The *Journal of Hate Studies* is published by the Gonzaga University Institute for Hate Studies. The purpose of the Journal is to promote the sharing of interdisciplinary ideas and research relating to the study of what hate is, where it comes from, and how to combat it. The Institute for Hate Studies operates under the auspices of Gonzaga University in Spokane, Washington. The views expressed in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Institute for Hate Studies, Gonzaga University, the institutions with which the authors are affiliated, or the editors.

The Journal welcomes unsolicited manuscripts (including essays and shorter pieces) and suggestions for improving the Journal. Manuscripts and other communications should be sent to Director, Gonzaga University Institute for Hate Studies, Gonzaga University, Spokane, WA USA 99258-0099.

For more information about the Gonzaga University Institute for Hate Studies and the Journal of Hate Studies, please visit www.gonzaga.edu/hatestudies.
JOURNAL OF HATE STUDIES EDITORIAL BOARD MEMBERS,
CHAIR CLAUDIA BUCCIFERRO, PH.D.

Volume 13 Special Guest Editor: Rebecca Barrett-Fox, Ph.D.

Claudia Bucciferro, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Communication Studies, Gonzaga University

Fr. Mike Maher, S.J., Associate Professor of History, Gonzaga University

Pavel Shlossberg, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Communication and Leadership Studies, Gonzaga University

Lisa Silvestri, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Communication Studies, Gonzaga University

INSTITUTE FOR HATE STUDIES COUNCIL OF EXPERTS,
CHAIR JIM MOHR, PH.D.

George Critchlow, Professor Emeritus of Law, Gonzaga University

Jim Mohr, Ph.D., Vice Chancellor of Student Affairs, Washington State University

Raymond Reyes, Ph.D., Associate Academic Vice President, Gonzaga University

STUDENT EMPLOYEES / GRADUATE ASSISTANTS

Casey Adams and Maggie Douglas

With support from Gonzaga University, Academic Vice President Patricia O’Connell Killen, Ph.D. and Associate Academic Vice Presidents Ron Large, Ph.D. and Raymond Reyes, Ph.D.
## CONTENTS

**Preface** ...................................... *Rebecca Barrett-Fox* 1

**Articles**

What to Do When Your Heritage Is Hateful ........................... *Christopher B. Strain* 9

Absence, Revision, and the Other: Rhetorics of South Carolina Antebellum Tourism Sites ........ *Deborah Cunningham Breede, Christine S. Davis* and *Jan Warren-Findlow* 17

The Love and Hate Relationship of Colonial Heritage: Exploring Changes of the Heritage Archive in Zimbabwe........ *Njabulo Chipangura* 43

Curating Hatred: The Joe McWilliams’s Controversy at the Ulster Museum................. *Tom Maguire* 61

Discussing Auschwitz, Scholarly Integrity and Governmental Revisionism: A Case Study in Academic Intimidation .......... *Kevin McCarthy* 85

Elements of Bile: Placing Daniel Ottolengui (1836-1918) in the Heritage of Hate ................. *Sally Stokes* 115

League of the South’s Internet Rhetoric: Neo-Confederate Community-Building Online...... *Brett A. Barnett* 151

**Book Reviews**

Christopher Bail’s *Terrified: How Anti-Muslim Fringe Organizations Became Mainstream* ........ *Stephen Sheehi* 175

Dan McMillan’s *How Could This Happen: Explaining the Holocaust* ......................... *Sondra Perl* 181
C. Richard King and David J. Leonard’s
*Beyond Hate: White Power and Popular Culture* .................... Bianca Gonzalez-Sobrino and Matthew W. Hughey 187

Eric Lichtblau’s *The Nazis Next Door: How America Became a Safe Haven for Hitler’s Men* ....................... Monique Laney 191

Alex Alvarez’s *Native America and the Question of Genocide* ......................... Lisa King 195

Audrey Thomas McCluskey’s *A Forgotten Sisterhood: Pioneering Black Women Educators and Activists in the Jim Crow South* .................... Doretha K. Williams 199
Preface

By midway through 2016, the year was shaping up to be a rough one. Terrorist attacks had occurred nearly daily worldwide, with significant loss of life in Zliten, Libya; Baghdad, Sharaban, Muqdadiya, Hillah, Iskandariya, Al Samawah, and Balad in Iraq; Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso; Dalori, Dikwa, and Alau Village in Nigeria; Baidoa in Somalia; Ankara and Istanbul; Beni in the Democratic Republic of Congo; Mukalla and Aden in Yemen; Darak, Cameroon; Dhaka, Bangladesh; Brussels; Lahore; Kabul; Nice; and Orlando before summer would end. In June, the Brexit vote, the UK referendum to leave the European Union, passed, with anger about immigration—mostly from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa—ranking as the main reason those who voted Leave did so (Skinner 2016). Continued war in Syria and political turmoil in nearby nations has caused continued suffering for refugees whose presence is cited by nationalist groups as evidence that Europe, Australia, and the U.S. are facing ‘cultural genocide’ (Hill 2016; “Violence Breaks Out” 2016; Younes 2016). In the U.S., protests continued in cities such as Charleston, South Carolina, where unarmed black men have been killed by police, even as new black activists and allies have taken up the charge to fight police brutality (Marusak, Portillo, Price, and Bell 2016). In North Dakota, indigenous people have gathered in the largest meeting of Native American people in modern history in an effort to halt the erection of an oil pipeline dangerously close to native lands and waters (Perlata 2016). The year ended with the ugliest presidential race in living memory, in which Donald Trump’s campaign and supporters invoked multiple forms of bigotry, including anti-immigrant xenophobia (Ye Hee Lee 2015) and anti-Muslim (Johnson 2016), anti-Semitic (Flores 2016), and misogynistic sentiments (Nguyen 2016). During the race, his supporters drew upon his rhetoric to justify attacks on American mosques and to call for voter intimidation (Parker, Corasaniti, and Berenstein 2016), and the days immediately after his election saw a spike in hate crimes reported to the Southern Poverty Law Center (2016). At the same time as the neo-Nazi National Policy Institute (Lombroso and Appelbaum 2016) and the KKK (Kaleem 2016) celebrated his victory, he moved to bring into the White House Stephen Bannon, whose Breitbart News is widely read by people warning of #whitegenocide (Kirkpatrick 2016).

Each of these cases is a fight, in some way, about heritage. Terrorism, like other forms of violence, threatens both material and immaterial culture, including some of the most brilliant and important contributions to art and religion that humans have made as well as natural wonders and environments. UNESCO Director-General Irina Bokova (2016) mourns the destroyed “invaluable legacy of humanity’s common heritage” currently
under attack in the Middle East, where heritage sites are destroyed and their artifacts sold to finance terrorism (1). Terrorist attacks on people, too, are concerted efforts to target human diversity, especially minority religions and ethnicities. Writes Bokova:

The destruction of culture has become an instrument of terror, in a global strategy to undermine societies, propagate intolerance and erase memories. This cultural cleansing is a war crime that is now used as a tactic of war, to tear humanity from the history it shares. (2)

The goal of such violence isn’t merely to take land or control a territory but to eradicate people and their heritages.

Terrorism and war are not the only threats to heritage, of course. Our natural and built environments, whether we inhabit them as colonizers or water protectors, and how we speak about, create, and care (or don’t) for them reflect our heritage and reveals our hopes for our legacies. Environmental degradation and the excesses of capitalism, both consequences of our political choices, threaten heritage even as, at the same time, those threats may invigorate activism around the question of heritage, as is happening now at Standing Rock, North Dakota. Threatening appeals to an imagined past free from diversity or a time when only dominant heritage mattered, including the call to “Make America Great Again,” lead to increases in hate crimes (Stone 2016; Foran 2016), but they also force us to grapple with why so many cling to that past, opening opportunities for constructive anger, empathy, and, eventually, personal transformation and social change. Threats to heritage expose our assumptions about whose history matters and how, how heritage is made and unmade, how it is often rooted in or floats atop injustice, and what is worth celebrating, ignoring, erasing, or revising. Broken open, conversations about heritage can turn into honest contestations of heritage, with dissonant voices struggling to define a culture’s values.

This issue of the Journal of Hate Studies honors those battles, which, at their best, push us to do the work of heritage better.

We begin with an essay by historian Christopher M. Strain, “What to Do When Your Heritage is Hateful.” Strain takes seriously the claim by Confederate flag supporters that displays of the flag are about “heritage not hate” but asks what responsibility such supporters have to “understand what their choice of symbols means to others besides themselves” and what the consequences for that eventual understanding might be.

Deborah Cunningham Breede, Christine S. Davis, and Jan Warren Findlaw work together in “Absence, Revision, and the Other: Rhetorics of South Carolina Antebellum Tourism Sites.” The three scholars take us on a
summer vacation to some of South Carolina’s most interesting tourist sites, each implicated in American slavery and each telling the story of that slavery differently. Their work, recorded in conversations shared in their article, helps us see how heritage professionals such as museum curators, docents, and plantation tour guides answer the question of “what to do” with hateful heritage differently.

Njabulo Chipangura answers the question from the perspective of a heritage professional. The curator of archeology at the Mutare Museum in Zimbabwe, Chipangura makes decisions each day about how hateful heritage is archived, ignored, or destroyed. He details the battles that the former British colony has faced in developing a national heritage archive that serves the diverse desires of those in the independent state in “The Love and Hate Relationship of Colonial Heritage: Exploring Changes of the Heritage Archive in Zimbabwe.” The issue, Chipangura notes, isn’t just about maintaining, decommissioning, or destroying memorials, statues, or museums but about the ways that heritage is used in continuing contestations about national identity and memory; battles about material culture are one manifestation of those tensions.

In “Curating Hatred: The Joe McWilliam’s Controversy at the Ulster Museum,” Tom Maguire focuses our attention on a specific piece of material culture that took on significance in fights about representation within heritage spaces: Irish artist Joe McWilliams’ painting Christian Flautists Outside St. Patricks, a painting that depicts parading loyalists garbed in KKK robes outside a Catholic church, referencing the 2012 arrest of members of a marching band for playing a racist song outside a Catholic church while on parade. When the piece was displayed in the Ulster Museum shortly after McWilliams’ death, the museum was faced with criticism that it was promoting the demonization of loyalists. Maguire details the controversy and uses it as a case study in how museums can serve and challenge their communities.

Kevin McCarthy’s work also begins with conflict in Ireland, examining briefly how Catholic and Protestant entities invoke Palestine and Israel in their own fights, including incorporating Nazi and Israeli flags into their public displays. McCarthy inadvertently stepped into a storm by engaging a letter writer in the Belfast Telegraph regarding the location of Auschwitz, the Nazi concentration camp. McCarthy’s argument—that the Nazis had selected occupied Poland for the site of the camp because of the anti-Semitism there—provoked the ire of some in the international Polish community. McCarthy describes what happened next in “Discussing Auschwitz, Scholarly Integrity, and Governmental Revisionism: A Case Study in Academic Intimidation.”

Sally Stokes takes us on an academic hunt for the author of a Recon-
struction era racist text in “Elements of Bile: Placing Daniel Ottolengui (1836-1918) in the Heritage of Hate.” Her study centers on the work of Daniel Ottolengui, a Jewish man whose life straddled both North and South before and after the Civil War, and whose output may help us understand some of the hatreds—both anti-black and anti-Semitic—that were in circulation at the time.

Brett A. Barnett examines how those same prejudices are treated online today by members of the League of the South, a neo-Confederate group. In “The League of the South’s Internet Rhetoric: Pro-Confederate Community Building Online,” he examines the online postings of the group in the days immediately after the June 2015 shooting of nine black worshippers in a Charleston, South Carolina church by a white supremacist. Barnett examines how calls to remove the Confederate flag, a symbol idealized by the shooter and others in white supremacist movements, from the South Carolina statehouse and other government spaces inspired violent rhetoric in neo-Confederate online spaces, where efforts are made to reach readers who may be sympathetic to the flag or to romantic visions of the South and invite them into the neo-Confederate movement.

The issue concludes with book reviews by outstanding readers whose time and insight JHS appreciates. We are fortunate to share with you Stephen Sheehi’s insights into Christopher Bail’s Terrified: How Anti-Muslim Fringe Organizations Became Mainstream (Princeton 2016), Sondra Perl’s review of Dan McMillan’s How Could this Happen? Explaining the Holocaust (Basic Books 2014), Matthew W. Hughey and Bianco Gonzalez-Sobrino’s comments on Beyond Hate: White Power and Popular Culture by C. Richard King and David J. Leonard (Ashgate 2014), Monique Laney’s review of The Nazis Next Door: How America Became a Safe Haven for Hitler’s Men by Eric Lichtblau (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2014), Lisa King’s thoughts on Alex Alvarez’s Native America and the Question of Genocide (Rowman & Littlefield 2014), and Doretha K. Williams’ critique of A Forgotten Sisterhood: Pioneering Black Women Educators and Activists in the Jim Crow South by Audrey Thomas McCluskey (Rowman & Littlefield 2014). Together, they remind us of the excellent work being done in hate studies and the importance of continued interdisciplinary scholarship in the field.

“The intrinsic dissonance of heritage, accentuated by its expanding meanings and uses and by the fundamentally more complex constructions of identity in the modern world,” write Brian Graham, Gregory John Ashworth, and John E. Tunbridge (2004), “is the primary cause of its contestation” (34). This issue of JHS presents just a few cases of how and why heritage is contested and what the consequences of that contestation are. On behalf of those who have worked to bring you this journal, including Insti-
tute of Hate Studies director Kristine Hoover, graduate student assistant Casey Adams and undergraduate student administrative assistant Maggie Douglas, I hope it inspires further conversations, undertaken with intellectual generosity and graciousness, that will push scholarship to better understand these dynamics.

Rebecca Barrett-Fox, Guest Editor
Assistant Professor of Sociology
Arkansas State University

REFERENCES


the-people-donald-trump-rted-this-week-follow-multiple-white-supremacist-accounts


What to Do When Your Heritage is Hateful

Christopher B. Strain
Florida Atlantic University

If one pays attention to the old Confederate battle flag (and since the horrific shooting rampage in Charleston, South Carolina on June 17, 2015, it’s been hard not to notice), one will eventually see it paired on bumper stickers and T-shirts with the words “Heritage, Not Hate.” This combination is a way for some white folks—often Southern, but not always—to explain their affinity for the Stars-and-Bars, not necessarily as a vestige of antebellum or Jim-Crow-era racism but as a way of celebrating redneck culture, “Southern-ness,” and/or nonconformity. While there’s nothing wrong with people celebrating what they interpret as their tradition, heritage, or homeland, what does one do when that heritage is less than fully inclusive, even antagonistic toward another group?

In a National Public Radio piece aired on July 14, 2015, Gene Demby describe the “awkward mental gymnastics” involved in certain cultural preferences. A person’s musical tastes might run toward gangsta rap or outlaw country, for example, both of which can be misogynistic and reactionary, but the listener might paradoxically consider himself to be a supporter of women’s rights. Such inherent contradiction might seem hypocritical to some, but there is a certain elasticity of symbols, as ciphers meaning different things to different people. For some, the Confederate flag is a sign of racial Neanderthalism, the trademark of unreconstructed segregationists and rednecks. For others, the flag is a happy reminder of Tom Petty’s 1985 “Southern Accents” tour. Who is correct? Whose interpretation wins?

Such questions are not particular to Southern history or Confederate heritage. If the past is what happened, and history consists of selective attempts to describe what happened, then heritage, as J. E. Tunbridge and Gregory John Ashworth have argued, is a contemporary product shaped from history. Because it draws boundaries (between ours and theirs, mine and yours), all heritage is “dissonant,” open to discord and disagreements; as such it is never fully inclusive or representative of all people. In light of the dissonance of heritage, it is possible that the Confederate flag is both a symbol of white supremacy and a relatively benign badge of regional and cultural pride. Perhaps we can acknowledge that not everyone who slaps a Confederate flag sticker on his truck or listens to Lynyrd Skynyrd is a racist, no more than we would argue that everyone who wears a hoodie or listens to 50 Cent is a thug. A USA Today/Suffolk University poll released in July 2015 found Americans evenly divided: 42 percent of respondents
said the Confederate flag was not racist but rather a symbol of Southern history and heritage, with another 42 percent saying the flag was racist and should be removed from state flags and official locations, with unsurprisingly differences reported by people according to race and region.³

All who display it—whether deliberately provocative, willfully ignorant, or blithely oblivious—do so with pride. But none of these positions absolves us from the implications of the symbols with which we choose to identify or inoculates us from the associations that others attach to those symbols. And certain images are laden with symbolic meaning, inescapably and unavoidably, apart from whatever meaning each of us individually ascribes to those images.

To illustrate, there were 173 pro-flag demonstrations in the two months after the Charleston attack—averaging out to just under three rallies per day.⁴ These demonstrations typically featured good ol’ boys (and girls) proudly displaying Confederate flags from their trucks and cars. While some of these demonstrators may have meant no offense, they must have realized the historical antecedents of such protests. In the twentieth century, public displays of Confederate patriotism usually came in two flavors: 1) parades by groups such as the Sons of Confederate Veterans and the United Daughters of the Confederacy, and 2) Ku Klax Klan rallies. The latter were especially terrifying: shadowy, nocturnal gatherings of hooded nightriders who burned crosses and hanged persons of color in effigy. They were staged dress-rehearsals for lynchings.

To rally around the Confederate flag in the wake of the June 17th Charleston shooting—in which nine African-American church-goers were shot to death by a violent, Confederate-flag-waving racist—is akin to the National Rifle Association holding its 1999 national convention in Denver ten days after the Columbine High School massacre in the Denver suburb of Littleton. Yes, of course they had the right to do so, but the timing could not have been worse; as the old British saying goes, just because you can doesn’t mean you should. A better comparison might even be to a neo-Nazi rally, replete with swastikas, in the aftermath of an anti-Semitic attack that specifically targeted Jews. As numerous Black commentators have made clear, their objection is not a matter of vague discomfort, but rather one of terror, based on real-life experiences and the lived inheritance of precarious survival in a violently racist society. That is, displays of the Confederate flag are not simply insensitive or ill-considered choices: they are direct threats, proclamations of hatred, invocations of a bloody history and, as the Charleston shooting made clear, a bloody present.

It is a dogged unawareness that ignores how the Confederate flag was weaponized during the Civil Rights Movement as white opponents asserted their rights and resistance in the face of boycotts, marches, school desegre-
gations, and other black protests in the 1950s and 1960s. African-American activists recall memories of being terrorized and intimidated by Confederate symbols—not only flags but also names, parades, and ephemera rescued from the dustbin of history specifically for the purpose of countering Civil Rights progress. The Georgia state flag, for example, did not always consist mainly of the Stars-and-Bars: the familiar version featuring a Confederate battle flag was designed by John Sammons Bell (a World War II veteran and attorney who was an outspoken supporter of segregation), adopted in 1956 at the height of “massive resistance” to the changes wrought by Brown v. Board of Education, and defiantly flown until 2001. Observers might ask which version of Southern heritage—the truculence of the Old South or the newfound race-baiting of the New South—is more often celebrated by contemporary flag-wavers; regardless, both versions allude to white supremacy, with its overtones of racially oppressive violence.

It is these overtones that create the most anxiety in those mindful of the power of symbols. “[T]he potency of symbols rests not simply in their ability to represent,” says Rebecca Klatch, “but in their ability to instigate action.” In her analysis of political symbolism and symbolic action, she has noted how symbols create “badges of identity” which define group boundaries, maintain a sense of togetherness, and “weld commitment to a cause”; they are “vital in creating harmony out of individual interest” as they aid in manufacturing consent. In their multivalent meanings, they can unify one group while alienating others from that group. They can also act as weapons or “means of domination” that legitimate the distribution of power and further divisions in society.5

When commissioners in Marion County, Florida, voted on July 7, 2015, less than a month after mass shooting in Charlotte, to fly the Confederate flag over the county’s government complex, author Jeff Klinkenberg—who has written widely on Florida history—questioned that symbolic action in a Facebook post two days later. “Why don’t we celebrate our stunning landscapes, our neighborliness, our food, our literature, our loyalty to family and our self-reliance?” he wrote. “Why a flag that represents our racist past, and, I guess, our racist present?” While folks in Marion may not see themselves as championing backwardness and hate, they also may not appreciate—or seemingly care—how upsetting that flag can be to non-whites (and many non-Southerners, too). Why flaunt a symbol that you know is offensive?

Of course, some people likely display the flag expressly because it is offensive, as a form of conservative recalcitrance in light of the belief that their place of power in the social hierarchy is being challenged. But what if that recalcitrance were subverted through cooptation and reinterpretation by those the symbol was meant to marginalize? I remember hearing an Afri-
can-American high-school student explain in 1988 (yes, this same debate has been going on for a long time) why he felt the state of Georgia should keep its Bell-designed flag: it served, he argued, to remind Georgians of all races and ethnicities of the region’s conflicted past, and it is important to be mindful of history, he continued, even when such memories are painful.

If there is an argument to be made for flying the Confederate flag across the Deep South expressly because of its negative connotations, then there is also a distinction between remembering and valorizing the past. One can remember, interpret, and critique the past without making a flag an officially sanctioned symbol for all people. As Klinkenberg notes, there are so many things about the South to love: the famous hospitality, the relaxed pace, the natural beauty, and so on. There are points of shame, too, including the region’s foul history of slavery, lynchings, and racial terrorism. Why draw attention to the latter when one can be proud of the former? Those rallying around the Confederate flag might easily find another aspect of Southern heritage to celebrate—there are many—and they could try using the U.S. flag, a symbol around which more Americans might find a way to unite, when they do.

Can we determine appropriate symbols for others? No—but we can help them understand what their choice of symbols means to others besides themselves; as Hugh Dalziel Duncan has written, “Who has the right to use what symbols, when, where, how, and for what purpose is not an individual matter but a matter of group legitimation.” When Marion County commissioners chose to hoist the Stars-and-Bars again, in a throwback to a less tolerant age, they engaged in a pernicious kind of political symbolism, a display that officially sanctioned a now divisive symbol. In today’s Trumpian dystopia, people in Marion might not see that act as perpetuating hate, but it most assuredly perpetuates a racist view of the South (and to whom it belongs and matters most), even if they are not aware of it.

Shortly after 10:00 a.m. on Friday, July 10, 2015—three days after Marion County officials had voted to raise the Confederate flag over Florida once again—uniformed highway patrol officers lowered the Confederate battle flag on the grounds of the South Carolina State Capitol. Raised atop the capitol dome in 1961 to commemorate the centennial of the Civil War, it had flown for 54 years beneath the U.S. flag and the state’s palmetto flag. Controversy over the flag influenced lawmakers in 2000 to pass the Heritage Act, which moved the flag from atop the dome to a pole next to a soldiers’ monument on the Capitol grounds. Ironically, it took the Charleston shooter to bring down the flag completely, as South Carolinians engaged in what Karen Till has termed “memory work” to rehabilitate traumatized public space and make heritage more inclusive.7

But where do such efforts end? It should be clear that removing the
Stars-and-Bars from government properties across the South, as happened in the summer of 2015, was the right, long overdue, thing to do. Whether expunging all traces of the Confederacy from the South—monuments, memorials, equestrian statues, grave markers, plaques, and so on—would be productive is open to debate. Spuriously connected to the antebellum South, many were anachronistically erected during periods of racial strife (at the turn of the twentieth century, just after Plessy v. Ferguson, for example, and during the Civil Rights era), as David Graham has noted. Those on public sites maintained by tax dollars might be relocated to museums or other educational settings; however, many of them were privately built, so numerous that it might be impossible to remove them all. The Southern Poverty Law Center has counted more than 1500 in 31 states.8.

Practicalities aside, removing Confederate symbols may be neither desirable nor sufficient. As Joshua Inwood and Derek Alderman have argued, taking down the Confederate flag should not be substituted for solving structural inequality. That is, simply removing the flag is a kind of historical and geographical erasure that fails to engage in genuine memory-work. “[W]hile state legislators from across the South should be applauded for taking down Confederate symbols,” they write, “that is not the same thing as addressing the deeply entrenched social and spatial conditions that allow white supremacy to permeate not just the Charleston AME church but wider swaths of American life.”9 Reconsidering Confederate symbology therefore represents a beginning, not an end, in the difficult work of reconciliation.

All heritage is someone’s heritage and therefore logically not someone else’s—where there is inheritance there is disinheritance—but the degree to which heritage can be inclusive can and ought to be maximized along utilitarian lines. If the dissonance of heritage is inevitable, then it can also be mediated. Whether they remain in public view or not, Confederate symbols can still stimulate new dialogue about the extreme violence to which they have long, tangled, blood-stained cords of connection. They can become part of the process of unifying and healing, part of the memory-work needed to come to terms with white supremacy and the legacy of racism. This memory-work necessitates listening to the concerns of activists, namely #blacklivesmatter; finding unifying rather than divisive aspects of culture to celebrate; and figuring out how to stop mass shootings and rampage killings—which, after all, is the reason we started talking about the Confederate flag again in the first place.


3. See Michael E. Miller, “Can We All Agree that the Confederate Flag is Racist? Apparently Not, According to Poll,” Washington Post (July 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/07/01/can-we-all-agree-that-the-confederate-flag-is-racist-apparently-not-according-to-poll/. Responses varied widely according to race. Only one third of white respondents considered the flag racist, with half saying it symbolized Southern heritage, nothing more. More than 75 percent of African Americans, however, responded that the flag was racist and should be stripped from public spaces. Only one in 10 black respondents thought the Confederate flag represented Southern heritage. Opinions also varied based on region, with Southerners more likely to view the controversial flag as not racist. Forty-nine percent of Southerners said the Confederate battle flag is not racist, compared to 34 percent who said it is. More Americans in the Northeast and West considered the Confederate flag racist than not — by 12 and 13 percentage point margins, respectively. Meanwhile, those in the Midwest were effectively split on the subject: 44 percent said it was racist while 42 percent did not.


6. Duncan, quoted in Klatch, 149.


Absence, Revision, and the Other: Rhetorics of South Carolina Antebellum Tourism Sites

Deborah Cunningham Breede, Christine S. Davis and Jan Warren-Findlow

The production of tourism situated within an antebellum history is fraught with tension. Moralties, power conflicts, and identities clash as tourist production based on historical apartheid in the United States proliferates and becomes more popular and profitable. Southern states such as South Carolina are particularly subject to such concerns. As one of the original thirteen colonies, South Carolina was a profitable participant in the plantation system, a system built upon rhetorics of absence, revision, and hatred. These rhetorical constructions effectively created a view of enslaved Africans that “othered” and minimized them and erased their presence, importance, and humanity. The resulting ethnocentrism, racism, and oppression still exists today within the American cultural and political landscapes. South Carolina – also the veteran of major revolts, wars, secessions, and occupations throughout its history—was a slave state for its first two hundred years. During these colonial and antebellum periods, its enslaved primarily black population outnumbered white people by the ratio of four to one (Lockley and Doddington 2012). Today, South Carolina offers a popular tourist vista dotted with homesteads, plantations, parks, battlefields, national historic sites, markets, and museums all originating from and documenting our nation’s “peculiar institution” of slavery (Calhoun 1837).

Within this cultural landscape filled with historical reproduction, a visitor might expect to find the presence of blacks—enslaved and free—permeating the presentations, performances, contexts, messages, and documentations of life in the South; such is not always the case. Communication about the experience of slavery varies widely among tourism locales within the state and is often marked more by a rhetoric of erasure, of an absence, than of a participation filled with power, production, and presence. The instances of thoughtful, varied, significant, and historically accurate inclusions of the experience of slavery on and within these historical sites contrast sharply with the absences and inaccuracies that characterize some of the other tourism offerings.

In this critical rhetorical analysis of a series of tourism locales, we present and theorize rhetorics of absence and revision across multiple sites in coastal South Carolina, from Georgetown south to Charleston. Bisected by U.S. 17, this former “King’s Highway” was the only land route serving
the multiple plantations that lined the South Carolina coast between 1750 and 1860, and now winds through not only the most popular and populous seasonal resort areas in South Carolina but also what were once some of the largest, most profitable indigo and rice plantations of the colonial and antebellum periods. Representing the national heritage by-way known as the Gullah-Geechee Corridor, the area is not only a fertile field for the study of plantation life but also is one context for the emergence of the unique African diaspora that developed out of the “Middle Passage” slave experience and still exists today. We suggest that these recurring and revisionist rhetorics of absence are consubstantiated by quiet—and sometimes not so silent—hatreds that serve to further affect emergent discourses today. These are the claims we will analyze and discuss through this research.

1.0 Method

This critical, rhetorical analysis—presented as a series of narratives—takes the reader on a tour of some of the tourist production sites along the King’s Highway, which purport to represent the low country plantation experience. While we do not claim that our visits to historic sites in this geographic area were exhaustive, for over two years, we visited, toured, explored, and collected oral, written, photographic, and videotaped field notes during multiple visits to a variety of former settlements, plantations, and historic homes; graveyards, burial sites, and memorials; and museums, heritage locations, and archives. We examined the sites’ historical records, tourism and marketing materials, and other written and visual artifacts. We interviewed local historians and talked with docents, tour guides, volunteers, and interpreters. We identified common themes in our fieldnotes, and then we each constructed individual stories about our experiences. We then analyzed and selected our representative narratives; we present the selected narratives and analyses in this piece. Within this paper, as we focus on rhetorics of absence and revision, we present our narratives and analyses of Middleton Place and Hampton Plantation, since our experiences at these sites generally represented our experiences across historic homes and plantations. We present our experiences at Rice Museum as a contrast and representation of the more thoughtful inclusions that we documented at some other tourism locales. We note that our experiences at Middleton Place and Hampton Plantation contrasted with rhetorics experienced at some of the other sites that represented more diverse histories/herstories.

The presentation of histories/herstories was one important consideration in our choice to craft our fieldnotes into personal narratives to present data and introduce analyses. Histories/herstories represent here, in part, a collection of stories about diverse people, experiences, events, and reflec-
tions of a temporally located discourse that recounts and recalls events of the past within the constraints of the presence. Writing about our participation as researchers from the vantage point of hearing the stories told—and not told at and within the historical sites allows us to react to and retain the narratives that comprise the rhetorical text of the historical site. We suggest in this piece that some of those narratives are revised and/or erased to achieve particular representations that consequently create particular perceptions. As a result, we apply Blair’s (2001) notion of “parable” in the narrative accounts we present here, with the intent within these stories, to demonstrate the absences, erasures, revisions, and other tensions that we then discuss in our analysis. In our efforts to recreate, embody, and re-story the plantation experience, we toured the homes and wandered the grounds; we walked the fields and knelt on the graves. As an experiential practice, we sought to perform, reform, and transform our tourist experience in order to understand the evolution of the sites themselves. We also sought to identify the agencies and generative and constitutive powers of these rhetorical texts (Blair 2001; Bruner 2005) as they continue to evolve and reproduce, yet remain whole, fixed, and individual (Kirschenblatt-Gimblett, 1991), from plantation to museum to barony. Our ongoing documentation of our experiences at these tourist sites evolved into a documentation of the absences and revisions of specific important standpoints and experiences that remain inherent within these sites. We suggest that these absences constitute a powerful rhetoric that is oppositional to a more thoughtful inclusion of the experiences of those working in bondage on many of these former plantations. These revisions, and our own positionalities as tourists and as scholars, affect and are affected by our own distinct cultural histories, experiences, and perspectives. Thus, in this paper, we juxtapose personal and cultural narratives with critical rhetorical analysis as we illustrate a process that, for us, was both generative and transformative.

2.0 Literature Review

2.1 The Rhetoric of Absence

Many scholars have documented the power of the invisible, the rhetoric of the absent (Bracy 1998; Chidester 2008; Goodwine and The Clarity Press Gullah Project 1998; Holdstein 2011; Jackson 1999; Kly 1998; Landau 2011; Nakayama and Krizek 1995; Scott 1993; Smallwood 2007; West 2001). As Foucault (1972) reminds us, historical discourse constructs knowledge through the power of language, and what is absent from that discourse often constitutes a powerful rhetoric about the dominant culture. As cultures, power structures, and social traditions move and shift, some-
times all that is left are the remnants of voice, a duality of speech and silence, of revelation and concealment (Scott 1993). The lack of speech—silence—is interpreted just as is voice, and silence, like voice, can invoke paternalism, power, subjugation, and marginalization. In some of his work, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Elie Weisel suggests that silence and forgetting become a type of complicity in hate speech and hate crimes (1986, 2006). These rhetorical twists and turns can lead to minimalization, objectification, and the resulting hatreds that ensue from rhetorics of absence.

Communication scholars, particularly, have applied these theoretical underpinnings to the construction of race. Whiteness is one such construct that has been critiqued, and the rhetoric of absence that marks the historical discourse about races other than whites is a construct of white-normativity concealed strategically in communication patterns and interactions (Jackson 1999; Nakayama and Krizek 1995). The English language, ironically, uses the term “blackness” to signify absence. Unknowable space is called a “black hole,” ignorance is often referred to as “being left in the dark.” This nomenclature is especially common in the racial construction of blackness, which is particularly vulnerable to rhetorics of silence and absence (West 2001).

In the United States, a historical understanding of race is intertwined with an understanding of the historical effects of slavery. The absences from and revisions to the documentation of the experiences of the primarily native, enslaved, and subjugated populations of the colonial and antebellum South are especially salient to our argument. For example, the canonical historical record noticeably reframes a series of rebellions by the freedom-seeking enslaved Africans, Caribbean Islanders, and indigenous populations in the South as “Seminole” or “Indian” wars. Historical battlefield reports omitted the words black, Negro, or African; disguised the nature of whom the whites were fighting by referring to the enslaved Africans as “Seminole” or “Interpreters;” called colonial and American defeats “massacres” instead of “battles;” and referred to free non-white encampments as “maroons running wild” (Kly 1998). Even today, the history curricula in South Carolina public schools omits most mentions of the efforts by the people who were enslaved at resistance, including one of the most important rebellions of enslaved people in colonial history: the Stono Rebellion (Goodwine 1998).

2.2 The Absence of Slaves When Narrating the Slave Experience

The absence and distortion of the voice and experience of the enslaved Africans in some of the historical representation(s) of plantation life is also well documented (Butler, Carter and Dwyer 2008; Creel 1988; Fairbanks
Part of this exclusion stems from the fact that enslaved people were often prevented from leaving written records of their own; they were neither typically written about, nor were they “considered worthy of record” (Fairbanks 1984, 1). However, a variety of scholars have found ways to document the resourcefulness and richness of plantation slave culture. As divergent African and Caribbean humans were imported into the British colonies, American states, and finally the Confederacy, and as those people continued, sustained, and adapted their own and others’ varied African and European cultural practices, they developed and “creolized” their formal and informal cultural practices Babson 1990; Bell 2010; Fairbanks 1984; Fennell 2011; Ferguson 1992; Handler 1996; Handler and Corruccini 1983; Mufwene 1998; Russell 1997; Stine Cabak and Groover, 1996; Weik 1997; Wilkie 1997; Young 1996). The resulting and still vibrant Gullah-Geechee culture blends and adapts language and linguistic forms; religious, medical, funeral and spiritual rituals; familial, interpersonal and gender norms; and food production and preparation practices (among others). Some of these blended cultural practices served to resist their abductors and colonizers, while other practices reflected assimilation and identification. The primary critique of the historical record of slavery concerns the hegemonic-representations of the master-enslaved relationship, labor practices, childrearing norms, lineage patterns and lines of succession, and the “limited interpretive options for public presentations of national history” which “in turn influences contemporary discourse on descendants of enslaved Africans, slavery, and plantations” (Jackson 2012, 100). Jackson continues by calling for “scholars to uncover or make visible what has previously been left out or ignored” (30). This is precisely our intent in this paper.

3.0 The Sites

3.1 Middleton Place

“It’s hot and it’s only 10am,” Jan observes, trying not to whine as she skirts a rectangular reflecting pool overlooking the lush grounds. Large hedges line the path, and Jan seeks out a well-shaded area of the walkway as she shields her eyes from the sun. “I can’t imagine how hot it would be if you had to work outside in the summer, like the enslaved population here did. No wonder the plantation owners would go to Charleston during the summer.”

Her husband, Tim, nodding, shoos a bug. “The mosquitos would be even worse down by the river.”
“Let alone if you are in the river! The enslaved Africans working here spent much of their time digging out cypress stumps, standing in water up to their armpits, while they cleared this land in order to make the rice fields and canals.” Jan shares her increasing knowledge of rice plantations from several months of visiting coastal South Carolina rice plantations for her research.

“I hope this tour tells us more about the history of the rice plantations. Hey, it’s about time to start. Let’s head over there,” Tim nods toward the cabin where they are to meet their tour guide.

They are tourists on a long weekend, a getaway for the busy, white, professional couple. They’re touring Middleton Place, one of the many former rice plantations near Charleston, South Carolina. Located on the Ashley River, Middleton Place is a designated national historic landmark that has remained in the Middleton family for over 320 years. Now managed by a family foundation, it comprises 110 acres that include landscaped gardens; the “Spring House,” a 1746 storage building that was expanded in 1850 for use as a chapel; a rice mill; and a circa 1870 former slave cabin called “Eliza’s House” (South Carolina Plantations 2014). Jan and Tim have chosen a tour called “The African American Focus.”

Standing outside the lone cabin formerly housing enslaved Africans, Jan and Tim meet their guide and docent, Mandy, a white haired, sixtyish woman originally from Wisconsin who moved to South Carolina three years earlier. Babette, a docent and curator from France, and the only other tour participant that day, waits with them for the tour to start. The morning sun beats down on them, and Jan and Tim peel their wet shirts away from their skin to let in some air as they fan themselves with their brochures and maps. Jan whispers, “I’m not sure I can make the whole hour tour in this heat and humidity.” Tim agrees, but before they can say anything else, the tour begins.

