picture, Michael MacDonald points out revealingly that Northern Ireland may be the only place in the world where one can be a Catholic Jew or Protestant atheist, thus showing that there is really no correlation between religious fervor and political commitment (MacDonald 1986, 9).

Religious identity is closely connected with ethnicity for both sides of the divide. For both communities, ethnicity is distinguished by a sense of shared heritage, reinforced by a feeling of collective grievance against the other group. History becomes a deadly weapon as each side demonizes the other through mythologized narratives of suffering and injustice, reminding the community of the continuing threat to its existence represented by the enemy population. In this sense, ethnicity is founded in collective mythology rather than in any historical reality. Irish ethnicity is theoretically based on a common Gaelic culture and language and shared Catholic faith, but this identity evolved considerably at the hands of the nationalist intelligentsia in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. On the Protestant side, ethnicity is much more complex because there are many more possibilities for self-identification. Protestants have identified themselves variously as English, Scottish, British, Northern Irish, Ulster, or Irish. The most radical strands of Unionism have articulated an Ulster nationalism that is willing to sever ties with Great Britain should its position and identity be threatened by British policy. The reality reflected in identity polls has shown that, in both the Protestant and Catholic communities, people’s self-identities cover a wide spectrum and overlap considerably.

The settler-native dimension has proven to be highly resilient and divisive. Even if the emotional resentments that it has engendered have taken on a quality of mythology, it still has theoretical utility in terms of understanding Northern Ireland economically. In spite of the fact that today Northern Ireland must be considered equally the home of Protestants and Catholics, the historical legacy of Protestantism being an outside colonial force has played into the hands of Republican propagandists, who have sought to portray them as foreign British oppressors. Economically speaking, as discussed above, it is sometimes helpful to view Northern Ireland as a colonial periphery, which is the assumption that undergirds the uneven development theory. However, the split labor market theory necessarily assumes the permanence of both groups even while recognizing the economic advantage of one of them.

The fourth dimension proposed by Ruane and Todd is that of civility versus barbarism. This dimension does not seem to have as much independent theoretical basis as a historical force, but it nevertheless is an ideological expression of superiority used to justify material dominance. Protestants came to be the driving force of most economic development and modernization in Ireland because of their political power over the Catholic population. Catholics were excluded from the British political and economic structures, while Protestants were able to make full use of British political, technological, and ideological advances. As Ruane points out, Catholic modernization and innovation only tended to confirm Protestant beliefs in their backwardness because of their different political and economic interests (1996, 27-28).

The final dimension emerged only in the nineteenth century with the rise of secular nationalism throughout Europe. Nationalism was singularly divisive in Northern Ireland because of the absolute claims that it made—each nationalist vision left no room for the aspirations of ethnic minorities, but demanded the right for its own state in which to pursue the community’s own interests and potential.

Irish nationalism as an ideology emerged in resistance to British rule, and sought to create a Gaelic-Catholic nation-state. Like many third-world nationalisms, this ideology was given added impetus as a response to British attitudes of racial superiority. Of course, Irish nationalism contained a certain amount of mythology and idealization, as it largely ignored Protestant contributions to Irish nationalism and the fact that most Irish people no longer spoke Gaelic. On
the other side, more extreme Unionists have espoused an Ulster nationalism that seeks a Protestant state for a Protestant people. In the nineteenth century, many Protestants saw themselves as part of an Anglo-Saxon British nation and part of a greater imperial whole. Partition in 1920 was a severe blow to Irish nationalism, whose vision saw the Irish state as comprising the entire island of Ireland. However, this vision was mutually exclusive to the aspirations of Protestants, who not only feared a loss of their historic privileges, but also feared socio-political isolation as minorities in a Catholic state (Ruane and Todd 1996, 28-29).

The culture of hate and violence is maintained in Northern Ireland through the combination of all of these dimensions of difference. The conflict is not merely religious—it is religious, political, and economic, all rolled into one. The factions can be described as rival ethnicities, political factions, or religious confessions, or it can be said that they are all of the above. In this way an understanding can be gained of the sectarian system, and of how language and symbolism in the public sphere and at the street level all contribute to an organic whole. The picture that one gets in stepping back from the strife is that in the end it makes little difference what dimension of difference a combatant uses to justify his or her claims, just so long as the difference is established. Either way, communal interests are served, whether individual community members view the conflict as religious, political, or ethnic.

The socioeconomic structures that exist today in Northern Ireland are a direct product of its history of uneven development and a split labor market. Northern Ireland's economy has failed to diversify since the nineteenth century and has suffered accordingly. It continues to depend on the textile, synthetic fiber, and shipping industries, resulting in frequent economic downturns influenced by global market forces. The Troubles, which broke out in 1968, were intensified in the 1970s as the world oil crisis caused a collapse in Belfast's exports of supertankers and a dramatic rise in raw materials costs for other industrial sectors. Furthermore, the violence caused a sharp decrease in direct foreign investment, which began to recover only after the IRA cease-fire in 1994 and subsequent peace agreement in 1998 (Birnie and Hitchens 1999, 5-7).

In relation to the rest of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland has the highest regional unemployment figures. In 1995, unemployment was 13%, compared to the 8.8% UK average, but lower than the Republic of Ireland's 14.3%. Moreover, 51.6% of those classified as unemployed were without jobs for longer than 12 months (Birnie and Hitchens 1999, 11). Indeed, long-term unemployment is a problem endemic to Northern Ireland's urban areas, and is reflective of structural problems related to poor education and the lack of cross-communal labor mobility, resulting in highly regionalized labor markets (14). Young people with little education and no job prospects are easy targets for paramilitary recruiters, and sons often follow their fathers and grandfathers into the web of violence. In this way, paramilitary groups like the IRA, Ulster Defense Force, Ulster Defense Association, and Ulster Freedom Fighters are
able to take up the slack that the legitimate labor market cannot absorb. These groups have established a system of territorial patronage based on smuggling and drug rackets, and the problem of unemployment and organized crime has been exacerbated by the release of “political” prisoners under the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. This is but one example of how the compromises of political negotiations have undermined the peace process by worsening the situation on the streets.

The unemployment figures given above do not even begin to do justice to the plight of some of the worst neighborhoods. In spite of affirmative action programs, Catholics still suffer from a higher unemployment rate than Protestants. In the predominantly Catholic Lower Ormeau area of Belfast, unemployment stood at 65% for people 18-25 years old in the 1980s, and overall unemployment in the area was at 42% when last measured in 1992 (Mornington Community Project Ltd. 2000, 1-2). While the average unemployment rates for Protestants are not as severe, there are nevertheless some deprived localities where unemployment reaches the 40-50% range. Because Protestants do not have a unifying institution under which to organize, they have had difficulties receiving European Union Structural Funds for the improvement of rundown housing estates. Catholics, on the other hand, have been able to do this through the Roman Catholic Church, and so they have seen improvements in their quality of life in recent years. The EU bureaucracy is difficult to impossible to crack for groups that do not have collective representation, and this fact alone has fueled resentment among Protestants, who feel that they have been ignored and marginalized by the peace process.

As we can see from this, Northern Ireland is suffering from a cycle of violence and poverty. Poverty and unemployment contribute to paramilitary activity and recreational rioting, which in turn discourage economic growth, producing more poverty and unemployment. Since 1998, the urban landscape has undergone rapid demographic change as middle-class families have fled the tense inner cities for the suburbs and countryside whenever it has been economically feasible. The consequence has been a higher “chill factor,” meaning less cross-communal contact in daily life, affecting choices on where to work, shop, and send children to school. This has also meant increased urban ghettoization. The process is accelerated by intimidation campaigns, in which homes of holdout families are vandalized or firebombed, and their occupants threatened or assaulted until they are forced out of the neighborhood.

It seems that, with all of the forces of sectarianism united against reconciliation and peacemaking, it would have been impossible for Northern Ireland to accept power-sharing institutions in 1998. The Good Friday Agreement was overwhelmingly supported by both communities, however, and this raises the question of how this could come about. Toward the end of their book, Ruane and Todd raise the issue of international involvement in Northern Irish affairs, and suggest an increasing importance of international opinion in altering the
currency of discourse. This moves beyond traditional analyses, which tend to maintain a narrow focus on North-South relations within Ireland and relations with the UK. However, the second half of the twentieth century has seen the globalization of capitalism and the introduction of new post-modern ideological norms in conjunction with this, characterized by language of cultural and moral relativism.

The internationalization of political discourse broke in on Northern Ireland with a shock in the late 1960s during the Civil Rights movement. Both Catholic and liberal Protestants demonstrated for an end to structural injustice against Catholics, and did so using the language of black Civil Rights activists in the U.S., singing “We Shall Overcome” and using the same slogans and symbolism. Globalization and mass media seemed to have suddenly created an international language on norms of social justice. However, the lack of a secular activist tradition in Northern Ireland allowed Republicans to reassert traditional Irish symbols and to reclaim the movement for their own aims, and the violence that followed quickly moved away from its original secular activist tone (See 1986, 126).

Since then, post-modernity has advanced hand in hand with global capitalism. As the opening of new markets has sought to tear down national barriers and pave the way for peace and prosperity, a new language of multiculturalism, tolerance, secularism, and relativism has provided a new ethic for bridge-building, as well as an increased awareness of global events. The Troubles’ beginning in the late ’60s launched Northern Ireland into international attention, and the Clinton presidency made peace in Northern Ireland an American interest, and encouraged fair employment and American investment. The increased integration of the EEC and the drive toward a common currency in Europe was also an important factor in the 1990s, in which peace and stability in Northern Ireland were seen as important European interests.

It has already been suggested that Orangeism and Paisleyism were a reaction to these international trends. Protestant hard-liners had further incentive to resist these trends because Nationalists encouraged globalization as a way of eroding economic barriers with the South and paving the way to a united Ireland. Moreover, Nationalists have supported the European Union and the emergence of a common currency in hopes that they will erode British sovereignty over the North (McGarry 2001, 305). This is a reversal of prewar Irish Nationalism, which sought to protect its markets through isolationism. However, the 1950s brought a liberalization of Irish trade policy and a consequent improvement in fortunes. The “Celtic Tiger” economy of the 1990s may have been an illusion, but the Irish economy did experience unprecedented growth thought to be a result of European integration.1

Indeed, it seems as though the economic interests of many locally-based Protestant capitalists in Northern Ireland would be best protected within the context of union with the UK. The economy of the North is more industrial than its Southern neighbor, but has not diversified. Its strongest sectors are now
being threatened by the emergence of competition from former Soviet-bloc states that have just joined the EEC, and this means that Northern Ireland will have to compete for foreign direct investment and for allocation of EU Structural Funds as a Priority One region. Moreover, integration into the EU will mean increased labor and environmental controls and regulations, which will probably raise production costs and make demands of worker productivity and entrepreneurial innovation that have not been demonstrated in Northern Ireland until now (Birnie and Hitchens 1999, 103-105).

Another factor that works against globalization in the North is monetary policy. Evidence has shown that the Republic of Ireland, as a peripheral economy, has been hurt by a strict EU monetary policy designed along German lines. For the UK, integration would also be harmful, as interest rates in Germany and the UK have generally been on opposite cycles, and they would thus experience devastating synchronization problems (Birnie and Hitchens 1999, 107). It therefore seems that there is a clear advantage for some to remain within the context of a strong UK currency independent from the Euro.

It is clear that the peace process in Northern Ireland did not take place in a political and economic vacuum. It was a huge step when all parties agreed that constitutional issues could be decided only by consent, rather than by force, and it was a step that took place within the context of a new international engagement, not only from the Irish and British governments led by Bertie Ahern and Tony Blair, but also by the U.S. delegation led by George Mitchell. Furthermore, the ongoing process now sees discussion and debate on a special Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland as a spin-off of human rights legislation passed in the EU. The stiffest resistance to the entire process is (not surprisingly) coming from Ian Paisley’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which sees it as a threat to the traditional Protestant position in Northern Ireland and to the particular position of local capital and family firms, which heretofore have been safe under the wing of the British welfare state. There has been a recent increase in Protestant unrest in the inner cities as workers have begun to feel marginalized by new government attitudes and policies, and their interests in terms of employment and housing have been ignored by the European bureaucracy.