The group obediently follows Mandy into the cabin - a dark, tiny structure smelling of musk and dust. Mandy points out a set of documents hanging on the wall, and Jan is momentarily confused until she realizes that they are hung for the benefit of the tour. She recites, “Sex, age, what is this...? Oh, it’s a listing of the Africans who were enslaved!”

“House or field slaves. General condition,” Tim reads verbatim.

“It’s like your portfolio listing!” Jan exclaims.

“Right, like an investment asset sheet,” Tim responds dryly.

Mandy’s presentation sounds scripted. “Slaves were a valuable economic resource for the South,” Mandy reports. “They were like servants, and the plantation owners protected and cared for them. After all, they
were assets, and owners wouldn’t mistreat or harm such a profitable commodity. They even got to live in their own little houses,” Mandy recites.

“She makes it sound like they were content,” Jan whispers to Tim.

“Yeah, like they were autonomous,” Tim whispers back.

Back outside in the sticky air after the short tour, Jan exclaims, “This tour was not at all what I expected!”

“Mandy said more about the economic livelihood of the rich white landowners than the ‘African American Focus,’” Tim agrees.

“I was hoping to hear about the experience of the human beings who were enslaved here, but this was about the experience of the commodity of slaves!” says Jan. She mentally recalls Smallwood’s (2007, 35) definition of slaves as “commodities whose most socially relevant feature was their exchangeability.”

They continue their tour around the gardens, marveling at the beauty of the terraced landscapes and the river views. Jan reflects on the demonstration of wealth that the plantation’s entry road would have displayed. “Those small cabins housing enslaved people would have lined the road, where visitors coming overland could see their wealth. On the other hand, visitors approaching on the river would view the grand plantation manor and the rice fields and their canals. The experiences of the people who were enslaved have been removed from the physical and social landscape of this tour,” she remarks. “Besides,” she adds, “the African American Focus is a misnomer anyway. These plantation workers weren’t African Americans, because they weren’t allowed to become Americans. They weren’t citizens. They were enslaved Africans.”

“Right,” Tim responds. “Mandy doesn’t seem to know much about either the experience of enslaved Africans or rice cultivation in South Carolina. I wonder if she has ever toured any other plantations or conducted any of her own historical research in this area.”

Jan nods. “I wonder if she’s ever spoken with any of the descendants of the people enslaved or read any of their accounts or memoirs of slave life. Has she ever heard the stories of enslaved Africans or read any of the WPA narratives that have been archived?”

The tour ends at the chapel that the plantation owner built for their enslaved workers. Standing in the small wooden building among the pews, Jan glances through the brochure that she picked up at the front entrance and notices that it doesn’t mention the African American Focus at all (Middleton Place n.d.).

“Look at this,” she points to Tim. “This brochure doesn’t mention enslaved people, Africans, or even rice.”

“The available tours allow you to experience plantation life (Middleton
Place n.d.),” Tim reads over Jan’s shoulder. “The rich white experience, apparently.”

“This is really one-sided!” Jan exclaims in frustration. “The experience of plantation life on this particular tour day at Middleton Place is only from the plantation owner’s perspective!” She shakes her head.

3.2 Hampton Plantation

Hampton Plantation in McClellanville, South Carolina smells like the river that sustained it. The air is heavy with the oppressive heat and humidity of the Lowcountry, and even though it is early June, leaves crunch underfoot; there are about six inches of dead magnolia leaves blanketing the former plantation grounds. The trees are dripping in silver, lacy Spanish moss, veiled mourners at a hot, silent, Mass. Jan smacks yet another mosquito that has lit on her pale, smooth leg. Despite the multiple applications of sunscreen and DEET in the mostly futile attempts to cover exposed flesh, Deb’s tanned skin is reddening and Cris’ freckled face is flushed as they wave their arms around to shoo off the mosquitoes, now swarming in a vicious mist.

“How could anyone survive this!” exclaims Cris, circling around toward the white plantation house. A two story Georgian home, with the typical sloping porch floors of the time, it was a rice plantation until the Civil War. The property had been in the Horry/Rutledge family since its construction in the 1740s until the family donated it to the state of South Carolina in 1971. It is now a public access state park, state historic site, and a National Historic Landmark (South Carolina’s Department of Parks, Recreation, and Tourism 2009; South Carolina State Parks 2012).

Deb wanders over to a huge oak tree that has a plaque in front of it. “There’s a great view of that tree from here,” remarks Jan from the front porch.

“George Washington saved this oak tree when he visited Hampton Plantation as part of his presidential tour after the Revolutionary War.” Deb reads the plaque out loud. “Shall we go around the back?” They start down a path overgrown with yellow and white honeysuckle and orange trumpet vine. On the right is a flat marker with a long inscription on it for John Henry Rutledge:

Son of Frederick and Harriott Horry Rutledge who departed this life on the 5th of March 1830 aged 21 years- he was distinguished for fortitude and firmness- the goodness and the magnanimity that he showed even in the agonies of painful death made an indelible impression upon all who witnessed it. He died in peace with all men and on the full confidence that his maker would receive his soul with that mercy and forgiveness
who is the hope and solace of the penitent in his approach to the throne of the eternal.

Cris, Deb and Jan wander farther down the path and discover another plaque with a poem by Archibald Rutledge, the most recent private owner and a former poet laureate of the state of South Carolina.

“All the things I expected to see aren’t here,” murmurs Deb, as they read and transcribe the plaques.

“Like graveyards holding the remains of enslaved people?” suggests Cris.

“Like any evidence of slavery whatsoever?” adds Jan.

“Yes, exactly!” exclaims Deb. “I thought there’d be some refuse piles, old graves, maybe remnants of homes of formerly enslaved people, historical reconstructions, but I guess all that would be decomposed after all these years. Why wouldn’t they construct some commemoration, try to tell some story?”

“You’d at least think there’d be a plaque like these...” Cris motions toward the Rutledge family plaques. “There’s not one mention or image of enslaved people on these grounds – not one plaque, not one marker! The TREE got more recognition than the people who built, maintained, and sustained this place!”

Jan opens the brochure she picked up at the front gate (South Carolina’s Hampton Plantation 2009). “Even the brochure only mentions the descendants of the enslaved; there’s nothing about the enslaved people who lived and died here.”

The women head over to Sam Hill Cemetery, one of the places on the property where the enslaved Africans were buried and where some of their descendants still bury their dead today. At #17, Sam Hill Cemetery, there are pockets of graves marked with surprisingly new silk flowers. “Of course,” remarks Jan. “Monday was Memorial Day.”

The three researchers begin wandering around the overgrown, sandy area. The mosquitoes are still buzzing. Newer gravestones look really old, primarily because they haven’t been maintained; there are no old grave stones here. The recorded deaths are all from the 1970s forward. The graves are clustered in twos, threes, sometimes fives. There are no manicured lawns or fresh flowers. There are no fenced graveyards or beautifully etched memorials. There are no marble tombstones; no artful poetry engraved near pretty little benches. The area is cluttered with garbage – rusted beer cans, faded silk flowers, used condoms. Deb begins making a list of all the striking absences, all the failures of remembrance, all the differences from the gated and landscaped Rutledge cemeteries.
The burial patches spread out over about an acre. Many graves are marked only with a small, rusted marker – about the size of a business card or luggage tag - with the person’s name and years of birth and death. Like rusty place cards, the markers stick up about six to eight inches from the grave. In time, the forest foliage and the sand will cover them up. Other graves have homemade wooden crosses. One such cross has been tied together with a pink bow.

When graves do display stones, they are often half buried in the woods, peaking out of the sand. Discarded plastic flowers are piled up at the edges of the clearings where the graves are clustered. There is another clearing with more graves, and more mosquitoes, farther back in woods.

“Had enough?” Jan asks, wiping her face and adjusting her headband. Cris and Deb quickly agree.

Deb scratches her leg and frowns. “We came to find evidence of a particular human population. They were kidnapped from their homes, brought here against their will, and sold to the owners of this plantation to live, work, and die. They were here for centuries! Where’s the evidence?”

“I never considered we might not find anything at all,” Cris sighs.

3.3 The Rice Museum

Cris, Deb, and Jan slip into the Rice Museum, which seeks to chronicle “the history of a society dependent on the rice crop” (Rice Museum 2014) and its impact regionally and globally. Located in Georgetown, the third oldest town in South Carolina and a major rice port during the 19th century, it is housed in the “Old Market Building,” a structure built circa 1832-1835, whose multiple governmental and commercial purposes included a slave market (South Carolina Department of Archives and History 2014). In 1840, half the rice in the world came from South Carolina; by 1850, Georgetown exported more rice than anywhere else in the world (Rice Museum 2012).

“Phew! What a relief!” Jan smiles broadly as she walks into the air-conditioned museum.

“Finally, a break from the heat and humidity!” agrees Cris.

“How did people live here before the invention of air conditioning?” Jan asks aloud as they crowd into the tiny museum shop to purchase tour tickets.

Annie, an incoming History major at a nearby university, is the docent on duty.

“I’m a present day member of the Gullah community,” she tells us, smiling broadly, “a descendant of the former slaves who still live and work


in the area. My mother, a sweet-grass basket weaver, and my auntie, a painter, have passed down generations of stories to me.” Her upbringing and training are evident in her knowledge.

“There were over 50 rice plantations in the ‘Garden of Gold,’ the nickname at the time for the area,” she reports. “Slaves worked in water shoulder deep. The greatest causes of death were from alligator attacks, snakebites, and their related infections.”

Deb is busy reading a large display – a collection of narratives of enslaved people, collected during the WPA ‘Slave Narratives’ projects. In one, when asked by the interviewer what the elderly did when they became too old to work the fields, one little boy’s response was, “There are no old people ‘round here” (Rice Museum 2012). Deb gazes at the little boy’s face and moves to an excerpt from one of the diaries of an “owner” of enslaved people. “Bristol reports that two of the slave women are confined and expected to give birth at any time,” she reads. “With the ban on the import of slaves from Africa, we need to ensure healthy children from the slaves we have” (Rice Museum 2012). Her reverie is interrupted by one of Annie’s stories.

“Despite the bleak living conditions, the slaves did have some sources of personal power. Slaves who were midwives, for example, could barter for good will garnered from successfully delivering the babies of their owners. For each healthy baby delivered, the midwife would present the plantation mistress with a shell that the mistress wore on her skirt. The shells designated the number of the babies that could be saved from the auction block.”

Deb fights back hot tears at the thought of the clunking shells on the mistresses’ skirts, keeping count of children to barter.

“Some plantation mistresses flaunted the law and taught the people who were enslaved to read and write, but mostly wet nurses and nannies educated African children by memorizing their white charges’ lessons and then passing them on to the black children,” continues Annie. “Most slaves often worked double duty, tending their own gardens when their chores were complete, trading and bartering that produce among themselves and to other plantations. Many of the nannies snuck tea biscuits back to the African children to try to keep them strong.”

“I never knew that,” breathes Deb.

Cris listens to Annie describe the harsh living conditions and imagines what it must have been like to turn virgin cypress swamp land into rice fields. The enslaved workers were essential labor producers, providing a large stable workforce. Rice cultivation in South Carolina could not have occurred without the manual labor, knowledge, and experience of the peo-
ple who were enslaved. Because of the muddy, sandy soil, and the high water table, rice cultivation machinery could not be used in the Lowcountry’s former swampland. Africans from Ghana, Senegal, and other parts of western Africa were specifically targeted because of their knowledge of rice production. They were skilled and experienced commodities, and their skills extended beyond agriculture. They were weavers and woodworkers, wet nurses and washing women. They bartered and traded those skills as well. They had high tolerances—and effective treatments—for mosquito borne illnesses such as malaria and yellow fever. In short, they were survivors. Cris shudders as she remembers the clouds of mosquitoes omnipresent at Hampton Plantation.

Jan examines an exhibit of some of the plantation houses in the area. She’s struck by the discussion of Georgian influence in design and architecture and remembers the gardens at Middleton Plantation and the sloping porches of Hampton Plantation. Residences, barns, outbuildings, and gardens—all set in straight lines or at right angles—emulated the country homes of the British elite of the time. Neat and orderly, these “slave rows,” and the plantation buildings they led to, reflected a desire for order.

Cris joins Jan. “I cannot imagine living here in the 1800s, certainly not as a field worker.”

“I know!” responds Jan. She scratches at the mosquito bites on her face. “You had to be tough to survive the summers here.”

“Tough to survive at all,” agrees Cris. Deb joins them as they begin making their way out of the museum. “Did y’all know all this?” she asks.

“I knew the Africans had a resistance to malaria,” replies Jan.

“I had no idea!” exclaims Deb. “I was raised in the South, and spent most of my history classes learning about plantation life and the Civil War, and I was never taught any of this!” She shakes her head. “It’s amazing to me that you can think you know something all your life, and then find out how little you really know about it after all.”

“Well, and think of the differences in representations!” observes Cris. “At Hampton Plantation, there was hardly a whisper of the experience of enslaved Africans. Here, we learn about this vibrant powerful culture...”

“Same at Middleton!” interrupts Jan excitedly. “Very different representations of experiences!”

“We need to write about this,” they agree, as they walk into the thick, porous, summertime heat.

4.0 DISCUSSION

Taking a break from fieldwork, Jan, Cris, and Deb go to lunch at an
upscale bistro at Pawley’s Island Shops, a collection of stores that were built as a tourist destination on the site of a former plantation. Sitting in an air conditioned alcove, in a building renovated from former homes of enslaved people that were dismantled and rebuilt on the property, the three women sip iced tea and chilled wine. They’re quiet as they reflect on the irony of eating a nice lunch on top of the bones of the dead enslaved Africans and recognize that, in many ways, they are sitting on top of killing fields.

“South Carolina’s tourist economy is still dependent on the legacy of the former enslaved population,” Deb observes.

“Absent or present, represented or misrepresented, they’re all around us,” Cris agrees. “Their stories might not be included within the dominant narratives that are being told by tour guides at some of these historical sites, but they’re as compelling and inspiring as the stories of the white people that came to this place.”

“They built so many of this nation’s iconic structures, created and maintained a vibrant economy, survived while enduring inhuman bondage and violence. . . it’s ironic, isn’t it, that enslaved Africans were the one group without whom this economy would fall apart?” Deb reflects.

“Yes, and think about it,” says Cris thoughtfully. “The same types of verbal and nonverbal constructions that allowed the enslavement trade to flourish and normalize at the time are still in place at many of these tourist sites today. There is no acknowledgement of either these people’s humanity or contribution at many of the places we’ve been visiting. There is no remembrance, no memory, no story being told. To deny people their story is to deny their worth” (Smallwood 2007).

“On the southern plantations, the people who were enslaved lived separate from the plantation owners. They were taught to be deferent, acquiescent, invisible. Even after the war, the resulting reconstruction and segregation periods in the American south reified these cultural norms and behaviors. ‘Separate but equal’ often meant that as a young white child, I would rarely see people of color except as service providers – maids, janitors, babysitters. This forced absence from a cultural landscape allows us to assume that people of color are different, are less than, are other.” Deb’s voice cracks with emotion. She clears her throat and takes a sip of her drink.

“And think about all of the tourist sites we’ve visited,” Jan responds. “We’ve seen so many different types of representations: places where slavery was not represented at all, places where slavery was mis-represented, and places where slavery seemed adequately, or even richly, represented. These differences in levels and types of representations also have a rhetori-
cal power. When you hear about the resourcefulness of people, like we did at the Rice Museum, you start really noticing the absences, the misrepresentations, the way some tellers of these histories produce a view that is extremely one-sided and invokes a sort of white nostalgia for white southern gentility.

Deb nods. “Especially at the sites that are former plantations! Some sites only represent one particular racial or ethnic experience, some sites include demonstrations of slavery, and other sites represent historical occurrences. Some of the differences in tour and museum experiences seemed based on the particular docent and other human interactions and interpretations within those ‘tour’ moments. Other researchers have noticed this as well” (Bruner 2005; Iles 2006; Pezzulo 2003).

“I wonder how different our ‘African American Experience’ tour would have been if we’d had a tour guide other than Mandy,” remarks Jan. “Yeah, and how different our experience at the Rice Museum might have been if we didn’t have Annie,” agrees Deb.

“Some of the differences in representation and experience seem to be related to whether the material is mediated, written, or oral,” adds Cris. “Some of them seem to be related to the type of site—plantation, park, battleground, national historic site, market, or museum, and how those purposes blend and blur. I’ve read this in other literature also” (Aden 2012; Iles 2006; Pezzulo 2003; Wallace 1981).

“It seems to matter who owns the site—the state, a private historical society, nonprofit, or the family of the original land grant owner,” Deb says with a chuckle. “The sites managed by family foundations seemed reluctant to even mention their ancestors’ role in slavery.”

“The state would want to sanitize that representation as well,” agrees Cris. “We need to acknowledge different representations for different purposes—most sites seek to tell a particular story, whether that story is familial and intergenerational. . .”

“Or historic or cultural. . .” Deb interrupts.

“Yes, and we need to acknowledge that not only are these fluid performances because of purpose, but they’re also shifting because of differing contexts, presentations, and interpretations,” observes Jan.

“Yet,” adds Cris, “all of these sites are positioning cultural production as tourism.

All of these constructions represent production of capital—past and present—and are therefore, in effect, performances of capitalism and commodification.”

“And hatred,” Deb inserts. “Absences are rhetorical holes—vacuums—and they’re going to get filled with something. In the absence of rich
and diverse understandings and human complexities, ignorance and fear can emerge to fill those vacuums.”

“So which is worse,” asks Jan, “rhetorics of absence, rhetorics of revision, or rhetorics of hate?”

Cris sighs and gazes outside through the thick old window pane glass warping her view of the bustling highway outside. “It’s this road,” she murmurs. “One leads to the other. They’re all the same path that lead to the same destination. Distaste, disgust, and hatred.” She sighs again. “And fear of each other.”

5.0 Analysis

Following Pollock’s (1998, 13) contention that there are “no true representations,” for “representations...make absent the very thing it wishes to make present” (17), we suggest that the multiple representations of the experience of enslaved Africans we encountered create a mosaic performance of incomplete and absent representations of slavery. Authentic reproductions are oxymorons. They cannot exist, and when we attempt to represent an experience the result is what Jackson (1998, 280-284) characterizes as “the inauthentic authentic.” The quest for authenticity is a discursive struggle over labels, interpretations, agencies, and values (Abblink 2000; Bruner 2005). In other words, as Shaffer (2004, 154) asserts, “authenticity must be viewed as a socially constructed concept.” Even experience, once reproduced, fails to be authentic anymore. While we understand authenticity to be a false construct, to note the complete absence of stories chronicling millions of enslaved Africans over a period of time spanning centuries, in places that are state or national historic sites, was and is incomprehensible to us. We suggest that such rhetorical absences allow many visitors to make assumptions about the experiences of the enslaved people in South Carolina and that these assumptions also are often devoid of agency, power, and narrative reasoning. These assumptions can translate into beliefs about their descendants.

All of the tourist sites we visited represent the experience of slavery on a Southern rice plantation quite differently. Some sites seek historical reproduction, some sites seek economic and/or capitalistic reproduction, some sites seek paternal and/or familial reproduction, and some sites seek intellectual and/or scholarly reproduction. In South Carolina, for example, we would suggest that the Rice Museum is a historical reproduction, perhaps allowing for a more balanced view, including narratives and perspectives from both enslaved Africans and whites. Like Middleton Place, the Rice Museum serves as a site of economic production: charging a fee to enter, selling items at a gift shop, sponsoring ticketed events. However,
Unlike the Rice Museum, Middleton Place, and Hampton Plantation are paternal and/or familial reproductions as well as historical reproductions. They seek to communicate a multi-generational family legacy that is often built upon and therefore devoid of the experience of the “other.” All of these spaces now function as tourist sites, and as such are all now economic and capitalistic reproductions. These diverse purposes are not bounded; they often overlap, blur, and blend. One common thread shared by the sites we discuss in this paper is that they have now become “places of public memory” or “cultural heritage sites” (Aden 2012; Chambers 2006; Kamen 1991; Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1991; McKercher and duCross 2002), and therefore, are now all cultural reproductions as well as familial, economic and capitalistic productions.

Cultural heritage sites are not just cultural, familial, economic, and capitalistic productions, however. They not only seek to represent some “history” important to our culture, but they also serve as gatekeepers. The information shared or not shared, the objects for purchase and those unstocked, the words and demeanors of the tour guides and docents—this production becomes a part of a story that the consumers craft, tell, and re-tell. Our experiences at various locales in South Carolina were enhanced or diminished because of the interactions with those who were telling the stories of these places. From Mandy at Middleton Place to Annie at the Rice Museum, our knowledge, histories, and herstories were affected by the narration of the tour guide, docent, or host. Even at the graveyards we visited in Charleston, which are not considered in this particular paper, our information was augmented and our experiences were enriched because of the time spent listening to the tales of the proud Gullah descendant, now self-identifying as a “proud African American veteran,” who managed the groundskeeping crew at St. Michael’s Cemetery since the 1980s; to the gossip shared by the primarily white, upper-middle class female volunteers at the parish gift shop who had been congregation members all their lives; to the stories behind the acquisition of items for the Rice Museum, told vividly by the two white male gift shop managers, marital and business partners for decades; and to the interviews with one of the local men, a black pastor, who narrated the WPA presentation there. We lunched with the interpreter at Hobcaw Barony at the same restaurant that we lunched at together after conducting fieldwork all day. Our experiences—as tourists, scholars, and citizens of America were heightened by these conversations.

These are contested spaces. Multiple stories exist in these places. These are conversations that civic groups and civic planners; museum foundations and stakeholders; politicians and religious leaders; and constituents representing diverse standpoints continue to have. We are not the first
scholars to study, document, and struggle to understand the motives and meanings, differences and preferences with regard to interpretations at cultural heritage sites (Aden 2012; Bird 2002; Butler, Carter and Dwyer 2008; Carter, Butler and Dwyer 2011; Iles 2006; Key 2012; Miller 2014; Montes and Butler 2008; Wallace 1981). These are not new tensions. But these tensions often mirror disputes occurring in our “culture writ large,” as we struggle with representation in all facets of our cultural milieu, including those of the historical as well as the modern. We suggest that a deeper understanding of the histories within these physical and discursive spaces not only make for interesting leisure but also make for much more common cultural co-habitants. We are neither naïve nor do we suggest that richer representations of our cultural diversity will eliminate racisms and hatreds, but we do insist that to approach understandings of difference is to approach understandings of our human commonalities. Such was the hope of desegregation in the American South during the second half of the twentieth century. We believe, even with all of our existing challenges, that there have been few social experiments in the United States as successful as desegregation, despite the disenfranchisements still existing in our country, and especially our “souths,” with regard to race and class, sexual identity and performance, and a host of other standpoints that color our worlds.

Katriel (1993, 69) contends that “our future is where our past is.” If we learn who we are through learning who we were, then who are we if the knowledge of our past is built on a rhetoric of absence? Who are we, then, as descendants of enslaved Africans? Who are we, then, as descendants of the white owners of enslaved Africans? Who are we, then, as tourists and consumers, historians, and ethnographers? We assert that it is impossible to begin to understand our history if segments of it are made invisible to us, especially as a nation of immigrants who share one commonality—most of us arrived here as travelers. Most of us came here from somewhere else, whether by choice or not. Especially now, when some national political candidates prepare for election to public office by reviling those who have come here as immigrants—especially if they are non-white—we suggest that these glaring absences in our histories, in our narratives, in our cultural presentation(s), help make possible the rhetoric that seeks to divide rather than unite us today.

Registry as a National Historic Site neither does nor should substitute for historical diversity. Likewise, narratives told only from the perspective of military victors are equally limited in scope, understanding and appeal. There are several ways to diversify and represent cultural and historical narratives that are rich, inclusive, and historically varied without sacrificing a pleasurable tourist experience. For example, the displays at Charlestowne Landing National Historic Site are from multiple perspectives representing
an array of religions, ethnicities, nationalities, and histories. These displays often consisted of diary, journal, and receipt book excerpts that include opportunities for visitors to manipulate by, for example, rummaging through chests of clothing to choose particular outfits for the author(s) of the records or to set the table according to the customs discussed in the record or to choose your standpoints to see what your social, familial, and work experiences would be like depending on your race, class, and sex. Prior to groundbreaking, archeologists conducted digs to locate original structures, wells, and graveyards, and those finds are destinations on the walking tour. Items for purchase in the gift shop reflect the diversity of these stories told and lived.

Alternative forms of historical representation include art, music, poetry—even absence—within the presence. At the Tamastslikt Cultural Institute in Oregon, which we have not visited as part of our research, the history of a native people is vividly represented. Struggling to adequately communicate the loss of the tribe’s horses in national government roundups, as well as the tribe members’ unspeakable horror when they realized their beloved equine family members had been slaughtered and sold as canned meat, one of the final displays in the institute is a silent telling of that story. In the middle of the largely empty room is a tall pile of empty dogfood cans. Just empty dogfood cans, and an explanation plaque telling the story, are the only things necessary to communicate a cultural loss so profound to its members that no words can express it (Miller 2015).9

Similarly, arts and literature can represent diversities and express these complexities in ways that sometimes the historical representation cannot. Multiple artists and writers have evocatively addressed these tensions for centuries.10 The work of poet laureate of the United States, Natasha Trethewey, addresses the creolization of American culture from an intensely personal perspective as a biracial citizen struggling to reconcile the histories that construct her physical, cultural, familial, and emotional identities (2002, 2006, 2012). Similarly, artist Jonathan Greene depicts his life within the Gullah culture of the South Carolina low country in his colorful drawings and paintings. These are only two such examples of many of the ways in which the artistic community can communicate a vibrant and varied history for public consumption.

The academy has a role to play in this expansion of our historical record as well. We hope to respond to the absences we have documented at tourist sites in South Carolina through this work, but there are many other examples of such scholarship that adds depth and breadth to our oftentimes conflicting accounts of our history. Such is the case in Miles’ (2015) accounting of her tour experiences at the Sorrel-Weed House in Savannah, Georgia. Her deconstruction of the “ghost tour(s)” conducted at the home
in question the taken for granted racial tropes present in the narrative of the tour. Additionally, her work (2008) investigating the quest for native personhood by “Nancy, a Cherokee woman,” tells a story of determination, agency, and ultimate victory (through her grandson) in seeking freedom as a native person. We also find Norm Denzin’s (2008, 2011, 2013) performative critiques of the historical depictions of race in popular culture helpful in understanding the diverse constituencies and rhetorical tropes at play within these cultural performances. There are many such stories being told today.

These examples of oppositional dialogue, autobiographical insertions, counter-hegemonic narratives and performances, and fieldwork designed to generate dialogue can replace the absences often imposed by the master narratives that comprise the written history (Abbink 2000; Carter Butler and Dwyer 2011; Butler Carter and Dwyer 2008; Denzin 2013; Katriel 1993; Miller 2005; Montes and Butler 2008). By adding these counter narratives to the master trope presented at these sites, we replace absence—not with distortion, distaste, or outright hatred—but with agency, diversity, and equality in perspective. Historical representation gives us a space within which to insert these importances, to reclaim herstories and histories in order to better understand culture (Pezzulo 2003). These understandings foster dialogue, and these are two important necessities for the dissipation of hate.

6.0 CONCLUSION

In this critical rhetorical analysis of coastal South Carolina tourism locales, we note a rhetoric of absence, revision, and a resulting vilification in which the representation of formerly enslaved Africans and now free African Americans has been minimized, erased, and divested of value. Within the commodification of history, the atrocities of racism, kidnapping, capture, murder, torture, neglect, hatred, and marginalization are whitewashed. Stories of agency and resistance are infrequent. Sites of backbreaking manual labor under the watchful eyes of armed guards have become air conditioned restaurants with African-American waiters working for tips. Places of anguish and grief have become walking tours through romanticized fairy tales about plantation life, invoking hoop skirted beauties and romantic carriage rides. Fields of death and mourning have become parking lots. We cannot change the past, but with a more balanced account of the history of those who were enslaved and those who enslaved, and by critiquing their depictions at similar historical sites, perhaps we can change not only those representations but some of the resulting interpretations that follow. We study cultural heritage sites as rhetorical texts, as ideological
and performative arenas, as places where stories (not History) are reconstructed, performed, promoted, and constantly revised. As Pollock (1998, 27) beautifully suggests, it is

at these moments of slippage, history shape shifts. It appears in a variety of forms: as an armed absence, as motility within the apparently fixed terms of the sign, as ideological panic and conflict, as the very stuff of cultural production, as utopic possibility, and as an excess or overflow. . .like bursting seams, these moments invite and require intervention. They avail history through culture of change – and position the historical subject as a historical agent capable of initiating change.

Thus, the absent is made present.

NOTES

1. Dr. Deborah Cunningham Breede is an associate professor in communication studies at Coastal Carolina University, where she is affiliated with Women and Gender Studies and the Center for Archeology and Anthropology. Her writing has appeared in Journal of Loss and Trauma, Journal of Contemplative Inquiry, and Qualitative Communication Research. Dr. Christine S. Davis is professor of communication studies at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. She is the author, most recently, of Communicating Hope: An Ethnography of a Children’s Mental Health Care Team (Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press, 2013) and Conversations about Qualitative Communication Scholarship: Behind the Scenes with Leading Scholars (Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press). Dr. Jan Warren-Findlow is associate professor of Public Health Sciences at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. Her scholarship has most recently been published in Southern Medical Journal, Journal of Human Lactation, and Journal of Healthcare for the Poor and Underserved.

2. In Charleston, we visited Charlestown Landing State Park; The Charleston Slave Market; St. Michael’s cemetery; the Fireproof Building, the location of the South Carolina Historical Society; and Middleton Place plantation. Up 17 north in McClellanville, we visited Hampton and Hopeswee plantations. Finally, in Georgetown, we toured the Rice Museum and embarked upon a variety of tourism and research options at Hobcaw Barony.

3. In addition to the Rice Museum in Georgetown, for more inclusive representations of the contributions of diverse populations, we strongly recommend visiting Charlestowne Landing Historic Site or Drayton Hall in the Charleston area and Freewoods Farm in the Georgetown area.
For more about the lives of people of color in the colonial and antebellum periods of the American South, we suggest readers turn to Leland Ferguson’s *Uncommon Ground: Archeology and Early African America, 1650-1800*; Goodwine’s and the Clarity Press Gullah Project’s *Legacy of Ibo Landing: Gullah Roots of African American Culture*; Joyner’s *Down by the Riverside: A South Carolina Slave Community*; and Black Majority: *Negroes in Colonial South Carolina* by Peter H. Wood.

5. “Mandy” is a pseudonym.

6. For another treatment of these narratives, see Davis and Breede (2015).

7. “Annie” is a pseudonym.

8. Most scholars agree that the TransAtlantic Database is the most comprehensive source for information regarding what is commonly known as the “Mid Atlantic” slave trade or the “Middle Passage.” While they acknowledge all calculations are estimates, they have documented 36,000 slaving voyages carrying as many as 10 million enslaved Africans to the “Americas” over a period of three centuries, with over 305,000 of them landing in the colonial or United States.

9. Monticello and Washington’s Birthplace in Virginia, the Hezekiah Alexander and Bennett homesites in North Carolina, and the Vann and Ridge Houses in Georgia are examples of historic sites that tell multi-racial, multi-conceptual stories of events, people, and places. There are many others.

10. These works are too exhaustive to list here, but that of Frederick Douglass, W.E.B. duBois, Toni Morrison, Gwendolyn Brooks, Langston Hughes, Alice Walker, Alex Haley, Basquiat, are just a few that immediately come to mind.

REFERENCES


Brockington, Lee. Date. Personal Interview.


Marshall, Amani T. 2014. “They are Supposed to be Lurking About the City”: Enslaved Women Runaways in Antebellum Charleston.” The South Carolina Historical Magazine 115 (3): 188-212.


Trans-Atlantic Slave Database. Available at http://www.slavevoyages.org/


The Love and Hate Relationship of Colonial Heritage: Exploring Changes of the Heritage Archive in Zimbabwe

Njabulo Chipangura
University of Wiwatersrand South Africa

ABSTRACT

This article presents some of the main debates circling around the conservation of colonial heritage in Zimbabwe and the contestations that undergird its protection because of a shift in understandings of the heritage archive, the former British colony’s national monuments register, which is constituted by a list of declared and protected heritage sites. In the conventional archive, archivability is “the product of a judgement, the result of the exercise of a specific power and authority, which involves placing certain documents in an archive at the same time as others are discarded” (Mbembe, 2002, p. 2), and so it is unsurprising that what should be kept or discarded is often contested. In Zimbabwe’s heritage archive, conservation and protection is selectively offered to liberation war heritage while colonial heritage has been marginalised, discarded, and left to deteriorate. The Southern African nation’s heritage archive is often constructed to suit the needs of the ruling government and veterans of Zimbabwe’s War of Liberation (1964-1979), and colonial heritage has been vandalised and destroyed without considering that it can be utilised for the purpose of a critical heritage practice so that questions about the experience of colonialism in Zimbabwe can be answered using colonial heritage as a key reference point.

Colonial heritage in this article is defined as monuments and sites that were produced as a result of Zimbabwe’s colonial encounters under British rule from 1890 to up until 1980, when the country gained its political independence. This heritage takes the form of buildings, memorials, graves, statues, churches, bridges, and forts. Because heritage is a value-loaded concept, in whatever form it appears, its very nature relates entirely to present circumstances. In Zimbabwe at one time, a number of colonial sites were on the heritage archive only to be de-proclaimed and removed from the register soon after independence (Mupira, 2009). Thirty-two colonial memorials were removed from the heritage archive at independence (Krieger, 1996). Today, this post-colony is finding it difficult to keep a heritage that is largely associated with a painful colonial experience, a heritage that hurts (Muringaniza, 2004).

Notions of power are central to the construction of this heritage
archive in Zimbabwe and thus heritage is not given, but rather is made. In this case, that heritage is being made through a careful propagation of liberation war heritage and, conversely, a destruction of colonial heritage spurred by a nostalgic hatred of a colonial past. The effect is that colonial heritage has ceased to be a priority area of heritage conservation and the post-colonial nation actually celebrates its discarding. Liberation heritage in Zimbabwe can be defined as tangible and intangible and as movable and immovable inheritance or places associated with resistance against colonial rule and injustices from 1890 to 1980. Haunted landscapes, mass graves, battle sites, assembly points, songs, narratives, biographies of nationalists, historic trails, routes, protected villages, detention centers, prisons, and transit camps/bases have been included in the broad comprehension of what constitutes liberation heritage. Issues of collecting, documenting, conserving and commemorating the mosaic of Zimbabwe’s heritage accumulated during the struggles for independence continue to emerge in a postcolonial state “standing at a crossroads in its management of national heritage” and “striving to cast off colonial legacies and forge a national identity” (Harrison and Hughes, 2010, p. 6). This amounts to a paradigm shift in the heritage management and conservation in Zimbabwe, which has seen the emergence of memorialization of the Chimurenga² wars forming a core aspect in this discourse. Zimbabwe’s fight against colonial rule, the 1st Chimurenga (1896-1897) and the 2nd Chimurenga (1964-1979), monumentalised as liberation war heritage. The politics of re-inscribing and recognising the suffering of people on the landscape where the war was fought, through acts of declaring and making of liberation heritage sites, representation, and communication, also form a core of this heritage.

Central to the discourse of liberation heritage are the recent exhumations, identification, and reburial processes that have become a kind of performance battle ground through which the dead are summoned from their graves by vernacular spirit mediums. These commemorative projects, which have focused on the identification, reburial, ritual cleansing, and memorialization of the human remains of the liberation war dead in Zimbabwe and across its borders have completely obscured the conservation of colonial heritage (Fontein, 2009).

**Hate and Love in Colonial Heritage**

Zimbabwe was former colony of Britain (1890-1980) and has over 100 colonial era monuments, with the grave of British imperialist Cecil John Rhodes in Matobo district probably headlining this heritage archive (Chakanyuka, 2015). The former Rhodesia was named after Rhodes, who is credited for establishing the colony in 1890 from his own personal
The genesis of the process that ushered in the dismantling of colonial heritage and its symbols can be traced to as far back as 1980, at the dawn of Zimbabwe’s independence. Kriger (1995) notes that in July 1980, the Cecil John Rhodes’s statue in Harare was removed and the then-Minister of Information, Nathan Shamuyarira, declared that “government would order the removal of only those colonial statues and monuments which by their presence raised political controversy” (Kriger, 1995). The new Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front government (ZANU PF), which had spearheaded the liberation struggle between 1976 and 1979, immediately displayed its antagonism toward colonial heritage upon the attainment of independence.

Figure 1: Pictures showing the two statues of Cecil John Rhodes that were pulled down in Harare and Bulawayo soon after independence. Adopted from the book Rhodesia and Eastern Africa by Allister McMillan.

In this regard, the removal of colonial monuments at the advent of independence in 1980 was at the heart of the new nation-state’s quest for political legitimacy and a national identity to be created from symbols drawn on the recent liberation struggle. In Eastern Zimbabwe, the Trek memorial in Chimanimani, which recognized the first white settlers in the area, had its two metal plaques removed from the memorial, and the monument notice was destroyed in the process. The wagon on top of the memorial was destroyed with picks by between forty and fifty young men and women singing ZANU PF revolutionary songs. The monument was eventually de-proclaimed in June 1983 and demolished by monuments inspec-
tors from National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe (NMMZ), the government body responsible for the protection, management, and conservation of all heritage sites, with the aid of labour force from the District Administrator’s office. In an interview, Chief Muusha, a traditional leader in the area, said the Trek memorial was destroyed because it did not have any significance whatsoever to the indigenous populace because it celebrated colonialism and was regarded as offensive. The case of the Trek memorial’s destruction illustrates the determination with which the ZANU PF government and its war veterans had obliterating colonial heritage soon after independence and exposes some of the weaknesses in the heritage archive model in Zimbabwe.

Figure 2: The Trek memorial in Chimanimani, before it was destroyed. (Picture from the Memorial Trek file at Mutare Museum)

The desire to discard a painful colonial past by the ruling ZANU PF government also manifested itself in the escalating and persistent calls by the veterans of Zimbabwe’s War of Liberation to remove Cecil John Rhodes’ grave Matopos Hills. Ranger (2004) argues that in 2002, war veterans in Matabeleland launched a campaign for the removal of Rhodes’s grave from Matopos Hills and demands were continuously made to have the exhumed bones returned to England. In the same year, another war veteran leader, Andrew Ndlovu, declared that “we cannot find peace when we are keeping a white demon in our midst,” referencing Rhodes’ burial (Guvamombe, 2002).

Because Cecil John Rhodes grave is a national monument located
within a cultural landscape that also has other venerated traditional religious shrines and because the whole Matopos Cultural landscape was inscribed as a UNESCO’s prestigious World Heritage Centre in 2003, the call for Rhodes’ grave’s removal had global significance. The debate about exhuming the remains of Rhodes also extended into contemporary heritage forums in Zimbabwe with Heritage Trust of Zimbabwe championing the cause. In one of the symposiums held by the Trust, some youths vehemently challenged the government to have the grave removed from Matopos, arguing that the hills were sacred and thus must be venerated as such. Burying Rhodes among the spirits of the country was thus similar to committing sacrilege against Zimbabwe’s forefathers, who were once enslaved by the same figure. Such calls were premised on the argument that the continued preservation of monuments laden with colonial history was tantamount to celebrating colonialism (Chakanyuka, 2015) and that removing Rhodes’ grave would fulfil former rebel leader and now long-time President Robert Mugabe’s 1961 promise (as recorded by Ranger) to “dig up” the grave of the man who “had stolen the country from the Africans” and then “send it to England” (2004, p. 213).

However, opposition to this plan arose during the 14th General Assembly and Scientific Symposium of the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) held at Victoria in 2003. Robert Mugabe, now the president of Zimbabwe, sang a different tune altogether, saying “Zimbabwe valued heritage so much that even the graves of the country’s colonialists such as Cecil John Rhodes were being preserved and that we accept history as reality” (Guvamombe, 2002). In 2012, the same government blocked plans by war veterans, who blamed the grave for the drought that had hit some parts of the country in that year, from exhuming the remains and arguing that Rhodes’ legacy was part and parcel of the country’s national history. Earlier in 2000, the war veterans had also staged protests demanding that the statue of Scottish colonialist David Livingstone in Victoria Falls be removed from Zimbabwean soil. They defaced the plaque on the statue, claiming that it was an insult to the country (McGregor & Schumaker, 2006). The government’s inconsistent response—a kind of love and hate game—to demands for the removal of colonial heritage is heavily informed by economics: the heritage is conserved if some sort of economic benefits derive from it. In Eastern Zimbabwe, near the city centre of Mutare, for example, Utopia House, the museum home of late-19th/early-20th century British South African Company surveyor Rhys Fairbridge and his wife Rosalie, and Kopje House, the town’s first hospital, in spite of their obvious colonial associations, continue to stand. With the changed political circumstances in Zimbabwe, the museum’s preservation continues with official
sanction as part of the indisputable facts of the history of the country (Locke, 1983).

Indeed, the Kopje complex has four buildings that have been converted into a cultural centre and is being leased out to various tenants by the NMMZ. The state of conservation on this historic complex is good compared to other such buildings that are under the care of NMMZ. There is a regular inspection and maintenance program run by the monuments and maintenance department from Mutare Museum. Furthermore, the historic component of this cultural landscape is still being respected in that all alterations to the buildings are prohibited unless undertaken by the curator of archaeology at Mutare Museum. One of the reasons why this heritage site enjoys a sizeable degree of sound conservation in relation to the other buildings is that the complex generates a lot of money for NMMZ through leasing. Part of the money that is being generated is therefore used in its conservation programs, which is significant as NMMZ does not directly fund such conservation activities. In contrast, funding in the region is directly injected into the maintenance and upgrading of liberation war memorials such as the provincial heroes’ acre, a burial ground, and the Chimoio shrines, dedicated to those who were killed in a massacre there at the hands of Rhodesian security forces in 1976, in bordering Mozambique. The Public Sector Investment Project (PSIP) is an initiative by the government that has rolled out funding specifically for the management and conservation of liberation war sites both in the country and outside the
borders. Historic structures at both Utopia House and Kopje House are not covered in the conservation grants that are doled out by the government through the PSIP initiative. In Zimbabwe, those liberation heritage sites focusing on the heroics and sacrifices of war are prioritized, those colonial sites that are profitable are maintained, and other colonial sites are neglected or destroyed.

**Figure 4:** The Manicaland Provincial Heroes, which is part of liberation war sites that receive annual grants for maintenance purposes. (Photo by N. Chipangura)

**Heritage Meanings and Contestations in Zimbabwe**

The concept of *dissonant heritage* can inform our understanding of the contestations between colonial heritage and liberation war heritage, such as those in management priorities, in Zimbabwe. As Graham and Howard (2008) observe, “[T]he quite unavoidable implication of heritage in the contestation of societies invokes the condition of dissonance which refers to the discordance or lack of agreement and consistency as to the meaning of heritage” (3). Not surprisingly, in contemporary Zimbabwe, this means that liberation heritage sites like provincial heroes acres (See Figure 4) and memorial shrines receive considerable funding each year directly from the government for rehabilitation.

Recently, the Chimoio liberation shrine in Mozambique has received some funding toward the upgrading of an onsite interpretative centre.
contrast, colonial memorials have been neglected and vandalised by veterans of the same liberation struggle. For example, the Thomas Moodie memorial in Chipinge was destroyed by the war veterans in 1985, who argued that the memorial did not have any relevancy in the post-colony because it was a hallmark of white supremacy and was therefore not a part of Zimbabwe’s new heritage. The vandalised memorial, a colonial heritage site that had been declared a national monument in 1939, was eventually de-proclaimed as a national monument by government notice 584 of 1986.11 As this example indicates, the different uses of heritage and its importance to different people for various reasons make it inevitable that it has emerged as a major arena of conflict and contestation (Graham 2004), for “heritage is both contested and culturally constructed, which inevitably makes it a highly political topic and one with a scarcity of clear-cut definitions and answers” (Aplin, 2002, p. 28).

Despite the complexity of dissonant heritage, the dominant forces in organizing Zimbabwe’s heritage archive often treat the nation’s heritage as if it were “clear-cut.” The liberation struggle in Zimbabwe was a military conflict; hence, the ZANU PF government and war veterans, when commemorating camps bombed during the liberation war, focus on victory and defeat. Liberation heritage is therefore conceived here as a sign of victory, whereas all forms of colonial heritage are branded as symbols of defeat and thus warrant obliteration. Heritage attests to the dissonant and conflicting uses and purposes of the past because the past can be purposely selected, modified, and re-appropriated to meet political agendas and ideological frameworks that underpin heritage in the present (Park, 2014, p. 18). There is a strong feeling among the general public that heritage values in Zimbabwe are formed and framed in a partisan way and ideologically impressed upon the citizens by the powers that be as if they are intrinsic, static, and substantial—and yet they are driven by people’s motivations, which are anything but intrinsic or static.

Liberation war heritage in Zimbabwe has become a cause of tension, conflict, and violence because the ruling ZANU PF government has framed and disseminated it in a way that depicts the regime as the real victim of the past. The process in Zimbabwe illustrates McDowell’s (2010) observation that “heritage is a highly politicised process that is subjected to contestation and bound in the construction, reconstruction and deconstruction of memory and identity” (37). National identity in Zimbabwe is constructed from liberation war heritage and subsequently and deliberately leaves no space for the conservation of colonial heritage. The government deploys the state media to broadcast the official and hegemonic understanding of liberation war heritage, an “invention of tradition” (Hobsbawn, 1983). The government refers to heritage from the war to indicate its bravery, power, and
might and to provide evidence that it can command a successful war against opponents.

This partisan approach to the past gives rise to a dissonant heritage. Fronting liberation war heritage in Zimbabwe has caused segregation and negative differentiation, a heritage that is not only dissonant (Tunbridge & Ashworth, 1996) but also undesirable (Chadha, 2006) and negative (Meskell, 2002). The intrinsic dissonance of heritage, accentuated by its expanding meanings and uses by the fundamentally more complex constructions of identity in the modern world, is the primary cause of its contestation (Graham, 2004), despite Zimbabwe’s government’s efforts to create a hegemonic narrative of victory. The root cause of the dissonant nature of heritage lies in the observation by Tunbridge and Ashworth (1996) that heritage is created by interpretation, which creates specific messages about the value and meaning of specific heritage places and the past it represents. In other words, the messages conveyed from heritage interpretation do not always find consensus and thus cause dissonance. Heritage knowledge in Zimbabwe is thus a field of contestation because it is situated in particular social and intellectual circumstances, it is time-specific, and its meaning(s) can be altered as text are re-read in changing times, circumstances, and constructs of place and scale (Graham & Howard, 2008).

Heritage in this case therefore becomes a selection of monuments and sites that glorify the victories associated with the liberation struggle relative to the destruction of symbols that reminds the nation about the painful colonial past. Russell (2010) argues that definitions of heritage elaborate on its quality as those things that are passed to future generations, even as Tunbridge and Ashworth (1996) recognize it as “a product of the present, purposefully developed in response to current needs and demands for it” (p. 6). Russell recognize “the difficulty in quantifying these exchange relationships is that they are negotiated and mediated often imperceptibly, over long periods of time” (2010, p. 29). In sum, the present determines and selects an inheritance from an imagined past for current use and decides what should be passed on to an imagined future. Heritage makes a selective use of the past, which is transformed through interpretation for current use and purposes. In this way, the heritage archive in Zimbabwe is constructed around liberation war heritage, leaving no place for colonial heritage.

Heritage is about telling stories; however, not all such stories may be equally acceptable in political and ethical terms. Suitable forms of engagement may range from openly promoting and strengthening some stories that benefit society to problematizing and undermining others that may harm (Holtorf, 2010, p. 51). Therefore, the dominant ideology thesis in heritage conservation in Zimbabwe has entailed that the story of the nation is synon-
ymous with the conservation of liberation war heritage and the denigration of colonial heritage. Kriger (1995) argues that, upon the formation of the new nation after independence in 1980, the ZANU PF government sought to enhance their political legitimacy and to foster a national identity through the discarding of colonial symbols, including statues and monuments, and through attempts to establish their own heroes as national symbols. National heritage is used by the government to legitimise the state; thus heritage was a concept appropriated by the ruling ZANU PF government to reinforce its power.

However, the needs of present day Zimbabwe require that heritage be framed and transformed from spaces of war to spaces of peace and reconciliation. Heritage can be sites of unity, social cohesion, peace, and reconciliation because it is a socially produced and negotiated entity whose meanings vary depending on context over time. It challenges the “archaeology of perpetrators” (Pollock 2007), where the process of exposing and describing landscapes of atrocity is used to provoke public discourse and explore uncomfortable aspects of history. Keeping faith with the dead and memories of wrongs suffered should not just be traces or mirrors of the troubling past; they can be catalysts for insight, resistance, social change, and doing justice. Lessons undertaken in the past can be used to fight injustice today. Misuse of memory can damage others and hence need to be forestalled or transformed (Volf, 2006), but if people remember rightly, heritage and history can be sources of peace and reconciliation. The liberation struggle represented by heritage places from the war can thus be transformed from evoking feelings of tension to introducing opportunities for unity, common identity, and history.

Changes in the Heritage Archive of Zimbabwe

The archive according to Mbembe (2002) basically places materials, such as traditional documents, into “a system that facilitates identification and interpretation” (p. 20). The materials that are placed in the archive selected from among many because of their particular “worth.” In this regard, archives “are the product of a process which converts a certain number of documents into items judged to be worthy of preserving and keeping in a public place, where they can be consulted according to well-established procedures and regulations” (Mbembe, 2012, p. 20); certain systems of power, authority, and knowledge influence the determination of what materials are “archivable” and “not archivable.” Similarly, the heritage archive of Zimbabwe herein refers to the system of selective listing and delisting of sites onto the national monuments register. Each site on the register has a file that contains a statement on its cultural significance/val-
ues, state of conservation, condition assessment and inspections reports, photographs, and maps. In Eastern Zimbabwe, seventeen sites are on this register, and only three of these are colonial heritage: Utopia House, Kopje House, and Nurses Memorial. This memorial was established to commemorate the lives of the first white nursing sisters who arrived in the area in 1891 from Beira, Mozambique. The sisters went on to set up the first clinic in the area that served the settlers. A memorial cross was constructed to recognise the devotion of the sisters to the humanitarian cause of the colony and declared a national monument in 1956 and still enjoys a sizeable degree of protection even up to now. This archive therefore does not adequately represent all the heritage typologies in the region because it over-represents liberation and archaeological heritage. Furthermore, nomination files are presently being prepared for two more liberation war heritage sites in Eastern Zimbabwe and thus the list on the heritage archive will soon grow to nineteen. Power relations at different levels to a large extent underpin the inclusions into and the exclusions from this archive. Hamilton (2002) observes that “what constitutes an archive, what form it takes, and what systems of classification signal at specific times . . . are the very substance of the politics of the times” (p. 15). Generally, the archive may thus be regarded as one of the mediums through which particular readings and understandings of societies are produced. Hence, it can well be argued, as Mbembe does, that “the heritage archive” in Zimbabwe is primarily the exercise of a specific power and authority, which involves conserving liberation war heritage and at the same time discarding colonial monuments. The exercise of power and authority with regards to the heritage archive may be hinged on particular meanings that are assigned to the “archivable” materials, which are dispersed into classes or categories (such as architecture) that may be favoured or disfavoured by archivists.

However, the National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe Act, Chapter 25:11 does not dichotomise heritage because it advances for the universal protection of all categories. This act explicitly states that it protects all areas, including ancient monuments or land areas, of historical, architectural, archaeological, scientific, and paleontological value, including distinctive geological formations, waterfalls, caves, grottos, avenues of trees, old trees, or old buildings or portions of buildings, or other objects, whether natural or constructed by people, of value of interest (NMMZ Act Chapter 2511). Such sites cannot be altered, excavated, or damaged, and materials on them cannot be removed without the written consent of the Executive Director of NMMZ. This act is currently under review, and the public and stakeholders have been invited to share views on what should constitute as national monuments. The NMMZ ACT will be changed into the National Museums and Heritage Act.
THE DISCARDING OF THE GREAT WAR MEMORIAL

In spite of the provisions of the NMMZ act, there has been a departure from history associated with the colonial past and this has resulted in an increase in the purging, vandalism, and destruction of colonial heritage. This purging was inspired by hate rather than by nationalism. War memorials of the painful colonial period have been neglected and left to deteriorate as all conservation efforts are now expended toward liberation war heritage. Figures 5 and 6 show a colonial war memorial located in Penhalonga, a mining village about 18 km north of Mutare, before and after independence; the Great War Memorial, now engulfed in overgrown grass, remembered white Rhodesian soldiers who died during World War I. It was declared a monument in 1946 and was maintained in good condition through independence, when it was removed from the “heritage archive.” This memorial now appears to have been completely abandoned and have been turned into a ruin. Historic buildings, statues, forts, and memorials of the colonial period, such as the Great War Memorial in Penhalonga, have been forgotten and increasingly vandalised over the past ten years, with a growing agitation in some sections of the society. To remove them from the “heritage archive.”

FIGURE 5: The Great War Memorial in Penhalonga, Mutare before independence, adapted from the book Rhodesia and Eastern Africa.
CONSERVATION AT OLD MUTARE

The set of buildings that comprise the Old Mutare heritage was constructed by the Pioneer Column, the military force that Rhodes and his military advisors used to occupy Mashonaland, between 1891 and 1897. This heritage precinct, located some 15km northeast of the city of Mutare, has twenty historic colonial period buildings that have survived since 1891. Old Mutare symbolises the first fort that was established by the settler regime in Eastern Zimbabwe in 1891, before it was shifted to the present day location in the city of Mutare in 1897 (Chipangura, 2013). The buildings have survived up to now and have been used by the United Methodist Church (UMC) with various renovations to suit contemporary uses. The conservation of historic buildings at Old Mutare bestows a legacy of the past that enriches and gives depth to the present. Compared to the other forms of colonial heritage, which are being neglected, the set of buildings at this precinct is being conserved by UMC at institutional level. Contemporary use has entailed that UMC does not alter the original fabric of the buildings and renovations are done in accordance to the principle of anastolysis, restoration using original elements. Because of such conservation efforts, these buildings can be used for different contemporary purposes while still allowing for interpretative work to be conducted. In this model, the experience of colonialism and the various movements of the Pioneer Column can be questioned and studied in Zimbabwe.

Though the case of Old Mutare represents a useful way that colonial heritage can critically inform the present, it is not the dominant model.
Aplin (2002) observes that “many nations are willing to incorporate in their heritage aspects of history that are certainly not pleasing memories,” but this has not been the thinking of government preservationists in Zimbabwe, as many in the country wonder why the nation should preserve colonial artefacts a painful remainder of a colonial period. Drury (2000) provides some useful insights into this debate, arguing that some buildings are generally accepted as great works of art and as expressions of the spirit of humankind or of a faith (p. 6). Buildings can be architecturally significant because they are outstanding examples of a particular form of architecture or a particular style, because they are representative of a major style, or because they are unique. Furthermore historic buildings impart a sense of permanence in relation to the span of human life. They give a sense of stability and provide points of references in a rapidly changing world (Drury, 2000). Another argument linked to this view is that “through the conservation of historic buildings,” heritage conservation “helps in providing a sense of time to illustrate past stages in history” (Aplin, 2002, p. 23). Preservationists believe in respecting the people of the past through preserving the most tangible tie to their culture: the historic built environment they constructed and used. Here buildings are significant as sites of historic events and experiences (Milligan, 2007). Even when they are remnants of a painful past, they can have value to the present.

**CONCLUSION**

In Zimbabwe, heritage as a concept has evolved and changed according to the agency of the ruling ZANU PF government and its emerging national identities (Harvey, 2001). Heritage is part of the way identities are created and disputed, whether as individuals, group, or nation state. A deep understanding of the historically contingent and embedded nature of heritage goes beyond treating heritage as a set of problems to be solved and calls for the engagement with debates about the production of identity, power, and authority. Heritage plays an important role in helping people to identify both who they are as individuals and collectives to which they belong (Harrison & Hughes, 2010). As such, heritage has the potential to serve purposes both hateful and healing—but not if colonial heritage is uniformly discarded in Zimbabwe.
Notes

1. Njabulo Chipangura is Curator of Archaeology at the Mutare Museum in Zimbabwe and a PhD Fellow in anthropology at the University of Witwatersrand in South Africa. He can be contacted at nchipangura3@gmail.com.

2. A Shona word that refers to the liberation struggle and the wars launched by the people of Zimbabwe against colonial rule. The first Chimurenga was fought between 1896 and 1897 spearheaded by the famous spirit medium, Mbuya Nehanda, and the second Chimurenga was fought between 1966 and 1979.


5. Interview with Chief Muusha, Chimanimani District, on 19.04.12.

6. Heritage Trust is a non-governmental organization formed in 2010 to preserve and present Zimbabwe’s heritage from a patriotic history point of view. The term patriotic history is borrowed from Terrence Ranger, who argues that it is a history intended to proclaim the continuity of the Zimbabwean revolutionary tradition to all the youths who are accused of forgetting the core values of the liberation struggle.

7. A presentation by Donald Zhou on the heritage of Zimbabwe at Mutare Museum, 17 February 2012. Donald Zhou is the National Director of Zimbabwe Heritage Trust.

8. Utopia House File, Monuments Department, Mutare Museum.

9. The National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe Mid Term Strategic Plan (2010-2012). In this plan, PSIPs that receive annual funding are clearly defined as liberation wars sites, including the national heroes acre, provincial heroes acres, and other liberation shrines of guerrilla fighters killed outside the country.

10. Interview with Rumbidzai Bvira who is the Curator of Militaria and is spearheading the Chimoio interpretative centre project. The interview was carried out on 16.07.16

11. The government notice was accessed in the Thomas Moodie file at Mutare Museum on 20.07.16

12. Interview with Dr. Paul Mupira who is the director at Mutare Museum and was leading the review exercise of the NMMZ Act. This interview was done on 21.07.16 at Mutare Museum.

13. The war veterans and some ZANU PF youths have the most loudest and dissenting voices against colonial memorials.

**REFERENCES**


Curating Hatred: The Joe McWilliams’s Controversy at the Ulster Museum

Tom Maguire
Ulster University

Abstract

Since heritage is a manifestation of how the past is used in the present, engagement with heritage is a critical indicator of how contemporary hatreds play out, both feeding and feeding off traditions and legacies. Despite its ongoing peace process, Northern Ireland remains a site of dissonant heritages, where sectarian hatred continues to be expressed in societal divisions, often resulting in outright violence. This relationship between current expressions of hatred and the uses of the past present particular issues for heritage professionals. This essay examines a recent example in which these tensions have been made manifest, the inclusion of a painting by Belfast artist Joe McWilliams in the Annual Exhibition by the Royal Ulster Academy at the Ulster Museum in 2015. The painting depicts the performance by a Protestant Orange Order band outside a Roman Catholic Church in Belfast as part of the annual Twelfth of July celebrations. It included a small group of figures wearing white hoods, akin to the Klux Klans, and Orange sashes. The controversy that the inclusion of this painting in the exhibition sparked illustrates the ways in which the artistic representation of a performed heritage challenges institutional practice in curating dissonance.

Keywords: Heritage, museums, Ulster, dissonance, curatorship, performance

Introduction

Since, as David Harvey suggests, heritage “has always been produced by people according to their contemporary concerns and experiences” (2001: 320), engagement with the past is a critical indicator of how contemporary hatreds play out, both feeding and feeding off traditions and legacies. Northern Ireland, enjoying an uneasy peace since the Belfast Agreement of 1998, continues to be a site where sectarian hatred is expressed in societal divisions over dissonant heritages, on occasion resulting in outright violence. This relationship between current expressions of hatred and the uses of the past presents particular issues for heritage professionals (Casey 2003; Crooke 2001; Dubin 1992, 1999; Watson 2014).
In this essay, I examine a recent example in which these tensions were made manifest: the inclusion of a painting by Belfast artist Joe McWilliams in the Annual Exhibition of the Royal Ulster Academy (RUA) at the Ulster Museum in 2015. The painting, Christian Flautists Outside St. Patrick’s, depicts a performance by a marching band outside a Roman Catholic Church in Belfast as part of the Orange Order’s annual Twelfth of July celebrations in 2012. I begin by charting different dimensions of the dissonant heritages at play in Northern Ireland where, as Hartnett (2011) suggests, culture has become a battleground where dissent and dissonance are still expressed—Northern Ireland’s own culture wars. Here I focus on the role of performed heritage as a territorial marker in the parading of the Orange Order and the site of the church as a critical part of a Catholic built heritage and site of memory. From there, I examine the artist’s own longstanding relationship to painting Orange Order parades. This will lead to an examination of how the controversy unfolded and the response of the lead actors. In this, it is the status of the Museum as a national institution that is critical since it engages the broader concerns of Unionists at the changed relationship between the Northern Ireland state and Protestant culture more generally. Through this, I draw attention to the sensitivity required when in curating artworks that depict, express, and have the potential to provoke sectarian hatred in a post-conflict society and identify some strategies for managing such “edgy” materials and “hot topics” (Cameron 2006).

HATE, HERITAGE AND COMMUNITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Without downplaying its fundamentally political nature, it is possible to identify sectarian hatred as a significant component of the ethno-nationalist violence that lasted in Northern Ireland for over forty years and was termed euphemistically “The Troubles.” Brewer and Higgins (1998) identify the ways in which the state of Northern Ireland was constructed to ensure the hegemony of the majority Protestant Unionist population through the Partition of the island into two states in 1921 (Hughes 1998). There is a further sub-group within this majority, loyalists, whose loyalty to the British crown is conditional and whose membership is predominantly working-class and more closely associated with militancy. Within the new Northern Irish state, anti-Catholicism and anti-Irishness became central defining tenets (Brewer and Higgins 1998). These were institutionalized in discrimination against the minority population, for example, in the allocation of economic resources, access to political representation, the deployment of state security forces, and control on the representation of Irish identity: hatred made systemic. Thus, from its founding and until the peace processes of the 1990s, the state was characterized by an asymmetrical relationship
between two ethno-religious communities of identity: Protestant Unionist and Catholic Nationalist (Nic Craith 2002: 45). In Northern Ireland, each community of identity has justified itself repeatedly by recourse to competing understandings of the past expressed in largely separate heritages (Crooke 2010: 17). The forty years of conflict only further increased the polarization of community identities. Appeals to separate heritages to exercise territorial claims (Graham and Nash 2006: 253) have been reinforced by the heritage of the violence itself through what McDowell has termed “both a tangible and intangible heritage of division and hurt” (2008: 405).

Although the provisions of the Belfast Agreement have acknowledged that the state has to accommodate both British Protestant and Catholic Irish cultural identities, it has struggled to come to terms with the legacies of the past. In detaching public institutions from their historic role in protecting and preserving Protestant-Unionist dominance, the peace process has seen the removal of symbols of that culture from public sites and institutions. Where post-Partition Northern Ireland was acknowledged to be “a cold house” for Catholics, after the Belfast Agreement, the phrase has been used routinely to describe the changing status for the majority population in Northern Ireland since 1998. I will discuss this later as a key part of the context for the controversy. In this next section, I examine the ways in which these dissonant heritages have been articulated as a context for the specific events depicted in Joe McWilliams’s Christian Flautists Outside St. Patrick’s: Orange marches and the site of St. Patrick’s church.

**Parading, Place and Dissonant Heritages**

The Orange Order, or more properly Loyal Orange Institution, is named in honour of the Protestant William of Orange who defeated the Catholic King James II in 1690. It was founded in County Armagh in 1795, during a period of intense sectarian violence, as a Protestant fraternity, men defending their country, their loyalty to the Crown and the Protestant faith by opposing Catholicism and Popery. Their first parades were held in 1796 and from that time parades have constituted a significant tradition, a performed heritage, shared as the Order spread to Britain and internationally. Today, the 2,000 or so Orange Parades that take place in Northern Ireland annually are enjoyed as part of the intangible cultural heritage of Northern Ireland’s Protestants, a public celebration of identity that roots them in place and time.

Such marching relies on the repetition of specific practices, ritualized over time, and passed from one generation to the next. From the earliest occasions, the routes selected had a very public dimension in territory marking. With a long history of opposing and contesting the marches within
the newly formed Northern Irish state, Catholic Nationalists have regarded them as an expression of triumphalism, by which their continued subjugation within a sectarian state was emphasised by the claiming of public space as territory. We can see in parading, then, an example of “heritage dissonance,” that is “a condition of discordance or lack of agreement and consistency as to the meaning of heritage” (Tunbridge and Ashworth 1996, 21). The dissonance of these different attitudes toward parades in Northern Ireland is articulated at key contested sites in expressions of sectarian hatred, often extremely violent.

Parading is such a contentious issue in Northern Ireland that one of the measures set out in the Belfast Agreement was the creation of a Parades Commission under the Public Processions (Northern Ireland) Act 1998. The Commission is required by the Act to issue guidelines on the conduct of parades and public protests and to rule on issues where marchers and residents cannot resolve their differences. One of the informing principles of the work of the Commission is that anyone exercising their right to free assembly by parading should “take account of the likely effect on their relationships with other parts of the community and be prepared to temper their approach accordingly” (Parades Commission 2005: 2). The Commission in effect is charged with arbitrating between competing rights based on heritage claims. One of the first and most contentious decisions taken by the Commission in 1998 was to ban a march along the Catholic-Nationalist Garvaghy Road in Portadown by Orangemen attending the Drumcree Church (Hughes 1998). While there had been a history of violence around the parade as early as the 1800s, it escalated from 1995 to 2000 in stand-off between residents and marchers, as a focal point for disputes between the rights accruing to each community of identity. At its height, it prompted a significant joint operation by the police and British Army, with a violent intensity that appeared to threaten the peace process.

Just as with Portadown’s Garvaghy Road, the area around St. Patrick’s Church in Belfast has repeatedly been a flashpoint between marchers and residents as a contested heritage site. The church has a distinctive history and place within Belfast for Catholics and Nationalists. It can be regarded as one of Pierre Nora’s lieux de memoire to which heritage is attached within both a physical site and in non-material ways such as celebrations, spectacles, and rituals (Nora 1989). The site was occupied initially by the second Catholic church to be built in the city, dating back to 1815, with the current Romanesque building founded in 1877. The church accommodates the Shrine of Mary of Comfort and a shrine to St. Anthony of Padua that houses a first class relic of the saint. In addition, the church holds important relics of St. Patrick and in 2012 opened a columbarium to accommodate urns containing the ashes of deceased parishioners. Thus, as a
religious site it is a sacred space and a material construction that commemorates the history of Catholics in the city.

Its inner-city situation marks its function as heritage further. The parish at which it is the centre serves the working-class Nationalist communities of Carrick Hill, North Queen Street, and the New Lodge. As the parish website notes, “The death toll of parishioners during that 30-year-period of sectarian strife known as ‘The Troubles’ stands at 100. Some of the worst atrocities of that conflict were committed within the parish bounds, and its people still bear the physical and emotional scars of that traumatic chapter in Ireland’s recent history.” That location makes it also a site of heritage contestation. The church’s front portal opens onto Donegall Street, a major thoroughfare connecting the north of the city to the city centre. It has formed part of the traditional route for Orange bands passing from the loyalist Crumlin Road into the city centre, often in forms of feeder parades to and from the main parade there. The attitude shown by bandsmen to the church is perceived as a test of respect for their religious heritage by residents, while the marchers see any challenge to their marching as an attack on their cultural heritage. Both marchers and residents then each make appeal to their heritage in support of their competing claims on the space around the chapel.

McWilliams’s painting pictures a Twelfth of July parade, which celebrates William of Orange’s victory at the Battle of Boyne and the beginning of the Protestant Ascendancy, in 2012 when an Orange marching band, the Young Conway Volunteers, played “The Famine Song” outside St. Patrick’s Church on Belfast’s Donegall Street as they marched in a circle. The song is regarded as racist and sectarian by Catholic-Nationalists. It has been the target of action by the Scottish Premiere League, for example, in its attempt to stamp out sectarianism at soccer matches there. Thirteen members of the Young Conway Volunteers were subsequently convicted of playing a sectarian tune outside a Catholic church provocatively. The judge rejected their testimony that they were actually playing The Beach Boys’ “Sloop John B” and in his judgment clearly regarded it as an expression of sectarian hatred. Here, the work being done by a painting representing such a contentious event thrusts it into a maelstrom in which heritage claims are put into conflict with each other. As Mitchell argues, “the intractability of offensive images stems from their tendency to take up residence in the front lines of social and political conflicts” (2001: 116). Yet, while this was a particularly notorious case, McWilliams’s treatment of Orange parades had a much longer lineage. In the following section, I suggest that his biography and oeuvre may share some of the characteristics that give rise to hatred but that his attitude was much more complex than that. The argument is that
while exhibiting the work had the potential to activate some hatreds, it was not motivated by McWilliams’s personal hatred.

**THE ARTIST AND HATE**

It is clear from McWilliams’s (1996) own account that his attitudes toward the Orange Order are rooted in his personal experiences, his background, and his community identity, in ways that might have generated antipathy to the Orange Order. He was born in the New Lodge area and attended St. Malachy’s College a short distance away on the lower Antrim Road. He attended and, from 1973 until his retirement in 1989, taught at the School of Art in Belfast’s York Street a couple of hundred yards from its junction with Donegall Street. His first job on graduating was teaching in St. Gabriel’s secondary school on the Crumlin Road. He was rooted in north Belfast, living and founding a gallery with his wife on Cavehill Road. Geoghegan has commented of the area, “Having witnessed some of the most brutal excesses of ‘the Troubles’, North Belfast is still divided along sectarian lines at the very micro level and remains prey to eruptions of violence at ‘interfaces’ between Catholic and Protestant communities” (2008: 178).

For McWilliams, that experience of sectarianism and systemic hatred stretched further back. In 1958, he won a place to attend Belfast College of Art but had to work part-time to support his studies. He explained that his inability to access state support was rooted in sectarianism: “You had to apply for a further education grant and further education at that time was totally and utterly dominated by unionists so Catholics in Belfast didn’t get grants” (Burns 2010: online). In the same interview, he recalled how a summer vacancy in the Sirocco Works was advertised only to Protestant students, ruefully commenting that anyone recalling “the good old days” was referring to a time when Catholics knew their place.

While his early work was predominantly landscape, at the outbreak of The Troubles, McWilliams turned with some urgency to the violent conflict as a subject matter. He painted scenes from the local area including, for example: Barricades & People, New Lodge (1971), Riots and Barricades, New Lodge Road (1971), Saracens and Orangemen, Carlisle Circus (1972), Belfast Youth (1974), and Peace line, Ardoyne (1980). While by background he was a Catholic nationalist, he was suspicious of political orthodoxies, and one extended series of works focused on icons of the different political ideologies of Irish Nationalism and Unionism, including, Green Icons (Pearse) (1982) and a portrayal of Republican leader Gerry Adams as a one-eyed cyclops. There were occasional works on nationalist parades such as Irish National Foresters (1994) and Republican Parade Falls
Library in the same year, but his oeuvre recurrently features depictions of the Orange Order. He reported that he had painted the Twelfth of July parades on almost an annual basis since 1958 (Little 2015).

These depictions of Orange parade feature both Drumcree and Donegall Street, including outside St. Patrick’s and the nearby offices of The Irish News, the city’s Catholic newspaper, for which McWilliams contributed a column in his later life. Titles include The Orange Parade Passing St. Patrick’s Church (1989), Orangemen Passing the Irish News (1994) Beating Drums in Donegall St. No.2 (1995), Orangemen Passing St. Patrick’s Church (1996) and Drumcree Sunset (2003). In 1996, in a catalogue introduction to a solo exhibition, he accounted for his repeated return to parades as subjects:

My Orange Parades are not folk parades. My Tartan Drummers are not musicians at garden fetes. There is aggression in their playing and this underlying violence is suggested by the fury of their drumming and the pixilated anonymity of their faces. But the Twelfth of July Parade is also a marvellous, colourful spectacle, whatever it’s [sic] political or religious base. The simple mechanics of this event appeal to me as a painter. The movement of colour on the streets becomes the textural movement of paint which develops a life and language of its own and hopefully extends and invigorates the subject. (online)

While many of his paintings are unflattering (including marchers urinating in the street, for example) some of the paintings were bought by prominent Orangemen. These included William Craig, a Unionist politician who formed the Ulster Vanguard Movement in 1972 (Burns 2010:). Moreover, McWilliams had already included images of the Klu Klux Klan in a number of paintings on the Drumcree Stand-off on the Garvaghy Road during the 1990s. There would seem to be no reason to anticipate that the inclusion of his painting within the RUA Annual Exhibition would cause offence. Indeed, following McWilliams’ death on October 7, 2015, an obituary for the News Letter included a comment from Progressive Unionist Party politician, Dr. John Kyle, who noted, “We recognise that he would not always have agreed with us but we would like, at this time of his passing, to record that his artistic endeavours were appreciated and that the people of Belfast should be proud to have had such an artist among them” (2015: online). Immediately after his death was announced but in advance of the exhibition, RUA President Denise Ferran wrote in the Irish Times, “Joe’s prize-winning painting Christian Flautists Outside St. Patrick’s will be silent testimony to the man and his craft” (2016: online). As I will discuss in the next section, the inclusion of that painting would give rise to a response that was far from silent.
The Royal Ulster Academy was founded in 1879 and is the largest and longest established body of practicing visual artists in Northern Ireland (RUA online). The Academy had its origins in a local Belfast organization, The Belfast Rambler’s Sketching Club, changing its name in 1930 to the Ulster Academy of Arts, becoming the Royal Ulster Academy in 1950. The Academy’s Annual Exhibition includes work of merit by members and non-members, and artists might submit a maximum of three works in any medium for selection by a short-listing panel.\(^3\) There is no over-arching theme for the exhibitions, and the 2015 exhibition, consisting of 310 works, was as diverse as its predecessors, including pieces in a wide range of media, about diverse subject matter and contributed by many different artists. Christian Flautists Outside St. Patrick’s was displayed alongside and in precisely the same way as other works. Neither the RUA nor the Ulster Museum had anticipated controversy. McWilliams’s work featuring Orange parades was well-known and he was well-regarded by at least some sections of the Protestant community, as the discussion above indicates. Previous exhibitions by other artists engaging with the Troubles, including works by artists such as Rita Duffy, Noel Feeney, Jack Packenham, and Paul Seawright, for example, had not attracted any negative attention.

In 2015, the exhibition opened on October 16, two days after McWilliams’s funeral. On November 4, representatives of two political parties and the Orange Order demanded that McWilliams’s painting Christian Flautists Outside St. Patrick’s be removed from the exhibition, issuing critical press releases, appearing on local media outlets, and staging photo-ops in front of the painting. Democratic Unionist Party politician William Humphrey was quoted as saying it was “a subtle but absolutely apparent sectarian slur and the museum should not allow itself to be used in that way” (BBC News 2015: online), while Traditional Unionist Voice vice-chairman Richard Cairns said that it was “deeply insulting, offensive and downright inaccurate to suggest that there is some sort of parallel between the Orange Order and the Ku Klux Klan” (Houston 2015: online). Their complaint concerned the inclusion in the image of a small blurred group of Orangemen who appeared to be wearing Klu Klux Klan hoods. The group occupies less than a square foot of the 7 x 5 feet painting. In demanding the removal of the painting, the Order made much of its world-wide racially diverse membership, including its lodges in West Africa. A press release issued by the Order stated that, “Members of the Orange Institution are entitled to feel outraged that a major publicly funded facility should display such artwork, which is deeply offensive to their traditions and the ethos of one of the
largest community organisations on this island” (cited Dudley Edwards 2011, 21).