When these socioeconomic factors are taken into account, it is not at all surprising that the power-sharing Assembly was on such shaky footing throughout 2002, finally dissolving in October. The last two years have only seen more segregation and increasingly radicalized politics on both sides, with Sinn Fein and the DUP each expanding their support bases. David Trimble’s moderate Ulster Unionist Party struggled to maintain leadership of the Protestant community as events continued to polarize the working classes. Today there is really little hope that devolved institutions will be able to reconstitute, because such bodies require a strong core of moderates to keep them from flying apart. A power-sharing Assembly controlled by hard-liners is simply an
oxymoron, since the stated raison d'être of the DUP has been to oppose power-sharing in the absence of several difficult Republican concessions.

Northern Ireland thus stands at a crossroads where it must make some painful choices. It is clear that the first cadre of policymakers failed by not pursuing a comprehensive reconciliation program, and now they must do so or risk losing control of the entire situation. The advantage that they have today is that the people of Northern Ireland have experienced a prolonged period of comparative normalcy, and will be more willing to invest themselves in whatever it takes to prevent a return to the warfare of the 1970s and '80s. Fortunately, there have been a small but heroic number of Christian clerics and laymen who are already doing effective reconciliation work that can be considered a model for any comprehensive plan that is enacted.

A major reason that the current peace process has stalled is that it really only addressed issues from the top down. Politicians failed to listen to grass-roots leaders who were actually making a difference, and this was due to the very nature of Northern Irish politics. The traditional assumption of democratic societies is that political parties will represent ideological visions, but this is not the case in Northern Ireland. The Rev. John Dunlop, a Presbyterian minister and former Moderator of the General Assembly, expressed concern early in 2002 that each party represented at Stormont represents an ethnic identity, and so the power-sharing Assembly has actually institutionalized sectarian divisions. The effect of this is only to increase the burgeoning problem of self-segregation, which is being encouraged and exploited by paramilitary crime rings. Dunlop nevertheless expressed support for power-sharing as a "necessary interim arrangement to foster the politics of cooperation at the level of the Executive" (Dunlop 2002). In other words, Dunlop sees the Executive formed by the Good Friday Agreement as a temporary arrangement to help foster more permanent peace and reconciliation programs at all levels of society. A more permanent arrangement can only be supported by a society with a renewed vision and commitment to living together equally and peacefully.

An example of how institutionalized sectarianism has played itself out on the street level has been seen in the financial plight of the highly effective Mornington Community Project on the Lower Ormeau Road. This Presbyterian community center is located in a predominantly Catholic working-class neighborhood that has recently been the scene of tension and violence during the summer marching season. The neighborhood suffers from a 42% overall unemployment rate, although among people who are 18-25 years old it stood at 65%, figures which testify to the deprivation of the area (Mornington Community Project 2001, 1-2).

Mornington offers an impressive array of services to the people of the neighborhood. The center of the project is the Gaslight Coffee Shop, which offers good, inexpensive meals and provides a relaxed environment where people in the community can meet and talk with staff and volunteers. It also continually employs six trainees who receive critical training and work experience,
after which nearly all will secure permanent employment (17). Through its employment training courses and Jobskills Programs, Mornington has made a dent in the unemployment figures in the area. Out of 397 people who participated in them, 100 found work, 138 went on to further training or education, and 159 reverted to unemployed status (7). Mornington provides an outreach to children and youth through after-school homework clubs, mothers and toddlers’ groups, and young men’s and young women’s clubs. Staff are always available to offer advice on welfare, health, and legal matters (Humpheries 2002; Mornington Community Project 2001, 9).

Essentially, the Mornington Community Project has become a nucleus for the Lower Ormeau area, and it offers almost every service for which there is a need. Much of the funding for the project has come through the European Union and the local government. Given the integral role that it is playing in community development, it may be surprising that it is currently on a shoestring budget because funding has been “decimated by unwarranted fluctuations in related government strategy, and by unethical, politically motivated manipulation of funding structures” (18). To put the wording into common language, the authorities have been reallocation funds to community centers run by political parties as a reward for refraining from violence. These parties are using the money to shore up their own territorial constituencies, and the money is not resulting in a fundamental change in the hearts and minds of paramilitary combatants in spite of the peaceful language of their political leaders.

This fact is an alarming injustice, and illustrates in very concrete terms how institutionalized sectarianism has played itself out in supposed “peacemaking” sponsored by the government. Policies like these reveal that politicians see “peace” as an absence of violence rather than a truly reconciled society. In effect, the government is paying off paramilitaries for not carrying out attacks, and the paramilitaries are able to accomplish their goals of segregating society more effectively through government sponsorship than they ever could through violence.

The solution in this particular case is obvious: Fund more endeavors like the Mornington Community Project that operate independently of the government and of the urban political machines. Mornington is just one among many Christian groups who are doing invaluable grassroots community development work by relocating to the most afflicted areas and bringing resources and skills to the local people. Christian community development work is particularly essential to Northern Ireland because of its dual focus on social justice and personal values. Not only does it provide social and economic resources for the down and out, but it has proven to positively change lives and steer people away from the path of violence and toward positive values of peace and reconciliation.

Christians are also making important contributions in the area of education. The Irish Council of Churches’ Peace Education Program has formulated
a school curriculum called Education for Mutual Understanding (EMU), which has been widely disseminated in state, Catholic, and integrated schools alike. The content of the curriculum is essentially secular, and is distributed in close cooperation with government agencies as schools express interest in adding the materials to their curriculum. The materials themselves are designed for children as young as primary one (the U.S. equivalent of pre-school or kindergarten), and shift in focus for older students. For instance, primary one materials focus on emotional awareness and social skills, while primary seven materials acquaint students with peaceful role models such as Martin Luther King and Mohandas Gandhi.

The Irish School of Ecumenics, affiliated with Trinity College in Dublin, offers a program entitled Moving Beyond Sectarianism, to be used by churches, encounter groups, and schools. It is meant to walk people through a process in which they confront their own sectarianism while building relationships with people of the opposite community. The resource packet that accompanies the course seeks to conceptualize and define sectarianism in all of its aspects, stressing its systemic nature and demonstrating how every individual is unconsciously a contributor to this system (Naylor 2001, 63).

Evangelical Contribution on Northern Ireland (ECONI) is an example of a body that does single identity peacebuilding. A single identity organization is one that focuses on speaking to its own culture by offering an insider’s critique of cultural commitments and assumptions. As its name suggests, ECONI seeks to mobilize the substantial evangelical community in Northern Ireland toward building bridges. Evangelicals comprise 12-18% of the population and are a major force within all of the Protestant denominations. However, they have also traditionally been uncritical supporters of the Protestant community, and thus their commitment to Christ was all too often “co-opted into political/nationalist agendas.” In this way, Christians as a whole lost the ability to critique society from a prophetic standpoint. Many clergy and laymen recognized this problem, and ECONI was birthed in 1988 when they came together to publish a series of scripture studies entitled For God and His Glory Alone. The title was meant to contradict the popular slogan “For God and Ulster,” and openly called into question previous cultural assumptions (ECONI 2002).

ECONI’s work is effective because it is able to galvanize its target community using its own language. Evangelicals distinguish themselves by their commitment to the Bible as God’s Word to humankind, and so ECONI stresses the Biblical mandate to seek peace and justice, build bridges, and love one’s enemies. It also uses scripture as a basis for critical thinking about society and culture, and resources churches and political leaders through seminars and publications. ECONI’s work is challenging Protestants to recast popular cultural narratives in a more balanced light, while reconsidering the way symbolism is used to represent the community. In this way, ECONI’s voice on politics and culture has been holistically informed by theology, history, sociology, and anthropology.
The few examples given above are examples of how Christians have already been an effective voice for reconciliation in Northern Ireland. Unfortunately, these voices are still in the minority. The Rev. Kenneth Newell estimates that only 10% of clergy of either confession are actively involved in peacebuilding efforts (Newell 2002). A major reason for this is that clergy themselves are products of the sectarian system, and have been so focused on burying the dead and comforting the bereaved over the past 30 years that they have failed to look beyond their communities. Pietist theologies have also discouraged many Christians from considering broader social action beyond the narrower concerns of individual salvation and sanctification, although this type of theology is now under major critique by theologians and by groups like ECONI. Perhaps a more potent force preventing pastors and priests from building bridges is the fear of backlash from their own congregations. Education and community development programs can counter this by raising up new generations to be future reconcilers.

Any future reconciliation program must therefore take seriously the efforts of Christian peace builders. Christianity is still a major shaper of culture in Northern Ireland, unlike in the rest of Europe, a fact that is borne out statistically. In 1995, approximately 34% of the population actively attended Roman Catholic churches, while approximately 18.6% attended the Church of Ireland, and 22.4% attended the Presbyterian Church in Ireland. These figures show that a total of 75% of the population attended one of the three largest denominations, and these statistics do not include smaller denominations like Baptists, Methodists, Congregationalists, and free churches (Dunlop 1995, 8-9).²

Christian scripture and tradition contain tremendous resources that can be drawn on as a foundation for reconciliation efforts. Christian faith has been a driving force for many who have carried the message of peace into the inner cities coupled with a willingness to serve those in need regardless of the cost to their own safety. It is time for political leaders to admit the failure of an approach that is only top-down, and for them to reward and encourage the efforts of those who have understood the true nature of the problems and found effective ways of mending them at the grassroots level. Power-sharing institutions at the top can be effective only if they are willing to forgo the easy paths of political expediency and adopt policies that will transform the culture of sectarian hatred from the inside out.

NOTES

1. Birnie and Hitchens argue that the “Celtic Tiger” was a myth, and that the Republic of Ireland stands to lose out if it joins a common currency. With the introduction of the Euro in the Republic in January 2002, economists will soon be able to make a judgment on this.

2. Percentages are taken from numerical attendance figures provided by Rev. John Dunlop, and assume a population of 1.5 million.
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The Role the Dutch Reformed Church Played in the Rise and Fall of Apartheid

Jennifer Nelson

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On a personal note, I was born and raised in South Africa under the apartheid regime. I knew then, and I know now, that the abhorrent policies of racial discrimination were strengthened by having a strong religious base. Because of my own detestation of both the political and religious systems under which I lived, I decided to immigrate to the United States in 1989. Adapting to a new country, completing a doctorate, and starting a new teaching position consumed me for the next 10 years. In that period, a miracle occurred in South Africa with the release of Nelson Mandela and the eventual collapse of the apartheid government. While there was a celebration in my heart, I quickly came to realize that racial discrimination in South Africa would not disappear overnight. And then I cast my eyes and thoughts toward the United States. Alas, I found a similar, if perhaps more subtle, discrimination based on religious grounds. This discovery forced me to look back at my country of birth and try to gain a deeper understanding of how religion can become the foundation of an entire political system.

I. THE DUTCH REFORMED CHURCH AND WHITE SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY

According to a 1996 census, approximately 75 percent of a population of more than 42 million South Africans adheres to the Christian faith. Hindus and Muslims account for approximately 2 percent of the population, and about 0.4 percent is Jewish. More than 15 percent of the population do not belong to any of the major religions, but consider themselves followers of traditional indigenous religions. The largest Christian denomination is the Dutch Reformed Church, which was brought to the Cape of Good Hope in 1652 by the Dutch East Indian Company. The English churches, such as the Methodist and Anglican churches, arrived with the British occupation of the Cape in 1802.

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The history of the Dutch settlers (later to become the Afrikaners), bound to their strong Calvinistic beliefs, became the cornerstone of white South African history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Great Trek (the emigration from the Eastern Cape Colony into the interior of Southern Africa by some 12,000 to 14,000 Dutch-speaking farmers between 1834 and the early 1840s) is regarded by Afrikaners as a central event of their history and the origin of their nationhood. It was during The Great Trek that the Afrikaans language and their unique culture developed. It was during this period that the Afrikaners’ attitude toward the British hardened and the Afrikaner philosophy of apartheid (separateness) was formulated. It was during The Great Trek that the Afrikaners came to believe that they were a “chosen race” and that it was their “manifest destiny” to populate the areas north of the Orange River.