The inclusion of these figures was being read as an expression of hatred. While there have been historic linkages between certain forms of loyalism and right-wing British fascist movements (McDonald 2011: online), there is no evidence of any such figures appearing at the actual events outside St. Patrick’s. Race hate attacks in Northern Ireland have increased massively since 2001, and newly arrived immigrant communities have been co-opted into a sectarian binary as either Catholic-Nationalist or Protestant-Unionist, irrespective of their origins, as Geoghegan has observed (2008). He provides evidence too of a greater concentration of attacks on ethnic minorities in working class loyalist areas (2008: 188). Geoghegan, however, also draws attention to initiatives within loyalism to combat racism. Any equation between the ideologies of sectarianism and racism will of course have to account for its presence within Catholic Nationalism too.

Such political representatives might be considered within the category that Dubin terms “professional ideologues” who contribute “to how these public tussles are scripted and how they are ultimately played out” (1999: 14). The response of the RUA was dismissive, perhaps recognizing that in such disputes “the struggle is not only over what is to be represented, but over who will control the means of representing” (Pieterse 2005: 169). It refused to remove the painting, rejecting calls for it to do so as an attack on artistic freedom: a defense of the RUA’s curatorial autonomy. This was in line with at least two of the strategies for museums to manage controversy recommended by the United States’s National Coalition Against Censorship (NCAC) in support of First Amendment principles:

1. Public Statement Affirming Commitment to Artistic and Intellectual Freedom of Speech (“Freedom of Speech Commitment”);
2. Procedures for Addressing the Press or Complaints from the Public after an Exhibition or Special Program Opens.

The RUA’s appeal to artistic freedom brushes aside objections to the inclusion of the painting as offensive. This contrasts with fears expressed by curators in other contexts considering the exhibition of controversial topics that inclusion would bring “hate into the museum [or] allow extremist views to be portrayed” (Ferguson 2006: 7). As a concession to the complainants, a notice was erected at three entrances to the exhibition on November 4, noting, “Visitors may find some images in this exhibition thought-provoking, controversial and potentially offensive.”

The conception of an artwork as offensive is far from straightforward,
of course. Barrow (2005) teases out a generalized sense of something as “offensive” as a signal of disapproval, from more specific and distinct meanings and uses. He focuses on the importance of individual and group beliefs that find offence in the action or speech of another. He proceeds to unpack variations within this, noting differences among “being offensive in the sense of 1) meaning to offend; 2) actually giving offence, and 3) behaving in a manner that is likely to cause offence (or, of course, any combination of these)” (2005: 268). What is critical is that offensiveness is what is perceived and is not intrinsic to an image. Within such an understanding, the notice placed at the entrances to the exhibition makes sense and is both a common curatorial strategy (Harper 2004: 59) and one recommended by Ferguson (2006) in managing potential controversy. What it does not do, however, is address the affective power of feelings aroused by images and objects in the experience of heritage as hate (Schorch 2014).

The placing of the signs outside the exhibition demonstrates a lack of sensitivity to the broader contextual issues that fed into the attitudes of the Orange Order and the Unionist politicians that explain why the controversy arose at this specific time. As Mitchell writes, rather than asking what is in the image that is offensive, “A better question might be, what is it about people that makes them so susceptible to being offended by images?” (2001: 115). He draws attention to the ways in which “offending images are radically unstable entities whose capacity for harm depends on complex social contexts” (2001: 119). Certainly its contours conform to many of the features identified by Dubin as common to arts controversies as far back as 1969 in the United States: “the acute breach between groups occurring along racial, ethnic, generational, and ideological lines, the dig-in-the-heels, take-no-prisoners bombast, and the demands for accountability in the use of public funds as a way to leverage control over content” (1999: 20). I focus here on two factors that made this image offensive to the Orange Order at this time. The first is the place in which the work was being shown, the Ulster Museum; the second has to do with specific changes in the Northern Irish state under the terms of the peace process. I will deal with the first factor, the site of the exhibition, in the following section.

THE ULSTER MUSEUM

One of the designated National Museums of Northern Ireland, the Ulster Museum’s roots were in the Belfast Museum and Art Gallery that opened in 1929. As Bigand notes, however, the extension of the scope to a national institution following World War Two was politically motivated to secure a separate sense of a Northern Irish identity: “The Northern Irish Government was not long in granting support to the project, not to fall out...
of step with developments in the South, and mainly for fear of Ulster being included in the Southern project, thereby losing its specificity” (2011: online). It was made a national museum under the 1961 Museum Act (Northern Ireland). Bigand observes that “from its creation the museum had to deal with the reputation of being strongly Protestant/Unionist-biased” (2011: online).

This reputation was confirmed in 1978 when attendants refused to hang a number of pieces in a travelling show from the Whitechapel Gallery in London, Art for Society, in a performance of Unionist solidarity. The attendants were supported by the museum’s trustees, and the work was refused display. One of the pieces excluded was an artwork by Cumbrian artist Conrad Atkinson, Silver Liberties: A Souvenir of a Wonderful Anniversary Year. The piece is made up of four panels: three in the green, white and gold of the Irish tricolor; the fourth, in black, includes the figure of a dead man. The first panel includes photos of the 13 people who were murdered on Bloody Sunday when British soldiers opened fire on a Civil Rights March in Derry and a blood-stained banner carried on the day of the march. Other elements include a graffito of a British soldier, street scenes in a Protestant part of Belfast, and a beaten IRA suspect. It was subsequently displayed in Wolverhampton Art Gallery in England, which has a large permanent display dedicated to Northern Ireland, away from the immediate frontlines of The Troubles and its current culture wars. Atkinson termed the Ulster Museum trustees “cultural paramilitaries” (BBC 2011: online) for their action, and when the museum was nominated for the Art Fund Prize in 2010, he campaigned against its inclusion (Jones 2010: online). The Museum was awarded the prize, nonetheless.

Another piece to be excluded was Joe McWilliams’ Community Door 2, featuring a petrol-bombed door from a community center, blistered and blackened from repeated attacks, woven through with a rainbow motif that spills down steps onto the floor. The piece both documented the effects of the violence and, in the rainbow motif, suggested an invitation to a more hopeful prospect on the other side. In 2012, Brian Ferran, Deputy Head of the Arts Council of Northern Ireland at the time of the controversy, recalled that,

I think the people who were to blame were not the attendants of the Ulster Museum but the trustees at the time . . . Interestingly two years before, we held an exhibition of Conrad Atkinson’s work in an Arts Council gallery which, I thought, was infinitely more controversial and nothing was said about it . . . . The museum was then a totally unionist dominated environment and they thought it was sympathetic to the IRA. (Burns 2012: online)
Indeed, the museum had been criticized for its unwillingness to engage directly with the conflict beyond its walls (Crooke 2001; Jones 2010).

Nevertheless, the museum has not been impervious to the pressures across the museum-world to become more inclusive of the different communities of its society (Dubin 1999; Ferguson 2006); to the political changes in Northern Ireland; or funding imperatives to support cross-community dialogue (Nic Craith 2002). Section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 requires National Museums Northern Ireland to comply with two statutory duties: broadly, “to have due regard to the need to promote equality of opportunity” and “to have regard to the desirability of promoting good relations between persons of different religious belief, political opinion or racial group.”

In 2001, its temporary exhibition Icons of Identity juxtaposed the display of objects from each of the main identity blocs in ways that sought to challenge historical certainties (Greene 2006: online). After a major refurbishment in 2009, the museum included its first permanent gallery dedicated to the Troubles. Even then, at the last minute, potentially contested relics and artefacts of the conflict were replaced with text-based panels (Meredith 2014a: online). In 2014, it staged a temporary retrospective exhibition, The Art of the Troubles, that included the previously excluded work by Atkinson and McWilliams. In 2015, Colin Davidson’s Silent Testimony exhibition comprised eighteen portraits of victims of the violence, registering the emotional impact on the sitters, and bearing testimony to the ongoing suffering caused by the conflict.

It is noteworthy that when it has engaged with The Troubles, the Museum has frequently had recourse to exhibitions of art works rather than objects to do so. This practice, taken alongside the response of the RUA President to the controversy cited above, raises questions about the positioning of the museum’s art gallery as a space somehow removed from the world from which its artefacts emerge and with which its exhibits engage, articulating a distinction between aesthetic and political values (Harrington 2004). Duncan (1994, 1995, 2005) draws attention to the ways in which the experience of galleried spaces is ritualized more generally within Western cultures of display to produce a specific kind of absorption in the works themselves. In the specific context of Belfast, performance artist André Stitt explained his turn to the streets of Belfast in the mid-1970s as the site for his artworks precisely because “conventional practice separated art from everyday experience by operating in traditional terms, in neutered spaces such as art galleries and institutions” (2015: 95). In 2014, commenting on the Art of the Troubles exhibition, the Belfast Telegraph’s Fionola Meredith suggested that a double distancing of artistic rendition and galleried display...
was being used as a tactic to defuse (or refuse) the potential dissonance of the heritage depicted:

I have a sneaking suspicion that the museum thinks that approaching the Troubles obliquely, through the medium of art, is a safer way to get to grips with it. Less controversial, less politically risky (though it clearly still scares the bejaysus out of it to mention the ‘T’ word at all; a friend in the media who phoned the museum to inquire about the show was informed that it was keeping it low-key because it was perceived to be sensitive). (2014b: online)

Even if this was an implicit or unconscious assumption, it ignores the long history of art controversies that demonstrate that no exhibition space can be impervious to the society outside its doors (Dubin 1992, 1999; Woolf 1993; Rothfield 2001; Casey 2003; Harper 2004; Ferguson 2006).

What this account demonstrates is that the museum has a highly politicized contested heritage. As Duncan notes, “[T]o control a museum means precisely to control the representation of a community and its highest values and truths. It is also the power to define the relative standing of individuals within that community” (2005: 79). Thus, the status of any museum as an institution with the power to endorse perspectives merely by displaying them in public is often at the heart of controversy. For example, when in 1994 the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum opened its exhibition of photographs taken during the Balkan War, Faces of Sorrow: Agony in the Former Yugoslavia, it became embroiled in a dispute with both Jewish and Serbian-American groups, accusing it of taking sides by depicting Croats as victims, despite a history of atrocities committed by them (Holmes 1994: online). This general authority accruing to museums is intensified when the museum is a national museum. Traditionally, national museums have a role “to present a definitive picture, a unified vision of national identity – ‘the’ national identity” (Ferguson 2006: 26). When that traditional role has shifted, under pressures of democratization, moves toward pluralistic understandings of identity, or revisionist historiography, for example, have not always been appreciated by the general public. Thus, the 1990s debacle over the Smithsonian’s plan to exhibit the B-29 bomber Enola Gay on the fiftieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima discussed by Dubin (1999) illustrates issues at stake when a national institution is perceived to fail to fulfil a function to “portray national history in a positive light, create a shared national identity and provide civic lessons” (Cameron 2006: 6).

For the Ulster Museum, the “national” history it had been entrusted with preserving had been almost entirely Protestant and Unionist for most of its existence and had been policed and protected by its trustees and
attendants as the Art for Society debacle demonstrated. The inclusion of the McWilliams’s painting within its walls as a national museum caused the radical changes in the wider political dispensation of the peace process to resonate all the more loudly. For the museum as a physical expression of the Ulster state and Northern Irish nation, the inclusion of this offensive representation was perceived as a manifestation of the broader “cold house for Protestants” syndrome: art being used to claim territory.

There is no small irony in this. McWilliams was overtly critical of what he saw as the crude propagandizing of wall murals to mark territory in unsophisticated displays of identity (2000: online). He argued vociferously that gallery walls were not to be confused with the gable walls of working-class estates where murals and graffiti are used to demonize the Other (McWilliams 2000: online; Hartnett 2011). Nonetheless, the inclusion of this painting was being perceived as an expression of an anti-Orange territorial claim on the national museum space. One newspaper quoted North Belfast DUP MLA William Humphrey, a member of the Orange Order, stating that, “This painting conveys a message no more sophisticated than some of the offensive graffiti daubed on gable walls” (Houston 2015: online). The place of the exhibition was one crucial factor then in the controversy. In this next section, I examine the second key contextual factor: timing.

PROTESTANT HERITAGE UNDER ATTACK

The unfolding of the peace process, particularly in accordance with Section 75 and Schedule 9 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998, has seen the removal of a number of markers of Northern Ireland’s British and thus, Protestant-Unionist, identity from the public realm (Hughes 1998), producing a reflexive defensiveness on the part of political and community leaders. As Dubin argues, timing is a crucial factor in any controversy: “the outbreak of conflict occurs when power is shifting and the relative status of different groups is in flux” (1999: 4). By 2012, the year of the Young Conway Volunteers incident, loyalist resistance to this process was gaining a critical momentum that would be sustained over subsequent years. In December 2012, a decision by Belfast City Council to limit the number of days on which the Union Flag would be flown from City Hall provoked widespread street protests across Northern Ireland, in some places leading to violent clashes between protesters and police that would continue across the following year. This would coincide with the revival of parading as an issue of contention in 2013 when the Parades Commission banned the return leg of an Orange parade from passing a particular section of the Crumlin Road in North Belfast. After violence at the blockade of the road
by the police, a protest camp was set up in nearby Twaddell Avenue and the site quickly became a magnet for discontented loyalists to vent their fury, with no resolution at the time of writing. Policing the site was estimated to have cost more than £18 million by 2016.

This violence has created difficulties for mainstream unionism, for politicians wishing to connect with their loyalist constituency and for the Orange Order whose membership and leadership have seemed split in reacting to events on the streets. In response in part to the images of violence at Drumcree that were disseminated around the world, the Orange Order had tried to reform, remould, or, at least, reimage parading, seeking, for example to rebrand the Twelfth of July celebrations as Orangefest. One online tourist information site has commented:

Belfast Orangefest showcases aspects of Ulster’s rich heritage and culture such as Orange Lodges, marching bands, fife and drums, flute music and the resonant sound of Ulster’s unique Lambeég drum. The Belfast “12th of July” celebrations are a magnificent spectacle of tradition, colour and music that can be enjoyed by all locals and visitors alike. (Culture NI, 2015: online)

These attempts to reframe parading as a celebratory and potentially inclusive heritage tradition were confounded by these disputes. Politicians and Orange Order leaders then needed some way to demonstrate leadership in defense of unionist culture against attacks on its heritage from without. A letter to The Down News elaborated the broader sentiment:

I do not believe this picture is freedom of expression at all. I believe it is a Quasi-political broadcast of the views of Irish Republicans toward the Orange Order. When the Orangemen walk the public streets to celebrate their culture is this not freedom of expression? When the Loyalist bands march the streets is this not freedom of expression and performing arts? Yet we are restricted at every opportunity and charged with criminal offences if any of the ridiculous restraints and restrictions placed on us and the bands are broken. Orangeism and Loyalism seems to be the only demographics in Ireland you are allowed to say and do anything to without the fear of consequences. (Brennan 2015: online).

This speaks to Mitchell’s view that some images, “offend because they degrade something valuable or desecrate something sacred” (2001: 120)—here, not just the specific band, but that band as a metonym for the whole of Orange cultural identity at a critical moment of vulnerability. In this next section, I outline why and how a greater sensitivity to this timing might have been demonstrated.
As Crooke has noted, “[T]he act of interpretation and presentation of the past carries a certain amount of risk: interpretations can be accused of misrepresentation, over-simplification or neglect” (2007: 98); thus curators and the institutions with which they work have a central role in managing risk and controversy. Under Section 75, the Ulster Museum has a statutory responsibility as a public space into which visitors with disparate identities and dissonant heritages come, and National Museums Northern Ireland have developed a range of equality procedures in response. The museum may function as a shared space (Komarova 2008) or a contact zone (Pratt 1991); what it cannot be is a neutral space. It has responsibilities to engage with dissonance to maintain both fairness and good relations. In the following section, I explore the alternatives that the curators might have adopted in presenting this painting as part of the exhibition.

In approaching the exhibition of this painting, I am not going to suggest that it should have been removed at the behest of the ideologues. As the Conflict in Cities and the Contested States project found, “Suppression of partisan events and sites is often unrealistic and ineffective; rather events and sites expressing multiple points of view need to be considered” (2012: 1). Accepting this means that curators have to take account of the subjective experience of heritage. Doering, Pekarik, and Kindlon (1997) found that,

Even when an exhibition is clear, focused and well understood by its audience, the meaning that it holds for a particular visitor is primarily dependent on that person and is not something “found” or “received” or “communicated” in the exhibition itself. Individuals invent their own responses, juxtaposing all the elements of the exhibition—its perceived messages, its contents, its design—against the background of their own lives and experience. Out of that creative, unique confrontation they establish, in some cases, a personal meaning.

This may mean limits to how any curatorial strategy might avoid offending. Dudley Edwards goes so far as to assert that, “artists should be free to express themselves freely and, indeed, to give offence” (2015: 21). Barrow suggests that in some instances individuals and groups have a moral obligation not to take offence in the sense that their dislike of something should require action by others (2005: 274). The politicians here might have engaged with the museum to defuse, rather than initiating or inflaming controversy. Alternatively, the painting might have been exhibited within a context that acknowledged the potential for offence as a means to opening up a discursive space for the issues it raised. Indeed the second strategy advocated by the NCAC is “Preparation in Advance of Upcoming Programs
and Potential Controversy, through agreement on clear curatorial procedures, feedback mechanisms, and educational plans” [online].

The museum had already developed such curatorial practices in handling other works. As Greene notes, during the 2001 Icons of Identity exhibition, a cooling off room was provided where staff and visitors could write out their responses on cards that were then pinned to a board, becoming an extension of the exhibition: “All comments were carefully collected by the museum, including those that alleged bias on the part of the staff: some visitors thought they detected a Republican bias while others suspected that the staff were pro-Unionist” (2006: 3). The 2014 Art of the Troubles exhibition was supported by an extensive programme of events, including talks, lectures, film showings, and an international academic conference. In 2015, the museum released its evaluation of the re-development of its modern history gallery that had used both formative and summative evaluations with key stakeholders and the general public. One finding was that “[a]ll the interviewees said that the right balance has been achieved between the ‘Orange’ and ‘Green’ stories and welcomed the inclusion of other themes such as ‘the gender story’ and disability” (NMNI 2015: 4). In its handling of the current Decade of Centenaries that includes the anniversaries of World War One, the Easter Rising, and Irish War of Independence, for example, the Museum has adopted many of the recommendations made by Ferguson (2006) that might be adopted by any museum exhibiting potentially controversial material. These advocate, for example, consultation with stakeholders in the development of the exhibition, including through formative and remedial evaluation. This demonstrates a growing experience of and confidence in handling “‘hot’ interpretation whereby the emotional engagement with heritage is acknowledged and forms the basis for representation and interaction with the audience” (Johnson 2013: 585).

The curatorial team for the Exhibition might also have looked elsewhere for examples of the handling of difficult topics. Johnson provides an account of the choices made by the Westfries Museum in designing an exhibition around the statue of the controversial figure of J.P. Coen in the Dutch town of Hoorn. Her conclusions were that, “[r]ather than seeking to support visitors in their attempts to negotiate difficult heritage, the museum explicitly avoided a moral judgement on Coen and took the role of facilitator of the public discussion allowing visitors to form their own opinion” (2013: 595). The inclusion of this opinion forming within the context of the museum aligns with the strategy of the Icons of Identity exhibition: dissonance is expressed and managed as part of the curatorial process. A second group of strategies proposed by Ferguson (2006) is to find ways to incorporate a range of perspectives into the exhibition itself. This would have been more difficult in that the painting was to be included within the
Annual Exhibition, rather than given a specific prominence on its own. The plurality of work on display might itself be seen as a broader artistic context for the painting.

A further set of recommendations proposed by Ferguson operate at a meta-level, whereby the processes by which history has been made and un-made might be laid bare within an exhibition or through associated framing devices, talks, and symposia. While there are talks by artists exhibiting at the Annual Exhibition hosted by the Museum routinely and an active program of talks and discussions across the year, no such provision was made in relation to this issue, in advance or in response to the controversy. McWilliams’s own ill health and death may have meant that these were not considered appropriate.

In their responses, both the RUA and the Ulster Museum missed these kinds of opportunities to explore the representation of hatred in the painting and the ways in which the painting itself was regarded as a display of hatred by those offended by it. Moreover, they could have anticipated that there would be a heightened sensitivity when the McWilliams’s painting was on display. As cited by Dudley Edwards, the Orange Order Press release calling for the removal of McWilliams’s painting argued that “[t]his inaccurate and negative portrayal of the institution comes only months after the Ulster Museum was accused of republican bias due to the lack of Ulster-Scots and Orange-related literature in its bookshop” (2015: 21). In this context, the RUA and the museum might have paid greater attention to the broader social context outside the doors of the museum and anticipated the sensitivities of the broader unionist population and its loyalist communities.

CONCLUSION

In tracing the controversy around the McWilliams’s painting, I have outlined a context in which sectarian hatred and heritage in Northern Ireland have been and continue to be imbricated within everyday experience and institutional values and practices. Following the Belfast Agreement of 1998, the Northern Ireland state has sought to rebalance itself to accommodate both communities of identity, expressed symbolically and publicly through the state’s treatment of key heritage sites, objects, and practices. Sectarian hatreds still flare up in violence as communities contend with evolving political power structures or settle old scores. The Ulster Museum’s inclusion of the painting within the RUA’s annual exhibition in 2015 occurred within a context of that site as a national museum at a point in time at which the sense of attack on the hegemony of Ulster Protestant-Unionist identity was felt most acutely. All the necessary conditions were in
place for a controversy. The presence of political leaders willing to seek out and express offence within the media provided the necessary impetus.

For the Ulster Museum and the RUA, such a controversy might have been anticipated with sufficient alertness to the wider political context to allow the adoption of measures in the display of the work to frame it within a dialogic space. What this controversy illustrates is that consideration of the ways in which any potentially controversial work is exhibited and curated does not mean removing an image that might cause offense. Rather, acknowledging the potential for offensiveness places an onus on the institutional practices of heritage professionals to develop mechanisms for dissonance to be expressed. Creating discursive spaces for dissonance may itself allow it to be contained rather than erupting into violence. While Duncan (1994, 1995, 2005) has argued persuasively for the ways in which the ritualized aspects of art museum display have been put to specific work of civilizing the citizen, there is the potential for a different approach. Instead of approaching civilizing as manufacturing consent toward single national narratives, one might see it instead as an approach to providing a discursive space for dissonance. Bishop, for example, develops a concept of “relational antagonism” through an understanding that, “a democratic society is one in which relations of conflict are sustained, not erased. Without antagonism there is only the imposed consensus of authoritarian order—a total suppression of debate and discussion, which is inimical to democracy” (2004: 66). For her, the art gallery can become a space in which disagreement can be discussed in the development of a society where civility rather than violence or territorialism provides a discursive framework. Viewed like this, curating hatred may be a key function for museums and galleries in societies emerging out of conflict.

NOTES

1. Tom Maguire is Senior Lecturer in Theatre Studies at Ulster University. His teaching and research interests include contemporary performance practices, including performed heritages and post-conflict performances. He can be reached via email at tj.maguire@ulster.ac.uk.

2. The painting can be seen online on the RUA’s website at http://www.royalulsteracademy.org/work/157/christian-flautists-outside-stpatrickrsquo;modal.

3. The current guidelines for submissions can be found at: http://www.royalulsteracademy.org/annual-exhibition.
REFERENCES


Harvey, D. (2001). Heritage pasts and heritage presents: Temporality, meaning and


——— (2015). *Christian Flautists outside St Patrick’s* [oil on canvas]. Royal
Watson, K. (2014). Before we were us, we were them: Curating controversy. Journal of Museum Education 39(1), 96-107.
Discussing Auschwitz, Scholarly Integrity and Governmental Revisionism: A Case Study in Academic Intimidation

Kevin McCarthy

In September 2015, I became embroiled in a controversial and confrontational media discourse that rapidly assumed a global context as external actors engaged in a hateful campaign of intimidation and threatening behavior. It was initiated by a letter I had published in the Belfast Telegraph, which included a reference that localised anti-Semitism was a factor in the Nazi decision to locate the Auschwitz-Birkinau extermination camp in Poland. It was a response to a letter thread that had included multiple mentions of Poland, Auschwitz-Birkinau, and hateful intimidation. However, a forensic examination of the letter suggests the confrontation had, in fact nothing to do with the Jewish tragedy of the Shoah and everything to do with the hateful intra-communal strife between the Catholic-nationalist and Protestant-loyalist communities of Northern Ireland that oftentimes cynically exploits external symbolism to further narrow parochial agendas.

My letter prompted an immediate intervention by the cultural attaché of the Polish Embassy in London, who took offense at my suggestion that historical anti-Semitism was a causal force in locating the six extermination camps of Auschwitz-Birkinau, Chelmno, Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka, and Majdanek in German-occupied Poland. This defensive commentary completely missed the parochial context of the letter sequence; it did not recognise in any sense the subtle complexities of Northern Ireland religious and ideological hatred that had endured for many hundreds of years.

This response prompted an immediate and vitriolic reaction from the Polish global diaspora, which included hundreds of hateful and threatening e-mails, hundreds of online commentaries in the same hateful vein, and a considerable number of letters to my home threatening all kinds of vile repercussions for my slandering of the Polish nation and its people. This prompted the Belfast Telegraph to suspend the dialogue thread underneath my letter and prepare a three-part editorial rebuttal that, if read sequentially, gives a comprehensive overview of the levels of intimidation directed at me personally and the paper as an institution.

In order to illustrate the fraught and stressful nature of this confrontation, this article will consist of two sections: Firstly, I will recount the contentious Belfast Telegraph debate; secondly, I will highlight the evidential package I put forward in order to defend myself. On reflection, this approach was perhaps a naïve expectation on my part. It quickly emerged
that every attempt at explanation was depicted as part of a twentieth-century Judeo Bolshevik plot to exploit Poland.3

The timbre of the refutation was almost medieval in language, sentiment, and vitriol; it was almost exclusively one that denied a past, or indeed present, Polish anti-Semitism. Perhaps this worldview is exemplified by Zbigniew Ziobro, Poland’s Justice minister who in an August 2016, debate on potential legislation relating to how individuals referenced Nazi occupied Poland, stated that “it wasn’t our mothers, nor our fathers, who are responsible for the Holocaust, which were committed by German and Nazi criminals.”4 This position was the dominant theme as the Polish government, where the nationalistic ruling party Law and Justice has a majority, approved a new bill “that foresees prison terms of up to three years for anyone who uses phrases like ‘Polish death camps’ to refer to Auschwitz and other camps that Nazi Germany operated in occupied Poland.”5

THE BELFAST TELEGRAPH: A CONFRONTATION WITH POLISH DENIAL

Over the late summer and early autumn of 2015, a public discourse that initially centered on the long established intra-communal hostility between Catholic-nationalist and Protestant-loyalist Northern Ireland slowly assumed a global significance. It expanded from an observation in the Belfast Telegraph by a nationalist member of the Northern Ireland Assembly (devolved parliament) who commented on the vocal objections of a loyalist protester to the flying of the Nazi swastika in July 2015, a conflict that will be further explained in this article.6

The timing of this contentious dialogue is a core aspect of contextualising the incendiary response mechanisms of the invested political and social actors; this is especially true for readers outside the hateful cauldron of Northern Ireland’s distrustful century’s old religious/ethnic conflict. Any theoretical framework for conflict in Northern Ireland has to incorporate at the very beginning the historical antipathy between Protestant Unionist and Catholic Nationalist citizens.

In the not so recent past this conflict has oftentimes been depicted in generalized religious terms of Protestant settler and indigenous Catholic conflict; however, for the purposes of this paper, it is more informative “to analyse it as a plural society, with one dominant and one subordinate ethnic group.”7 This template imposes a power dynamic emphasizing how “many Protestants see Catholics as the Other, the eternal enemy, always a threat. . . . Their ‘ woes’ are imaginary, invented by agitators and swallowed by people who cannot think for themselves.”8 Therefore, the concept of a substantial “Other” within Northern Ireland is essential to understanding the intra-communal antipathy between dominant and subordinate group; it con-
textualizes the political, cultural, and social characteristics of the *Belfast Telegraph* debate.9

This intra-communal strife has endured, and in some respects deepened, since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement of April 1998, which notionally, at least, ended hostilities and brought the para-militaries of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Ulster Defense Association (UDA) to the negotiating table. However, it did not, indeed could not, end an ideological and religious hatred dating back to the 17th century.10 This would have been apparent to any student of modern Ireland who understood how ancient religious and ideological hatreds had become ever more entrenched since the partition of the six Ulster counties from the newly created Irish Free State in 1921.11

From a loyalist perspective, the antipathy toward the nationalist community was grounded in the determination to secure the initially fragile link to Britain.12 Over time, this was reinforced by the governing status of the new and almost universally Protestant political elite. This cohort legitimated “the state as the vehicle for the destiny of the dominant group” by excluding as different the minority Catholic community.13 In turn, this engendered a sense of alienation in the disenfranchised nationalist block, which consequently embraced the state building philosophy of their co-religionists in the newly independent Irish Free State.14 This, superficially at least, was grounded in the idea that to be Irish was to be Catholic and that anyone outside of this privileged position was somehow “less” than or the “other.”15

This fixed ideological worldview reinforced intra-communal identity along rigid religious and ethnic lines, which, in turn, defined access to basic structural supports. This unequal division of national wealth would inevitably precipitate a revolutionary mindset in the disenfranchised nationalist community, and it was only a matter of when and how this would ultimately manifest. Northern Ireland was not immune to the wave of social unrest that engulfed the globe in the 1960s, and the disenfranchised Catholic-nationalist demographic, like many discriminated groups, became increasingly organized as it sought a platform to air its grievances. This young and increasingly educated middle-class cohort took a lead from the Civil Rights movement in America, which had taken to the streets to demand an end to segregation for their black fellow citizens.16 They quickly learned how effective passive but vocal demonstrations by young white students could be and founded the Northern Ireland Civil Rights movement as a platform to demand equal access to education, housing, and health services for their less fortunate co-religionists.17

These demands were resisted with increasingly violent responses by the dominant loyalist ruling class; intra-communal confrontation became an
every-day factor of Northern Ireland existence. This reached an apex in 1969 when hatreds that had festered since partition nearly 50 years earlier erupted into openly violent confrontation; the so-called “Troubles” would last for 30 years and claim nearly 3,500 lives before the 1998 Good Friday peace settlement.

Subsequently, each community elected representatives from their own tradition to the Northern Ireland Executive Assembly, each side steadfastly refusing to engage on a social and cultural basis, each side resolutely refusing to abandon the visible manifestation of allegiance to the British Crown or the Irish Republic. As each community sought to maintain an overt identification with its political, cultural, and social genesis within the ramifications of peace, the manifestations of hate became a core tenet of this new relationship: the flying of the British Union flag and the Irish Republic’s Tricolour, the right to inflammatory marches by the Orange Order in nationalist enclaves, and the annual commemoration for the murdered civilians of 1972’s Bloody Sunday, in which British soldiers opened fire on Irish protestors, killing 14, all inflamed an already outraged and deeply held tribal allegiance.

In the context of the intense religious and ideological hatreds that defined Northern Ireland, these parochial acts of symbolic identification were understandable. What is not as easily explained is the appropriation of the Israeli-Palestine conflict by loyalists and nationalists as a means of continuing hostilities in a proxy war. This became clear in the immediate aftermath of the Camp David summit failure in 2000 as hostilities between Israeli and Palestinian residents of Gaza became ever more confrontational in the early years of the new millennium. Parts of Belfast began to assume a Middle Eastern air as the Star of David began to fly in the loyalist heartland, while slogans proclaiming “we support the suicide bombers” and “victory to Jenin” began to appear in republican strongholds.

If this seems inexplicable from an external perspective, it was nevertheless a reality in the intra-communal and polarized daily existence of contemporary nationalist and loyalist Belfast. It is partially at least explained by the simplistic ideological framing of the Middle Eastern tragedy; oftentimes this is conducted by actors who appropriate external conflict to justify parochial conflict strategies. They may adopt strategies to raise their international profile and increase chances of gaining support. Those groups best able to “pitch” themselves to an international audience and “match” their grievances to recognized abuses—often by framing localized conflicts, parochial demands and particularistic identities—are most likely to arouse transnational activism. The “pitch” takes two main forms: direct lobbying of potential supporters and indirect promotion through media coverage.24

This approach by loyalist and nationalist actors has achieved a degree of success; Ithamar Handelman Smith captures the vociferous - albeit not surprising - views of Northern Ireland’s Protestants and Catholics with respect to the situation of Palestinians in Israel in the thought-provoking documentary Shalom Belfast.25 This shows how individuals who oftentimes have never left Belfast become ideological adherents to a mythical Zionist vision of Israel (which is totally unrecognizable to Israelis) or a mythical vision of heroic Palestinian freedom fighters (which is the antithesis of the oftentimes grubby daily existence of Gazans).

The parochial nature of this simplistic narrative was clear for those who understand the micro-forces that underpin loyalist-nationalist discourse. However, an appreciation of these subtleties was completely absent in a letter by John Dallat, the Socialist Democratic Liberal Party (SDLP) member for East Derry that appeared in the Belfast Telegraph in July 2015. Dallat opened “Loyalists Guilty of Contradiction over Flag Flying” by opining that:

I am impressed by the anger of loyalists in Carrickfergus following the appearance of Nazi flags in the town and I am sure anyone who has been to Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp in Poland (or, indeed, to any of the other death camps run by the Nazis) will be full-square behind the Carrickfergus loyalist who stood in front of the cameras to make his views known.26

Dallat then went to the heart of his thesis, a harsh critique of how some loyalist factions do not hesitate to celebrate nationalist deaths during the Troubles.”

However, while making no comparisons on scale and the extent of the Holocaust perpetrated by the Nazis, I found it a little odd to see loyalist paramilitary flags fluttering in the background while the condemnations
were being made. Am I to understand that people outraged with flags linked with the atrocities carried out by Nazis have no problem living with flags commemorating people like the Shankill Butchers [a particularly brutal loyalist gang operating in the 1970s and early 1980s]? The reality is that we still live in a very confused society and it worries me that the duplicity shown by those in Carrickfergus and replicated in other areas doesn’t auger well for the future. The very fact that some people thought it a good idea to put Nazi flags up in Carrickfergus in the first place tells me that there are still some very dangerous people in our midst who think Nazism was a good idea.27

This type of polarized intra-communal criticism is not unusual in Northern Ireland, especially at the height of the marching season (April through August); however, in an extraordinary and misplaced display of national outrage, Kaja Kazmierska, the press attaché at the Polish embassy in London, responded to Dallat’s opening paragraph naming Poland as the location for Auschwitz-Birkenau.

I would like to draw your attention to the phrase “Auschwitz-Birkenau Concentration Camp in Poland,” used in the first paragraph of the letter. Such a phrase is inaccurate as during the Second World War, Poland was occupied by Nazi Germany and the USSR. Consequently, the concentration camp you are referring to was not “in Poland” but rather on the German-occupied Polish territories. I hope that you would agree with me that it is an important distinction, as without making it, one runs the risk of distorting the historical truth about some of the most horrific crimes perpetrated in the 20th century. The following phrasing: “Auschwitz-Birkenau Concentration Camp in Nazi German-occupied Poland” might be a worthwhile alternative.28

Fully cognizant of the parochial sub-text of Dallat’s letter, I responded to this rather strange intervention by offering an alternative opinion, including an argument that Polish anti-Semitism, not only German occupation, was also a factor in the location of Auschwitz-Birkenau. My letter was titled “Auschwitz Location,” which the Belfast Telegraph published under the banner “Poles Cannot Deny Role in Auschwitz,” which as events transpired, would prove to be an unfortunate editorial decision that would merely inflame an already contentious dialogue. I wrote:

Kaja Kazmierska is technically correct when stating that “Auschwitz-Birkenau Concentration Camp [was] in Nazi German-occupied Poland,” and not under the control of a sovereign Polish government. However, the reason for this is a straightforward one; the Nazis knew that Poland, with its deeply entrenched political, cultural and social acceptance of anti-Semitism, was arguably the only place under its control that would accept an extermination centre of such barbaric proportions.29
My argument was intended to point out the historical reality that, to a degree, anti-Semitism, as well as spatial and demographic factors, had played a part in the Nazi decision to locate Auschwitz-Birkenau in Poland, a historical reality long acknowledged by Holocaust scholars.\textsuperscript{30} To reinforce this point, I pointed to the horrendous anti-Semitic worldview that pervaded post-war Poland. This prejudicial religious discrimination would have devastating consequences for the pitifully few Jews still left in Poland, when, just 16 months after the liberation of Auschwitz,

an enraged Polish community in Kielce. . . initiated a pogrom of brutal proportions. In the full knowledge of what had happened to more than 1,000,000 Jews in nearby Auschwitz, in the full knowledge that a Polish community of 3,500,000 Jews had disappeared from their midst, this small town murdered nearly 50 Holocaust survivors.\textsuperscript{31}

I finished my letter with what must be admitted was a rather strong rebuttal of Kazmierska’s demand for “historical truth:”

This innate anti-Semitic worldview was why the Nazis located extermination centres in Poland, that is “the historical truth,” and although this might be unpalatable for modern day Poles to hear, it cannot, nor should not be denied.\textsuperscript{32}

At this point, it has become clear that my use of the term “innate anti-Semitic worldview” is highly problematic from a scholarly perspective. For after all, if pre-war Polish anti-Semitism had indeed been innate, this whole debate would never have arisen as anti-Semitism would have been a universally accepted precursor to the Nazi decision to locate Auschwitz in occupied-Poland. The problem is, of course, once a phrase enters the public domain, it cannot be removed. Therefore, the only course of action open to me is an explanation of the casual use of such a term. It was made in the heat of a dialogue that I never for one moment imagined would reach an academic level and consequently, the level of oversight that I normally apply to my writing was clearly missing. What it has reinforced at a personal level, is that no matter the individual level of experience, it is imperative that one remembers how important terminology is, even more so in a non-academic environment. As this paper proves, an imprudent and/or thoughtless comment can be the flame that ignites an incendiary dialogue if incorrectly applied.

Having said that, it is important to also state that my argument was not made maliciously but after years of intensive research into aspects of pre-war Polish anti-Semitism for my biography of Robert Briscoe, an Irish-Jewish politician who became a leading member of the New Zionist Organ-
isation (Revisionists) and led a 1939 rescue mission to Warsaw on behalf of Ze’ev Jabotinsky, the revisionist leader. Therefore, even though my phrase was a throwaway comment in a provincial newspaper, it was grounded in an empirical appraisal of the political, social, and cultural forces underpinning pre-war Polish anti-Semitism. This research subsequently prompted a macro analysis of Polish attitudes towards its Jewish citizens pre- and post-war; a major part of this focused on the enlightened writings of some members of the Polish intelligentsia who reflected on their nation’s wartime shortcomings. For example, Jerzy Andrzejewski opined in his 1946 essay in *Odrodzenie* that

> I wish I could honestly say [that] yes, anti-Semitism in Poland is disappearing... Unfortunately, after many years of thinking about this matter as an open, infected wound festering within our organism, witnessing all that happened in Poland before and during the war, and what is taking place at present; listening to people from various milieus and of different levels of intelligence, noticing their often unconscious gestures and reactions, observing how certain gestures and reactions automatically follow, I am not able to conclude, I cannot conclude, anything else but that the Polish nation in all its strata and across all intellectual levels, from the highest all the way down to the lowest, was and remains after the war anti-Semitic.34

Armed with my research, I really did not give much thought to the possible repercussions to my statement in the *Belfast Telegraph*; isolated in my academic bubble of scholarship I presumed, erroneously as it immediately transpired, that anyone engaging in this debate would also share the same objectivity I had applied in my response to Kazmierska. However, I was instantaneously disabused of this naïve expectation by the torrent of personal invective and ridicule directed at myself and the *Belfast Telegraph*. Even at this remove, and having approached the subsequent events from an academic perspective by imposing a theoretical framework on subsequent events, I still find myself at a loss in terms of how to describe the crescendo of hatred that descended on my head over the next fortnight.

The response was immediate as I realized when I opened my e-mail on the morning of September 17th and found my inbox filled with the vilest type of invective and threat from an outraged global Polish community. Most of what was said is unprintable; some of the more printable examples included “Jew-loving commie bastard”; “you are a Catholic traitor who will burn in hell”; and “you must be a yid convert to betray Catholic Poland in such a way.” It emerged that my profile on the Irish Professional Historians website had been used to gain personal information that had been passed around the globe to Polish web activists who then proceeded to launch a
virulent campaign of denigration against me. I immediately had to shut it
down; consequently, all my publication information and conference
addresses were denied to colleagues and friends.

The campaign included thousands of blog posts; the setting up of
Facebook pages, and, to my knowledge, at least one radio station devoted
a segment to my letter. Over the following days, these were accompanied
by more than 20 postal letters from diverse locations around the globe
including the U.S., Canada, South Africa, and Australia. The common
theme in these was we know where you live, and you deserve what is com-
ing to you; the threats expanded to include a sinister targeting of the Jewish
Museum in Dublin, based solely on the fact I had previously lectured there.

The threats and hateful commentary was not simply confined to a per-
sonal level; the Belfast Telegraph was targeted at both a macro level with
the Polish ambassador in London demanding a public retraction of my con-
tribution to the debate, and a micro level, with the comments link under-
neath my letter flooded with hundreds of outraged statements. These
denigrated the paper for supposedly fostering an anti-Polish narrative and
included a complaint to the Independent Press Standards Organisation
(PSO) from a reader living in Dublin, who argued I had no empirical basis
for my argument. This was despite the fact that I had initially tried to
engage in the commentary section of the paper by posting copious research
material on pre-war Polish anti-Semitism.

This complaint was immediately dismissed by the PSO; however,
despite the Belfast Telegraph winning a decisive victory for free speech, it
became clear that this was not going to easily accepted by the Polish
embassy in London. On October 6th, the ambassador, Witold Sobkow,
made his displeasure public by sending the following letter to the paper:

[I]t would seem that the Belfast Telegraph is trying to put itself into the
role of sole advocate for freedom of speech. I reiterate that it was not my
intention to demand only “inoffensive” opinions be published. I do, how-
ever, stand up for accuracy and historical truth. If one publishes informa-
tion which is not true, one must not simply invoke freedom of speech in
its defence. If the Belfast Telegraph is an eager defender of freedom of
speech, why does it fail to allow the other side to express their views in
response to Dr. McCarthy’s letter?

The universal response (as evidenced by the ambassador’s commen-
tary on my inclusion of the Kielce pogrom as a context to illustrate Polish
anti-Semitism) was either an outraged denial that it had ever happened or
that it had been carried out by Polish communists at the behest of orders
from Moscow. Outrageous anti-Semitic polemics from Wikipedia formed
the basis for this irrational and defensive response.
This reached incendiary levels when I attempted to broaden the narrative by including Jan T. Gross’ *Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland*, an account of the massacre in the northeast Polish town as an example of a wartime pogrom. Gross recounted the July 1941 experience of the Jewish citizens of Jedwabne, who were clubbed, drowned, gutted, and burned not by faceless Nazis, but by people whose features and names they knew well: their former schoolmates and those that sold them food, bought their milk, and chatted with them in the street.

In order to accurately retell this horrific story, Gross rigorously researched the archives, oral history, and diaries of the time. It is a harrowing read that draws you into the terror of the Jewish citizens of Jedwabne, who feared the worst from the Nazi invasion but were eventually slaughtered by their fellow Poles. Gross immediately and viscerally sets the scene by citing the following testimony from control-investigative files from the Lomża Security Office; it was given at the trial of 22 individuals who were being prosecuted for their participation in the 1941 pogrom.

Before the war broke out, 1,600 Jews lived in Jedwabne, and only seven survived, saved by a Polish woman, Wyrzyk Owska, who lived in the vicinity. On Monday evening, June 23, 1941, Germans entered the town. And as early as the 25th local bandits, from the Polish population, started an anti-Jewish pogrom. Two of those bandits, Borowski (Borowiuk?) Wacek with his brother Mieek, walked from one Jewish dwelling to another together with other bandits playing accordion and flute to drown the screams of Jewish women and children. I saw with my own eyes how these murderers killed Chajcia Wasersztajn, Jakub Kac, seventy-three years old, and Eliasz Krawiecki. Jakub Kac they stoned to death with bricks. Krawiecki they knifed and then plucked his eyes and cut off his tongue. He suffered terribly for twelve hours before he gave up his soul. On the same day I observed a horrible scene. Chaja Kubrzańska, twenty-eight years old, and Basia Binsztajn, twenty-six years old, both holding newborn babies, when they saw what was going on, they ran to a pond, in order to drown themselves with their children rather than fall into the hands of the bandits. They put their children in the water and drowned them with their own hands: then Baśka Binsztajn jumped in and immediately went to the bottom, while Chaja Kunrzańska suffered for a couple of hours. Assembled hooligans made a spectacle of this. They advised her to lie face down in the water, so that she would drown faster. Finally, seeing that the children were already dead, she threw herself more energetically into the water and found her death too. The next day a local priest intervened, explaining that they should stop the pogrom, and the German authorities would take care of things by themselves.⁴⁰

When Gross published this vital research, it was not received as a
cathartic cleansing of an unsavory past; instead it was met with a virulent denial by a deeply shocked Polish society, where it was politically rejected and socially denigrated. Gross’ work was immediately challenged as the work of an amateur historian whose methodology and sources were either suspect or invalid despite the fact he is an eminent Princeton academic.

This attempt to denigrate Gross’ thesis has not diminished in the ensuing 15 years since the publication of Neighbors. Elements of the Polish establishment still cannot/will not accept the historical validity of his research.41 This is borne out by the recent publication of The Crime and the Silence: Confronting the Massacre of Jews in Wartime Jedwabne by Anna Bikont.42 In this excellent work, Bikont rigorously analyzed the national resistance to Gross’ work of 2001; she insightfully highlighted the collaborative process between historians and politicians to denigrate Gross and undermine his research. For her troubles, she also received numerous threats. In an insightful review of Bikont’s exposé, Lawrence Douglas, professor of law at Amherst College, highlighted a few examples that included accusations that Bikont was infected with a “crazy anti-Polonism” and warnings that she would face “an imminent kamikaze attack.”43 In a broader framework, Douglas perfectly summarizes the contemporary context of denial by suggesting “that anti-Semitism is more than capable of flourishing in the absence of Jews,” an argument reinforced by the fact that “of a pre-war Jewish population that once totaled more than 3.3 million, Poland now has no more than 11,000 Jews.”44

In this context, Bikont’s work perfectly illustrated how the process of denial implemented by post-communist nationalist politicians has cast a generation of Poles adrift from their nation’s past. In many respects, this is the true tragedy for contemporary Poland, as the fact that their national narrative is one of genuine tragedy and victimhood is denigrated by an inability to holistically acknowledge the past. Indeed one could argue that this type of contemporary denial actually denigrates the hundreds of thousands of wonderfully brave Polish citizens who risked everything to save their Jewish neighbors. For after all, how can one acknowledge this heroism if the act itself is isolated from the reality that many of their fellow citizens availed of the opportunity to implement a centuries-old hatred toward Poland’s 3,500,000 Jews?

There are however, brave voices in Poland’s historical community who are ready to acknowledge the past; for example, in a 2001 colloquium to test Gross’s thesis, Professor Jerzy Jedlicki made the following profound admission:

Hatred towards Jews, contempt and mockery of Jews, are part of twentieth-century Central European culture, and that includes Poland. By that I
don’t meant to say that everybody would have been prepared to commit atrocities. But the destruction of the Jews was watched with amusement by a significant part of the local Polish population. That amusement, the laughter that accompanied the Holocaust—I remember it, because at that time I was on the other Aryan side of the wall. Until today, our stance, and I include myself in this, has been a flight from the subject, a cowardly fear of the darkness lurking in our collective history.45

Not all contemporary Poles agree, as evidenced by the aggressive response of the Polish embassy to my letter in the *Belfast Telegraph*. That response should be understood in the context of events in Poland since the contentious re-election of Jarosław Kaczyński, now the leader of the ultra-conservative Law and Justice Party, as part of a ruling coalition in October, 2015. His election contextualizes the aggressive reaction to my letter in the *Belfast Telegraph* by locating it against the backdrop of the Polish election campaign that included a number of demonstrations with an overt anti-Semitic content.

This included a massive demonstration in Warsaw where far-right activists carried banners accusing its political opponents of defending “Jewish communist wealth.”46 Simultaneously in Wrocław, supporters of Kaczyński’s Law and Justice Party proclaimed with sinister reference to the Second Republic nationalists of the 1930s, that “Wrocław is being de-Polonized as the Jews are buying up homes in the city.”47 As far as I am aware, the Law and Justice party, known also by its Polish acronym, PIS, has failed to denounce any of these acts which contain anti-Jewish invective.

This campaign reached its apex in February 2016, when the Law and Justice government under the control of Kaczynski moved to strip Jan Gross of his 1996 awarded Order of Merit of the Polish Republic for wartime scholarship.48 It is clear even 15 years after the publication of *Neighbors* that Gross is a target of Poland’s ultra-nationalist Law and Justice governmental as it attempts a revisionist expunging of even the merest suggestion of Polish complicity in the Holocaust. This accusation prompted scholars around the globe to come to Gross’ defense: recently, more than 30 academics have signed two open letters in the Polish press challenging the Law and Justice revisionist narrative. The first letter included the following statement from Professor Jan Grabowski, of the University of Ottawa, who forcefully described Gross as “a patriot who looks at both darker and lighter periods in Polish history.”49

Despite this stout defense, Gross is aware his attempted to engage his compatriots about a troubling and indeed, forgotten aspect of wartime Poland, has failed. He described a societal rejection of past horrors as “a
confrontation with ghosts in the consciousness of Polish society” in an interview with MA students in the Holocaust Studies program at the University of Haifa on January 10, 2016. As the vitriolic reaction to his valiant attempt at tweaking the conscience of Poland increased in intensity, it is clear that his fellow citizens were not either ready or willing to listen in 2001 or 2016.

**PRE-WAR POLISH ANTI-SEMITISM AND A CONTEMPORARY FOUNDATIONAL MYTH**

As the confrontation in the *Belfast Telegraph* reached an apex against the backdrop of a divisive internal Polish election campaign, I attempted to refute the challenge to my academic credibility by assembling a research package illuminating the extent of pre-war Polish anti-Semitism. Subsequently, I posted this material in the commentary thread under my original letter—unfortunately, to no avail, as my scholarly credentials continued to be vilified regardless of whatever empirical evidence I posted to support my argument. I then realized that this campaign had far exceeded, in political and social terms, the mere posting of a response in a provincial letters page; it had arguably become part of an official, government sanctioned strategy attacking any counter-narrative that challenged contemporary Poland’s foundational mythology. In turn, this prompted the scholar in me to examine contemporary Polish attitudes toward any individual or group outside of the narrow definition of a Catholic-nationalist definition of citizenship. I felt the need to understand the vitriolic response of denial to my initial argument about the existence of anti-Semitism before I could subjectively address the hateful, xenophobic response to a relatively benign academic challenge.

In constructing a theoretical framework of contemporary Polish denial of a racist, xenophobic, and/or anti-Semitic past, I drew upon an article in the *Sunday Times* (UK edition) by Sir Ian Kershaw, the preeminent British Holocaust scholar, who offers a historical context for the contemporary resistance of post-communist Eastern European states to the admittance of Syrian-Muslim refugees. Kershaw argues that nearly five decades of Soviet dominance contextualised “the fact that they haven’t had a lengthy period of socialization in anti-racist, anti-xenophobic values” and has led to an exclusionist worldview.

Although Kershaw is not specifically referring to Poland, the manifestation of this insularity appeared in immediate aftermath of that nation’s independence. Poland’s new political regime was at once resistant to inward migration, especially those from sub-Saharan Africa who had since the mid-eighties used Poland as a transit to gain access to the Scandinavian states.
This reached an apex in early 1990, when Sweden “expelled nearly 1,000 asylum seekers of African and Arab origin back to Poland.” In turn, this act prompted an immediate transference of migration responsibility from “from [a] humanitarian agency (labor ministry) to a structure within [a] security agency (minister of the interior)” under the control of Lieutenant-Colonel Zbigniew Skoczylas, a career military officer. Although particularly focused on potential non-white migration, Polish policy also refused requests from ethnic Poles in the former Soviet states to return to the “motherland,” so great was the fear of economic collapse.

In order to understand Kershaw’s argument, the political, cultural, and social context of post-communist Poland needs to be considered, beginning with the absolute political imperative of creating a new state reflecting pre-war Polish thought and philosophy. This necessitated the construction of a foundational narrative by the main political actors that assumed power in the Third Republic (1989-present). It was grounded in the resurrection of core historical values of “the nation, the fatherland, patriotism, sovereignty and patriotic duty,” writes Owa Ochman. In the new nation, “these values were seen as rooted in Polish history, universally recognised by Poles and endorsed by national consensus,” and importantly, “Polish self-identification through Catholic symbols and rituals (the Pole-Catholic model) was regarded to be a persistent and dominant phenomenon in the national culture.”

This identification with a heroic past was reinforced over subsequent decades until reaching an apex with the 2005 election of the Kaczyński brothers, Lech Kaczyński as President of Poland until his death in 2010 and Jarosław Kaczyński, who initially as Prime Minister (2006-2007) before assuming leadership of the Law and Justice party in 2015. A core tenet of the Kaczyński template was the definition of modern-day Poland as the manifestation of a tragic past of victimhood.

This was legitimized “on a narrative focused on freedom fighting, victimhood and heroic martyrdom [epitomized by] the Second World War and the Warsaw Uprising.” This worldview of heroic victimhood was perhaps best exemplified by the reaction of Lech Walesa, the Solidarity hero and former Polish president, to Gross’ exposé of the Jedwabne pogrom. As Lawrence Douglas previously mentioned, Walesa angrily denounced Gross’ work by exclaiming “the Poles have already apologised many times to the Jews: we are waiting for the apology from the other side because many Jews were scoundrels.” This attitude of expectant apology by Walesa was not a dominant feature of Polish criticism of my letter in the Belfast Telegraph; in the main, the response emphasized Walesa’s narrative of “heroic victimhood” by citing the Warsaw Uprising by Polish nationalists while
either completely ignoring or denigrating the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising by the Jewish resistance fighters.

The stylized and selective use of a specific historical event central to the foundational myth of post-communist Poland immediately emphasized that the politics of memory are an essential component in controlling a national narrative about the past. This places the pre-war “Jewish Question” at the center of contemporary Poland’s constructed political and social memory of the communist post-war regime. The construction of a contemporary foundational myth was predicated on the careful manipulation of temporal and multiple public memories of Poland’s 3,500,000 strong Jewish community.

Essentially morality and justice were sidelined as a benign memory of pre-war Poland was instilled through a society unused to freedom of expression. This, of course, created internal tensions between individuals of conscience like Gross and Bikont and the nationalist myth of post-communist Poland. This is not uncommon in new nation-states that have been the victim of oppression, where an inevitable consequence of emphasizing a “heroic past” is the obliteration of negative historical national characteristics. In Poland’s case, this is evidently the eradication of a centuries-old anti-Semitic ethos that, in ultra-Catholic states “was often regarded as a manifestation of national pride and religious devotion.”

This was especially so in post-World War 1 Poland, a successor state that had been reconstructed from the remnants of the failed Austria-Hungarian and Russian empires. The establishment of Poland as a sovereign state was accompanied “by the jarring music of pogroms against Jews, especially in places of mixed population, where the loyalties were deemed by Poles to be suspect.” This was reflected in the actions of Polish troops in November 1918 in Lvi—now a part of the Ukraine but at that time about to become an integral part of a newly reconstituted Poland. The troops “embarked on a rampage through the Jewish quarter, looting, beating and even killing some of its inhabitants (estimates range from 50 to 72); the justification for this atrocity was the Catholic dogma insisting on the Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy.”

A wave of pogroms quickly followed the Lvi one; over the next two years, these were driven by a nationalist belief that Jews on Polish soil were at best “tolerated guests” determined to undermine Polish sovereignty. This hatred toward citizens of a centuries-old Jewish community culminated in the city of Pinsk on April 5, 1919, where Polish troops murdered 35 Jews who had gathered together to share gifts sent to them by relatives in the United States. In a reflection of today’s denial of an anti-Semitic history: The authorities tried to hush up the incident, but the wave of rioting and pogroms had a severe repercussion abroad. The Poles
attempted to shirk all responsibility and cynically claimed that the reports of rioting and pogroms were merely sick propaganda intended to destroy the image of the Poles in world public opinion. The Poles were especially irritated by the use of the term *pogrom*.\(^{62}\)

The presence of such a visibly alien cohort led to a nationalist rejection of Jews by individuals like Roman Dmowski, leader of the National Democratic Party, which “maintained [Poland should be] a unitary national state in which all minorities [but especially the Jews] were either polonized or forced to emigrate.”\(^{63}\) This belief system dominated inter-war Polish attitudes toward its Jewish citizens. Writing in 1924, Dmowski rationalised this view thus:

> It is known to all that in the nineteenth century the main aim of the Jews was entrance into European societies, acquisition of European culture and knowledge, adoption of customs and ways of life of the nations among which they lived, transformations of themselves into Frenchmen, Englishmen, Germans, Poles and so forth. . . . Jews amassed great wealth and acquired a significant role in the in the social and political life of countries. In addition, the amassing of wealth quickly increased their role as a result of the material dependence on them by wide circles of European societies. . . . To these were added secret international organizations, in which Jews always had their defenders and in which, at a certain time, according to all data, they held executive positions. This was facilitated by the fact that they did not really belong to any nation and lived among all of them, they were created, as if by design, for the main role in all international undertakings.\(^{64}\)

The nationalist project of anti-Semitism was executed by structural anti-Semitism. For example, in August 1936, the Polish Ministry of Commerce ordered that all shops had to have a sign on the front giving the store owner’s exact birth certificate name, thereby clearly identifying those of Jewish ownership,\(^{65}\) and leading to increased attacks on Jewish-owned businesses. This bill was just one of the expressions of intensifying anti-Semitic feeling in Poland, from 1936-1939. The impact of this development was to influence the adoption of measures by Polish professional organizations that excluded Jews, including the Polish Medical Association, the Polish Bar Association, the General Assembly of Journalists in Wilno, and the Bank Polski, the nation’s largest financial institution.\(^{66}\)

The political, cultural, and societal ramifications for Poland’s Jews during this time were life-and history-altering. Writing from Budapest in 1937, the Hungarian-Jewish scholar Desider Kiss noted that the large Jewish population of Poland—ten per cent of its people—both allowed Polish Jews to turn to the orthodoxy of the Middle Ages and, on the other hand, to
follow dreams of Zionism in mass emigration to Palestine. Indeed half of the Jewish newcomers to Palestine were from Poland, both drawn to Palestine and fleeing persecution in Poland.67

In sum, the Jews of interwar Poland were frequently victims of state-sanctioned as well as everyday, casual anti-Semitism, a fact that did not go unnoticed in an interwar Irish Free State, which itself had a 5,000 strong Jewish community. As previously mentioned, my understanding of Polish pre-war anti-Semitism came from extensive research into the life of the Irish-Jewish politician, Robert Briscoe, who led a Revisionist Zionist rescue mission to Poland in December 1938.

This research also revealed how Briscoe worked in tandem with Isaac Herzog, Ireland’s first Chief Rabbi, who in the fullness of time would also assume this position in the British controlled Palestine Mandate and then in an independent Israel.68 Herzog, who was a personal friend of Irish Taoiseach (prime minister) Éamon de Valera, poignantly described Polish Jews’ situation in a 1936 speech on Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement), the most solemn day in the Jewish liturgical calendar:

When one reviewed the present state of affairs in so far as they affected the Jewish people, gloom in its very widest sense stared them in the face. . . . In Poland the plight of three and a half million of Jews [sic] was appalling in the extreme. . . . they were made to suffer from the poisonous darts of Jew-hatred and Jew-baiting. In Germany the Jewish position was going from bad to worse and systematic efforts were increasingly made to make existence impossible for the 500,000 Jews still remaining there. . . . Alas! the plague of Jew-hatred, the most wicked and at the same time the most senseless phenomenon in this age of enlightenment was spreading.69

The relationship between Herzog and Briscoe coalesced on the issue of the Nazi persecution of Germany’s Jewish citizens; both men fervently believed that a mass exodus to the British controlled Palestine Mandate was the only option if a remnant of European Jewry was to survive. This belief became a core tenet of Briscoe’s Jewish worldview in the mid to late 1930s after his failed inward Jewish migration endeavor to the Irish state.70 This failure confirmed his adherence to the Zionist ideal of a Jewish National Homeland in Palestine, and, as previously mentioned, this belief had inexorably led him to becoming a senior member of the revisionists under the leadership of Jabotinsky by the autumn of 1938.71

Briscoe’s commitment to the Revisionist ideal was reinforced as the tragic consequences of the failed Evian Conference on Refugees became apparent.72 Roosevelt had initiated a global conference of the refugee crisis after the Anschluss (Nazi annexation of Austria in March 1938). He asked
the invited nations “to consider what immediate steps [could] be taken, within the existing immigration laws. . . to assist the most urgent cases.” The conference took place in Evian-les-Baines in France, Roosevelt’s personal envoy Myron Taylor giving an opening address on July 6th, which finally seemed to acknowledge “that discrimination and pressure against minority groups and the disregard of elementary human rights were contrary to the principles of civilization.”

This was an admirable sentiment; however, almost immediately a universal rejection of open immigration emerged as the British representative Lord Winterton echoed the parochial concerns of Germany’s nearest neighbors. In a statement that almost identically reflected the Irish position, he said his “Government were stretching their policy as far as they could in view of. . . their own problem of unemployment.” He then repeated the immigration principle that Briscoe had heard so often in his many representations to the Department and Industry and Commerce: that only “refugees [who] could make a useful contribution to industrial life” would be considered. Sir Neil Malcolm, the League of Nations High Commissionaire for German Refugees, reinforced this position by doubting

the possibility, at least for some time to come, of any large scale immigrations and settlements because of the present conditions of the labor markets in nearly all the countries in the world. Furthermore, he thought, any large movement of Jews might result in an increase of anti-semitism in quarters where the sentiment is now negligible.

The majoritarian response was acknowledged in clause three of the conference’s concluding recommendations:

[T]he involuntary emigration of people in large numbers has become so great that it renders racial and religious problems more acute, increases international unrest, and may seriously hinder the processes of appeasement in international relations.

The consequences were devastating; Hitler immediately increased the levels of Jewish persecution, secure in the knowledge that the West was not going to intervene. He had prefaced the conference with the acerbic comment that

I can only hope, and expect that the other world, which has such deep sympathy for these criminals, will at last be generous enough to convert that sympathy into practical aid. We on our part, are ready to put all these criminals at the disposal of these countries, for all I care, even on luxury ships.
When the conference closed, it was clear in the final resolutions that the participating nations were not willing to receive Hitler’s “criminals.” This had emboldened the Nazis, and a series of increasingly vicious assaults eventually culminated in a brutal pogrom on the 9th and 10th of November 1938.\textsuperscript{80} The Nazis used the assassination of Ernst vom Rath, a middle-ranking official at the German Embassy in Paris, by a disaffected young Polish Jew, Herschel Grynszpan, to bring the simmering assault on Germany’s Jews to a vicious climax.\textsuperscript{81} This terrible event has become universally known by its German name of Kristallnacht, or night of the broken glass, and its brutality toward Jews reinforced to the global diaspora that Hitler was intent on entirely expelling their co-religionists from its ranks.\textsuperscript{82}

Less than a month after Kristallnacht, Briscoe (with de Valera’s full support) accepted Jabotinsky’s request to lead a mission to Warsaw in order to effect a long-standing plan to secure a mass emigration of Poland’s Jews.\textsuperscript{83} The Revisionists had been engaged in the endeavor to move Polish Jews to Palestine since 1937, oftentimes in cooperation with the Polish Government.\textsuperscript{84} This cooperation might initially seem strange; however, as a consequence of a “continuing impoverishment of the Jewish masses” and an increased anti-Semitism, the Poles sought to encourage Jewish emigration.\textsuperscript{85} Jabotinsky had been promoting the idea of a modern-day Exodus to Poland’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Felicjan Slawowy-Składkowski and Colonel Józef Beck, who were, by and large, supportive of his ambitious plan.\textsuperscript{86}

The Polish response to Jabotinsky’s initiative was simple: if the Jews were willing to go, then the government would facilitate this by every means possible, including, if necessary, financial assistance. However, Jabotinsky needed to convince them that the British would cooperate by accommodating the potential emigrants. This proved to be a task too great, and by summer of 1938, it was apparent he had failed to convince the Poles, who clearly did not believe the British would open the borders of Palestine.\textsuperscript{87} Consequently Beck had addressed the League of Nations “demanding that facilities be provided for the annual departure of between 80,000 and 100,000 Jews” from Poland to Madagascar, Kenya, or even Australia.\textsuperscript{88}

In an attempt to refocus the emigration plan on Palestine, Jabotinsky had instructed Joseph Schechtman, the resident revisionist envoy in Warsaw, to arrange a meeting in the foreign office with Beck to shift the Polish position.\textsuperscript{89} For the next six months, the revisionists negotiated with the Poles about where Polish Jews would go and, in December, Jabotinsky sent Briscoe to Warsaw.\textsuperscript{90}

On November 24th, 1938, Briscoe informed the Nessuit (The Executive Council of the Revisionists) in London that he had “a very lengthy conversation with Mr. de Valera, and I am very happy at the attitude he is
now taking. . . . I am awaiting news from you as to when it will be expected of me to start for Warsaw.” When he finally arrived in the Polish capital, Briscoe secured an audience with Colonel Beck, in the foreign office, and set about trying to put into place Jabotinsky’s ambitious emigration plan. He set about his task with gusto, and his account of the meeting with Beck is a dramatic one:

On behalf of the New Zionist Movement, speaking mainly for European Jews, not for those of England or America, speaking for them, I suggest that you ask Britain to turn over the mandate for Palestine to you and make it in effect a Polish colony. You could then move all your unwanted Jews into Palestine. This would bring great relief to your country, and you would have a rich and growing colony to aid your economy.92

Briscoe’s plan was based on the revisionist presumption that Britain felt itself bound to consult with nations such as Poland before determining immigration schedules for Palestine.93 This was not the case, as Beck had already found out; Britain merely humored the Poles by listening to their plans for Palestine, and as the war approached, the Palestine emigration plan for Poland’s Jews became inconsequential to British geo-political concerns. Therefore, it is clear the mission was doomed to failure before it ever started, and Briscoe’s despair was evident in his September 1939 letter to Bill Ziff, a fellow revisionist from America:

It is quite obvious that as far as the Jewish problem is concerned, a lot of it unfortunately has been solved. The population of Jews in Poland will no longer I feel be anything like the 3.5. millions, (sic) and before this war is over goodness only knows how many more of the people who profess the Jewish faith will be non-existent (sic).94

Prophetic words indeed.

CONCLUSION

Along with Russia, no, country suffered more at the hands of Nazism than Poland, a fact that was never disputed by my intervention in the Belfast Telegraph debate about the location of an extermination center at Auschwitz. Unequivocally, Poland as a state, and Polish citizens of every religion and social standing, were victims of terrible war crimes committed by the Hitlerite hordes.

At the same time, virulent religious anti-Semitism, which tragically manifested in vicious pogroms in both the pre-and post-war years, has blighted Poland throughout the centuries. Indeed, the evidence suggests that
anti-Semitism still pervades contemporary Poland. For example, as recently as September 2015, numerous tombs were desecrated at a Jewish cemetery in Bielsko-Biała in Southern Poland, a cemetery that contained a commemorative plaque honoring the Jews of the region who fought and died in the Polish army during World War II.95

This worldview was reinforced in the interregnum between the end of World War II and the start of the Cold War as Polish communists, at the behest of their masters in Moscow, attempted to construct the political memory of the Nazi era. A core component of this post-war narrative was a relegation of the “Jewish catastrophe [to] the margins of discussion,” a position that would ultimately inform Polish policy “both ideologically and politically” to the present moment in time.96 Consequently, Jewish suffering was always subordinate to Polish suffering, a worldview that transcended the fall of communist Poland and continued into contemporary nationalist Poland.

Consequently, the evidentially fragile nature of contemporary Poland’s democracy and its lack of inclusivity for minorities, whether the tiny Jewish community or various other ethnic groups, is a cause of grave concern for fellow-member states of the European Union. In January 2016, the EU proposed a monitoring mechanism to observe the state of Poland’s fragile democracy.97 This was a reaction to the increasing curtailment of personal freedoms in Poland under the leadership of Jarosław Kaczyński and the Law and Justice Party, which is incrementally pushing contemporary Poland back to the authoritarian ethos of the communist era, a time when free speech was curtailed in pursuit of a nationalist identity that emphasized Nazi terror and Polish victimhood.

In summary, the one clear message to emerge from the whole Belfast Telegraph incident is the threat to scholarly integrity and the ability of the researcher to articulate with freedom aspects of a national past, however unsavory they may have been. As Dominick LaCapra has so incisively argued, although the contextualization of past traumatic events is crucial to understanding “the present and foreseeable future,” it poses “particularly acute problems for historical representation.”98

National memory, especially in relatively new democracies, is vital to constructing a contemporary narrative; therefore, if the memory is challenged in any way, it is immediately attacked. This is a transnational response; for example, Irish historiography has been at the epicenter of a controversial and oftentimes confrontational debate on the interpretation of the political, social, and cultural forces underpinning the national movement toward independence a century ago (particularly applicable in 2016, the centenary of the Easter Rising in Dublin).99

As a historian, I argue that this is perfectly acceptable if conducted in a
non-threatening open forum where disagreement is an essential component of scholarly progress. What is not acceptable is when an observation, however challenging it might be, leads to a personal vilification conducted through anonymous social media postings and e-mails. This undermines the very notion of independent empirical scholarship and will unless checked, lead to scholars becoming increasingly reluctant to research areas of contention.

NOTES

1. Dr. Kevin McCarthy received his PhD in history from the University of College Cork who works as an independent scholar. He is the author of Robert Briscoe: Sinn Féin Revolutionary, Fianna Fáil Nationalist and Revisionist Zionist (Berne: Peter Lang Academic Publishers, 2016).


5. Ibid.


8. Ibid., 53.

Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: Sage, 2009), 87-122. This is a highly theoretical approach, but essentially it argues that there are five critical stages in defining newcomers as the other: 1) How are persons named and referred to linguistically? 2) What traits, characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to them? 3) By means of what arguments and argumentation schemes do specific persons or social groups try to justify and legitimize the exclusion, discrimination, suppression, and exploitation of others? 4) From what perspective or point of view are these labels, attributions and arguments expressed? 5) Are the respective utterances articulated overtly? Are they intensified or are they mitigated?


20. Anthony D. Buckley, Symbols in Northern Ireland (Belfast: Institute of Irish Studies, Queen’s University, 1998), 50-60.


22. John Dumbrell, “Political Comparisons: From Johannesburg to Jerusalem,” in A Farewell to Arms?: Beyond the Good Friday Agreement,


27. Ibid.


32. Ibid.


35. A search for “Kevin McCarthy and Polish Antisemitism” among Facebook users turns up posts in both English and Polish that call for action from the international Polish community. These can be found at https://www.facebook.com/search/top/?q=kevin%20mccarthy%20and%20polish%20antisemitism.

36. Orla FM, a bilingual radio program serving the Polish community in the UK, devoted a radio discussion to the matter. “Poles Collaborated with Nazis. Did Belfast Get It Right?” was broadcast on October 12, 2015. It is available at http://www.orla.fm/poles-collaborated-with-nazis-did-belfast-telegraph-get-it-right/. The program, in English, includes a conversation
between protestors Jan Niechwiadowicz and host George Matlock. Both
denounce the violent threats but do not agree with the original claim that
Polish anti-Semitism was the reason for the placement of Auschwitz in
Poland and argue that the newspaper handled the controversy incorrectly
while also recognizing protestors’ initial response may have been too
strong.

37. Witold Sobkow, “Historical truth is as important as free speech,”
_Belfast Telegraph (UK)_ , September 6, 2015, www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/op
inion/letters/historical-truth-is-as-important-as-free-speech-31584292.html

38. Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, _Neutralizing Memory: The Jew in
Contemporary Poland_ (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1990),
1-25.


40. Jan T. Gross, _Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community
in Jedwabne, Poland_ (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 16-
17.

41. Michael Shafir, _Between Denial and Comparative Trivialization:
Holocaust Negationism in Post-Communist Europe_ (Jerusalem: Hebrew
University of Jerusalem, 2002), 1-10.

42. Anna Bikont, _The Crime and the Silence: Confronting the Massacre of

43. Lawrence Douglas, “The Crime and the Silence: A Quest for the
Truth of a Wartime Massacre,” _Irish Times_ , January 23, 2016,
http://www.irishtimes.com/culture/books/the-crime-and-the-silence-

44. Ibid.

45. Bikont, 9.

46. Donald Snyder, “Poland Turns Hard to Right—and Jews Wind Up in
87/poland-turns-hard-right-and-hits-the-jews/?utm_content=daily_Newslet
ter_MainList_Title_Position-1&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email
&utm_campaign=Daily%20newsletter%20-%20personalized%20%5BD%5D%2012-17&utm_term=The%20Forward%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20percent

47. “Polish Lawmaker Makes Anti-Semitic Slur,” _World Jewish
news/polish-lawmaker-makes-anti-semitic-slur-12-1-2015

48. Alex Duval Smith, “Polish move to strip Holocaust expert of award
.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/14/academics-defend-historian-over-
polish-jew-killing-claims

49. Ibid.

51. Josh Glancy, “Yes, This is a Crisis but Europe can Cope,” *The Sunday Times (UK)*, September 27, 2015, http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/newsreview/features/article1611770.ece.


53. Ibid., 234.


55. Ibid., 29.


68. For the most up to date information on the Briscoe-Herzog relationship see McCarthy, *Robert Briscoe*, 80-100.
69. *Irish Times*, 28 September 1936.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. “As to the Refugees,” *World Affairs* 101, no. 3 (1938), 139-140.
85. Ibid., 482.
88. Hamerow, 62.
89. Rosenblum, 483.
91. Briscoe Files Jabotinsky Institute Tel Aviv 2/253 2, 24 November 1938.
94. *Robert Briscoe Private Papers*, September 22, 1939. This private family archive remains the property of Mr. Ben Briscoe (son) and is contained in unnumbered boxes.
95. As reported by Polish TVN24, “Suspects of Jewish Cemetery Desecration were Arrested,” *Antisemitism*, November 11, 2015, http://antisemitism.org.il/article/100932/suspects-jewish-cemetery-desecration-were-arrested
Elements of Bile: Placing Daniel Ottolengui (1836-1918) in the Heritage of Hate

Sally Stokes

AROUND AND ABOUT IN OLD NEW YORK:
LITERARY AND THEATRICAL GOINGS-ON

Just east of Broadway, in 1846, Isaac D. Baker and Charles Scribner opened their publishing house on Nassau Street near Ann Street in lower Manhattan.¹ By the time of the Civil War, Baker & Scribner had cemented a reputation for thoughtful and elevating texts. In 1867, the firm, now Charles Scribner & Co., having moved up to 654 Broadway and released a miscellany of Christian meditations, poetry by Robert Burns, and a translation of the Iliad, had picked up Henry Ward Beecher’s Norwood, or Village Life in New England. This lone novel by Beecher— orator, abolitionist, and minister of Brooklyn’s Plymouth Church—had run as a serial in Robert Bonner’s paper, the New York Ledger, starting in early May.²

The Ledger’s May 9th advertisement in the New York Times captured more than two dozen reviews. From the Titusville Herald: “[If Beecher can write an ‘entertaining’ sermon [. . .], it is [. . .] not to be feared that he will write a ‘dull’ novel.” Turf, Field and Farm fawned, or perhaps chortled, “[It] gives promise of great power and brilliancy.”³ Not cited was Flake’s Bulletin: “Worse novels have been read, and a great many better ones have died. [. . . It] will be hardly known five years hence” (“Eminent”; “Beecher’s Novel”).⁴

Norwood is replete with stereotypes, such as hack-driver Hiram Beers and African American Pete Sawmill. The saga follows Abiah and Rachel Cathcart and their adult children, Alice and Barton. Neighbor Rose Wentworth is fond of Barton but has other suitors, including a Virginian, Tom Heywood. Soon after the bombardment of Fort Sumter, Barton joins the Union army. Tom serves the Confederacy, but his exposure to Norwood’s inhabitants makes him question the Rebel cause. Alice and Rose serve as nurses at Gettysburg, where Tom conveniently dies in a charge led by Barton, who is taken prisoner. Just as Alice is about to speak with General Lee about Barton’s release, she learns that her brother is safe. After two more years in the Union army, Barton returns to Norwood, where he and Rose are married, to the joy of the villagers.