A few voices have been chosen to convey these teachings:

On Slavery and Racial Equality

“It was not so much their (the slaves’) being set free as their being placed on an equal footing with Christians, contrary to the laws of God.” Anna Steenkamp

“The Afrikaners argued amongst themselves, but shared one article of faith; to deny political rights to Africans and Colored people of mixed race.” Thomas Packenham

“There were many causes of The Great Trek, but the prime cause was the desire of the Boers to get away from this new ideal of racial equality which to them was abhorrent.” Alan Paton

“It should be a recognized principle of government that natives—men, women and children—should only be permitted within municipal areas in so far and for so long as their presence is demanded by the wants of the white population.” Stallard Commission

On Afrikaner Culture

“The idea of an Afrikaner people as a cultural entity and religious group with a special language will be retained in South Africa as long as civilization stands.” P.W. Botha

“You cannot separate culture from politics.” Anita Armond

“Most societies use their culture to control citizens.” Pieter Dirk Uys

On Religion

“They had their own language, their own customs and traditions, and a myth to light their way, a mystic Christian mission on the Dark Continent.” Rian Malan
“With the Bible as his only instrument of culture, with his gun to shoot game and protect him against those he regarded as savages, the Boer was perfectly adjusted to his environment.” David Harrison

“So long as we honor God we will survive as a volk (nation).” Constand Viljoen

On Being a “Chosen Race”

“Like the Jews, what we want is a country in which we can survive as a people, in which we can live our lives, maintain our standards and our Christian way of life.” Tienie Groenewald

“As long as there is a commitment among Afrikaners to cherish their language and their culture and their traditions, the Afrikaner nation will continue to exist.” F.W. de Klerk

“Their religion, setting them apart from the unelected pagans about them, bred in them a sense of special destiny as a people.” C.W. de Kiewet

The crux of The Great Trek and the religious foundations for the future Afrikaner government are best summarized in the vow taken prior to the Battle of Blood River on December 16th, 1838.

My brethren and fellow countrymen. At this moment we stand before the Holy God of heaven and earth, to make a promise if He will be with us and protect us, and deliver the enemy into our hands so that we may triumph over him, that we shall observe the day and the date as an anniversary in each year, and a day of thanksgiving like the Sabbath in His honour; and that we shall enjoin our children that they must take part with us in this for a remembrance even for posterity.¹

This vow was repeated every December 16th across the country from 1838 until 1994. The day itself was preserved as a religious and nationalistic day. The centerpiece in the Voortrekker Monument in Pretoria highlights this specific event.

After the defeat of the Zulus at the Battle of Blood River, the Afrikaners established the independent (of British rule) Republic of Natal. The next 90-plus years would see the Afrikaners rebelling against British annexations and influence, as well as refining their own culture, religion, and language. During this period, the Afrikaners came to believe that their own survival as a community was threatened. Together with a growing belief in racial separation, social and spiritual survival became intertwined in church philosophy and political ideology.
II. The National Party Comes to Power

In 1948, the Afrikaner National Party won the all-white general election based on the apartheid platform. Dr. Daniel Malan, the first National Party Prime Minister, expounded on the relationship between apartheid and Christianity in a letter to the Rev. J. Piersma, a minister in Grand Rapids, Michigan:

The Church believes that God in His wisdom so disposed it that the first White men and women who settled at the foot of the Black Continent were profoundly religious people, imbued with a very real zeal to bring the light of the gospel to the heathen nations of Africa. These first South Africans lit a torch which was carried to the farthest corners of the subcontinent in the course of the last three centuries and whose light now shines upon the greater part of all non-White peoples south of the Equator.²

In its early days, the Church used the blessings of civilization as a means to attract the heathen, but today the traditional concept of European guardianship has taken the form of fostering and financing to the full the social, educational, and economic development of the non-white. And while believing that God helps those who help themselves and, therefore, encouraging and assisting non-Europeans also to participate in this general movement of uplift and enlightenment, the Church has at all time vouchsafed the various black groups the right and duty to retain their national identities. Christianity must not rob the non-white of language and culture. Its function is to permeate and penetrate to the depths of black nationalism, while encouraging the retention and refinement of those national customs and traditions that do not clash with Christian tenets.

The Afrikaners' traditional fear of racial equality between white and black derives from an aversion to miscegenation. Afrikaners have always believed that if they are to be true to their primary calling of bringing Christianity to the heathen, they must preserve their racial identity. The church is, therefore, opposed to intermarriage between black and white and is committed to withstand everything that is calculated to facilitate it. At the same time, it does not begrudge the non-white the attainment of a social status commensurate with his highest aspirations. Whereas the church, therefore, opposes the social equalitarianism that ignores racial and color differences between black and white in everyday life, it is prepared to do all in its power to implement a social and cultural segregation that will redound to the benefit of both sides.

The Bible is accepted as being the Word of God, and the Dutch Reformed Church accepts the authority of Holy Writ as normative for all the political, social, cultural, and religious activities in which humans indulge. The church acknowledges the basic rights of the State as a particular divine institution to regulate the lives and actions of its citizens.
III. THE IMPLEMENTATION AND ACCEPTANCE OF APARTHEID

The National Party implemented the policy of apartheid by passing a number of laws between 1948 and 1954. Among these laws were the Classification Act, the Group Areas Act, the Pass Law Act, the Immorality Act, the Mixed Marriages Act, and the Education Act. Doctor Verwoerd, the National Party’s government Minister of Native Affairs/Bantu Affairs, continued to introduce the long and complex series of apartheid laws. As he had told the Senate in 1952, “The various Acts, Bills and also public statements I have made all fit into a pattern, and form a single constructive plan.”

As an example of a specific law, Dr. Verwoerd introduced a bill in 1953 to remove black education from missionary control to that of the Native Affairs Department. He stated: “I will reform black education so that Natives will be taught from childhood to realize that equality with Europeans is not for them.” Verwoerd attacked the liberalism of missionary education which gave black children ideas of growing up to live in a world of equal rights between black and white. He later explained to the Senate that there was “no place” for blacks outside the reserves “above the level of certain forms of labor.” So, “What is the use of teaching a Bantu child mathematics when he cannot use it in practice?” He added: “Education must train and teach people in accordance with their opportunities in life.”

The Bantu Education Act was put into operation in April 1955. Only two major churches continued to run state-assisted missionary schools, the Dutch Reformed Church and the Swedish Lutheran mission. The other major churches refused to accept government conditions, including new Bantu Education syllabi and other controls on teaching, in return for continued state financial aid. Black schools no longer studied the same syllabi as non-black schools but followed new Bantu Education syllabi. The Bantu Affairs Department had to approve teachers and also controlled the local school boards consisting of parents and officials—which managed the everyday running of schools.

As Prime Minister, Dr. Verwoerd recognized that expanding industries in white areas needed an expanding black labor force. But he predicted that the black urban population would begin to fall in the late 1970s, by which time apartheid would have succeeded in developing the black rural reserves as alternative areas of employment. Verwoerd saw total separation between white and black societies as the final aim of apartheid. Black labor in white society was like “donkeys, oxen and tractors,” which could someday be replaced by other machinery.

So, where did the churches in South Africa stand with all this? The Dutch Reformed Church gave its support to the system of apartheid. As apartheid was called into question throughout the country in the 1970s and the 1980s, church leaders were, in general, more committed to apartheid than many of their followers, and the church became an impediment to political reform. A few Dutch
Reformed clergy opposed apartheid. The best known of these, Rev. Beyers Naude, left his whites-only church in the late 1970s and joined a black parish within the Dutch Reformed church. The efforts of other church leaders who worked to reduce the church’s racist image were often constrained by the fact that the church’s highest authorities, who supported apartheid, controlled parish finances.

IV. RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION TO APARTHEID

In the 1990s, black South Africans formed a majority in all large Christian churches in South Africa except the Dutch Reformed churches, as had been true throughout the apartheid era. In these churches, many people became involved in efforts to reverse the effects of apartheid policies, but with varying degrees of militancy. Again, there were often significant differences between church leaders and their followers concerning race and politics. For example, senior officials within the Roman Catholic Church in South Africa opposed apartheid, but a group of Catholics formed the South African Catholic Defence League to condemn the church’s political involvement and, in particular, to denounce school integration.

Leaders of the Anglican Church spoke out in opposition to apartheid, but church members disagreed about tactics for expressing their views. Some white Anglicans vigorously opposed their church’s involvement in politics, while many black Anglicans became leaders in the antiapartheid movement. The Methodist Church, which was overwhelmingly black, adopted openly antiapartheid stands on many public issues, but its leaders’ activism cost it support among those who feared public scrutiny on this politically sensitive issue.

Religious alliances provided a means of coordinating church opposition to apartheid while minimizing the public exposure of church leaders and parishioners. The South African Council of Churches (SACC) was the most active antiapartheid umbrella organization. The SACC not only opposed apartheid, but also offered encouragement to those who contravened race laws. Under the leadership of Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu in the 1980s, the SACC also attempted to withhold cooperation with the state, as much as possible, in protest against apartheid. SACC leaders were outspoken in their political views, lodging frequent complaints with government officials and organizing numerous peaceful protests.

Countering the efforts of the antiapartheid community, the Christian League of Southern Africa rallied in support of the government’s apartheid policies. The Christian League consisted of members of Dutch Reformed and other churches who believed apartheid could be justified on religious grounds.
V. The End of Apartheid and the Role of Religion in the New South Africa

In 1990, Nelson Mandela was released from prison and it was clear that the old order was about to come to an end. The Dutch Reformed Church, led by Johan Heyns, who was later killed by right-wing Afrikaners, gave an official apology for the travesties of apartheid. But there is proof that the church hasn’t totally exorcised the specter of apartheid. In 2000, one of the very few female ministers not only resigned but also revoked her affiliation with the Dutch Reformed Church over an article in which she called Afrikaner nationalism the biggest divide in the church and claimed that the church was being abused as the last vestige of Afrikanerdom.

The new South African Constitution (1994) provides for freedom of religion, and the government generally respects this right in practice. The Bill of Rights, included in the Constitution, specifically provides for and protects freedom of religion. The Bill of Rights prohibits the State from unfairly discriminating directly or indirectly against anyone on the grounds of religion, and it states that persons belonging to a religious community may not be denied the right, with other members of that community, to practice their religion and to form, join, and maintain religious associations. Cases of discrimination against a person on the grounds of religious freedom can be taken to the Constitutional Court.

The Constitution states that religious instruction at public schools is permitted so long as it is voluntary and religions are treated equally. However, the Department of Education is still using a syllabus that requires public schools to administer one period of religious instruction a week. The syllabus provides six options for religious instruction: Bible Education, Hindu Studies, Islamic Studies, Religious Education, Right Living, and Scripture. Many public schools have dropped religious instruction in practice. In schools that do administer religious instruction, students have the right to not attend the religious instruction, and school authorities respect this right in practice. A new syllabus has been drafted that, if implemented, would provide for voluntary, not mandatory, religious instruction in public schools. There are some private religious schools in which religious instruction is required.

VI. Conclusion

To conclude on another personal note, as a child I well remember feeling “different” because I was English speaking and attended an English school and an English church. My Afrikaans neighbors appeared to have a deeper respect for our country and a more definite belief that they were indeed a chosen “race.” I remember attending religious instruction classes at school and sensing that the Calvinistic doctrine was at the heart of those classes. In fact, as the
entire education system was based on Christian National Education, even our history classes were filled with Afrikaner nationalism. I remember as a teacher reading a Dutch Reformed Sunday school textbook. It told young people that the Bible required absolute loyalty to their country and its leaders and that compulsory military service was a privilege for all white male civilians. I remember my father accepting the principles of apartheid even though he was a good man. I remember my delight when my mother joined the Methodist Church and became actively involved with a large group of black women. I remember my heartbreak when she died and those same black women were denied the right to attend the “white” church from which she was buried. My last, and perhaps only, act of defiance was to ask all those black women to come to the same church that had excluded them to honor my mother at a later date. My 5-year-old niece and I were the only white people in an all-white church on that wonderful day.

From a distance, I follow the political and religious development of the New South Africa with interest. I believe that the Christian churches, including the Dutch Reformed Church and the Roman Catholic Church, are working closely with each other as well as with other non-Christian faiths on the socio-political front. The New South Africa appears to “render unto God what is God’s and to Caesar what is Caesar’s.” A strong moral base has been accepted in order to create a strong socio-political future, but unlike the National Party regime, which made the Dutch Reformed religion an official religion, the New South Africa will not impose a national religion on the citizens.