Scholars have concluded that Beecher’s attitudes about religion and human dignity were inconsistent, and that Norwood is unexceptional.⁵ Perhaps for these very reasons, librettists of the 1860s sprang swiftly into
action. Only a few installments of *Norwood* had appeared in the *Ledger* when in August 1867 Buffalo saloonkeeper W. T. Dulany advertised for applications to produce his comedy, derived from Beecher’s novel. The last installment of *Norwood* ran in the *Ledger* on November 11th 1867. That same evening, *The Legend of “Norwood,”* by the leading melodramatist of the day, Augustin Daly, debuted at the Worrell Sisters’ Theatre at 728–730 Broadway. Pete Sawmill, whom Beecher had introduced as “a great, black, clumsy-moving fellow” (20), Daly described as “the most useless piece of timber about the village” (7). Daly’s play was quickly caricatured in black-face minstrelsy as *Norwood, or Village Life Almost Anywhere*, at the fabled Tony Pastor’s music hall in the Bowery (Odell 353; Zellers 27–31). Daly’s production soon moved to the Brooklyn Academy of Music, opening on December 9th. The same night, in Hooley’s New Opera House in Brooklyn, yet another burlesque adaptation of *Norwood* began its run.

At 609 Broadway, in October 1867, the curtain had risen on a different bit of theatre, in the emporium of Messrs. Brady & Co. A year and a half after Abraham Lincoln’s assassination, Mary Todd Lincoln had engaged W. H. Brady to sell some of her clothing, furs, and jewelry. Assisting her in this effort was the Washington, D.C. dressmaker Elizabeth Keckley. Mrs. Lincoln’s wardrobe sale was of national interest. *Harper’s Weekly* featured an illustration of the showroom (Fox 684); the *Brooklyn Daily Eagle* reported that ‘all sorts and conditions’ of men, women, and artists continually visit it, but unfortunately not to buy’ (“Mrs. Lincoln’s Property”). Journalists had little sympathy for Mrs. Lincoln. The publication in the *New York World* of letters Mary Lincoln had written to Brady only intensified disdain for the President’s widow. The matter came to be known as the “Old Clothes Scandal” (Ellison 194).

Back in Baker & Scribner’s old neighborhood, there had blossomed a corpus of bookmen whose presses rolled out satire, farce, and rant. Calvin Blanchard, a sometime tenant at 23 & 26 Ann Street, issued classic works in reprint and tirades on the “bunkum rhetoric” of preachers and politicians. The George W. Carleton Co., of the 400 block of Broadway, in association with the New York Printing Company at 81, 83, and 85 Centre Street, handled the works of humorists Bret Harte and Artemus Ward, peppering its offerings with Beecher’s *595 Pulpit Pungencies*; Fanny Fern’s “spicy new novel,” *Folly as it Flies*; and George Carleton’s own—writing as Radical Freelance, Esq.—*The Philosophers of Foufouville*, a send-up of the Fourierist Utopian North American Phalanx. None of these, however, would cause such a commotion as did Elizabeth Keckley’s *Behind the Scenes, by Elizabeth Keckley, Formerly a Slave, but More Recently Modiste, and a Friend to Mrs. Lincoln*, which Carleton’s spring 1868 advertisements would tout as “a literary thunderbolt,” “sensational disclo-
sures,” and “White House revelations.” Chapters I through IV cover Keckley’s years as an enslaved person and her rise to independent businesswoman. The bulk of the book consists of anecdotes about the Lincoln family, Lincoln’s cabinet, and Mrs. Lincoln’s relationship with Stephen A. Douglas. Chapter XV is titled “The Secret History of Mrs. Lincoln’s Wardrobe in New York”; the appendix consists of twenty-one letters from Mary Lincoln to Elizabeth Keckley.

Literate from childhood, Keckley had purchased her freedom. She enjoyed success as dressmaker to politicians’ wives, Union and Confederate, including Mary Todd Lincoln and Varina Davis, wife of Jefferson Davis. Keckley served as president of the Contraband Relief Association, which fed and clothed destitute freedpersons. A letter with Keckley’s signature block, soliciting donations to the Association, shows the writer to have been eloquent and decorous. Keckley’s apologia for her role in the sale of Mrs. Lincoln’s clothing, however, and the breach of confidence in publishing Mary Lincoln’s letters to her did Keckley no favors in the public eye. The gossipy tone of *Behind the Scenes*; the idea that a former slave could have written any book, especially one with such highly-wrought Victorian expressions as “love’s tendrils” and “paroxysms of grief,” called her authorship into question. Remarked the *Eagle*:

*Behind the Scenes* [. . . ] purports to have been written by Elizabeth Keckley, but bears sufficient internal evidence of the handiwork of that class of [. . .] literary craftsmen who are always ready for an odd job, and not too particular as to what it is. [. . .]

If her African friend and confidante had designed to hold [Mrs. Lincoln] up to ridicule and contempt it would not have been easy to hit upon a more effectual method than the publication of *Behind the Scenes* (“New Publications” [2]).

Eight blocks from the New York Printing Company, which had manufactured *Behind the Scenes* for Carleton, was the ostensible National News Company, purportedly quartered at 21 & 23 Ann Street. The entire product of the not necessarily National News appears to consist of three items, all published in 1868. Two were burlesques of releases from Scribner and Carleton, respectively. As was typical of this form of humor, the take-offs spoofed the original titles and authors’ names; thus, *Gnaw-wood, or New England Life in a Village*, by “Henry W. B. Cher”; and, more churlishly, *Behind the Seams; by a Nigger Woman who Took in Work from Mrs. Lincoln and Mrs. Davis*, by “Betsey Kickley.” *Gnaw-wood* has received scant attention from Beecher scholars; *Behind the Seams* has evoked dismay and revulsion at the hatefulness of the text and, along with *Behind the Scenes*,
has been the subject of scholarly evaluation. Researchers and critics have long been confounded in tracing the authorship of *Behind the Seams* because of a typesetting error on the verso of the title page.

**MYSTERY WRITER**

In 1866 or 1867, Daniel Ottolengui, about thirty years of age, arrived in New York from his home city of Charleston, South Carolina. Charleston had provided abundant opportunities for a lad of the merchant class who was interested in literary arts or dabbled in greasepaint and footlights. Its Library Society had been founded in 1748; Russell’s bookstore was the local “mecca of culture” in the 1850s (Stern 61). Poets and pundits published their works through small presses around town. Between 1800 and 1861, over fourteen hundred concerts, plays, and traveling acts were performed in Charleston auditoriums. As Daniel approached adulthood, a typical season might include engagements by Edwin Booth and Campbell’s Minstrels, as well as local stock presentations. The theatre-goer of 1857–58 could see *Il Trovatore*, *Nicholas Nickleby*, *Macbeth*, and light fare such as *Irish Assurance and Yankee Modesty* (Hoole, Ante-Bellum 49, 147–48).

Ottolengui, educated in the classical tradition at South Carolina College, had surely been exposed to an abundance of written works and theatrical diversions by the time he set out for New York.\(^{18}\)

The Civil War and early Reconstruction took a shattering toll on the “cradle of secession.” As journalist Robert Somers wrote in 1871, “Never had a completer ruin fallen on any city” (37). In the spring of 1865, freedmen from the countryside had flocked into Charleston, moving into the abandoned houses of white residents. Union officers governed, censoring newspapers and cooperating with the Freedmen’s Bureau to control the public school system. And none other than Henry Ward Beecher had given the address in April at nearby Fort Sumter, upon its restoration to Federal control (“Fort Sumter. Raising”; “Fort Sumter. Restoration”).

The recently widowed father of three young children, Ottolengui had departed this unsettled environment to seek work in New York. By February 1867, he had become a manager at The Hall, a lesser amusement spot around the block from the Worrell Sisters’ playhouse.\(^{19}\) He may well have caught the first segment of *Norwood* in the *Ledger* in May, and read, or seen reviews of, Bret Harte’s *Condensed Novels*—short sendups of well-known works, out from Carleton & Co. in October (“New Publications” [1]). By the time the Trow’s 1868 city directory was compiled, Ottolengui was employed at a “segar” store at 860 Broadway, which, like the Hall, was within easy strolling distance of Brady’s.\(^{20}\) It happens that the cigar store was located at one of the hotels in which Mrs. Lincoln, under an assumed
name, stayed with Mrs. Keckley while negotiating arrangements for the wardrobe sale. From that hotel, the Union Place, Mrs. Lincoln penned her letters to Brady (Keckley 212).

The Union Place Hotel was a key activity point for nattering and news bulletins about the two secretive guests. According to Keckley’s memoir, “Our trunks in the main hall below were examined daily, and curiosity was more keenly excited when the argus-eyed reporters for the press traced Mrs. Lincoln’s name on the cover of one of her trunks” (212). If Ottolengui was working at this cigar store between early October and late November 1867, he was right in the heart of the Old Clothes Scandal.

In Charleston, Ottolengui had been a newspaper stringer, producer, lyricist, health officer, and clerk. Did he aspire to join the ranks of Pastor, promoter of blackface musicals and variety theatre; of Daly, producer, playwright, and director; of Blanchard, master publisher of abstruse criticism; or of Harte, re-draftsman extraordinaire of novels into burlesques? Did he hope to parlay his newswriting background into a spot on a New York daily, or supply news feed on Mrs. Lincoln’s and Mrs. Keckley’s movements? Whatever his aims, he was awake to the popular reaction to Norwood, and to its byproducts, and was wholly conversant with Behind the Scenes.

Indeed, Daniel Ottolengui was the author of both of these texts—Gnaw-wood and Behind the Seams. In the latter, his name is incorrectly given as “Ottolengul.” This slip-up at the National News has frustrated researchers who have tried to trace the individual who crafted the hate-filled Keckley parody. Reinstating the “i,” and consulting ephemeral and other sources, permits exploration of the life, mind, and impact of a writer whose attitudes were embedded in his Charleston origins and heritage but were not foreign to the New York literary, newspaper, and theatrical world.

**Witty wag or hateful humorist**

Gnaw-wood starts with a sassy recasting of Norwood’s preface that is followed by roguish digests of Beecher’s protracted passages. Ottolengui intentionally lets his summaries peter out, then jerks them alive with “But it is time to have some plot,” and, a few pages later, “As I have before remarked, it is time to have some plot.” He alters characters’ names in purposely hackneyed fashion: Beers becomes “Lager”; Wentworth, “Wentforth”; Cathcart, “Cathwagon”; Heywood, “Strawwood.” In all, Gnaw-wood may at first glance seem a cheeky trifle. Yet its components are those of literary burlesque as it was understood, according to Mark Twain scholar Franklin R. Rogers, by “19th-century practitioners of the art.” Such writers saw the form as
a humorous imitation and exaggeration of the conventions [. . .] peculiar to a literary type or a particular play, short story, or poem [and] not necessarily the result of a critical appraisal and condemnation of another work or literary device. It may reflect instead [. . .] an aversion for the particular book in question, a personal animus for an author, an innocuous desire to be funny, or, strange as it may seem, a desire to learn by imitation (10).23

Rogers continues,

A statement in Vanity Fair (the house-organ, so to speak, of the New York Bohemians, the group of young writers [including Mark Twain and Artemus Ward] who gathered in Pfaff’s famous beer-cellar [at 653 Broadway] during the late 1850s and early 1860s, [and who] made literary burlesque their specialty [. . .]) indicates that, to some of the Pfaffians at least, burlesque was nothing more than a frivolous game: “We are [. . .] proving that everything is susceptible of being burlesqued” (10). 24

Excerpts from the prefaces of Norwood and Gnaw-wood are revealing:

Beecher’s Norwood

“I . . . I received Mr. Bonner’s proposal to write a story for the Ledger. Had it been a request to carve a statue or build a man-of-war, the task would hardly have seemed less likely of accomplishment. . . .

“I reflected that . . . the life of a humble family . . . even if not told as skillfully as Wordsworth . . . or as minutely faithfully] as Crabbe . . . could hardly fail to win some interest. . . .

“By interesting my readers . . . in the ordinary experiences of daily life, . . . and by a certain largeness of moral feeling, I hoped to inspire a pleasure which, if it did not rise very high, might . . . continue the longer.”

Ottolengui’s Gnaw-wood

“I received a note from Mr. Bonheur, proprietor of Dexter and also of the New York Sledger. . . . If he had suggested that I should build an Iron Clad, or carve a statue of his friend Commodore Vanderbilt, I would have done it, although I know nothing about either business. . . .

“I do not pretend to write as well as Wordsworth, or Tupper, or Crabbe, or Augustin Daily [sic], or Artemus Ward, or Dickens, or Fanny Fern, nevertheless I’m some on a story, as well as on a sermon, at least Bonheur thinks so, he likes my style, ‘he pays his money and he takes his choice.’ . . .

“There is a certain largeness of moral feeling about the story, and a corresponding largeness of size about the book, considering the smallness of the plot.”

Ottolengui demonstrates the burlesque norm of flinging in a French
witticism and/or assumes his reader knows the works of painters Auguste and Rosa Bonheur; takes a swipe at Bonner’s trotting-horse rivalry with Cornelius Vanderbilt; places Beecher in the realm of such didactic writers as Martin Farquhar Tupper; and shows that he is versed in popular social satirists and humorists. His mentioning Ward shows that Ottolengui knew Ward’s trademark to be deliberately flawed spelling and grammar. Notable also is Ottolengui’s reference to Daly, playwright of The Legend of “Norwood.” It appears that Ottolengui is out to demonstrate his competence at burlesque writing and to show Beecher as a humbug. As Gnaw-wood proceeds, however, the “aversion” and “personal animus” that Rogers notes begin to crystallize. One soon senses that Ottolengui deeply detests Henry Ward Beecher.

In Gnaw-wood, Ottolengui was warming up for Behind the Seams, in which Elizabeth Keckley transmutes to “Betsey Kickley.” Elizabeth Young, who has examined the structure of Behind the Seams as parody, concludes that Behind the Scenes was itself a parody before the parodist ever got his hands on it (146). Young focuses on Ottolengui’s abilities in wordplay and sexual metaphor, but Behind the Seams is more than dalliance with quips, alliteration, and innuendo. As in Gnaw-wood, Ottolengui follows literary burlesque conventions (see Shepperson) by delivering a version of the target work involving mimicry and distortion of an author’s style and the characters’ idiosyncrasies. For example, Ottolengui extends the affectations of Behind the Scenes by having Kickley lob the occasional pseudo-sophisticated French expression such as “mauvaise honte” —literally, “false shame”; idiomatically, “bashfulness.” Neither interpretation is flattering to Keckley/Kickley.

Ottolengui’s choice of “Betsey,” an unremarkable diminutive of “Elizabeth,” may seem innocuous; but it demeans Keckley by presuming familiarity, further mocking the fact that Mary Lincoln, too, addressed Keckley by a common diminutive, “Lizzie,” (which Keckley apparently found acceptable). “Betsey” was also a popular term for a gun; “kick,” argot for the weapon’s recoil. Ottolengui’s Kickley is rough-mannered and shoots from the hip. Her vocabulary overflows with slang (“spondulix,” “shinney around”). Kickley underscores Ottolengui’s malice by referring to herself as “I, Betsey Kickley, nigger.” On the last page, she “signs” the book as an illiterate person would have endorsed a document, with an “X,” next to which an official would have written, for example, “John Doe, his mark.” Ottolengui’s version of the stock attestation is “Betsey Kickley (Nigger), her mark.”

Behind the Seams has facets of a dramatic piece, including unstated but obvious pauses for laughter and applause. Ottolengui augments his theatre allusions by writing dialogue as if for a playscript, with the spoken lines
preceded by the character’s name; and by tossing in stage directions such as “exeunt.” *Behind the Seams*, however, traverses a variegated space from literary/theatrical burlesque to blackface. Indeed, Katherine Adams in 2001 noted that its author “‘tries on’ [Keckley’s] voice in a kind of black face performance.[. . .] rescript[ing] her life for Vaudeville [. . .]” (76). The characteristics Adams identified further evoke the transgender associations of music hall genres, in which men regularly played women’s roles. An oral reading of *Behind the Seams* shows that it could function as a performance piece to be spoken by a white man, Ottolengui, in the character of a black woman, “Betsey Kickley.” Ottolengui thus becomes a female impersonator, known in the world of 1860s blackface minstrelsy as a *prima donna* (Bean 248–49).

The proposition that Ottolengui insinuates blackface female impersonation in *Behind the Seams* is reinforced through a piece by Charleston correspondent Alfred Brockenbrough Williams. Ottolengui returned to Charleston by the summer of 1870 and would forge a reputation there for spinning out shows in which men played women. At the Owens Academy of Music he would manage “The Ottolengui Combination,” to which troupe Williams made reference in his article. Williams was one of four white men aboard the bark Azor when it sailed in 1878 from Charleston on a mission to resettle members of the American “surplus colored population” in Monrovia and Liberia (“Sailing”; “New Liberia”). Williams reported on a play he attended in Sierra Leone, “a farce entitled ‘John Dobbs,’ [in which] the actors were all black, the female parts being assumed by men (shades of Manager Ottolengui)” (22).

**CONFEDERATE SEPHARDIM**

Daniel Ottolengui was a proud Southerner. He served as a private in the Charleston Guard of the South Carolina Militia during 1863.26 His older brother Jacob trafficked in slaves.29 Their father was a slave owner.30 In 1861, Jacob had designated Daniel as liaison in a plan to assist their sister Sarah and her husband, “fully southern in heart and soul,” to return from New York, where they had been at the outbreak of the war (Ottolengui to Davega). Daniel’s first documented creative work in print was *The Soldier’s Grave*, an ode to a fallen Confederate.31 In 1865, in the *New York Sunday Mercury*, Ottolengui published “The Blackbird,” a stab at the laziness of freedmen; he plucked the meter and the blackness metaphor from Poe’s “The Raven.”32 Ottolengui’s impudence nearly got the better of him when he ran afoul of General Sickles, Commander of the Second Military District (the Carolinas). His offense: writing a story for the *Courier* about a fight between U. S. troops and freedmen and titling it “Dog Eats Dog.”33
Daniel Ottolengui was also a Jew, the youngest child of Abraham and Sarah Ottolengui, and descended from one of Charleston’s first Sephardic Jewish families. Abraham’s father, Mordecai, sponsored a cornerstone for Congregation Kahal Kadosh Beth Elohim’s synagogue in 1792. Abraham served as congregation president for ten years and steered K. K. B. E.’s members through the controversy surrounding installation of an organ. When he died, in 1850, he left K. K. B. E. (also called Beth Elohim) $1,500 to be used to aid the poor. Jacob, the slave auctioneer, was also a doer of good. Active in the Hebrew Benevolent Society, he took on a grueling charitable role during the yellow fever epidemic of 1858. We have no evidence as to whether he aimed to save black Charlestonians from the disease. Indicators of the strength and nature of Daniel’s adherence to Jewish tradition in his youth or young adulthood are also obscure. Daniel married Helen Rodrigues, adopted daughter of Charleston dentist B. A. Rodrigues, in 1860 (Elzas 31); the ceremony was performed by Henry S. Jacobs, minister of Shearith Israel, the traditionalist congregation that had split off from Beth Elohim in 1840. Daniel and his brother Israel resigned from Beth Elohim in January 1861 for reasons that remain indistinct. 

Slave ownership among Charleston Jews was proportionally equivalent to that among non-Jews. Jews fought for the Confederacy because the South was their land and they were loyal to it. As to the Southern Jew’s view of slavery in Ottolengui’s day, Bertram Wallace Korn advises, “Except for the teachings of a very few rabbis like David Einhorn of Baltimore, Judaism in America had not yet adopted a “social justice” view of the responsibilities of Jews towards society” (American Jewry liii). Korn also quotes Savannah civic leader Solomon Cohen, who wrote in 1866, “‘I believe that [. . .] slavery was [. . .] the only human institution that could elevate the Negro from barbarism [. . .]’” (l). It is apparent that Daniel Ottolengui embraced Cohen’s sentiments and that Ottolengui’s family evidently saw little conflict between holding or selling slaves and serving God and community through Jewish organizations.

The question of what Daniel Ottolengui expected to accomplish by writing Gnaw-wood and Behind the Seams must be considered in light of whether it is significant that he was a Southerner and a Jew. It is hardly surprising that Ottolengui would fix on authors who contested the white South’s cherished ways. Whether Ottolengui harbored ill feeling toward Beecher because Beecher was a Christian minister is trickier to ascertain. Jews had lived in Charleston since the late seventeenth century, enjoyed religious and civil freedoms, and participating in most aspects of Charleston’s white, predominantly Protestant, society. But Ottolengui was attuned to injustices toward Jews in the U.S. and abroad and surely dis-
cerned that Beecher’s agenda did not emphasize the problem of anti-Semitism (Clark 138–39, 150–51, 154).

Ottolengui likely also subscribed to the logic that Rabbi Morris Raphall promoted in a widely-distributed, controversial 1861 challenge to Beecher. Raphall maintained that nothing in the Bible condemned slavery (26, 28, 29). By the time Beecher arrived at Fort Sumter in 1865 to deliver his speech, Ottolengui must have sealed his scorn for the Brooklyn clergyman. By 1868, Ottolengui surely reveled in joining like-minded New York wits in lampooning Beecher’s attempt at a novel and in unmasking Beecher as a hypocrite. for it could not have escaped Ottolengui’s notice that Beecher had rendered Pete Sawmill as the bumbling, grinning Negro.

Ottolengui’s response to the Keckley book trends more toward his Southern roots, although it must be emphasized that race hatred was not unique to the South. Whites had been a minority in Charleston for much of the antebellum period. Bernard Powers notes the “congenital suspicion [. . .], hostility and fear” that Charleston’s white residents felt toward free blacks and persons of mixed race (62, 64). Keckley did not live in Charleston, but she was a free female mulatto business owner. It is easy to conclude that she represented to Ottolengui the same threat as did the so-called “brown elite” (51) of Charleston. Others, however, figure in the tale, and their putative participation in creating *Behind the Scenes* shifts the spotlight from Keckley as the sole source of Ottolengui’s provocation.

**BEHIND THE SCENES AT CARLETON & CO.**

As interest in the literary and historical expression of African American women advanced through the twentieth century, *Behind the Scenes* became the subject of literary criticism. Scholars continue to seek the voice of Keckley as a formerly enslaved person and African American female author; some have allowed a ghostwriter to hover in the near distance. In a 2003 article, the second of two in which she assesses *Behind the Scenes*, Barbara Ryan sweeps aside earlier Keckley analyses by evaluating *Behind the Scenes* as a window into Keckley and as a work that could have been ghostwritten/edited to serve someone else’s purposes. By refusing to attribute the text to Keckley, Ryan elicits a breakthrough in Keckley studies and opens the way to understanding the reactive qualities of Ottolengui’s *Behind the Seams*.

In 1935, an Associated Press news story spread the false impression that Lincoln researcher David Rankin Barbee, aided by V. Valta Parma of the Library of Congress, had discovered that Keckley was not a real person and that the white journalist and abolitionist Jane Grey Swisshelm had fabricated both Keckley and *Behind the Scenes*. Sylvia Hoffert, writing in
2001, finds “no direct evidence” that the two women knew one another (22). The journalist Smith Fry reported in a 1901 article, “Lincoln Liked Her,” that Keckley told him she had “told her story to two newspapermen,” though Fry did not state any names. Frances Smith Foster, a principal scholar in Keckley studies, believes Keckley to be the true author but also examines the ways in which others could have assisted—or interfered.41

One potential Keckley advisor is Hamilton Busbey, who had served the Union in the First Kentucky Infantry. He had been an editor of the *Louisville Journal* for about a year before going to New York in 1865 to begin his career with *Turf, Field and Farm*; that paper’s glib review of *Norwood* has already been noted. In letters to David Barbee in 1935 and 1936, Busbey’s nephew, Ralph C. Busbey, maintained that he had heard his late uncle speak not only of interviewing Keckley but also of preparing the text of *Behind the Scenes* and, moreover, collecting the royalties. Ralph Busbey wrote to Barbee that he owned a copy of *Behind the Scenes*, autographed by Hamilton Busbey. Ralph Busbey emphasized that he could not corroborate Hamilton Busbey’s assertion of having prepared the Keckley text for Carleton but that he could state that Uncle Hamilton had made such a claim.42 Hamilton Busbey had all but done so in 1911, in *The Forum*: “[Keckley] had taken advantage of her position [. . .] to preserve personal letters. [. . .] I saw the letters and know that they were genuine.” He added, evidently with tongue in cheek, “It is difficult to say what would have happened had they fallen into the hands of a modern muckraker” (290).

John Washington’s 1942 study of Keckley presses for James Redpath as editor/ghostwriter. Redpath, whom Foster, with reservations, deems “a likely suspect” (Keckley li) was an ardent abolitionist and, like Busbey, a journalist. Through Washington’s work, we again have plausible but hand-me-down evidence regarding a ghostwriter or recorder. Around the time the Barbee/Swisshelm article was circulating, Washington interviewed Hannah Brooks (1842–1936). Her aunt had rented rooms to a primarily African American clientele at 543 Broome Street, New York, where, according to Brooks, Keckley resided during the last quarter of 1867. Brooks was working there during that period, or so she recalled. In a June 1938 letter to John Washington, Brooks’s daughter Mamie restated the reminiscences her mother had given orally to Washington in Mamie’s presence. Hannah Brooks—posthumously, through Mamie’s letter—told Washington that “every morning, many white men,” but “no white women” (thus indicating that there were more than two men, the number Keckley reputedly gave Fry, and also ruling out Swisshelm, a woman)

would come to see [Keckley . . .] about the writings. One man by the
name of Redpath would spend several hours every evening with her. Everybody in the house knew that Mrs. Keckley was writing a book on Mrs. Lincoln and that Mr. Redpath was helping her compile it. [. . .] He would take down her story each evening. [. . .] I was constantly in and out of the room, taking ice water, etc. [. . .] (235–36).

Even if Ottolengui had never met Busbey or Redpath, idle talk at the “segar” counter, or at The Hall, about the upcoming “White House revelations” could easily have involved hearsay about Carleton’s methods in bringing about Behind the Scenes. Ottolengui, himself a newswriter, was probably aware of the Louisville Journal’s antislavery position. The idea that Busbey, late of the Journal, was involved in Behind the Scenes could have irritated Ottolengui, but more poisonous would have been the thought that Redpath could have been an operative.

Although Hamilton Busbey signaled that he was responsible for Behind the Scenes, and Redpath apparently did not, Redpath, who wrote for Horace Greeley’s abolitionist New York Tribune, published a compendium of slave narratives in 1859 titled The Roving Editor: Talks with Slaves in the Southern States. Redpath had spent time in Charleston both while on his mission to record slaves’ stories and as a military correspondent, a capacity that allowed him to file the first report to the North of the capture of Charleston, according to biographer Charles Horner (112).

On top of this, Redpath was from February to September 1865 superintendent of public education in Charleston, where he ensured enrollment of African American students in the previously all-white schools. The Freedmen’s Record and the New York Times published his reports. When he was honorably relieved of his duties, black citizens of Charleston prepared a testimonial, published in the Courier (Jackson 18–20; Taylor 325–27; “Testimonial”). As the racist father of three young children not yet of school age, Ottolengui would certainly have been concerned about, if not enraged by, Redpath’s rapid integration of the Charleston schools.

Robert Rosen observes that hatred of Lincoln in South Carolina was so intense that “Charleston book shops closed their accounts with Harper’s Weekly and Harper’s Magazine because these periodicals had published a portrait and a biography of Lincoln” (Confederate Charleston 38). Brandishing a South Carolinian’s intense negative feeling toward Redpath and Beecher as representative of abolitionist ideals was Sue Sparks Keitt. Her husband, South Carolina Congressman Laurence Massillon Keitt, had been an accessory to the 1856 caning of Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner. Sue Keitt wrote to a Northern friend on March 4, 1861,

Unite your [Charles] Sumners and [William] Stewards to Ebony spouses and send them . . . to Timbuctoo and Ashantee. . . . [A]ttach the death penalty to all future agitation of the slavery question (Herd 87).\textsuperscript{46}

Although it follows that Ottolengui might bristle at the notion of Redpath or Busbey’s involvement in the Keckley book, there is another possible take on Ottolengui’s approach to his material. Depending on how sharply Ottolengui perceived the shadier workings of New York publishing, and on whether he knew or suspected that Busbey was the ghostwriter, Ottolengui might have imagined himself to be sharing a joke with Busbey and Carleton. He could have been expanding on a presupposition, or even direct knowledge, that Busbey judged Keckley a fool for having shown Carleton, or his underling, her letters from Mrs. Lincoln\textsuperscript{47} and for having contracted with Carleton & Co. to publish \textit{Behind the Scenes}.\textsuperscript{48}

Carleton had a dodgy reputation with authors. In an 1868 letter, Mark Twain, whose work Carleton had, admittedly, turned down, had called the publisher a “Son of a Bitch”: Twain’s initial capitals stress the point. Twain also implied that Carleton would soon enough “swindle” Bret Harte (\textit{qtd. in} Rogers 18 and Nissen 83), who was already aghast over the “vulgar” drawings with which Carleton & Co. had illustrated Harte’s \textit{Condensed Novels} in 1867 (Nissen 83–84). If Carleton was using Keckley as a moneymaker in his mirth mill, why not, Ottolengui perhaps reasoned, join the fun by creating a work that rendered \textit{Behind the Scenes} a consummate absurdity? Ottolengui’s use of “Betsey Kickley (Nigger): Her Mark,” not only suggests Keckley’s illiteracy and ignorance. It plays on one of George Carleton’s well-known insignias: a crest displaying the contrived archaic legend “CARLETON : hys Marke.”\textsuperscript{49}

“A Jew”

\textit{Gnaw-wood} and \textit{Behind the Seams} settled into obscurity, the former to be cited in passing in later works on Beecher, the latter to surface via a knavish 1945 reprint, to be discussed presently, and through subsequent heightened interest in Keckley. Jennifer Fleischner, a Keckley scholar who describes \textit{Behind the Seams} as “ugly and viciously racist,” grants that even though “[g]enteel reviewers would not have been so crude,” they “shared the parodist’s sentiments” (317). That Ottolengui reflected the outlook of Southern whites, and probably of many Northerners as well, is apparent. The extent of Ottolengui’s involvement in the Jewish community, and his speaking or writing from a Jewish perspective on matters not directly related to \textit{Norwood} or \textit{Behind the Scenes}, must now be contemplated.

Whether Ottolengui took part in Jewish religious life in New York
remains unknown. When he returned to Charleston in 1870, he did not
rejoin Kahal Kadosh Beth Elohim, whose membership had since 1866
included the dissidents who had left Shearith Israel. The organ at K. K. B.
E. had been destroyed during the War, and a new one was needed. There
is no record of Ottolengui’s feelings on the controversy over organs in Jewish
worship, but he did mount a production of the classic 1830s John Baldwin
Buckstone comedy, Married Life, in 1871 to benefit the congregation’s
organ fund. For this effort he received a letter of thanks from the congrega-
tion for his “indefatigable and untiring exertions” (Levin to Ottolengui). His
later repertoire at the Academy of Music included, in 1878, scenes from the
1862 Augustin Daly play, Leah, the Forsaken, based on the Biblical story
of Deborah (Pagès 527). These theatrical endeavors represent indeterminate
ties to Charleston’s Jewish culture.

Of greater interest is an anonymous letter that appeared in the Charleston
Daily Courier, after the 1856 expulsion from Switzerland of A. H.
Gootman. In 1855, the United States had ratified a treaty with Switzerland,
even though the U.S. recognized that certain Swiss cantons excluded Jews
from living or doing business within their boundaries. Gootman, an Ameri-
can citizen, was required to leave Switzerland because he was Jewish. K. K.
B. E.’s minister, Maurice Mayer, wrote to the Courier in the summer of
1857, calling for Jews and Christians to protest the conditions of the treaty.
The Courier printed a reader’s response, signed “A Jew.” That person urged
the American government to take a hands-off approach:

We will suppose that a Swiss citizen (a negro, a mulatto) comes to the
port of Charleston in a foreign vessel, and […] is not permitted to land at
all. Can the Swiss Government […] change this law [forbidding entry]?
No. And why? Because our Federal Government has the [lawmaking]
power in her own hands. So it is with the Cantons of Switzerland
(“Treaty”).

Also in 1857, a group calling itself “The Israelites of Charleston, S.C.”
published a memorial (a memorandum). Addressed to President Buchanan,
the memorial, unlike the letter from “A Jew,” expressed consternation with
the treaty, “sanctioning as it does, and legalizing all disabilities and medie-
val annoyances to which the Federal as well as Cantonal Governments of
Switzerland may, in accordance with their laws, subject the Israelites of the
United States” (Memorial 2).

The following year, Charleston Jews joined their American coreligion-
ists in expressing outrage over the kidnapping, by Papal authorities, of the
Italian Jewish child Edgardo Mortara, who was taken from his family to be
raised as a Roman Catholic. On this issue, twenty-two-year-old Daniel
Ottolengui addressed the Hebrew Benevolent Society of Charleston in
December 1858. In *The American Reaction to the Mortara Case*, Korn notes that Charleston Jews’ declarations were different from others [made by Jewish groups] only in that they [ . . . ] asked for no official protest by the American government. That this was not a careless omission was indicated by Daniel Ottolengui’s speech on the subject [ . . . ]. Ottolengui castigated the [ . . . ] “Pontifical kidnapper”; but he spoke not a word on the desirability of official American action. [ . . . ] The Charleston Jews [ . . . ] were isolationist and cautious of any hint of interference with local institutions anywhere (44–45).

But the Charleston Jews who had endorsed the 1857 memorial had not been “isolationist and cautious.” Ottolengui, in person, and “A Jew,” in the *Courier*, set themselves apart from this group by sharing the careful posture of Southerners who feared that criticism of foreign powers’ internal policies toward Jews would draw negative international attention to the institution of slavery and possibly also to Jews as slave owners and traders. Ottolengui referred to the Pope as “the bigot high priest” of the Vatican, but portrayed the Mortara case as an issue to be tried in the international court of public opinion: “We do not consider the question as a religious one. [ . . . ] Let Jew and gentile, and all sexes and creeds join in heart and voice, and cry out [ . . . ] against an act which degrades human nature and arrests the progress of civilization.” Anytown, including a newspaper editor, can sign a letter “A Jew”; yet the similarity of tone and rationale to Ottolengui’s 1858 exhortations warrants embracing the possibility that Ottolengui was “A Jew.”

A document published a decade later, and also signed “A Jew,” now comes into view. The National News Company, it will be recalled, produced, in addition to *Gnaw-wood* and *Behind the Seams*, one other publication in 1868. It is not witty. It lacks rascally bite. It is bitter. Its title is *General Grant and the Jews*, and the copyright was registered in the Southern District of New York on 17 June 1868 to “Ph. von Bort.” In the form of a letter to Ulysses S. Grant, then a candidate for President of the United States, it is an outburst over Grant’s General Orders No. 11, the 1862 document evicting Jews “as a class” from the war zone known as the Department of the Tennessee. *General Grant and the Jews* calls for American Jews to defeat Grant in the upcoming election. It finishes with a typeset signature that includes a sneering adverb: “Yours, obediently, A JEW.”

In his treatment of Grant’s orders in *American Jewry and the Civil War*, Korn briefly highlights *General Grant and the Jews*, arguing that sectional differences mitigated against a unified Jewish effort to thwart Grant
He concludes that von Bort did not speak for American Jewry when he vowed that Jews would remember Grant’s 1862 decree and vote against Grant in a united bloc. But who was von Bort? Census and city directory searches have so far yielded no results. “Ph.,” unlike “Jno.” or “Jas.,” is not a standard nineteenth-century abbreviation for a male first name. But because copyright to two of the three demonstrable products of the National News Company was registered to Ottolengui, a Jew, and because the likelihood of Ottolengui’s having published a letter as “A Jew” is under consideration here, at the risk of dismissing the possibility that Ph. von Bort was a real person, or another’s persona, I propose that Ottolengui might have created the pen name Ph. von Bort and was the author of General Grant and the Jews.

Consistent with the pattern in “Henry W. B. Cher,” “A Nigger Woman,” and “Betsey Kickley,” “Ph. von Bort” appears to play back into “A Jew,” with an acid tang and a Confederate twist. It resembles Heros von Borcke, the name of the Prussian lieutenant who arrived in Charleston in 1862 and became an aide to Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart. J. B. Lippincott in 1867 had published Von Borcke’s Memoirs of the Confederate War for Independence. This is a work that Ottolengui would have been eager to read, with von Borcke’s mantle a fine complement to Ottolengui’s pseudonym wardrobe. Further, “Ph.” and “Bort” may derive from Hebrew letters: “Ph.” from the common transliteration of Fe (י): “mouth,” and by extension, “word” or “voice”; and “Bort” from Bet (ב): Resh (ר) Tav (ת), which consonants essentially form brit, (יָרֶשֶׂ) or covenant; and which I take to connote the chosen people of the Mosaic Covenant at Sinai: the Jews. Retaining “von” (ו) allows “word of the Covenant,” or “voice of ‘A Jew.’” The author’s Hebrew code, if such it is, conceals his identity while confirming, to himself, his Jewishness.

General Grant and the Jews is rife with resentment not merely of Grant’s perceived anti-Semitism. A sardonic passage, enhanced by exclamation points, hints further at a Southern author: “You became the great instrument in the hands of Providence, which overthrew the rebellion! It was you who conducted that fratricidal war to a glorious end! You are the hero whom history will know as the man who swept the accursed institution of slavery forever from the free and blessed soil of this continent!” (6). Von Bort goes on to disparage Grant for exhibiting “the stupefaction of an habitual profligate” and brands him a liar “who [uses] his language only to conceal his thoughts” (7).

Just as anyone could call himself or herself “A Jew,” so could anyone call Grant a liar. But Ottolengui, in the early 1860s, was already at work on that task, reconfiguring the popular Scottish ballad/music hall song “The Cork Leg” into a new work, “The Lying Machine.” Ottolengui wrote that...
it was “[c]omposed during the early portion of the war, when . . . the official dispatches of the Federal generals were often founded on falsehood.” The story-poem includes such lines as “Though Grant and Stanton can lie by the ream” and has Grant, and Lincoln’s Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, bellow, “We can each tell a thousand [lies] a minute at least.” Ottolengui’s doggerel informs us that he had at least once set pen to paper on the subject of Grant’s mendacity. The case for Ottolengui’s authorship of General Grant and the Jews may eventually be controverted, but there is sufficient evidence not to close it yet.57

THE OTTOLENGUI LEGACY

Ottolengui returned from Charleston to New York in the 1880s. All three of his children were there as well. Rodrigues later pioneered advanced techniques in orthodontia and became a crime novelist of some renown, as well as an advocate for bicycle paths in Central Park (“Dr. Ottolengui”; “For Park”). Rodrigues was also librarian and curator of the entomology department of the Brooklyn Institute (“Saratoga”). He led a movement to found a society of free-thinkers, the aim of which was to develop “a doctrine of life devoid of tenet or creed” (“A Buddhist Society”). Rodrigues was married in an Episcopal church to May Cameron Hall in 1890 (“Saratoga”). Daniel Ottolengui is listed in the Brooklyn city directories of the late 1880s at Rodrigues’s address. His profession is given as “elocutionist,” as it had been in the federal census of 1880, when he was still living in Charleston with his children and brother Jacob.

Lee Ottolengui managed various theatres, including the Amphion in Brooklyn. He sometimes also used the initial of his first name, Israel. He married Lilian Rush, the daughter of Brooklyn educator Edward Rush. Lilian, who had been a church worker, died in 1914 (“Obituary Notes”). Lee was later married to Elise Bloch. Daniel’s daughter Helen took ingénue roles in romantic comedies (“Notes of the Stage”; “Plays”). She married Arthur Hirsch, who became a buyer in the jewelry business; whether Helen and Arthur were members of a Jewish congregation is still to be discovered. Helen, active in Brooklyn civic projects, served on committees with Guilfoyles, Rooneys, Popes, and Schumanns, perhaps a reflection of her propensity to participate in a diverse (white) Brooklyn rather than identifying overtly with the burgeoning Jewish community.58 Any strong Jewish, or Southern, identity in the family had probably diminished by the time Daniel’s children reached adulthood. When Daniel Ottolengui died, in 1918, his ashes were interred next to the remains of his wife, Helen, in Charleston’s Magnolia Cemetery. Why Helen and Daniel were not laid to rest in Coming Street Cemetery, the Jewish burial ground, is unclear.59
Back in Charleston, Ottolengui kept a foot in the performance halls and was a regular in the chess scene. Later, as a Brooklynite, he continued to participate in tournaments (“Chess Intelligence”; “Over the Chess Board”). Chess is a quiet game. Perhaps his children were glad of that. What one would not give, though, for Ottolengui’s thoughts on the lecture bureau that James Redpath formed in 1868, with Henry Ward Beecher as a lead talent; on Grant’s 1870 appointment of Benjamin Peixotto, Grand Master of B’nai B’rith, as U. S. Consul to Bucharest to press for an end to the Romanian pogroms; on the Beecher adultery scandal, gearing up in 1874; on the arrival in Brooklyn in 1897 of the Rev. Edgardo Levi Mortara, now a Catholic priest, and the reports in the New York Times that December, attesting to Mortara’s having “left his home of his own free will at the age of seven years to adopt the Christian faith”; or on the selection of Keckley’s memoir to be displayed at the 1901 Paris Exposition among representative works of African American authors.

In the Ottolengui line, the racially-charged comic touch did not die with Daniel. His great-nephew was Octavus Roy Cohen (1892–1957), the creator of Florian Slappey, a “sepia gentleman” of Birmingham, Alabama and, though a stereotype, one of crime fiction’s first black detectives. In Cohen’s lifetime, Ottolengui’s work came to light in 1945, when Manhattan Americana dealer Charles P. Everitt issued a run of two hundred reprints of *Behind the Seams*. The new edition carried a preface by “A. Lincoln Fann,” who refers dryly to “Ottolengul” as a “gentleman of New York State literary circles.” The pseudonymous punster has more than a little in common with Everitt, demonstrating knowledge of the rare book trade and of defying copyright infringement, and makes recurrent use of parentheses (a habit of Everitt’s). The *Abraham Lincoln Quarterly*, announcing Everitt’s 1945 offering, observed, “The intriguing pseudonym of ‘D. Ottolengul’ remains as mysterious as ever” (“News and Comment”). The unsubtle alias “A. Lincoln Fann,” however, may no longer be so mysterious.

It may be that Ottolengui’s humor was more closely knotted into popular trends of the urban Northeast, as “Fann”/Everitt implies, than it was to the Southern comic traditions of, for example, George Washington Harris and his shambling “Nat’ral Born Durn’d Fool,” Sut Lovingood. If so, Ottolengui’s work still resists classification as Jewish humor and performance art, having come from the soul of a Southern Sephardi before the Yiddish theatre and press were cultural fixtures in New York and when Italian, German, and Irish immigrants presided in east coast thespian spheres. On the subject of classifying Jewish humor of any kind, Stephen J. Whitfield admonishes: “So numerous are the complications that anyone foolish enough to generalize on the topic of American Jewish humor must march past the bleached bones of earlier analysts who perished in the attempt”
Ottolengui defies categorization as a Jewish humorist not only because such an effort poses the risk of tripping over the washed-out skeletons of which Whitfield has warned, but also because Ottolengui’s sense of what was funny, from a Jewish slant, derives from a period that offers limited data for control or comparison. But Whitfield strikes a hopeful note when he describes the joke books and show business autobiographies that function as “artifacts of mass culture” in the study of Jewish humor (“Distinctiveness” 248). Perhaps Ottolengui’s work will find a place in this gallery.

In “Jules Feiffer and the Comedy of Disenchantment,” Whitfield observes that “what helps make life bearable is the exposition of its incongruities in comic modes” (180). To Ottolengui, it must have seemed inconceivable that Henry Ward Beecher could sell a novel or that Elizabeth Keckley’s memoir could make it into bookstalls. The comic mode he chose in elucidating these absurdities was burlesque, a vernacular of mid-nineteenth-century popular culture. Perhaps for Ottolengui, writing *Gnaw-wood* and *Behind the Seams* was therapeutic and helped him through the miseries of war, the death of his young wife, and separation from his children, whom he had likely left with relatives in Charleston while he was in New York. When he stood before the Hebrew Benevolent Society to express himself on the Mortara Case in 1858, he was yet untouched by these adversities. When he wrote “The Lying Machine” early in the war, he put Grant and his military peers in the category of the incongruous. If he did write *General Grant and the Jews*, then by 1868 he had come to view Grant’s bid for the presidency not as an incongruity but as an affront, worthy of invective, not jest. And if *General Grant and the Jews* was indeed the product of his pen, then it is worth noting that he did not include his real name anywhere in the document.

The known extent of Ottolengui’s output is laced with hatred, anger, and racism. But by having crafted the harshly comic retellings of *Norwood* and *Behind the Scenes*, Ottolengui provides us insight into his aggrieved mindset. His burlesques can be viewed as marginal, uncouth exercises in imitating this already imitative form; or as potent elements in historical, literary, theatrical, social, and religious trends of the decades on either side of the Civil War, from the perspective of a Southern Jewish man whose worldview was bred both below and above the Mason-Dixon Line.
1. For an early history of the firm, see Delaney.
2. The concluding installment in the Ledger was published November 11, 1867, and was announced in a classified advertisement that ran in triplicate that day on page 5 of the New York Times (“Miscellaneous”). The first (1867) U.S. reprinting of the story from the Ledger in book form appears to have been handled by Fords, Howard & Hulbert and in London by Sampson Low & Co.
3. Both reviews appear in the 1867 Times advertisement “Henry Ward Beecher’s Story.” Bonner was known for running full-page advertisements in other newspapers to promote the Ledger. See Admari 178.
4. According to Randolph Lewis in the Texas Historical Association’s Handbook of Texas Online, Flake was a Unionist living in Galveston. He was reputedly also a slaveholder.
5. Scholarly treatments include Henry Nash Smith’s “A Textbook of the Genteel Tradition” in his Democracy and the Novel, 56–74 and McLoughlin’s The Meaning of Henry Ward Beecher the central theme of which is the manner in which Beecher’s philosophy and theology are captured in Norwood. Also see Clark 182, 183, 188–89.
6. Dulany’s listing in the Buffalo City Directory for 1869: “Dulany, William. T., saloon, h[ome] 100 Exchange.” Dulany’s “comedy, already written from prologue to catastrophe,” is highlighted in “Minor Topics,” whose author opined that “as but a few of the chapters of Norwood have as yet been printed, and as the final disposition of the characters of the story is yet unknown, the present feat takes rank as a literary phenomenon of the first order.” I have yet to locate a script of or other documentation associated with Dulany’s work.
7. See “Amusements: New York Theatre—Norwood.” On Beecher’s public anti-theatre stance, in contrast to his willingness to have Norwood dramatized, see Felheim. For commentary on the upset the play caused at Beecher’s church, see “Plymouth Church.”
8. “An Immense Hit! The Triumph of the Season!” bawled Hooley’s front page ad in the December 20, 1867 Brooklyn Daily Eagle. The Eagle’s review column predicted a “long and prosperous run,” and well it might: the paper’s city editor, Joseph Howard, Jr., who had served as agent between Beecher and Daly for the melodrama, had hijacked Daly’s script and worked up the comedic version himself. See “Amusements: Hooley’s Minstrels” and “Amusements: Hooley’s New Opera House” for December 6 and 16, 1867. Howard impenitently recorded this deed in his 1887 biography of Henry Ward Beecher (401–02).
9. Keckley is sometimes referred to as a mantua maker, which is
perhaps a more apt term in her case; it implies a high degree of design expertise. See Powers 106.

10. On the Eagle’s Civil War-era political stance and attitude toward Beecher, secession, and slavery, see Schroth 59–68. The internal quotation is a reference to the Collect or Prayer for All Conditions of Men in the Book of Common Prayer.

11. In “The Sale of Mrs. Lincoln’s Wardrobe” the Eagle gives an inventory, with values, of articles to be sold and reprints some of Mary Todd Lincoln’s letters to Brady, justifying this on the basis of the fact that the letters had appeared in the Tribune, a paper sympathetic to Abraham Lincoln.

12. Blanchard was the proclaimed author of two of these: The Art of Real Pleasure (1864) and A Crisis Chapter on Government (1865), in which he appropriated, among others, the following designation: “Head Member of the Society for Abolishing Utopia, and Humbug, and Failure” (4). His office was located at 23 Ann Street at the time. The New York City directory for 1868 (probably prepared in 1867) lists Blanchard at 26 Ann Street. Blanchard died at age 60 in Greenville, S. C., in January 1868, before Ottolengui published his small books. (“Topics of To-Day.” Also see Sargent.)


14. A letter of April 25, 1842 from “Lizzy” (Elizabeth Keckley) to Fanny Burwell in the Burwell-Catlett Papers, Department of Special Collections, Earl Gregg Swem Library, College of William and Mary, shows Keckley to have written in correct, straightforward prose, with only minor punctuation lapses. Fleischner (182) includes an image of this letter. Fleischner has concluded that Keckley commonly spelled her surname “Keckly.” I respect Fleischner’s observation, but I have elected to retain the “ey” ending when spelling Keckley’s name in this paper. Note also that the printed letters from Mary Todd Lincoln in the Keckley book are to “Lizzie.” Also see Keckley, “An Appeal” and “Anniversary”; the latter notes, “Received of Mrs. President Lincoln, 15 boxes of clothing and $10 worth of groceries.” In connection with Mrs. Lincoln’s support of the Association, also see Keckley, Behind the Scenes 114.

15. On Keckley’s judgment in making the letters from Mrs. Lincoln available to her editor/ghostwriter, see Ryan, “Kitchen Testimony” 150–51. Also see “New Publications” [3].

16. In a similar vein is “Literary Notices.” See also [Review 1—No
Title], *The Old Guard* and “Table-Talk.” For a more favorable review, see “Books of the Month.”

17. Per a WorldCat search of July 22, 2016; uncatalogued National News Co. ephemera may exist, but I have discovered none. The National News, if such it was, was not listed in either the 1867 or 1868 New York City directories. It does appear in the 1869 edition (data likely compiled in 1868) at the Ann Street address, which also housed the American News Company, a major distributor of newspapers and periodicals. See “American News Company Up to Date” and Wadsworth 111–12. The National News, in 1868, may have functioned as a subsidiary of the American News Company, with a printing press on site or available for small jobs, and/or was perhaps a short-lived imprint thereof, possibly requested by Ottolengui for his express use. In any case, Ottolengui’s press/publisher may at some point have shared at least a corridor with the eccentric Calvin Blanchard, and the tenants and clients could have interacted with one another. If Ottolengui met Blanchard there, however, such a meeting would have taken place no later than December 1867.

18. The all-male College was precursor to the University of South Carolina. In the 1850s, according to Hollis, a typical graduate “shouted defiance at the Yankee”; many alumni embarked on a combined legal and political career in the state (259–60). For entry requirements, curriculum, and evidence of Ottolengui’s enrollment, see South Carolina College Catalogues for 1854 (14, 17–19) and 1855 (13, 18–20); for the social, religious, political, and intellectual environment in the 1850s, see Hollis 142–211.

19. It is not clear whether he was the house manager or the manager/director of a troupe and/or of one or more individual productions. An admission pass for guests, pre-printed with “D. Ottolengui, Manager,” is in the B. A. Rodrigues Ottolengui Scrapbook.

20. Ottolengui’s entry in the 1868 New York City Directory (796) reads, “Ottolengui, Daniel, segars, 860 B’wy,” and lists Ottolengui’s residence as “124 E. 52nd.”

21. Harte’s *The Condensed Novels [. . . was] immediately recognized in both the United States and England as the high point of the burlesque-novel movement* (Rogers 17).

22. Typesetting and spelling errors, and questions of authorship, are salient factors in this study. Copyright to *Gnaw-wood* was registered to D. Ottolengui in the Southern District of New York on March 25, 1868. Copyright to *Behind the Seams* was registered to D. Ottolengui in the Southern District of New York on April 22, 1868, but his name is given as Daniel Ottolengul on the verso of the title page of the published work (District Court Record Books, Rare Book and Special Collections Division,
Library of Congress). This substitution of “l” for “i” was carried along in cataloging records for *Behind the Seams* after 1912, when the book was first added to the Library of Congress catalog. The 1868 typesetting error has until recently interfered with scholars’ ability to trace the parodist (Young, 339 n70). Daniel Ottolengui is the only individual with the surname Ottolengui, and the first initial “D” I have found listed in any official record during Daniel Ottolengui’s lifetime. See notes 28 and 31.

23. Although there are many fine distinctions between parody and burlesque, mid-to-late Victorian humorists often used the terms interchangeably; I will therefore do the same in this paper. See Blair 236 n1 and Dentith 6.

24. The *Saturday Press* was the other “house organ.”

25. See Rogers, 23. Rogers here also mentions a slightly different humor technique, the “consciously inappropriate use of [. . .] foreign expressions.”

26. The horse Dexter was a celebrated trotter owned by Bonner. Fanny Fern was a regular contributor to Bonner’s *Ledger* and at one point was one of Bonner’s highest-paid authors. See Admari 178.

27. One possible reason scholars have paid more attention to *Behind the Seams* than to *Gnaw-wood* is that, unlike the circumstances associated with *Norwood*, there seem to have been no other period efforts (beyond the many dismissive press reviews) to hold *Behind the Scenes* up to calculated ridicule.

28. Common misspellings/variants of Ottolengui were “Ottolingui,” “Ottolingue,” “Ottolanghi,” and “Ottolenghi.” A Private “D. Ottolingui” served in the Charleston Guard of the South Carolina Militia from July 10, 1863 until his discharge by the Regimental Surgeon on September 26, 1863. The remarks of the copyist who completed the record of “D. Ottolengui” also misspelled “organization” (dropping the second “i”) (Service Records reel 147). Charleston came under siege in the spring of 1863, hence Daniel’s enlistment that year. I have located no other men of military service age in South Carolina during this period who had the surname of Ottolengui or its variants and a first name beginning with “D.” I thus conclude that “D. Ottolengui” was Daniel Ottolengui. See notes 22 and 31.

29. A classified advertisement of January 1, 1857 in the *Charleston Daily Courier* for an “Estate Sale” of “Valuable Negros” apparently ran at least once again, two days later (Hagy 98). We have no evidence that Daniel himself owned slaves. Census data show that as a young man he tended to board in rooming houses and, after his marriage to Helen Rodrigues, with his in-laws. He did not operate a household, a plantation, or a business in which it would be expected that he would own slaves.
30. Abraham Ottolengui’s will states that his widow may select four of his slaves “in consideration of her relinquishing her dower.”

31. See notes 22 and 28.

32. Ottolengui’s was not the only Raven takeoff; further, Poe wrote his own share of comic pieces (Galloway 7–22). A holograph of “The Blackbird” is in the B. A. Rodrigues Ottolengui Scrapbook.

33. Sickles reportedly threatened Ottolengui with “time in Castle Pinckney (then popularly known as the Bastille)” if he did not write an apology (Centennial Edition 19). Sickles ensured that the so-called Black Codes, which would strip freedmen of their rights, would not be passed. He was a colorful character and a principal in the 1859 Sickles-Key case: Sickles shot his wife’s lover, the son of Francis Scott Key, in Washington, D.C.

34. See Hagy 266 n96.

35. Jacob Ottolengui’s efforts during the epidemic were acknowledged by S. Valentine, President, at the Hebrew Benevolent Society meeting of December 22, 1858. A transcription of the proceedings can be found in “Hebrew Benevolent”; Valentine’s thanks to Jacob Ottolengui appear on pages 572 and 573.

36. Kahal Kadosh Beth Elohim, Records, ledger 1848–1861, 319, mss. no. 1047-20-3. It is possible that Helen, although raised by a Jewish family, was not ethnically Jewish.


38. At least one Ottolengui had converted to Christianity before coming to America. Joseph Ottolengui or Ottolenghi, born in Italy, emigrated to London and became an Anglican “missionary to the negroes” in Savannah in the mid-eighteenth century. I have not yet discovered how this was viewed within Daniel Ottolengui’s family (Hühner 10: 91, 93).

39. Beecher had not persuaded all potential Union soldiers that blacks and whites were equal. Beecher’s half-brother warned him in 1862 “‘that the day you succeed in writing your magnificent principles on our national banner, . . . the men [of rural New York] will say, ‘We ain’t going to fight for the niggers’” (Thomas K. Beecher to H. W. Beecher, August 10, 1862; qtd. in Clark 154). On Southern Jews as “whites,” see for example Rogoff.

40. See “Bizarre Lincoln Story is Traced.” The Rev. James Henry Stansil of Buffalo had republished Behind the Scenes in 1931 in tribute to Keckley’s memory, according to Brooks-Bertram, with whom I have corresponded extensively on the matter of Stansil and the Keckley book. The “evidence” of Swisshelm’s authorship consisted mainly of the statement on the verso of the title page, indicating that copyright had been registered in the “Southern District of Pennsylvania.” Swisshelm was from Pennsylvania. V. Valta Parma, Curator of the Rare Book Collection at the
Library of Congress, was quoted in the November 11th Star article as having hailed “the discovery of the Swissshelm connection as ‘a truly significant contribution to Lincolniana.’” (Parma’s name is incorrectly given in the article as “V. Vola Parma.”) In a letter that the Star edited heavily, and published on November 26, 1935, Barbee wrote that although he believed Swissshelm to have been the book’s author, he did not deny the existence of Keckley and thought it would be “a thrilling discovery” if it could be proved that a slave woman had been the author of “one of the most remarkable books in American literature” (“Writer Explains Error”). Barbee knew perfectly well that Elizabeth Keckley had existed. In his folder on the subject of the true authorship of Behind the Scenes is a transcription, with an annotation in his own hand, of an excerpt from an article in the April 23, 1862 Ohio State Journal praising the “artistic elegance” of the gowns fashioned by “Lizzie” for Mrs. Lincoln (Barbee Papers, Series 1, Box 1). Jennifer Fleischner dismisses Barbee as a “self-proclaimed ‘unreconstructed Southerner’ and Lincoln hater” (324). In an internal memorandum of January 6, 1936, Parma took credit for the revelation of Swissshelm’s supposed role: “The discussion in the Press regarding the authorship of Behind the Scenes was initiated by me,” he wrote to the Chief of the Secretary’s Office. “As yet,” he continued, “no direct evidence has been turned up that connects Mrs. Keckley with the book.” The Office of the Chief Assistant Librarian of Congress had on December 4, 1935, requested a search of records for the Court of the Southern District of Pennsylvania. The request met this reply: “Copyright office has no record of Southern Dist. of Penna., however no entry found in name of Elizabeth Keckley in and around year 1868 in the Eastern & Western Court records of Penna.” See the following memos: Valta Parma to Chief of the Secretary’s Office, Library of Congress, 6 Jan. 1936; Chief Assistant Librarian [of Congress] to Mr. Brown, 4 Dec. 1935; “J. M. M.” to Office of the Chief Assistant Librarian [of Congress], 5 Dec. 1935, all in David C. Mearns Papers, Box 83, Library of Congress. No entry was found for a Pennsylvania copyright registration because copyright to the title of Behind the Scenes was registered to Elizabeth Keckley in the Court of the Southern District of New York on March 15, 1868, by clerk George F. Betts, only a few weeks before Carleton & Co.’s April release of the “White House Revelations” (District Court Record Books). In his unpublished manuscript, “Read No Evil,” Clark Evans states that Parma himself did ultimately confirm the New York copyright process for Behind the Scenes. As is indicated in the book’s text, Keckley was residing in New York City at the time the narrative was completed. In the midst of the brief tumult over the authorship of Behind the Scenes, Parma called the reporter’s attention to Ottolengui’s Behind the Seams. According to the Library of Congress card
number, Ottolengui’s burlesque of the Keckley memoir had been cataloged in the Library of Congress sometime before 1912. It probably languished in the general stacks before Parma chose it for his Rare Books collection (Clark Evans to author, April 17, 2006; Evans, “Librarian in Disguise”).

41. See Hoffert; and Foster, Written by Herself, 128–30. Also see Foster’s historical introduction to the 2001 University of Illinois reprint of Keckley’s Behind the Scenes, 1–lvii.

42. Ralph Busbey to Barbee, December 3, 1935 and December 30, 1935; Barbee Papers, Series 1, Box 1. In 1936, Ralph Busbey related a comparable account to a popular Lincolniana newsletter, Lincoln Lore. I have not uncovered evidence that Hamilton Busbey ever recorded slave narratives or edited others’ memoirs.

43. It is possible that Redpath could have collected the “slave narrative” portion of the book and turned over the rest of the job to Carleton, who might have then given it to Busbey for final plumping. Foster (in Keckley) raises the question of why Redpath would not have stood up for Keckley

44. Some appeared first in the Charleston press. See for example, by Redpath, “Public Education” and “Report.” Black and white children attended the same schools but had separate classrooms.

45. For more on Keitt, especially his defense of slavery, see Merchant, 87–93.

46. Elmer Don Herd, “Sue Sparks Keitt to a Northern Friend, March 4, 1861,” South Carolina Historical Magazine 62 (1961), 87. I have retained Keitt’s spelling.

47. “To Mrs. Eliza Williams, her most confidential friend, [Keckley] stated that Mrs. Lincoln’s letters were never returned by Redpath [italics mine] and that the publishers printed them without her consent” (Washington 239). Scholars have consistently accepted Washington’s statements as true. The salutation for most of the letters is “My dear Lizzie.” Ottolengui does not specifically make sport of the letters, except indirectly by his use of the familiar form “Betsey.”

48. The validity of this latter argument rests in part on whether Hamilton Busbey, not Keckley, reaped the available financial reward and whether, if Busbey did receive the royalties, Ottolengui knew that this was so.

49. See Stern, “The Need for Laughter in America: G. W. Carleton: His Mark,” in her Imprints on History, 191–205. Images of this crest, of Carleton’s other well-known insignia, and of one of his cartoons appear on page 205. Stern makes no reference to Behind the Scenes in her essay on Carleton’s career. Evans, in “Read No Evil” (13), postulates that Carleton was not directly involved in receiving Behind the Scenes for publication, as he had sailed for North Africa in late January, with the intention of returning in May. Carleton could have contracted for the book before his
departure. See “Notes on Books and Booksellers” and “Passengers Sailed.”
Carleton’s friend Morris Phillips, in a 1901 remembrance, states that
Carleton told him that one of the Carleton insignias (possibly the best
known) was meant to represent the Arabic word for books, kutub.

50. For a summary of the Gootman affair, and for the essence of this and
related letters to the Courier, see Hagy 87–88.

51. A transcription of Ottolengui’s remarks appears in “The Hebrew
Benevolent Society” 583–84. See also Hagy 88–89.

52. For an inspection of the larger response to General Orders No. 11,
see Sarna.

53. George F. Betts, the clerk of the court of the Southern District of
New York who processed the deposit, in that office, of a copy of General
Grant and the Jews entered “he” in the blank requesting the third person
subjective pronoun for the copyright registrant, Ph. von Bort. District Court
Record Books.

54. The memoirs had been previously published in Blackwood’s
Magazine (Von Borcke, preface, unpaginated).

55. I have not determined the extent of Ottolengui’s facility with
Hebrew, but this “code” would have been fairly simple to put into place,
even with only elementary knowledge of the language or understanding of
the fact that Hebrew letters carry many nuances. K. K. B. E.’s Sunday
School curriculum did not include Hebrew when Ottolengui was a child
(Harlan Greene, Senior Manuscript and Reference Archivist, Department of
Special Collections, Addlestone Library, College of Charleston, to author,
December 6 2012; see also Richman 567, 571). Hebrew was not offered at
South Carolina College during the period of Ottolengui’s enrollment (Hollis
79, 84).

56. Also see Ford 332–34. The holograph of “The Lying Machine,” on
which appears Ottolengui’s statement of its history, is in the B. A.
Rodrigues Ottolengui Scrapbook.

57. I have considered, and for now set aside, pursuing an author
attribution study through text data mining and sentiment analysis. The
corpus of Ottolengui’s work is small, and the General Grant pamphlet does
not employ the same vocabulary and syntactical structure as the parodies.
Such a study may be feasible, but is outside the scope of this article.

58. To one of these events, the April 1893 Brooklyn Teachers’ Aid
Association Fair, a donor provided, as a fundraising device, the cast of the
bronze statue of Henry Ward Beecher statue unveiled in 1891 in front of
Brooklyn Borough Hall. See “Teachers’ Aid Association Fair.”

59. See Records of Burials at Magnolia Cemetery, South Carolina
Room, Charleston County Public Library. Helen was adopted; it is possible
that her birth parents were not Jewish.
60. See “G. H. Hathaway”; “Benjamin F. Peixotto”; Korn, American Jewry, 146; “The Beecher Scandal”; “Strange Story”; and “Negroes as Authors.” A White House domestic employee memoir of the twentieth century that was heavily capitalized upon, and which received some negative press, was Lillian Rogers Parks’s 1961 My Thirty Years Backstairs at the White House. A miniseries based on the book was aired in 1979.

61. The spelling mix-up regarding Ottolengui/Ottolengui would not be resolved till more than sixty years later. Examples of Everitt’s use of parentheses, usually in the form of a conversational aside, appear on pages 4, 5, 11, 16, 27, 40, 41, 45, 60 and on throughout his Adventures of a Treasure Hunter. Note that “A. Lincoln Fann” dates his preface April 1, 1945: April Fools’ Day.

62. Ruth Wisse’s No Joke (Princeton, 2013) is a recent contribution; Wisse does not inquire into Sephardic Jewish or Southern American Jewish humor.

63. Although this paper does not venture into theories of neurological bases of racism and race hatred, research such as that conducted by Brosch, Bar-David, and Phelps (q.v.) might apply to studies of Ottolengui’s writings.

REFERENCES


———. Papers. Georgetown University Library Special Collections Research Center.


“Eminent Berlin; Bismarck; King William; Mrs. Elizabeth Keckley.” Flake’s Bulletin 17 (July 1868): 5.


———. Message to the author. 17 Apr. 2006. E-mail.


*Mémorial Addressed to His Excellency The President of the United States by the Israelites of Charleston, S.C., in Relation to The Swiss Treaty*. Charleston: James and Williams, 1857.


“Negroes as Authors; Their Books to be a Feature of the Paris Exposition.” *New York Times* 22 Jan. 1900: 9.


New York City Directory, 1868.
“News and Comment: Reprints.” *Abraham Lincoln Quarterly* 3 (1945): 413.
“Notes of the Stage.” *New York Times* 9 Sept. 1886: 4. [Helen Ottolengui will recite Bob-o-link at Wallack’s.]
Ottolengui, D[aniel]. *The Soldier’s Grave: As Sung with Unbounded Applause by Miss Laura, of the “Queen Sisters!”* arr. Herman L. Schreiner. Macon: John C. Schreiner & Son, 1861.
———. Letter to Sarah Davega. 18 December 1861. Photocopy no. 30-4 Ottolengui. Ottolengui vertical file, South Carolina Historical Society. Location of original unknown.


“[Review 1—No Title].” *The Old Guard* June 1868: 6.


———. Treasurer’s Report to the Honorable Board of Trustees of the South Carolina College, November 1, 1855. Columbia: R. W. Gibbes, 1855.


“Testimonial to Mr. Redpath.” Charleston Courier, 17 June 1865.


League of the South’s Internet Rhetoric: Neo-Confederate Community-Building Online

Brett A. Barnett

ABSTRACT

A nationwide backlash against the Confederate flag and other Confederate symbols occurred after the deadly June 17, 2015, church shootings in Charleston, South Carolina, when images of the alleged gunman displaying a Confederate flag surfaced. This backlash sparked a reactionary movement among pro-Confederate supporters who viewed the attacks on Confederate symbols as an affront to their Southern heritage. Some neo-Confederate groups exploited the backlash, and the pro-Confederate sympathy it generated, as an opportunity to build their communities. This essay examines how the neo-Confederate group League of the South (LOS) used its website to attract members to its community in the week before the Confederate flag’s removal from South Carolina’s state capitol on July 10, 2015. Analysis reveals LOS may have aided its community-building efforts by attempting to foster a sense of shared identity within the pro-Confederate community and employing fear-raising rhetoric relating to the backlash against Confederate symbols. The relevance of examining U.S.-based hate groups’ Internet rhetoric has substantially increased in recent years as the United States has witnessed a series of deadly mass shootings perpetrated by various extremists, some of whom were apparently motivated by rhetoric they accessed on U.S.-based extremist sites.

Keywords: Confederate, pro-Confederate, neo-Confederate, community building, Internet

On June 17, 2015, nine black worshippers participating in Bible study were gunned down inside Charleston, South Carolina’s historic Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church (Ford, 2015; Lee, 2015). Shortly after the fatal shootings, authorities arrested suspected shooter Dylann Roof, a 21-year-old high school dropout and white supremacist (Capehart, 2015; Lee, 2015). As news of Roof’s arrest made headlines, several photographs of the suspected shooter appeared in news media coverage. In one photograph, Roof was shown wearing a jacket adorned with the apartheid-era flags of Rhodesia and South Africa, and in at least one other photograph,
Roof was shown holding a pistol while displaying a Confederate flag (Ford, 2015; Taylor, 2015). The flurry of mass-mediated images of suspected shooter Dylann Roof displaying a Confederate flag instantly reignited the decades-long call for South Carolina to remove the racially-divisive banner from its state capitol (Ford, 2015; Taylor, 2015). On July 10, 2015, South Carolina officially removed the Civil War-era flag from its state capitol where the emblem had flown since 1961 (Brumfield, 2015; Worland, 2015).

South Carolina’s decision to fly the Confederate battle flag was a controversial one, a controversy that intensified over time. Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education, many white Southerners became enraged by the federally-mandated racial integration of public schools (Watts, 2008, p. 88). When looking for icons to display during their protests, white Southerners chose to resurrect symbols of the Confederacy, including the Confederate battle flag (Watts, 2008, pp. 88-89). Although various flags were used by the Confederacy during the Civil War, in contemporary times the Confederate battle flag is widely regarded as “the Confederate flag.” In 1961, South Carolina raised the Confederate flag at its state capitol with the stated intent of commemorating the 100th anniversary of the Civil War, but the flag’s critics believed the actual intent was to protest desegregation (Brumfield, 2015; Watts, 2008, pp. 88-89; Worland, 2015).

Since the Civil War, the Confederate flag has been viewed by its defenders as symbolizing an honorable heritage of fighting for liberty, while critics view the flag as symbolizing a hateful history of racism and racial oppression (Watts, 2008, pp. 87-88). As Watts (2008) writes in her book about Southern identity, “[N]o symbol has divided the contemporary South as widely and to such an extreme as the red field, blue cross, and white stars of the Confederate battle flag” (p. 87). Certainly, the Confederate flag, or “rebel flag” as it is often referred, has been displayed as a symbol of race-based hatred by Ku Klux Klansmen and other white supremacists since the Civil War (Watts, 2008, p. 87). Although overtly racist displays of the Civil War-era symbol have instilled fear and loathing in those individuals and groups who have been the targets of race-based hatred, it was not until July 10, 2015, amid a nationwide backlash against the Confederate flag, that South Carolina would officially remove the Civil War-era flag from its state capitol.

In the months following South Carolina’s removal of the Confederate flag from its state capitol, political leaders in many other Southern states began calling for the removal of Confederate flags, or flags bearing the Confederate battle cross, from public properties and government-produced products. Alabama Governor Robert Bentley ordered the removal of four Confederate banners from a monument on the state capitol grounds (Brad-
ner, 2015; Kytle & Roberts, 2015). In Virginia, Governor Terry McAuliffe ordered that the Confederate flag no longer be placed on license plates, and political leaders in Georgia, Maryland, Tennessee, and North Carolina vowed to do the same (Bradner, 2015; Robertson, Davey, & Bosman, 2015). Philip Gunn, Mississippi State House speaker, called for the removal of the Confederate battle cross from the upper-left corner of his state’s flag, the only remaining state flag incorporating the emblem (Bradner, 2015; Robertson, Davey, & Bosman, 2015). Political leaders in a number of Mississippi cities (e.g., Macon, Columbus, Hattiesburg, Grenada, Magnolia, Clarksdale, Greenwood, Starkville, Yazoo City) voted or issued executive orders to eradicate the state flag from city property (Guarino, 2015; McLaughlin, 2015). The City Council in Mississippi’s state capitol, Jackson, which had not displayed the state flag on city property for over a decade, voted to urge the state of Mississippi to create a new flag (McLaughlin, 2015).

Outside of the political arena, various organizations followed the trend of denouncing the Confederate flag. The University of Mississippi removed the state flag from its campus (McLaughlin, 2015). Some other organizations in Mississippi, such as the Gulf Coast Business Council and the Mississippi Gulf Coast Chamber of Commerce, echoed calls for a new state flag, specifically one devoid of the Confederate battle cross (Guarino, 2015; McLaughlin, 2015). Amazon and eBay announced they would no longer permit the sale of Confederate flags, joining Sears and Walmart, which had already done so (Robertson, Davey, & Bosman, 2015).

In the midst of the nationwide backlash against the Confederate flag, protestors in several states also began directing their ire against Confederate memorials. Statues paying honor to the Confederacy and those individuals who fought for it were vandalized in Charleston, South Carolina, as well as cities such as Asheville, Austin, and Baltimore (Kytle & Roberts, 2015). Soon, some Southern political leaders began calling for the official removal of Confederate memorials from public properties. In Tennessee, leaders from both sides of the political aisle agreed that a bust of Nathan Bedford Forrest, the Confederate general who later founded the Ku Klux Klan, should be removed from the state house (Bradner, 2015; Robertson, Davey, & Bosman, 2015). New Orleans Mayor Mitch Landrieu formally requested that the City Council begin the process of removing four Confederate monuments from prominent locations throughout the city (Rhodan, 2015), a request later approved by a 6-1 vote in December 2015 (Levin, 2015). The New Orleans City Council approval paved the way for the removal of monuments honoring Confederate President Jefferson Davis, Confederate Generals Robert E. Lee and P.G. Beauregard, as well as a memorial to the postwar battle of Liberty Place (Levin, 2015). Some individuals predict fur-
ther efforts to efface symbols of the Confederacy will extend to the renaming of parks, schools, buildings, and military bases named after Confederate soldiers (Brophy, 2015).