NOTES


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Engendering Hate Crime Policy:  
Gender, the “Dilemma of Difference,” and the Creation of Legal Subjects

Valerie Jenness*

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I. INTRODUCTION

Nearly six years after two women were bound and gagged and had their throats slit while camping and hiking in Shenandoah National Park, U.S. Attorney General John D. Ashcroft held a historic nationally televised press conference on April 11, 2002 to announce that the U.S. Justice Department invoked the federal hate crimes statute for the first time to charge the alleged murderer with hate crime. In announcing the indictment, Ashcroft spoke at length about his meeting with the parents of the victims and about the lives and characters of the young women: two Midwesterners who migrated to New England, met and became lovers, and shared the love of science and the outdoors. Justifying the invocation of federal hate crime law, which carries with it enhanced penalties, Ashcroft said, “Criminal acts of hate run counter to what is best in America,

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our belief in equality and freedom. The Department of Justice will aggressively investigate, prosecute, and punish criminal acts of violence and vigilantism motivated by hate and intolerance.”¹ Moreover, he said, “We will pursue, prosecute, and punish those who attack law-abiding Americans out of hatred for who they are,” and “Hatred is the enemy of justice, regardless of its source.”²

In this case, evidence suggests the “source of hatred” is twofold: sexuality and gender. According to prosecutors, Darrell David Rice, a computer programmer from Columbia, Maryland, is, by his own account, a man who hates lesbians and enjoys intimidating and assaulting women. According to law enforcement officials, sometime after being arrested, Rice told law enforcement officials that he intentionally selected women to assault “because they are more vulnerable than men,” that he “hates gays,” and that the victims in this case “deserved to die because they were lesbian whores.”³ Accordingly, lead Assistant U.S. Attorney Tom Bondurant, Jr. plans to argue that Rice chose to slit the throats of the two young women because of their gender and because of their “actual or perceived sexual orientation.”⁴ According to court documents, Bondurant will introduce evidence of the defendant’s numerous physical and verbal assaults upon randomly selected women, including acts of road rage, physical assaults, demeaning sexual comments, and threats of injury or death. The U.S. Assistant Attorney plans to argue in court “that the defendant’s killing of the two women was part of an ongoing plan, scheme, or modus operandi to assault, intimidate, and injure and kill women because of their gender.”⁵

As the first federal prosecution of a hate crime based on gender, this case raises a plethora of questions about the status, meaning, and workings of gender in hate crime policy in the U.S. Although there is a growing body of literature on the ways in which public policy associated with crime control is gendered,⁶ the literature is surprisingly silent when it comes to understanding the ways in which gender—as a central axis of differentiation around which violence and discrimination manifest—has been constructed, positioned, and reacted to via the emergence, content, and evolution of public policy on bias-motivated violence, especially legal reform and law. Most notably, an examination of gender as a feature of policy connected to hate crime has been notably absent in recent journal publications devoted specifically to the study of hate crime in the U.S. and abroad. For example, neither the recent special issue of The American Behavioral Scientist devoted to “Hate Crimes and Ethnic Conflict: A Comparative Perspective”⁷ nor the recent special issue of Law and Critique on “Hate Crime: Critical Reflections”⁸ contains an article that focuses specifically on gender and hate crime policy, including law.⁹

To fill this gap, this article provides an overview of the status of gender in hate crime policy in the U.S. To do so, it first introduces the concept of “hate crime” as a politically determined and legislatively defined subset of criminal behavior. This section treats “hate crime” as a recently developed term that is now commonly used to signify age-old forms of conduct. With this in mind, it then inventories the ways in which gender has—and more notably, has not—
loomed large in state and federal lawmakers' most institutionalized response to bias-motivated violence in the U.S. (that is, the law). This section reveals that gender is best envisioned as a "second-class citizen" in social, political, and legal discourse in the U.S. which speaks directly to the larger problem of violence motivated by bigotry and manifest as discrimination (that is, bias-motivated violence). Thereafter, this article offers a discussion of what feminist legal scholars refer to as "the dilemma of difference" inherent in hate crime policy in the U.S. Here, the focus is on how the dilemma of difference has been attended to in the formulation of hate crime policy in the U.S., which simultaneously recognizes the ways in which gender is both distinct from and similar to other status provisions that anchor hate crime law in the U.S. (that is, race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disabilities, and so on).

II. Hate Crime (Loosely Conjured) in the U.S.

In the latter part of the twentieth century, the term "hate crime" and the legal logic it implies diffused across the globe as civil rights groups and criminal justice systems responded to an age-old form of violence—that which is organized around axes of social differentiation and targets minorities—in newfound ways. Thus, it is appropriate to conceptualize hate crime as part of a larger complex process of legal and cultural regulation of violence directed toward minorities in the U.S., and recently, across the globe.

A. The Emergence of Hate Crime in the U.S.

The concept "hate crime" first emerged in the United States in the late 1970s and has since been institutionalized in social, political, and legislative discourse in the U.S. and abroad. Although it remains an empirical question whether the U.S. and other countries that use the term to reference a subset of crime are experiencing greater levels of hate- or bias-motivated violence than in the past, it is beyond dispute that the term "hate crime" has found a home in various spheres of social and institutional life. From the introduction and politicization of the term in the late 1970s to the continued enforcement of hate crime law at the beginning of the twenty-first century, modern civil rights movements constructed the problem of bias-motivated violence in ways that distinguish it from other forms of violent crime; state and federal politicians made legislation that defines the parameters of hate crime in ways that distinguish it from other types of violent crime; judicial-decision makers elaborated and enriched the meaning of hate crime as they determined the constitutionality of "hate crime" as a legal concept that distinguishes types of violence based on the motivation of the perpetrator; and law enforcement officials continue to investigate and prosecute bias-motivated incidents as a special type of crime that warrants enhanced penalties.
As a result of these changes, violence born of bigotry and manifest as discrimination has been resignified and reacted to in ways that result in the reconfiguration of violence directed toward minorities. The result is twofold. First, in the U.S. it is increasingly understood that criminal conduct takes on a new meaning when it involves an act motivated by bigotry. Second, people of color, Jews, immigrants, and gays and lesbians are recognized routinely as victims of hate crime, while other vulnerable victims—for example, union members, octogenarians, the elderly, children, and police officers—are not. As this article will reveal, girls and women fall somewhere in between. This classification reflects the unique politics of hate crime in the U.S. In the U.S. the use of the term “hate crime” is now commonplace in settings as diverse as prime time television, the evening news, academic conferences, presidential proclamations, and all levels of lawmakers. In the last decade alone, a steady stream of seemingly disparate incidents has been presented to the public as hate crime, including repeated attacks on African Americans who moved into a predominately white neighborhood in Philadelphia; attacks by neighborhood youths on families of Cambodian refugees who fled to Brooklyn; the beating to death of a Chinese-American because he was presumed to be Japanese; the harassment of Laotian fishermen in Texas; the brutal attack on two men in Manhattan by a group of knife- and bat-wielding teenage boys shouting “homos!” and “fags!”; the assault on three women in Portland, Maine, after their assailant yelled anti-lesbian epithets at them; the gang rape, with bottles, lighted matches, and other implements, of a gay man who was repeatedly told “what faggots deserve”; the stabbing to death of a heterosexual man in San Francisco because he was presumed to be gay; and the gang rapes of a female jogger in Central Park and a mentally handicapped teenager in Glen Ridge, New Jersey.

B. Considering Three High-Profile Cases

In the latter part of the 1990s, three highly publicized cases of homicide occurred in which the victims were chosen because of a social characteristic. The first was the murder of James Byrd in Jasper, Texas in June of 1998. This event, covered extensively in the national media, presented the murder as a “hate crime” after it was revealed that Byrd, a 49-year-old black man, had been beaten and then dragged to his death behind a truck by three white men known to be affiliated with a white supremacist group. Shortly thereafter, the murder of Matthew Shepard, a young gay man who was pistol-whipped, tied to a fence, and left to die, was treated as a hate crime by the national news media. In contrast to these two incidents, the murder of four young girls in a Jonesboro, Arkansas schoolyard in March of 1998 generally has not been viewed as a hate crime, despite the revelation that the young boys in custody for the killings sought to shoot girls because it was girls that angered them. That is, they selected their victims on the basis of gender. Nonetheless, Time referred to it as a “youth crime” and Newsweek called it “schoolyard crime.” Because of
this framing, the incident triggered a different set of legal and policy discussions, most often expressed in terms of school violence and the debate over gun control.

Despite the empirical dissimilarities in the details of these three high profile cases, they nonetheless share an underlying parameter: In each of these cases the victims were apparently chosen by the perpetrators not because of who they were, but because of what they were. The fact that the events in Jasper, Texas and Laramie, Wyoming were interpreted as hate crimes and the event in Jonesboro, Arkansas was not reveals a key aspect of the contested terrain of hate crime: Who and what is included is a matter of interpretation, legal and otherwise. Clearly, then, if one were to rely upon media portrayals, gender would not be constitutive of “the hate crime problem in the U.S.” That is, it does not loom large in the most highly visible and widely discussed events that fall under the rubric of hate crime. However, it is important to note that the media does not define crime, at least not in a technical sense. It is the state that defines crime through the passage of law. Therefore, as most criminologists would agree, it is appropriate to define crime, including hate crime, with reference to statutes. Accordingly, the next section examines the standing of “gender” in both state and federal hate crime law in the U.S.

III. THE ENGENDERING OF HATE CRIME (LEGALLY DEFINED) IN THE U.S.

As others have documented, in the latter part of the twentieth century the law became the primary institution charged with defining and curbing hate- or bias-motivated violence.25 During a Congressional debate on hate crime, U.S. Representative Mario Biaggi said it most succinctly when he argued: “The obvious point is that we are dealing with a national problem and we must look to our laws for remedies.”26 Concurring, U.S. Representative John Conyers, Jr., the ranking member of the Judiciary Committee, explained that the enactment of hate crime legislation “will carry to offenders, to victims, and to society at large an important message, that the Nation is committed to battling the violent manifestations of bigotry.”27 Consistent with these views, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, lawmakers throughout the U.S. began to respond to what they perceived to be an escalation of violence directed at minorities with a novel legal strategy: the criminalization of discriminatory violence, now commonly referred to as “hate crime.” As a result, by the turn of the century, “in seemingly no time at all, a ‘hate crimes jurisprudence’ had sprung up.”28

A. Defining the Parameters of Hate Crime Law

With considerable variation in wording and content, criminal hate crime statutes are laws that criminalize, or further criminalize, activities motivated by bias toward individuals or groups because of their real or imagined characteris-
tics. Drawn from Grattet, Jenness, and Curry,\textsuperscript{29} this definition consists of three elements. First, the law provides a new state policy action by creating a new criminal category, altering an existing law, or enhancing penalties for select extant crimes when they are committed for bias reasons. Second, hate crime laws contain an intent standard.\textsuperscript{30} In other words, statutes contain wording that refers to the subjective intention of the perpetrator rather than relying solely on the basis of objective behavior. Finally, hate crime laws specify a list of protected social statuses, such as race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender, disabilities, and so on.\textsuperscript{31} These elements of the definition of hate crime law capture the spirit and essence of hate crime legislation designed to punish bias-motivated conduct.

B. The Content of State Hate Crime Law

At the state level, in the last two decades almost every state in the U.S. has adopted at least one hate crime statute that simultaneously recognizes, defines, and responds to discriminatory violence. Hate crime statutes have taken many forms throughout the U.S., including: statutes proscribing criminal penalties for civil rights violations; specific “ethnic intimidation” and “malicious harassment” statutes; and provisions in previously enacted statutes for enhanced penalties if an extant crime is committed for bias or prejudicial reasons. These laws specify provisions for race, religion, color, ethnicity, ancestry, national origin, sexual orientation, gender, age, disability, creed, marital status, political affiliation, age, marital status, involvement in civil or human rights, and armed service personnel. In addition, a few states have adopted statutes that require authorities to collect data on hate- or bias-motivated crimes; mandate law enforcement training; prohibit the undertaking of paramilitary training; specify parental liability; and provide for victim compensation. Finally, many states have statutes that prohibit institutional vandalism and the desecration or the defacement of religious objects, the interference with or disturbance of religious worship, cross burning, the wearing of hoods or masks, the formation of secret societies, and the distribution of publications and advertisements designed to harass select groups of individuals. This last group of laws references a previous generation of what, in retrospect, could be termed “hate crime” law.\textsuperscript{32}

More importantly, hate crime statutes vary in terms of the specific status provisions recognized by law. Status provisions such as race, religion, ethnicity, ancestry, sexual orientation, gender, disability, and so on, implicitly reference what Soul and Earl refer to as “target groups.”\textsuperscript{33} That is, race is a proxy for non-Whites, religion is a proxy for non-Christians, sexual orientation is a proxy for gays and lesbians, gender is a proxy for girls and women, and so forth. Given this, status provisions clearly single out some minorities and axes of oppression as worthy of legislative attention and attendant legal intervention,
while rendering invisible other axes of oppression around which violence is organized and attendant vulnerable victims.

In other words, status provisions contained in hate crime law define who does and does not count as a hate crime victim; likewise, status provisions in hate crime law delineate who does and does not qualify as a hate crime perpetrator. This determination and attendant differentiation is important insofar as it affects the types of people protected by hate crime law, as well as the types of perpetrators prosecutors can pursue using hate crime law. For example, if gender is included in a hate crime law, a person victimized because of her gender qualifies as a victim of hate crime; if, on the other hand, gender is not included in a hate crime law, the crime is not charged as a hate crime.

As lawmakers drafted, revised, and adopted hate crime law, especially early on in the process of thinking about the parameters of hate crime in the U.S., which types of distinctions should be written into law was an open-ended question. Activists and policymakers alike had to ponder a series of related questions, such as, “Who should be represented in hate crime law? Why? On what grounds?” To emphasize the political, rather than legal nature of this question, Laurence Tribe, Professor of Constitutional Law at Harvard University, informed lawmakers that the question of which status provisions to include in hate crime law presents no constitutional problem. As he explained in U.S. Congressional hearings on hate crime:

> Nothing in the U.S. Constitution prevents the Government from penalizing with added severity those crimes directed against people or their property because of their race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender or sexual orientation, and nothing in the Constitution requires that this list be infinitely expanded.\(^{34}\)

If, as Tribe suggests, legislators had considerable latitude, how did they proceed to demarcate status provisions in hate crime law? In particular, how did gender fare in the process, both in absolute terms and in comparative terms?

C. The Status of Gender in State Hate Crime Law

Some state lawmakers and attendant legislatures have ensured that “gender” found a home in state hate crime law. When it appears in hate crime law, the status provision for gender is articulated in different ways. First, it often is coded as “sex” in the legal definition of a hate crime. For example, in 1999 North Dakota passed a law that says:

A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if, whether acting under the color of law, he by force, or threat of force or by economic coercion, intentionally: 1) Injures, intimidates, or interferes with another because of his sex, race, color, religion, or national origin and because he is or has
been exercising or attempting to exercise his right to full and equal enjoyment of any facility open to the public. 2) Injures, intimidates, or interferes with another because of his sex, race, color, religion, or national origin in order to intimidate him or any other person from exercising or attempting to exercise his right to full and equal enjoyment of any facility open to the public.35

Similarly, West Virginia hate crime law declares the following:

All persons within the boundaries of the state of West Virginia have the right to be free from any violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their persons or property because of their race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation, or sex. If any person does by force or threat of force, willfully injure, intimidate or interfere with, or attempt to interfere with, or oppress or threaten any other person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him or her by the Constitution or laws of the state of West Virginia or by the Constitution or laws of the United States, because of such other person’s race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation, or sex, he or she shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction, shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.36

Second, consistent with the example in the introduction to this article, gender often appears alongside sexual orientation. For example, in 1991 Illinois passed a law that included both gender and sexual orientation as factors that shall be accorded weight as reasons to impose a more severe sanction (that is, enhanced penalty). This law defines a hate crime as a crime in which

the defendant committed the offense against a person or person’s property because of such person’s race, color, creed, religion, ancestry, gender, sexual orientation, physical or mental disability, or national origin. For the purposes of this section, “sexual orientation means heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality.”37

Similarly, Rhode Island’s “Hate Crime Sentencing Act” specifies the following:

[If any person has been convicted of a crime charged by complaint, information, or indictment, in which he or she intentionally selected the person against whom the offense is committed or selected the property that is damaged or otherwise affected by the offense because of the actor’s hatred or animus toward the actual or perceived disability, religion, color, race, national origin or ancestry, sexual orientation, or gender of that person or the owner or occupant of that property, he or she shall be subject to the [enhanced] penalties provided in this section.38
Finally, in some cases the status provision for gender was included in hate crime law as an amendment to a previously articulated hate crime law. For example, in 1987 California adopted an “Interference with Exercise of Civil Rights” law. It stated that:

No person, whether or not acting under color of law, shall by force or threat of force, willfully injure, intimidate, interfere with, oppress, or threaten any other person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him or her by the Constitution or laws of this state or by the Constitution or the laws of the United States because of the other person’s race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or sexual orientation.  

Thereafter, the California State legislature amended the law in two ways. First, it 1991 it amended the law to include “disability” and “gender.” Then, in 1994 it amended the law to include “or because he or she perceives that the person has one or more of those characteristics.” The law now reads:

No person, whether or not acting under color of law, shall by force or threat of force, willfully injure, intimidate, interfere with, oppress, or threaten any other person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him or her by the Constitution or laws of this state or by the Constitution or the laws of the United States because of the other person’s race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, gender, or sexual orientation or because he or she perceives that the other person has one or more of these characteristics.

Clearly, then, “gender” has been recognized as a source of bias-motivated violence by some legislators and legislatures. Nonetheless, it is fair to ask, how much has it been recognized as part and parcel of a larger hate crime problem in the U.S.? How does it compare with other axes of inequality and attendant discriminatory violence?

Figure 1 presents the total number of status provisions, by type, in the U.S. The most common status provisions are for race, religion, color, and national origin. These status provisions are associated with the most visible, recognizable, and stereotypical kinds of discriminatory behavior in U.S. history and in the current era. For example, in the U.S. the stereotypical hate crime involves violence toward or harassment of blacks, immigrants, or Jews. Accordingly, these status provisions can be referred to as “core” hate crime provisions in state hate crime law. In terms of frequency counts, a second tier of provisions includes sexual orientation, disability, ancestry, gender, creed, and ethnicity. Given that legislators, like the population at large, tend to conflate ancestry, creed, and ethnicity with race, religion, color, and national origins, at least at the level of terminology and attendant identity politics, these status provisions also arguably can be classified as core provisions. As a result, sexual orienta-
tion, disability, and gender stand alone as "second tier" provisions insofar as they appear with comparable frequency and less frequently than core provisions. Finally, there are some comparatively anomalous status provisions, including age, political affiliation, marital status, involvement in civil or human rights, and involvement in armed services personnel. These status provisions can be classified as anomalous insofar as they appear in state hate crime law comparatively infrequently. They have failed to gain a foothold as a key component of hate crime law.\textsuperscript{42}

**Figure 1**

![Chart showing the number of states with status provisions](image)

Figure 2 reveals the cumulative frequency of the status provisions included in state hate crime laws from 1978, the year the first state hate crime law was passed, until 2001, the last year for which systematic data on hate crime law are available. The respective unfolding of these clusters of status provisions—the core, the second tier, and the anomalous provisions—reveals that although the idea of including gender in hate crime policy was introduced very early on in the process of making hate crime policy, it did not find a secure home in hate crime law until about halfway through a larger process of legal reform designed to curb bias-motivated violence.\textsuperscript{43} Moreover, once it gained legitimacy and subsequent inclusion in law, gender nonetheless remained a less accepted provision in hate crime policy than those identified as core provisions.

The ways in which gender has been demoted in the politics of hate crime lawmaking are revealed in Jenness’s work on the politics of hate crime.\textsuperscript{44} Namely, early on in federal lawmaking the Coalition on Hate Crime,\textsuperscript{45} the primary group responsible for defining the parameters of proposed hate crime leg-
islation, contemplated recommending including gender as a protected status in legislation, but eventually decided against it for a variety of reasons. First, some members of the Coalition believed that the inclusion of gender would delay, if not completely impede, the timely passage of the law. Second, some members of the Coalition argued that including gender would open the door for age, disability, position in a labor dispute, party affiliation, and/or membership in the armed forces provisions. This, at the time, was seen as an undesirable outcome. Third, some believed that including gender would make enactment of the law too cumbersome, if not entirely impossible, since violent crimes against women are so pervasive and, arguably, caused by factors other than bigotry or discrimination. Fourth, and related, others argued that not all acts of violence against women fit (what was then) the working definition of a hate crime. Fifth, some members of the Coalition argued that expanding the categories of officially recognized hate crimes to include gender would not improve upon current efforts to collect official data on rape and domestic violence, two categories of gender-based violence deemed most worthy of special concern. Focusing on feasibility, opponents feared that adding gender as a victim category would simply overwhelm the data collection efforts of law enforcement agencies and human rights organizations that track hate crimes. Related, the large number of crimes against women would overshadow statistics on hate crimes against members of other groups.46
These patterns revealed in Figure 1 and Figure 2 are consistent with the history of various post-1960s civil rights movements in the U.S. Race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, creed, and ethnicity reflect the early legal contestation of minorities’ status and rights. Thus, there is a more developed history of invoking and then deploying the law, especially civil rights law, to protect and enhance the status of blacks, Jews, and immigrants. In contrast, the gay/lesbian movement, the women’s movement, and the disability movement reflect a “second wave” of civil rights activism and “identity politics” in the U.S. Accordingly, sexual orientation, gender, and disability only recently have been recognized as status provisions in hate crime law in the U.S. As Jenness has shown in her work on the U.S. Congressional hearings on hate crime, these are also more heavily contested protected statuses than the “first wave” (that is, core) categories. Not surprisingly, they remain less embedded in hate crime law. Finally, marital status, creed, age, armed service personnel, and political affiliation are not visibly connected to issues of discrimination and victimization by any particular mass movement; and, they are fairly anomalous status provisions in hate crime law in the U.S.

D. The Content of Federal Hate Crime Law

Following the states’ lead, the U.S. Congress has passed three laws specifically designed to address bias-motivated violence, only two of which reference gender as an element of hate crime. In 1990 President Bush signed the Hate Crimes Statistics Act, which requires the U.S. Attorney General to collect statistical data on “crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity, including where appropriate the crimes of murder; non-negligent manslaughter; forcible rape; aggravated assault; simple assault; intimidation; arson; and destruction, damage or vandalism of property.” As a data collection law, the Hate Crimes Statistics Act merely requires the Attorney General to gather and make available to the public data on bias-motivated crime, which has been accomplished every year since 1991. It does not stipulate new penalties for bias-motivated crimes, nor does it provide legal recourse for victims of bias-motivated crime. Most importantly, it does not include a provision for “gender”; thus gender-based bias-motivated crime is not visible in official hate crime statistics in the U.S. produced by Uniform Crime Report on Hate Crime in the U.S.

In 1994, Congress passed two more hate crime laws. The Violence Against Women Act specifies that “all persons within the United States shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender.” The Violence Against Women Act allocated over 1.6 billion dollars for education, rape crisis hotlines, training of justice personnel, victim services (especially shelters for victims of battery), and special units of police and prosecutors to deal with crimes against women. The heart of the legislation, Title III, provides
a civil remedy for “gender crimes.” The justification for such a remedy is as follows:

Congress finds that (1) crimes motivated by the victim’s gender constitute bias crimes in violation of the victim’s right to be free from discrimination on the basis of gender; (2) current law provides a civil remedy for crimes committed in the workplace, but not for gender crimes committed on the street and in the home; and (3) State and Federal laws do not adequately protect against the bias element of gender crimes, which separates these crimes from acts of random violence, nor do they adequately provide victims the opportunity to vindicate their interests.\(^{52}\)

In essence, Title III entitles victims to compensatory and punitive damages through the federal courts for a crime of violence if it is motivated, at least in part, by animus toward the victim’s gender. This allowance implicitly acknowledges that some, if not most, violence against women is not gender-neutral; instead, it establishes the possibility that violence motivated by gender animus is a proper subject for civil rights action. In so doing, it affixed the term hate crime to “a crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to animus based on the victim’s gender.”\(^{53}\) Although this law was recently ruled unconstitutional,\(^{54}\) it was predicated upon and promoted the inclusion of gender in the concept of a hate crime.

Also in 1994, Congress passed the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act. This law identifies eight predicate crimes—murder; non-negligent manslaughter; forcible rape; aggravated assault; simple assault; intimidation; arson; and destruction, damage, or vandalism of property—for which judges are allowed to enhance penalties of “not less than three offense levels for offenses that finder of fact at trial determines beyond a reasonable doubt are hate crimes.”\(^{55}\) For the purposes of this law, hate crime is defined as criminal conduct wherein “the defendant intentionally selected any victim or property as the object of the offense because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any person.”\(^{56}\) Although broad in form, this law addresses only those hate crimes that take place on federal lands and properties. It is this law that U.S. Attorney General Ashcroft invoked in the case described in the opening paragraphs of this article.

E. The Enforcement of Gender Provisions in Hate Crime Law

The state and federal laws described above suggest that in the contemporary era, many lawmakers and other policymakers share a commitment to using the law, law enforcement, and the criminal justice system as a vehicle to enhance the status and welfare of minority constituencies deemed differentially vulnerable to violence motivated by bigotry. However, the place of gender in
this commitment is distinct in empirically identifiable ways. First, gender is present in hate crime law, but only a second-class citizen in larger legal efforts to respond to bias-motivated violence. As described above and summarized in Figures 1 and 2, the distribution of provisions for gender in state and federal hate crime law reveals that gender has found a home in legal discourse on hate crime legislation, but it remains in the guest house of that home.

Second, connected to the location of gender in hate crime law, both federal and state efforts to collect data on bias crimes directed at people because of their gender have lagged behind efforts to collect data on the other types of bias crimes. For example, The Hate Crime Statistics Act does not mandate the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to collect data on bias crimes based on gender as part of the Uniform Crime Report (UCR); thus, gender-based violence is not referenced in official statistics on hate crime in the U.S. Similarly, at the state level, efforts to gather reports on gender-based hate crime have been delayed. For example, California, one of the largest and most heterogeneous states in the U.S., reports very few hate crimes based on gender. In 2001 California’s Attorney General’s Civil Rights Commission on Hate Crime published a report on the Attorney General’s webpage, which reported “hate crimes based on gender are not reported generally.” Accordingly, the report recommended that “the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) revise its training and guidelines to provide special emphasis on gender-based crimes.”

Third, consistent with reporting practices, police training publications and curriculum at federal, state, and local levels tend to discuss gender-based hate crime only infrequently, if at all. For example, the word “gender” does not appear in the major national bias-crime training manual for law enforcement and victim assistance professionals, Training Guide for Hate Crime Data Collection, published by the U.S. Department of Justice. Moreover, gender often does not appear in the law enforcement hate crime policies. For example, as Figure 3 reveals, in a large, heterogeneous, and progressive state like California, which has had a gender provision in its state hate crime law since 1991, gender appears in law enforcement hate crime policy less than one-third of the time. Specifically, only 121 law enforcement agencies, out of 397 law enforcement agencies, direct their officers to attend to gender-based hate crime. As a result, gender-based hate crime remains largely invisible to front line law enforcers, who tend to focus mostly on race, religion, sexual orientation, and nationality. A lack of emphasis on gender in law enforcement curriculum and policies leads to a lack of recognition among law enforcement officers, which, in turn, results in an underreporting of bias-motivated crimes based on gender.
Fourth and finally, when law enforcement personnel attempt to enforce gender provisions in hate crime law, they do so with added complications. For example, in Massachusetts the Attorney General has instituted a policy whereby gender-based hate crimes require at least two previous restraining orders issued to protect two different domestic partners.61 Over the past ten years there have been fewer than ten cases in which these criteria have been met.62 Restrictive policies such as these ensure that hate crimes based on gender are extremely difficult to prosecute.

Moving beyond the question of enforceability, as with any policy reform that directs attention to any minority constituency, the inclusion/exclusion of gender in hate crime law raises the larger question of how best to resolve the dilemma of difference in policy/lawmaking. This question is addressed in the next section.

IV. GENDER, HATE CRIME LAW, AND THE DILEMMA OF DIFFERENCE

For legal scholars the "dilemma of difference" can best be stated as a question: Should those interested in enhancing the status and welfare of minority groups pursue policies that provide "special" treatment for minorities, including women; or, alternatively, should they pursue policies that ignore the unique social location, special qualities, and socially structured obstacles faced by minorities, including women, and work solely toward improving "equality" for all members of society? With regard to crime control policies in particular,
should the law recognize the “special” needs of minorities, including women, or should the same social and legal resources be made available to all victims of crime, regardless of their social characteristics or group membership? Stated more succinctly, should all victims of crime be treated the same, or should some victims of crime, namely “vulnerable victims” and people who face unique barriers when accessing the criminal justice system and pursuing justice, be distinguished and treated differently? Historically and in the current era, advocates for minorities, feminists and other critical legal scholars, and policymakers of all stripes have had to respond to this question. This section addresses this familiar, yet pressing, concern by examining the contours of and justifications for status provisions, especially “gender,” in American hate crime law. In so doing, this section concludes this article by arguing that the inclusion of gender in hate crime policy allows the “sameness/difference” debate to be solved in a way that both 1) treats girls and women as a special category of crime victim and, at the same time, the same as other hate crime victims; and 2) treats perpetrators of gender-based crime as a special category of offender and, at the same time, the same as other types of bias-motivated offenders. How does it do this?

A. Gender and the Dilemma of Difference Historically

In the latter part of the twentieth century, feminist legal scholars debated how best to invoke and position gender when using the law to advocate on behalf of girls and women in the pursuit of their full participation in U.S. society. Early on, scholars split over the following, seemingly simple, question: How should the law attend to institutionalized gender inequality? The so-called “equal treatment” advocates argue that gender equality requires identical treatment of the sexes, without regard to pregnancy, differential vulnerability to crime, underrepresentation in the workplace, and so forth.63 As Williams argued in her often cited article, “Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate,” “an anti-discrimination provision is a device for telling legislators, governments and designated others what they may not do, thus setting parameters within which they must operate. It does not, and cannot, do the basic work of readjusting the social order.”64 In contrast, the so-called “special treatment” camp rejects the equal treatment model in favor of an equal opportunity model, often labeled a “special treatment” or a “positive action” approach.65 Here, the idea is that the law must treat classes of persons, for example girls and women, differently insofar as they are differently situated in society. Still others advanced an approach that tried to “split the difference,” as it were, between the poles represented by the “sameness/difference” positions. For example, in her classic work on “Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy,” Herma Hill Kay put forth an “episodic analysis” for dealing with pregnancy (or any other gender related difference).66 Kay argues that the law should treat biologically derived sex differences as legally significant only
when they are being utilized for reproductive purpose—that is, only when the differences matter in the context under legal scrutiny.\(^{67}\)

More recently, the choice between whether to emphasize and delineate social difference(s) in social policy, especially law, has been astutely characterized by Harvard Law Professor Martha Minow as the “dilemma of difference.”\(^{68}\) As Minow (1991) details in her book *Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law*, the dilemma of difference is a philosophical, legal, and strategic issue that has implications for an array of social issues ranging from affirmative action to maternal leave policies to gay marriage to discrimination in the workplace against persons with disabilities.\(^{69}\) As Minow writes,

> The stigma of difference may be recreated both by ignoring and by focusing on it. Decisions about education, employment, benefits, and other opportunities in society should not turn on an individual’s ethnicity, disability, race, gender, religion, or membership in any other group about which some have deprecating or hostile attitudes. Yet refusing to acknowledge these differences may make them continue to matter in a world constructed with some groups, but not others, in mind. These problems of inequality can be exacerbated both by treating members of minority groups the same as members of the majority and by treating the two groups differently.\(^{70}\)

Often summarized as a tension between “same” versus “different” treatment policies, “the dilemma of difference may be posed as a choice between integration and separation, as a choice between similar treatment and special treatment, or as a choice between neutrality and accommodation.”\(^{71}\) As such, it obviously evokes questions about how to treat social differences, such as those loosely referenced under the rubric of “gender,” in public policy, especially lawmaking, as there are costs and benefits associated with both choices to policymaking.

Policies that emphasize gender as a significant axis of social differentiation by focusing on the “special” needs of women, such as pregnancy leave and affirmative action policies, risk reinforcing cultural distinctions between women and men. Such policies can construct women as different from men, underscore their incapacities and special needs as the defining feature of their social identities and, ultimately, place them in subordinate positions within both public and private spheres of social life. Arguably, one of the unintended consequences of social policies that single out women for “special” protections and treatment is the reinforcement of the idea that women are more vulnerable members of society and are less capable of responding to real and perceived vulnerabilities.\(^{72}\) And so it is with the *presence* of gender in hate crime law, which clearly treats girls and women as “target groups”\(^{73}\) in need of special treatment.\(^{74}\)
In contrast, policies that ignore differences between types of victims risk being insensitive to the increasingly well-documented institutional, organizational, and interactional disadvantages faced by women, including those who find themselves confronting a criminal justice system with ideologies and structures that were enacted with men in mind.\textsuperscript{75} Treating women the same as other crime victims does little to challenge the biases and stereotypes with which criminal justice officials often operate. A sizeable body of evidence suggests that ignoring social difference seldom is enough to produce equality, especially in the criminal justice system. Indeed, failing to acknowledge the differences around which systematic injustices revolve allows state officials to continue to do business as usual and does little to remedy systematic inequality. And so it is with the \textit{absence} of gender in hate crime law, which clearly ignores girls and women as “target groups”\textsuperscript{76} in need of special treatment.\textsuperscript{77}

B. Resolving the Dilemma of Difference

As described in the previous section, the presence and absence of gender is evident in the introduction, adoption, and enforcement of a body of law properly called “hate crime law.” This situation speaks to both the positive and the negative consequences of including gender in hate crime law. On the negative side, the inclusion of gender in hate crime law often is perceived to be creating “special” treatment where such treatment directly or indirectly reproduces stereotypes about women as vulnerable victims in need of state protection. On the positive side, the inclusion of gender in hate crime law serves to acknowledge the drawbacks of ignoring girls’ and women’s differential vulnerability to violence. Clearly, at this point in history, both the negative side and the positive side of the dilemma of difference remain evident in the in/exclusion of provisions for gender in hate crime law.

To the degree that gender has been recognized as a component of hate crime in the U.S., violence directed at girls and women because they are girls and women is segregated from other types of violence, and perpetrators of gender-based violence are deemed different from other types of perpetrators. Consistent with the spirit of hate crime law,\textsuperscript{78} when a crime involves a “gender bias” it receives different treatment and evokes segregated practices. Such is the case with the high profile crime introduced at the beginning of this article. In this case, U.S. Attorney General Ashcroft did something historic: He called the double murder a hate crime, invoked the relevant law to legitimate this definition, and treated the double murder as a “special” case of murder—one that deserves enhanced penalties. In this unique case, this criminal category hate crime evokes special prosecutorial concerns and harsher penalties, as well as immense media coverage of heretofore unheard-of state action. This is no small result of decades of legal reform around bias-motivated violence.

Paradoxically, the same legal reform that resulted in the U.S. Attorney General’s distinguishing the murder described in the opening paragraph of this
article as a hate crime also embraced the “norm of sameness.” As a basic assumption of American law and thus lawmaking, the “norm of sameness” is best expressed in the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution and is echoed in innumerable other locations. Simply put, the “norm of sameness” stipulates that laws must apply equally to all groups and individuals in society. As a journalist recently observed and questioned with regard to the proliferation of hate crime law, “A large stone in the foundation of the American dream is the idea that every person is equal in citizenship and that every life should be equally valued and protected. No one should accept less, but is anyone entitled to more?”79 For the most part, “equal treatment” historically has meant “sameness.” That is, a law must not give one group benefits or protections that it does not extend to others; all groups must be treated the same.80

C. Applying the “Norm of Sameness”

In the case of hate crime law the norm of sameness is evident in two outcomes: “across-category sameness” and “within-category sameness” (see Figure 4). With regard to the former, violence against girls and women is rendered equivalent to other types of “crimes against minorities.” The institutionalization of gender provisions in hate crime law serves to include girls and women in the coalition of status groups already covered under the law, ensuring there is nothing “special” or “different” about girls and women when compared with blacks, Jews, persons with disabilities, immigrants, and so forth. That is, “girls and women” are extended the “same” treatment accorded to other similarly situated (minority) groups deemed “vulnerable victims,” in this case other “target groups” recognized in hate crime law. As a result, hate crimes against women are rendered equivalent to hate crimes against immigrants, just as hate crimes against persons with disabilities are rendered equivalent to hate crimes against Muslims.81
The second way in which the "norm of sameness" has been manifested in legal reform related to hate crime is through what might best be called "within-category sameness." Although the spirit of hate crime law is to protect minorities, each side of the minority-majority dualism is—technically speaking—equally protected by law. Like the other anti-discrimination laws that preceded them, hate crime laws are written in a way that eludes the historical basis and meaning of specific forms of bias-motivated violence by translating specific categories of persons (for example, blacks, Jews, gays and lesbians, Mexicans, and so on) into all-encompassing and seemingly neutral categories (for example, race, religion, sexual orientation, national origin). In doing so, the laws do not offer any remedies or protections to members of minority groups that are not simultaneously available to all other races, religions, genders, sexual orientations, nationalities, and so forth. Minorities are treated the same as their counterparts. With regard to gender provisions in particular, violence against girls and women is rendered equivalent to violence against boys and men when the violence occurs because of gender.
V. Conclusion

At the end of the day, members within and across socially recognized minority and majority groups have equal standing before the law. Although hate crime law can, at a glance, appear to identify, demarcate, and promote attentiveness to social differences and the social disadvantages that accrue around them, the way it is written and enforced promotes sameness overriding differences. Thus, in the case of gender, hate crime law, and the dilemma of difference, it is possible that state and federal hate crime law manages to increase the public awareness of criminal victimization of women as gendered beings, without defining them as "different" from other minorities—or from men, for that matter. As a result, in the case described in the opening paragraph of this article, the U.S. Attorney General, a Republican appointee, is able to simultaneously treat the murder of Julianne Marie Williams and Laura Winans, two women who happened to be lesbians, as significantly different from most murders that occurred in the U.S. in 1996 and basically the same as other hate crimes perpetrated against other minorities in the U.S. That is no small feat. It is as much a historic moment as it is a paradoxical expression.

Notes

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
9. The one article that does directly address gender as a key component of hate crime examines the "ways in which gender forces us to revisit the meaning of violence through the sins of omission as well as commission, through a deepening of the understanding of public and private spheres of life, and to expand what we mean by victims, survivors, and resisters." See Debra J. Kaufman, “Renaming Violence,” American Behavioral Scientist 45 (2001): 654-654.
12. Ibid.
19. For a complete review of the emergence and evolution of the concept in the U.S., see Jenness & Grattet, Making Hate a Crime; Valerie Jenness, “The Hate Crime Canon and Beyond: A Critical Assessment,” Law and Critique 12 (2001): 279. More recently, the U.S.-born concept of hate crime has diffused across international borders as various Western countries, especially those sharing a predominantly English-speaking culture, appropriate and deploy the concept to reference bias-motivated conduct in their respective legal and cultural milieu. See Jenness, “Hate Crime in the U.S. and Abroad.” Australia, for example, has outlawed at the federal, state, and territory levels words and images that incite hatred toward particular groups of people. Relying on discrimination law, Australian legislators have outlawed conduct that constitutes “vilification” or “racial hatred.” Britain and Canada also have passed a series of laws designed to curb racial-ethnic violence. Finally, Germany has passed laws that forbid “public incitement” and “instigation of racial hatred,” including the distribution of Nazi propaganda or literature liable to corrupt the youth. Unlike the U.S., other countries have adopted a fairly limited view of hate crime, focusing primarily on racial, ethnic, and religious violence, and still other countries—mostly in the non-western world—have not adopted the term to reference racial, ethnic, religious, and other forms of intergroup conflict.
21. Despite this media portrayal of the incident, the case was not prosecuted under the Texas hate crime law. While publicly understood as a hate crime, in legal terms the incident
was defined as aggravated homicide. The maximum penalty for the murder could not have been enhanced because aggravated homicide is a capital crime.

22. Like the Byrd case, this case was not prosecuted as a hate crime.
29. Grattet, Jenness & Curry, "Homogenization and Differentiation."
31. Jenness, "Managing Differences."
32. These laws appeared as early as the late 1800s in response to perceived escalation of Klan activity. They are distinct from the contemporary hate crime laws insofar as they are considerably older, do not contain a bias "intent standard," do not specify protected statuses, and most notably, were not introduced under the rubric of "hate crimes legislation."
36. WV ST § 61-6-21 (1982).
40. Ibid.
41. Levin & McDevitt, *Hate Crimes Revisited*; Perry, *In the Name of Hate*.
42. Anomalous status provisions continue to be introduced in states. For example, in 2001 a bill was introduced in Portland, Oregon that calls for an additional five years in prison for an offender whose crime is motivated by "a hatred of people who subscribe to a set of political beliefs that support capitalism and the needs of people with respect to their balance with nature." See the *Oregonian*, 11 February 2001, sec. D, p. 1. According to the local press, if passed, this legislation would "expand the definition of hate crimes in a novel direction: to include the actions of eco-terrorists and critics of capitalism." See the *Oregonian*, 11 February 2001, sec. D, p. 1. Interpreted by the national press, this bill would "make it a hate crime to smash a Starbucks window or sabotage a timber company." See the *Associated Press*, 10 February 2001.
43. For a larger discussion along these lines, see Broad & Jenness, "Institutionalizing Work."
45. The Coalition on Hate Crimes was comprised of civil rights, religious, ethnic, and law enforcement groups, as well as a diverse array of professional organizations, including: the ADL, the American Bar Association, thirty Attorneys General, the National Institute Against Prejudice and Violence, the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, the American
Psychological Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the Center for Democratic Renewal, the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Jewish Congress, People for the American Way, the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, the Police Executives Research Forum, the Criminal Justice Statistics Administration, the International Association of Police Chiefs, the National Council of Churches, the National Coalition of American Nuns, and the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee.

46. For a more detailed discussion of the debates around whether to include gender in hate crime law, see Jenness and Broads work on the topic. Jenness, "Managing Differences"; Jenness & Broad, Hate Crimes: New Social Movements.


49. Jenness, "Managing Differences."


56. Ibid.

57. Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990, see note 53.


59. Ibid.


61. Levin & McDevitt, Hate Crimes Revisited, 21.

62. Ibid.


64. Weissberg, Feminist Legal Theory: Foundations, 151.


67. Ibid.

68. Minow, Making All the Difference.

69. Ibid.

70. Minow, Making All the Difference, 20.

71. Minow, Making All the Difference, 20-21.
73. Soule & Earl, “Differential Protection.”
76. Soule & Earl, “Differential Protection.”
77. Bufkin, “Bias Crime as Gendered Behavior.”
80. Minow, *Making All the Difference.*
81. It is important to emphasize, of course, that the history and content of violence organized around gender is not equivalent to other forms of discriminatory violence, such as those organized around race, religion, nationality, disabilities, sexual orientation, political affiliation, and so on. Each axis of social differentiation carries with it a different context for bias-motivated violence, as well as different causes, manifestations, and consequences of bias-motivated violence.
STUDENT VOICES

The Conquering Lion

by Julian Aguon

People have often asked me what I thought justice meant. I used to quote
the rhetoric voiced by many leftists today across college campuses. Now I see
that justice is a word that drips with sweat and blood. Studying the rich history
of black women in America, I am compelled to look inward to see myself, and
my own truths, and listen to my own stories, and to ground my journey as a co-
creator of justice with integrity.

Integrity grounds this work, and it is integrity that will lead me home.
What is justice, then? The path and where it leads. The voices of black women
— those sung and unsung heroic voices that command me to connect and tell
me to give flesh to what should never become the intellectual game of people
who talk about oppression casually and without reverence. As a junior in an
American private university, I have witnessed too many conversations in which
the oppressed remain objects of someone’s experiences and not subjects in their
own right.

The voices of these black women have called me to remembrance and
revealed to me a new history. Prophets throughout the world’s main religions
have always spoken of the one to come, the one to follow after. Deliverance is
a beautiful thing once understood. Harriet Tubman led her people to freedom in
the Underground Railroad. A Moses of her people, she parted the sea again and
again. She answered the call of the Anawim, what the ancient Hebrews called
the suffering and poor of the earth. Tubman freed them, at the risk of her own
life.

For her, as for many black women in American history, to answer the call
of the oppressed was to risk your life. To be a revolutionary was to invest your
whole self into the struggle for freedom. For Harriet Tubman, the act of sur-
vival was itself resistance. It was rebellion against the injustice. Armed with
their freedom songs, these women waged war for their emancipation. They
fought by staying alive and creating community. And they fought through song.

Many college students have jumped on the bandwagon of social justice as
a theme and hastened fast onto the leftist star. So many angry leftists talk about
how revolutionary they are. Is this anger even theirs? I find it indecent to claim
rage not one’s own. It’s not that the pain of injustice cannot cross racial or any
other socially constructed divide. Human pain is human. But many of these
self-proclaimed progressives so easily and often commit the crime of oversimp-
lication, and oversimplification is dangerous.

I’ve witnessed too many conversations in these progressive circles in
which young people believe, at times arrogantly, that they know exactly what
they are talking about, that they understand the horribleness of oppression. Many have never seen and may never see the truly cruel face of terror that is oppression, or realize that they too are marked by the sin of human disconnectedness. By the very nature of oppression, the hands of the oppressor are scarred with shame. How revolutionary are these often well-intentioned, but young, minds? What is revolution anyway? Blood. Sweat. Tears. It is the road so hard to walk, the one loaded with all the hard questions. But it is precisely the hard questions that should be asked.

Where does the path of righteousness begin? In small acts of integrity. It starts in a humility that knows righteous anger intimately. Righteousness is a word I understand best when I listen to the freedom songs of people bleeding for the struggle to emancipate themselves from social bondage. To be righteous is to weep for the Anawim. In 1964, Fannie Lou Hamer sang “This Little Light of Mine” after the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party was denied seats in Atlantic City. These people, so devoted to the cause of earning the vote for black people in their racially torn southern state, were turned away at the national convention. They couldn’t even sit. So, in all their dignity they stood. And sang. Their song was a freedom song.

The inspirational black hymn that day became a historically manifested war cry of the Anawim—those people whose blood burned after God and justice and who never lost hold of their radical hope for the dignity they deserved as human beings. History has heard again and again the caged bird sing. Wailing, lamenting, Fannie Lou stood up for something. Is it safe to say there are two types on the path? Those who want justice, and those who need it. The black community that took that bus ride from Mississippi up to Atlantic City needed it. As tears poured down the faces of these freedom fighters, injustice was etched into human consciousness, and the indignity and shame of oppression rose above them, unfurling like the greatest flag, up to scar the sky.

What does it mean to be a freedom fighter today? It means to stay in the struggle. Indeed, the face of the struggle for freedom has changed. It has grown subtle and more conniving. To chant down Babylon today is not to attack white people but to destroy the system of white privilege. Babylon is not white people but whiteness. But it is more than that, too. Babylon is our social structures and institutions that perpetuate the injustice and indignity of oppression. It is the system of hopelessness, of those who no longer believe they can do anything to mend the torn fabric of human society. Those who chant down Babylon today are entering the conversation, burning after justice in their hearts.

Today, wars are waged in American classrooms at institutions of higher learning to connect and remain connected, to stand up for something, to not fall into the far-too-tempting trap of escaping the moral obligation to care about the well being of other people, to not distance social strife by declaring the -isms that once wrought the country as things of the past. Make no mistake; they are saturated in the present moment. Everything is connected to everything else.
I am a sociology major. I share this major with Martin Luther King Jr., but I also share it with so many of my peers whose furthest step in their education for justice is that there is inequality and injustice in this country and in the wider world. It is a sad day when these students erroneously believe that the same face of terror is no longer alive and well in this country. To not acknowledge the problem is a grave misstep. There are new wounds, and old ones have remained. Racism and other -isms are nowhere near gone. They have become institutionalized and are in one way far more potent. The spirit of freedom was strong in many of these black women. It is strong today, in the hearts of those people who humbly walk the path of righteousness.

Righteousness is the road to freedom and to redemption. Whose redemption? Absolutely everyone’s. Righteousness is a journey of perseverance. Again, a soul fruit that was ripe in the lives of black women who carried their communities on their backs. Lauryn Hill’s song “The Conquering Lion,” inspired by the truth-telling and spiritual righteousness of Bob Marley’s music and for the sake of all the children of the Diaspora, is today’s freedom song.

“The conquering lion shall break every chain, every chain, every chain. Give him the victory, we need some victory, we need some victory again and again and again and again.” The road to redemption is precisely this always-unfolding journey. There is a righteous anger that transcends race as the social construction it is. It is the emancipatory spirit of righteousness, given flesh in the lives of people willing to stay in the struggle wholeheartedly, even if it means to fight the same war again and again. To understand the wholeness of this commitment is to understand what the 13th-century Sufi mystic Rumi once said: “Half-heartedness doesn’t reach into majesty.”

To stay in the struggle is to be willing to sit with the agony of not having absolute certitude, to be able to sit with unresolved tension and to stop looking to escape or transfer the burden of our most pressing moral obligations. Our present condition as a human family needs serious attention. Now is the time to answer the call of the Anawim. Now is the moment to lay down the sword of social deception for the sword of righteousness. I am opening and beginning to see what our struggle looks like.

Ours is the journey of the conquering lion.
BOOK REVIEWS

Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing*

Reviewed by Steven K. Baum

It used to be that if you wanted to examine the psychology of genocidal thinking, there were only a handful of writers from which to choose. Over the last decade solid psychological examinations have been offered by Erving Staub1 and Neil Kressel.2 Now there is a third, and this newest contender can be proud as his is the most comprehensive work offering the best understanding of why we as a species hate so effectively.

James Waller, chair of Whitworth College’s psychology department, has built on his previous writings (two previous books and several key articles) by offering a model of extraordinary evil that finally takes the awe from the awful and incomprehensible. Waller begins the daunting task of explaining hate by focusing on the conditions under which many of us could be transformed into killing machines. His focus remains locked on ordinary people. By sifting through thousands of research and theory articles from multiple sources, he creates a synthesis not previously known.

In section one, he examines several current notions of hate, i.e., group processes, ideological attraction, psychopathology (e.g., Mad Nazi), and personality (including critiques of Lifton and Milgram), and concludes that none of the prior conditions is sufficient to explain hate’s processes. The next section introduces his own model of extraordinary evil and consists of shadow or ancestral drives, such as ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and social dominance; perpetrator identity components, such as cultural beliefs, moral disengagement, and self-interest; as well as context or culture of cruelty (socialization, group influences and role/person merger). The paradigm is easy and makes sense.

The final section consists of the question, “What have we learned and why does it matter?” and summarizes all that we currently have learned in the field. It should come as no surprise that this is the shortest section, so Waller correctly focuses on the burgeoning field of genocidal warning signs.

The book jacket states that Explaining Evil is written for layperson and academician alike. This is blatantly wrong. This is a scholarly work that provides hundreds of thoughtful and helpful footnotes. Perhaps the publishers meant to comment that the book is well written, or that it makes complicated concepts easy to understand. What the book does offer is a feature not seen in most works of this kind. This has to do with a structure that shifts back and

forth between theory and practice. For example, when a theoretical point is made, it is followed by a short first-person account of what life was like during mass killings in, say, Babi Yar, Croatia, or the lesser known Tonie Sap. Such vignettes create the effect of moderator in the foreground followed by visuals in the background and offer the reader an enhanced sense of reality. This provides some respite in an otherwise difficult and too theoretical topic.

Einstein once said that it is easier to denature plutonium than to denature the evil spirit of man. Waller has done a highly commendable job of furthering our understanding of that spirit.

NOTES

The Popes Against the Jews: The Vatican’s Role in the Rise of Modern Anti-Semitism*

Reviewed by Steven K. Baum**

Rome has had a lot of apologizing and explaining to do lately. Added to the growing list of assaults, sex scandals, and indignities is the Catholic Church’s long-standing love-hate relationship with the Jews. In a nation that bore the first Jewish ghettos, made Jews wear identity badges, forbade them to develop relations with Christians in marriage, commerce, land ownership and living quarters, Vatican politics and policy and legendary denial should not come as any surprise.

Brown University Social Science professor David I. Kertzer should know. Author of The Kidnapping of Edgardo Mortara, he examined the Bologna Church’s 1858 kidnapping of a Jewish child (Mortara) and the forced baptism, Catholic press propaganda, and Church denial during a Catholic conversion. In The Popes Against the Jews he focuses on the larger issues of the Vatican’s involvement in the Dreyfus Affair, the Catholic press, transmission of hate mythologies, for example, blood libel (Jews allegedly kidnapping Christian children to eat during Passover), as well as papal politics from 1740 and 1940. Kertzer links theory with results and asks: After hundreds of years of anti-Semitism, why question Pope Pius XII’s indifference to the thousand Roman Jews en route to Auschwitz?

This is not yet another indictment of anti-Semitic popes. Kertzer speaks to Church intolerance, stonewalling, and cover-up. A recent event is telling. Pope John Paul II called for an inquiry into Church culpability during the Jewish genocide. The panel was finally convened in 1999 by the Vatican’s Commission for Religious Relations with the Jews and the International Jewish Committee on Inter-religious Consultations. Professors Robert Wistrich (Hebrew University, Jerusalem), Michael Marrus (University of Toronto), and Bernard Sucheky (University of Brussels), plus three Catholic researchers, released a report asking 47 “significant” questions regarding the policies and actions of Pope Pius. As this was more than the Vatican wanted the world to know, church officials immediately called off the probe.

Change is slow in the Catholic Church. As of 1965, the Jews were no longer guilty of having killed Christ; Galileo was forgiven by 1981. The Church did go to great lengths to separate religious anti-Semitism from its nine-

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** Steven K. Baum is book review editor for the Journal of Hate Studies and former book review editor for the Journal of Adult Development.
teenth-century racialist cousin. (The latter Darwinian version is thought to have
given rise to the Jewish genocide of the Second World War.) The argument is a
spurious one, however, since both ideologies have proven to be quite effective.
One would have to ask the victims of the Inquisition and Crusades if they could
tell the difference.

Kertzer rightly acknowledges that the Roman Catholic Church is hardly
alone to blame for enmity toward Jews (One cannot find more anti-Semitic
statements than from prominent Protestant theologians such as Martin Luther).
Individual acts of bravery in saving Jews and “hidden children” are well docu-
mented and lauded.

There are other, more trenchant examinations on the subject currently
available, Daniel J. Goldhagen’s A Moral Reckoning4 prominent among them.
But Kertzer offers a brief and concise explanation of what was and what could
have been. What Kertzer makes clear is that alleged Catholic Church indiffer-
ence to the Jewish genocide is not an act of omission, but occurs by quiet
collusion and the politics of hate.

NOTES

1. Venice, 1516.
3. Vatican II.
A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation*

Reviewed by Beth Greenbaum

Driven by thirst after just arriving at Auschwitz, told he can’t even break off an icicle to suck, Primo Levi asks, “Why?” A guard answers, “There is no ‘why’ here.”

Why did this happen? Why did the Holocaust happen? Why do other genocides continue to happen? Eric D. Weitz, in his book *A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation*, suggests a nation’s attempt to create a utopian society leads to genocide. His answer to this unanswerable, almost unaskable question—why—is courageous and fruitful.

By examining events of four genocides (in Germany under Hitler, the USSR under Stalin, Cambodia under Pol Pot, and Yugoslavia under Milošević), Weitz shows how a maniacal search for the utopian society leads to exclusion of those “others” who don’t fit in. Thus, the Soviets tried to obliterate their moneyed classes to create a proletarian society, the Cambodians tried to obliterate the educated and professional classes to create a classless society, the Serbs tried to eliminate all other ethnic and religious groups to create an exclusively Serbian nation, and the Germans tried to eliminate Jews, Gypsies, and the physically and mentally impaired to create a society of supermen.

Eric Weitz proves his thesis meticulously by explaining and showing how each of the four genocides shared several common attributes: the desire to create a utopia, the classifying and ostracizing of the “other,” and finally, the removal of those “others” through expulsion, re-education, ethnic cleansing, or death. It was with glorious visions of nationhood—of the perfect society—that populations could rally around a charismatic dictator’s call for a new union that excluded those deemed an impediment to the new nation. This elimination of undesirables led to mass murder and genocide, to state sanctioned sadism.

Weitz carefully defines in his first chapters the growing focus in the modern world on race and nationhood. He shows how social Darwinism’s focus on evolution and survival of the fittest provided a rationale to those seeking to understand disparities in populations, as well as those seeking to sift out unwanted people.

In each genocide Weitz describes how the ruling elite, seeking a homogeneous citizenry, dehumanized a portion of the population through law and language. Like the Nuremberg Laws instituted in 1935 in the Third Reich, there were laws preceding each of the other genocides that banned certain citizens from jobs, parks, and public transportation. There was language used that turned humans into “microbes” or “vermin” or “parasites.” Diversity was not

welcome, and indeed dividing the population into those on the inside and those on the outside eased the way for outsiders to be dehumanized and pushed out altogether.

In the Soviet Union, despite the goal of unifying the country and teaching the “underdeveloped peoples” to brush their teeth, bathe, and read, there were “cleansing” actions against “suspect” nationalities and “anti-Soviet elements,” including Greeks, Bulgarians, Armenians, Kurds, Koreans, and Chechens. And, of course, there were the notorious Stalinist purges by deportation, imprisonment, or execution of those of bourgeois or aristocratic origins, the unproductive, and social marginals. All this death and purging was intended to form a more perfect union.

The story of extermination in Nazi Germany has been told numerous times. However, Weitz presents a cogent explanation of the development and horror of racial thinking that led to the deaths of Jews and Gypsies. “Always direct in his lectures to fellow Nazis, Himmler made it clear that National Socialist occupation policy was designed carefully to distinguish the different peoples of eastern Europe—and to eliminate the inferior ones, physically or culturally or both.” The primacy of race, Weitz writes, as an ideology, as a set of social practices, as state policy, helps explain the origins of the genocide and how it could continue even when it contradicted military goals.

In Cambodia, the task of the Khmer Rouge was to “rid in each party member, each cadre, everything that is of the oppressor class, of private property, of stance, view, sentiment, custom, literature, art.” Essentially, the Khmer Rouge attempted to take away all that humanizes and civilizes man. The Khmer Rouge, like the other parties and movements discussed in Weitz’s book, “venerated the state as the agent that would create the future society,” depopulating the cities, collectivizing the countryside, creating conditions for an ideal communism.

Weitz quotes horrifying accounts of witnesses who watched Khmer Rouge kill a man by stringing him up, cutting out his liver while he was still alive, and cooking the liver in an already heated frying pan—and eating the liver. “Like rape, like torture, cannibalism symbolizes the utter, complete degradation of the individual, the utter domination of another through the decimation and consumption of the body. As an act of total power, nothing could be more complete than this.” And “this” is, ultimately, what state sponsored genocide is about: the degradation and dehumanization of a human being—even after death.

In the Balkan confluence of ideology and religion, Weitz describes a whirlpool formed of communism, nationalism, Serbian Orthodoxy, Albanian Muslims, Bosnian Muslims, and Croats. The racial cleansing and genocide in the Balkans again follows the process of separating a diverse population into factions and classifications. “In the drive to establish a completely homogeneous and ‘pure’ Serbian state and society, nationalists adopted the most violent
methods designed to make a multinational society unthinkable and, finally, unbearable."

One problem in reading Weitz’s historical narrative is his piling of fact upon cited fact, leaving no sense of the author’s voice. In a single paragraph, survivors’ voices mingle with SS soldiers’ voices, as well as historians’ voices. It would be preferable to know who is speaking without having to flip back constantly to the biographical notes.

This book offers a cautionary tale that might, as Weitz suggests, serve as a guide to the warning signs of genocides in formation. In none of the cases discussed was genocide predetermined or inevitable, not even in Nazi Germany. In each case, the leaders were animated by powerful visions of a future utopia.

If these movements and regimes envisioned distinctive utopias, they shared a common determination to remake fundamentally the societies and states they had either conquered or inherited. Ironically, in their drive to found utopia, the four regimes Weitz discusses fought to create the “new man” and the “new woman.” And none succeeded.

In his conclusion, Weitz writes that we are moving slowly toward “a new international order in which the world community seems more willing to intervene in cases of massive violations of human rights.” Perhaps we are also moving toward a global community, full of diversity.