The nationwide backlash against the Confederate flag and other Confederate symbols sparked a reactionary movement among pro-Confederate supporters who claim the removal of these symbols is an affront to their Southern heritage (Bradner, 2015). The week following South Carolina’s removal of the Confederate flag from its state capitol, approximately fifty individuals staged a pro-Confederate flag rally at the site (Fieldstadt & Stanley, 2015). In the wake of the rally, the number of pro-Confederate flag rallies and attendees grew. During the same month, pro-Confederate flag rallies in South Carolina and North Carolina drew an estimated 2,000 and 4,000 attendees, respectively (Ingraham, 2015). In July 2015, another pro-Confederate flag rally held in Ocala, Florida, the largest pro-Confederate flag rally thus far, drew an estimated 5,000 attendees (Ingraham, 2015). Several smaller pro-Confederate flag rallies were held in various other Southern states. While pro-Confederate flag rallies were overwhelmingly concentrated in the South, rallies were also held as far north as Michigan and as far west as Oregon (Ingraham, 2015). Before 2015 had ended, over 350 pro-Confederate flag rallies had been held in a total of 22 states, and over 20,000 individuals are believed to have attended those events (Ingraham, 2015; “Mapping hate,” 2015).

Given the reactionary movement following South Carolina’s removal of the Confederate flag from its state capitol, much attention has understandably been focused on the recent offline activities of the pro-Confederate community, a community comprised of individuals who view Confederate symbols as signs of heritage. However, less attention has been afforded to the community-building efforts undertaken online by pro-Confederate groups, including those adhering to extremist ideologies. Some extremist groups exploited the nationwide backlash against the Confederate flag as an opportunity to publicize their radical pro-Confederate ideology online to an audience of pro-Confederate sympathizers who may have become receptive to their rhetoric. Consequently, the present essay examines the community-building efforts undertaken online by League of the South (LOS), an Alabama-based group that is not only staunchly pro-Confederate but also advocates for Southern independence and a society dominated by European Americans (“League of the South,” n.d.).

In a study examining the Ku Klux Klan’s use of the Internet to rhetorically build its community, Bostdorff (2004) called for research on how hate groups respond on the Internet to particular public issues, and this essay is a response to that call. This study examines how LOS used the Internet in its rhetorical efforts to attract members to its neo-Confederate community the
week before South Carolina’s removal of the Confederate flag from its state capitol on July 10, 2015. Examining LOS’s Internet rhetoric in the week preceding South Carolina’s removal of the Confederate flag from its state capitol—the most significant event to energize the pro-Confederate community witnessed in recent years—can provide useful insight into how the group has attempted to rhetorically build its neo-Confederate community.

“NEO-CONFEDERATE,” “NEO-CONFEDERACY,” AND “NEO-CONFEDERATES”

The Southern Poverty Law Center, which monitors hate groups in the United States, characterizes LOS as “neo-Confederate,” a term used to describe the revival of the principles, including racist doctrines, of the Confederacy (Potok, 2006, p. 57). Like neo-Confederate, the term “neo-Confederacy” has been used to describe modern-day “revivals of pro-Confederate sentiment in the United States” (Hague, 2010). The term neo-Confederacy was applied to groups like United Daughters of the Confederacy in the 1920s as well as those individuals resisting racial integration during the 1950s and 1960s (“Neo-Confederate,” n.d.). In its current incarnation, neo-Confederacy is used to describe the pro-Confederate sentiment emerging since the early 1980s with publications like Chronicles, Southern Partisan, and Southern Mercury (Hague, 2010). Today, neo-Confederate groups like League of the South (LOS), Sons of Confederate Veterans (SCV), and Council of Conservative Citizens (CCC) are among the many “neo-Confederates” in the larger neo-Confederacy network in the United States (“Neo-Confederate,” n.d.).

Strongly nativist, neo-Confederate ideology involves advocacy for measures to end immigration and a conception of race suggesting support for racial segregation and the belief in white supremacy (Hague, 2010). Often, neo-Confederates are openly secessionist (“Neo-Confederate,” n.d.). Neo-Confederacy also involves advocacy for traditional gender roles, strong opposition to homosexuality, and hostility toward democracy in favor of a hierarchy (i.e., superiors, equals, and inferiors) believed to be God-ordained (Beirich & Hicks, 2008, p. 86; Hague, 2010). Adherents of neo-Confederacy claim to be in pursuit of Christianity and heritage as well as other supposedly fundamental values perceived as having been abandoned by modern Americans (“Neo-Confederate,” n.d.).

Overall, neo-Confederacy is a reactionary, conservative ideology corresponding with the worldview of white nationalists as well as other more radical extremists within the racist right (Hague, 2010). Indeed, some former members of white supremacist organizations, such as James Edwards, who used to be a member of the neo-Nazi group National Alliance, went on to become active members of neo-Confederate groups like Council of Con-
servative Citizens (Beirich, 2015). As host of the racist radio program *The Political Cesspool*, Edwards has invited guests such as neo-Nazis and other white supremacists (Beirich, 2015). In 2013, Michael Cushman, also a former member of the neo-Nazi group National Alliance, became chairperson of LOS’s South Carolina chapter (Hankes, 2013). What is more, in recent years white supremacists from Klan and neo-Nazi organizations have been attending the same events as members of neo-Confederate groups. For example, LOS members were joined by members of the neo-Nazi group National Socialist Movement and other white supremacists at a “Feds Out of Kentucky” rally in northern Kentucky organized by an LOS member who lived in the area (“With hate,” 2015; “League of the South,” 2015).

In addition to appealing to some individuals within the racist right, neo-Confederacy has also garnered favor with some members of the political right (Hague, 2010). Support for neo-Confederacy among members of the political right is evidenced by various elected officials within the Republican Party being directly involved in the activities of neo-Confederate organizations (Hague, 2010). Some elected officials within the Republican Party, most notably then-Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) in the late 1990s, have spoken at meetings of the neo-Confederate group Council of Conservative Citizens and even expressed sympathy for the group’s positions (Hague, 2010; Phillips, 2015). In 2004, a photo surfaced of Haley Barbour, Republican candidate for Mississippi governor, posing with leaders of Council of Conservative Citizens at a barbeque (Phillips, 2015); Barbour won the governor’s office that year and again in 2008, serving the state’s maximum number of terms. In discussing the political influence of Council of Conservative Citizens, particularly within the Republican Party, Washington Post columnist Amber Phillips (2015) explained the group “has a long history with politicians in the South – a history that includes a level of success that today seems pretty remarkable.” What is more, some other elected officials within the Republican Party have been members of neo-Confederate groups while in office, such as the late Alabama State Senator Charles Davidson, who was a member of LOS between 1994 and 1998 (Hague, 2010).

**League of the South**

Founded in 1994, League of the South (LOS), formerly called Southern League, touts itself as a “Southern Nationalist” organization, having as its ultimate goal a free and independent Southern republic (“League of the South,” n.d.; “Online home,” n.d.). According to the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), LOS’s overarching mission “is to accomplish what the Civil War did not – Southern secession” (“League of the South,” n.d.).
Starting with a single office in Killen, Alabama, LOS has grown to include chapters in 15 states, including the 11 former Confederate states (i.e., Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia) as well as Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, and West Virginia (“League of the South,” n.d.; “State chapters,” n.d.).

In the beginning, LOS’s board was comprised largely of academics, mostly Southern professors like the group’s only president Dr. Michael Hill, who was then a professor of British history at Stillman College, a historically-black university in Tuscaloosa, Alabama (“League of the South,” n.d.). Under Hill’s leadership, LOS grew quickly as white Southerners became attracted by the group’s academic façade and its initial assertion that it was not a racist group, despite the fact LOS included some racist hardliners from the outset, such as founding member and life-long segregationist Jack Kershaw (“League of the South,” n.d.). Never one to hide his racist views, in 1998 Kershaw told a reporter, “Someone needs to say a good word for slavery. Where in the world are the Negroes better off today than in America?” (“League of the South,” n.d.). Despite such publicly and overtly racist comments by one of its founding members, LOS had recruited 4,000 members by 1998 (“League of the South,” n.d.).

When first established, LOS seemed to focus on a cultural defense of the South, including bitter complaints about mainstream media’s treatment of Southerners (Beirich & Potok, 2004). Initially, LOS suggested Southern secession might only be required “if the rest of America did not straighten out” (“League of the South,” n.d.). However, it was not long before LOS began seriously advocating for Southern secession, openly advocating a theocratic form of government, and calling for “a return to ‘general European cultural hegemony’ in the South” (Beirich & Potok, 2004).

By 2000, LOS claimed to have 9,000 members, a number that would soon grow to 15,000 (“League of the South,” n.d.). That same year, LOS was listed as a hate group by SPLC as the group’s ideology had become more explicitly racist, but the group nevertheless continued to assume a leadership role in the larger pro-Confederate community (Beirich & Potok, 2004). LOS’s ideas regarding the “Anglo-Celtic” (i.e., white) nature of the South were widely embraced by other “pro-South” groups, and the group worked actively with other racist groups to promote pro-Confederate flag rallies throughout the South (“League of the South,” n.d.).

LOS’s leadership status within the larger pro-Confederate movement was dealt a serious blow following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks (“League of the South,” n.d.). Within days of the attacks, Michael Hill suggested the attacks were deserved because they were “the natural fruits of a regime committed to multiculturalism and diversity” (“League of the
South,” n.d.). Hill’s comments provoked a mass exodus of LOS members, perhaps most significantly Donald Livingston, a professor of philosophy at Emory University who headed LOS’s Institute for the Study of Southern Culture and History, which hosted workshops and distributed literature (“League of the South,” n.d.). By 2004, Hill’s increasingly hardline positions continued to drive away LOS members, including many of the academics involved in founding the group, such as Grady McWhiney and Forrest McDonald, both well-known historians and authors who mentored Hill while he completed his Ph.D. in history at the University of Alabama (“League of the South,” n.d.). By 2009, LOS was only able to draw a handful of individuals to the group’s events (“Michael Hill,” 2015).

Faced with declining membership, LOS shifted its rhetorical strategy to cloak its hardline positions (“League of the South,” n.d.). However, in recent years LOS has returned to espousing radical rhetoric, including writings about potential violence, criticisms of perceived Jewish power, and warning blacks they would be defeated in a “race war” (“League of the South,” n.d.; “Michael Hill,” n.d.). For example, in a July 15, 2014, post on LOS’s website about warfare and bearing arms to defend personal freedoms, Hill (2014) made the following statement: “the primary targets will not be enemy soldiers; instead, they will be political leaders, members of the hostile media, cultural icons, bureaucrats, and other of the managerial elite without whom the engines of tyranny don’t run.” Hill’s militaristic rhetoric took on added significance when SPLC, during that same month, reported LOS had formed a secret paramilitary unit tasked with advancing LOS’s goal of initiating a second Southern secession and the unit was believed to include various white supremacists who were formerly members of Klan and neo-Nazi groups (Lenz, 2014). Indeed, LOS’s rhetoric became so radical, the group began to be barred from many pro-Confederate events (“Alabama Flaggers,” 2015; “League of the South,” n.d.). As LOS’s rhetoric became more radical, the group’s community of supporters further dwindled.

Although LOS’s radical views (e.g., pro-secession, pro-segregation, deservedness of September 11 terrorist attacks) caused other pro-Confederate supporters to distance themselves from the group in recent years, LOS appears to be returning to prominence within the pro-Confederate movement in the wake of the ever-growing national campaign against Confederate symbols (“Alabama Flaggers,” 2015). For example, in an August 2015 SPLC article about an upcoming Confederate flag rally sponsored by the Alabama Flaggers at Alabama’s state capitol it was stated:

The Alabama Flaggers have made it clear that everyone is welcome, including members of the LOS, which was extended a special invitation
despite being barred from many Confederate flag rallies in the past months for their extreme views ("Alabama Flaggers," 2015).

Given LOS’s previous exclusion from pro-Confederate events, the group’s renewed acceptance within the pro-Confederate community was so significant it warranted special mention. Moreover, in 2015 LOS participated in 35 Confederate flag rallies ("Michael Hill," n.d.). With the tide of pro-Confederate sympathy generated in the wake of the nationwide backlash against the Confederate flag and other Confederate symbols, LOS’s radical rhetoric may begin to resonate with like-minded individuals within the larger pro-Confederate movement.

Confederate flag supporters commonly make the oft-disputed claim that the flag and other Confederate symbols are about Southern heritage not hate, and this claim has long served to unify the pro-Confederate community. Today, this claim is helping to unite the pro-Confederate community in an unprecedented way as evidenced by the large number of pro-Confederate flag rallies taking place across the United States. Accordingly, the pro-Confederate community’s response to the ongoing backlash against the Confederate flag and other Confederate symbols warrants examination.

LOS’S NEO-CONFEDERATE ONLINE RHETORIC

LOS has been using the Internet in its community-building efforts since establishing its first website, www.dixienet.org, in the mid-1990s (Barnett, 2007). Amid the nationwide backlash against Confederate symbols following the Charleston church shootings, LOS continued its online efforts to create a sense of shared pro-Confederate and Southern identity on the group’s new website, www.leagueofthesouth.com ("Online home," n.d.). Although Michael Hill posted comments on LOS’s website five days after the Charleston church shootings denouncing the murders as “a reprehensible act,” he also suggested suspected shooter Dylann Roof may have been “provoked” into committing the deadly acts. Hill wrote:

> It is evident that young Mr. Roof, if his manifesto is legitimate, had had a belly full of a society that treats blacks like spoiled children, Big Daddy Government catering to their every need and want, and conversely blaming whites for being perpetual scoundrels whose main goal in life is to make things miserable for black folks. And he acted in his anger and allegedly committed murder. Now, the question looms: will blacks be “provoked” to take revenge? (Hill, 2015a).

Elsewhere in the post, Hill decried the public backlash against the Confederate flag that ensued after images of Roof displaying a Confederate flag surfaced, writing:
Now we have the same Establishment politicians and media howling that alleged Charleston AME church shooter Dylann Roof, far from being solely responsible for his own actions, is a product of a dark and horrible culture—the traditional white South. To sum it up, the Confederate battle flag and all who have ever said a good word for it are collectively guilty for everything that has ever afflicted the black community (Hill, 2015a).

In addition to discussing the backlash against the Confederate flag, Hill discussed how he believed “the white South,” particularly the neo-Confederate community, was being unfairly demonized as a result of the Charleston shootings. Near the end of the post, Hill wrote, “In this very hostile anti-white and anti-South environment, it would be wise for us in the Southern nationalist movement to be ‘situationally aware’ in all matters” (Hill, 2015a).

Hill’s comments during the week of the Charleston church shootings would foreshadow commentary posted on LOS’s website the week preceding South Carolina’s removal of the Confederate flag from its state capitol. For example, in a July 3 post, LOS used terms like “our people,” “we Southerns,” and “fellow Southerns” when referring to members of the pro-Confederate community and terms like “they,” “those people,” and “other ‘americans’” when referring to individuals living in the United States who were not part of the pro-Confederate community (Hill, 2015b). LOS further expressed disdain for the non-Confederate segment of society with statements such as “the enemy’s flag” and the use of lower-case references to the United States (e.g., “america,” “american,” “americans,” “u.s.,” “u.s.a.,” “united states”) (Hill, 2015b).

Having framed the narrative in us-versus-them terms, LOS attempted to energize the pro-Confederate community by claiming the “u.s. regime” is oppressing their community and then offering hope that the pro-Confederate community could liberate itself from this oppression. Referencing the backlash against Confederate symbols following the Charleston church shootings, LOS wrote, “the events of the last two weeks provide us with a nice, concise view of some of that reality . . . the denigration and hopeful elimination of all things Southern and Confederate from the public, and perhaps private, sphere” (Hill, 2015b). Following the oppression rhetoric, LOS instructed the pro-Confederate community on how to liberate itself from this oppression:

If you are willing to live and act in the real world, there is hope. There is a sane, sensible, and practical solution to the oppression and evil under which the South and her people are suffering. Yes! Suffering! But you must take your head out of the sand, or maybe your own backside, reject the u.s. regime, its symbols, its culture of death, and join the ranks of we
in the Southern nationalist movement who are struggling for our cultural, social, economic, and political well being [sic] and INDEPENDENCE from this tyrannical occupier of our native lands. See things for what they truly are, and NOT what you wish they were. . . . God save the South!! (Hill, 2015b).

The page on which this message was posted also included a graphic with an image of LOS’s Southern nationalist flag (i.e., a black diagonal cross on a white background) along with the words “For the Southern people! League of the South” (Hill, 2015b).

On July 4, LOS used the national holiday as an opportunity to renew its call for Southern independence. In a post, Hill (2015e) continued LOS’s denouncement of the nationwide backlash against Confederate symbols, particularly the Confederate flag, following the Charleston shootings. Couching the backlash in terms of war, Hill warned the pro-Confederate community, “everything even remotely connected to the South and her history has been put in the Cultural Marxists’ cross-hairs. And they have pulled the trigger” (Hill, 2015e). Hill referred to the nationwide backlash against Confederate symbols as “cultural genocide” intended to destroy the cultural underpinnings of Southern people, and he even went so far as to suggest this “cultural genocide” may be a prelude to “physical genocide.” Hill then advised that if the pro-Confederate community wanted to resist this “onslaught,” its members needed to organize and aggressively “push for the protection and advancement” of their Southern identity. Hill further explained “Southern nationalism” refers to the movement aimed at protecting and advancing their identity, as well as promoting “the survival, well being [sic], and independence of the Southern people” (Hill, 2015e).

After a call for the pro-Confederate community to organize for purposes of advancing the “Southern nationalist” movement, Hill heralded LOS as the ideal organization to lead the movement writing, “There is no other organization willing to stand for the Southern people outside of The League of the South” (Hill, 2015e). Following his promotion of LOS, Hill asked Southerners to join the group and “take a stand for the South,” emphasizing Southerners should pool their numbers and resources. Hill further explained LOS is an ideal organization to lead the Southern nationalist movement, in part, because the organization does not cower when called “bigots,” “racists,” “xenophobes,” or “anti-Semites.” Indeed, in describing individuals he viewed as “Southern people,” Hill declared true Southerners as “the white people of the South, of European descent” (Hill, 2015e). After declaring LOS’s membership to be exclusively white, Hill then asserted, “our end game is one which promises a permanent solution to the sorts of attacks we have seen lately” (Hill, 2015e).
Hill continued his rhetoric of Southern oppression in another July 4 post. Unapologetic about his reverence for the Confederate flag, Hill (2015c) wrote, “I have celebrated so far by raising my Confederate battle flag . . . God willing, I will spend the rest of the day working in The League of the South office . . . for a future for my people free from this monstrosity called the USA.” Hill followed up his rhetoric about working to free Southern people with a call to action stating, “I hope you’ll be doing the same” (Hill, 2015c). The page on which this message was posted also included a graphic with the words “We Are Prisoners” and an image of an American flag in which the stripes of the flag were altered to depict a cell in which a person was imprisoned (Hill, 2015c). Also on July 4, Hill posted the following statement, “‘Heritage Not Hate’ is the effeminate, limp-wristed, apologetic battle cry of Rainbow Confederates designed to inform the recipient of his message that he is not a ‘racist.’ Pathetic” (Hill, 2015d). The post, which was adorned with a Confederate flag, echoed Hill’s earlier comments about how LOS does not shy away from being called a racist organization.

On July 7, LOS’s Internet rhetoric shifted toward discussing how the group had made appeals to “fellow Southerners” at a July 6 “Confederate Flag and Heritage Rally” held at the Mississippi state capitol in Jackson (Tracey, 2015a). Some members of LOS’s Georgia chapter spoke at the rally, which was organized primarily as a show of support for keeping the current Mississippi state flag in the wake of demonstrations calling for its removal. A link to a YouTube video of a speech given at the rally by William Flowers, Georgia League of the South vice chairman, was included in the post. In the video, Flowers discussed LOS’s Southern nationalist ideology, explaining he had attended the rally because an attack on a fellow Southerner was an attack on himself and opining Southerners should be outraged by recent events in which their “history and their heritage” have been denigrated. Using us-versus-them rhetoric, Flowers ended his speech by calling for Southern secession as well as individuals to join LOS in the Southern nationalist movement. The post also included a photograph of Flowers speaking at the rally along with a statement in which Flowers described his own speech as being “well received” with many listeners expressing interest in examining Southern nationalism (Tracey, 2015a).

On July 9, the eve of the removal of the Confederate flag from South Carolina’s state capitol, Michael Hill (2015f) continued his calls for the pro-Confederate community to resist the “cultural genocide” he believed was being unleashed against the South and Southerners. Once again speaking in us-versus-them terms, Hill expressed the view that Southerners owed no one an explanation regarding their culture or the symbols they have chosen to represent their culture. Hill wrote, “Those symbols are ours. We define them and they define us” (Hill, 2015f). Accompanying the text-based
rhetoric was a graphic including the third national flag of the Confederate States of America (i.e., “Blood-Stained Banner,” a white banner with a Confederate battle cross canton and a trailing red stripe), which is also the final flag of the Confederate government, along with the words “THE UNSURRENDERED BANNER OF THE SOUTHERN PEOPLE 1865-PRESENT” (Hill, 2015f). In a rather ominous fashion, Hill ended the post:

For those in our midst who are outsiders, as well as for home-grown traitors, we will not forget your diabolical attacks on our very identity. I can promise you this: you will pay a heavy price for it. When, where, and how? You’ll be finding out. I promise (Hill, 2015f).

On July 10, the day the Confederate flag was removed from South Carolina’s state capitol, LOS posted a story about how LOS’s Florida chapter, along with other pro-Confederate supporters, had counter-protested a July 9 “I hate Dixie” rally in Gainesville, Florida, a rally demanding the removal of a Nathan Bedford Forrest monument (Tracey, 2015b). According to Andrew Tracey (2015b), an author of frequent posts on LOS’s site, the group was counter-protesting the “‘cultural rape’ of all things Southern” being perpetrated at the rally by the protestors, who he claimed were “feminists,” “Marxists,” “black supremacists,” and “cross dressing trannies.” In Tracey’s post, protestors were described as persons who “wore all different types of clothing with signs full of hate filled messages” and “ran around yelling and swearing” (Tracey, 2015b). Conversely, pro-South counter-protestors were described in flattering terms as being “well dressed, calm,” and “well behaved” (Tracey, 2015b). The post also included several pictures of the event, including an image of pro-Confederate supporters holding signs (e.g., “Stop Southern Cultural Genocide”) and Confederate flags.

LOS’s community-building efforts are perhaps most clearly reflected in a short YouTube video accessed by clicking a link at the bottom of the webpage. Making reference to the nationwide backlash against Confederate symbols, the video began with the following statement appearing on-screen: “When they want your flags, your monuments and your heritage gone . . . What they are really saying is they want YOU gone.” Next, an LOS advertisement appeared on-screen that read: “Fight the Cultural Genocide of the Southern people . . . LeagueoftheSouth.com” (Tracey, 2015b). As with other posts on LOS’s website, the on-screen advertisement was a call for Southerners to fight back against the eradication of Confederate symbols. What is more, like other content on LOS’s website, the on-screen advertisement’s inclusion of the group’s website address was a call, albeit implicit, for Southerners to join LOS’s neo-Confederate community.

Later on, the video transitioned to the “I hate Dixie” rally featuring
both protestors and pro-Confederate counter-protestors engaging in activities at the event. Video of protestors calling for the removal of the Nathan Bedford Forrest monument and holding signs with statements such as “heritage of hate” was annotated with derogatory on-screen comments referring to the protestors as “spoiled children” and “hate-filled minions” (Tracey, 2015b). Then, in a scene seemingly inspired by the movie *Birth of a Nation*, video of white pro-Confederate supporters at the rally appeared with the exclamation “The calvary [sic] arrives!” Throughout the rest of the video, a series of images of pro-Confederate supporters, including children, displaying Confederate flags and pro-South signs (e.g., “Stop Southern Cultural Genocide,” “Confederate Lives Matter”) were supplemented with a variety of pro-Confederate community rhetoric and calls for Southerners to take action. The on-screen, pro-Confederate community rhetoric included statements such as “Love your people,” “our folks combine together and fight the hate of our heritage,” and “To have a heritage and identity is the basics of what it means to be human” (Tracey, 2015b). The on-screen, pro-Confederate call to action rhetoric included statements such as “Build Southern identity in your children,” “Take a stand before it’s too late,” and “unite together as a folk – the Southern people” (Tracey, 2015b). Near the end of the video, there appeared another on-screen graphic of LOS’s website address, further emphasizing how important the group views its website in its neo-Confederate community-building efforts.

**DISCUSSION**

Within the scholarly literature regarding Southern culture, several scholars have examined Southern identity (e.g., Cobb, 2005; Goldfield, 2002; Watts, 2008). Certainly, Southerners have a distinctive group identity, one difficult if not impossible for non-Southerners to fully grasp. Indeed, as Watts (2008) writes, “‘Distinctiveness’ may be the key to identifying Southerners with one another while recognizing the value to be found in the diversity that has kept them divided both from one another and the rest of the nation” (p. 161). Even today, it is not unusual for whites living in the Southern United States to regard themselves foremost as Southerners rather than Americans. Although the Confederacy’s bid for a distinct national identity (i.e., secession) from the United States was thwarted during the Civil War, white Southerners’ sense of Southern identity was not diminished; it was arguably heightened by the myriad of extraordinary experiences Southerners sustained during the war and its aftermath. In describing the enduring significance of the Civil War in the South, Goldfield (2002) writes:
The Civil War is like a ghost that has not yet made its peace and roams the land seeking solace, retribution, or vindication. It continues to exist, an event without temporal boundaries, an indeterminable struggle that has generated perhaps as many casualties since its alleged end in 1865 as during the four preceding years when armies clashed on the battlefield (p. 1).

One must also recognize that the history of the Confederate South, a contentious and sometimes even disputed history, is an indelible part of white Southerners’ identity. In his book on the history of Southern identity, Cobb (2005) writes:

Architects of new group identities typically base their claims to distinctiveness and superiority on the vision [emphasis added] of a glorious communal past. The more venerable that past, the better, for it is usually harder to exalt events and deeds that can actually be recalled clearly than those that must simply be imagined (p. 42).

Accordingly, for the pro-Confederate community seeking to preserve its distinct identity, an identity shaped in large part by perceptions of a revered Confederate South, there is perhaps no battle of greater import than the fight to preserve the Civil War-era battle flag, arguably the most iconic symbol of the Confederacy.

The fight to preserve the Confederate flag took on added urgency for pro-Confederate groups when a nationwide backlash against the emblem ensued following the Charleston church shootings. Some neo-Confederate groups such as League of the South (LOS) exploited the nationwide backlash against the Confederate flag as an opportunity to publicize their radical ideology to members of the pro-Confederate community who may have become receptive to their rhetoric. In discussing the recent pro-Confederate flag movement, SPLC’s Mark Potok (2016) commented on how LOS “took a leadership role among the many groups, including Klan groups, supporting the Confederate battle flag after the Charleston massacre.” Moreover, LOS’s renewed involvement in public pro-Confederate events suggests the neo-Confederate group is growing its community, a growth likely attributable to the rhetoric LOS espouses online.

LOS’s success in garnering support for its neo-Confederate community may be largely due to the credibility individuals assign to the online rhetoric of the group’s leader Dr. Michael Hill, a retired university professor from a Southern college turned outspoken advocate for Southern secession. Hill has authored many of the “scholarly” essays posted on the group’s site, essays that serve as the rhetorical foundation on which LOS’s community continues to be built. Indeed, in the week preceding the removal
of the Confederate flag from South Carolina’s state capitol, Hill was responsible for most of LOS’s radical neo-Confederate online rhetoric in an effort to attract members to the organization’s neo-Confederate community in the week preceding South Carolina’s removal of the Confederate flag from its state capitol.

For one, the non-textual content (e.g., Confederate flags, Confederate battle cross, image of Nathan Bedford Forrest monument) appearing on LOS’s site had a Southern theme, creating an inviting environment to Southerners generally and to individuals with strong pro-South sentiments particularly, the two groups constituting the core of the pro-Confederate community. Moreover, as much of the non-textual content on LOS’s site reflected the group’s pro-South sentiment (e.g., Confederate flags, LOS’s Southern nationalist flag), it helped to instill a sense of group identity and Southern pride in Southerners that, in turn, may have increased the likelihood of their becoming involved with, or remaining involved with, LOS’s neo-Confederate community.

While some of the non-textual content posted online by LOS served mainly to give its website a pro-South aesthetic, several of the images on the site helped the organization further legitimize itself as a bona fide group within the larger pro-Confederate movement, thus aiding its community-building efforts. LOS posted photographs and videos of its members engaging in various activities in the offline world (e.g., meetings, pro-Confederate rallies) and portrayed a respectable, conservative public image that could help the group to maintain members within, and attract new members to, its neo-Confederate community. Indeed, the mere existence of these photographs and videos on LOS’s website aided LOS’s community-building efforts by demonstrating the group has an offline presence, knowledge that serves to instill a deeper sense of purpose in current members, while suggesting to prospective members they can be part of something worthwhile. LOS further reinforced this belief by describing public speeches given by their members as being “well received” and generating interest in their cause. Additionally, LOS utilized computer-generated images on its site (e.g., logos for the various LOS state chapters, graphics including the words “South” or “Southern”) to help promote its ideology and state chapters, all of which served to further build its neo-Confederate community.

However, LOS’s efforts to build its community were likely aided more by the group’s online textual rhetoric, the main content of its website. For one, current and potential members may have been drawn to LOS’s site, wherein they are exposed to the group’s neo-Confederate rhetoric, simply because it contains various Southern-themed posts (e.g., survival, well-being, and independence of Southerners). By continuously expressing affection for the South, proclaiming its commitment to defending Southern
interests, and speaking out on behalf of Southerners, LOS may have helped generate sympathy for the pro-Confederate cause, especially from white persons living in the South. In promoting itself, LOS publicized its agenda and activities, something that could have helped the group in recruiting new community members while maintaining current ones.

LOS used its site to help forge a sense of community by discussing the activities of its individual members and by allowing those members to contribute to its online discourse. Another way in which LOS helped to create a sense of community was by emphasizing how current, and potential, community members share a common culture. LOS further defined the members of its neo-Confederate community by identifying the activities (e.g., anti-Confederate rallies), entities (e.g., news media, federal government, opponents of Confederate symbols), and edicts (e.g., official removals of Confederate symbols) the group views as being anti-Southern, typically in us-versus-them terms (e.g., “they,” “those people,” “other americans”). What is more, LOS’s us-versus-them rhetoric persisted throughout the posts examined in this study. Having defined who and what it regards as being anti-Southern, and thus at odds with the neo-Confederate community that the group seeks to build, LOS encouraged pro-Confederate community members to mobilize together (e.g., “unite,” “take a stand”) to initiate changes the group believes would ultimately benefit the South and Southerners, such as Southern independence.

In its community-building efforts, LOS was not above playing to fears that may be held by white Southerners, those individuals most likely to join the pro-Confederate community, about how the nationwide backlash against Confederate symbols was not only a threat to their Southern heritage but also to them as individuals. LOS intensified its rhetoric regarding how it believes the removal of Confederate symbols represents a threat to white Southerners through terms associated with war, terrorism, or political violence (e.g., “death,” “genocide,” “onslaught,” “trigger,” “cross hair”). Similarly, LOS advised Southerners they were being oppressed by the rest of America and needed to “take a stand” (e.g., join LOS, pool numbers and resources) to liberate themselves from this oppression. LOS often followed its oppression-liberation rhetoric (i.e., “suffering” and “struggling” versus “hope” and “independence”) with a call for Southerners to join its movement. In playing to concerns white Southerners may have as well as utilizing a rhetoric of Southern oppression, LOS may have generated even more support for, and attracted more followers to, its neo-Confederate community.
CONCLUSION

The relevance of examining U.S.-based extremist groups’ Internet rhetoric has substantially increased in recent years as the United States has witnessed a series of deadly mass shootings perpetrated by various extremists, some of whom were apparently motivated by rhetoric they accessed on U.S.-based extremist sites (Barnett, 2014). Indeed, the Internet rhetoric of U.S.-based white supremacist groups (e.g., White Aryan Resistance, World Church of the Creator) is believed to have played a role in motivating individuals to perpetrate race-based (e.g., blacks, Asians) and religion-based (e.g., Jewish) murders since the first “hate site,” www.stormfront.org, was established in 1995 (Barnett, 2007; Barnett, 2014). More recently, it appears that the Charleston church shootings were inspired, at least in part, by content posted on the website maintained by the neo-Confederate group Council of Conservative Citizens (Cohen, 2015; Devine, Griffin, & Bronstein, 2015). An online manifesto believed to have been authored by Roof stated: “The first website I came to was the Council of Conservative Citizens. There were pages upon pages of these brutal black on White murders. . . . At this moment I realized that something was very wrong . . .” (Devine, Griffin, & Bronstein, 2015). Chillingly, web server records indicate the online manifesto was last modified merely hours before the Charleston church shootings (Robles, 2015).

Much like SPLC regards Council of Conservative Citizens as a “crudely white supremacist group” (Council, n.d.), LOS’s ideology is crudely racist despite the group’s academic façade. LOS’s rhetoric has shifted from denying it is a racist organization, to a strategy of cloaking its hardline positions, to now being overtly racist with anti-black comments appearing in its text-based Internet rhetoric as well as video posted on the group’s site. Indeed, LOS proudly proclaimed on its site the group was not concerned with being labeled as “racist” or any other labels (e.g., bigots, xenophobes, anti-Semites) characterizing it as a hate group.

Given LOS’s overtly racist rhetoric, the group’s renewed prominence within the pro-Confederate movement is disturbing. Even more troubling, LOS’s resurgence within the pro-Confederate movement is coming about as the group is articulating even more radical rhetoric, including advocacy for violence. Within the Internet posts examined in this study, LOS called for members of the pro-Confederate community to “take a stand for the South” and made mention of an “end game . . . which promises a permanent solution.” These statements, while only implicit suggestions of violence, are nevertheless cause for concern when coupled with LOS’s prediction of an impending race war, the group’s recent paramilitary operations, and the
passions stirred within the pro-Confederate community following the nationwide backlash against Confederate symbols.

Future studies may want to examine the online rhetoric of LOS and other neo-Confederate groups as such examinations may lend insight into what the groups may be planning to do in the offline world. After all, the pro-Confederate community is likely to remain animated as the move to efface Confederate symbols begins to focus on monuments and facilities named after Confederate soldiers. Moreover, the pro-Confederate movement is likely to remain large-scale given the many coordinated pro-Confederate flag rallies that occurred in the wake of the public backlash against Confederate symbols, rallies no doubt aided by LOS’s and other pro-Confederate groups’ use of the Internet.

Just as this study examined how LOS rhetorically responded to the public backlash against Confederate symbols to advance its neo-Confederate agenda, future studies may want to examine how extremist groups attempt to use other current events as rhetorical capital to advance their causes. For example, Michael Hill recently posted commentary regarding Muslim ban statements made by Republican Presidential candidate Donald Trump, the Pulse nightclub shootings in Orlando, and UK’s decision to exit the European Union (i.e., “Brexit”) as a strategic means of generating support for LOS’s anti-immigration, pro-gun, and pro-secessionist ideologies, respectively. Examinations of how extremist groups respond to current events can lend further insight into how extremists attempt to rhetorically build their communities and advance their causes, information that could assist society in guarding against acts of extremism perpetrated by like-minded individuals.

NOTES

1. Dr. Brett A. Barnett is Associate Professor of Communication at Slippery Rock University of Pennsylvania. He is the author of Untangling the Web of Hate: re Online “Hate Sites” Deserving of First Amendment Protection? (Youngstown, NY: Cambria Press, 2007).

REFERENCES


BOOK REVIEWS


Stephen Sheehi
College of William and Mary

Christopher Bail’s Terrified: How Anti-Muslim Fringe Organizations Became Mainstream is a fascinating and original contribution to the growing number of critical examination of Islamophobia in the United States, especially since 2001. Bail’s sociological study is the first quantitative study of anti-Muslim activism. The author clearly announces in the opening pages that “principle contribution” of his work is “a new theory that explains how cultural, social psychological, and structural processes combine to shape the evolution of shared understandings of social problems in the wake of crisis such as September 11th” (9).

Bail’s explores a “shared understanding” about Muslims in the United States, which, he claims, goes through shifts upon disruptions in social “equilibrium,” such as with September 11. The originality of the study comes less from this operative use of “shared understanding” or his “new theory,” analysis, and conclusions than from the quantitative methodology by which he approaches the topic and gathers data. Specifically, he grounds his theory in “the new wave of “big data” research” or the “increase in text-based data” available through the internet, digitalization of media, political texts, and social media. (11) In particular, Bail uses plagiarism detection software to compare press releases from 120 civil society organizations, traditional media outlets, and social media who contributed and “competed to shape shared understandings of Islam” in the years after 9/11 (11-12).

In this regard, Bail’s work is a contribution to the sociology of “big data” and also offers information to corroborate previous research by academics, activists, and think tanks that map the mainstreaming of anti-Muslim “fringe” groups and their Islamophobic sentiments. He notes the rise of civic engagement of both Muslim civil liberties organizations and the “foundation” and rise of the anti-Muslim “fringe” as exemplified by those such as Daniel Pipes and Steven Emerson.

Bail uses plagiarism detection software to show a trend in the media as “a dramaturgical stage at the center of the public sphere” (41), where journalism played to and preyed on the emotional sensibilities of an anxious post-9/11 American audience regarding perceptions of Muslims. This plagi-
arism software detected that sensationalist and, Bail insinuates, fundamentally lazy news outlets picked up and disseminated sensationalist, psychologically evocative, and Islamophobic articles and talking points that originated in and were disseminated by previously insignificant fringe groups such as Pipes’ Middle East Forum and Emerson’s Center for Security Policy. Bail asserts that “though the vast majority of civil society organizations produced pro-Muslim messages, journalists were captivated by a small group of anti-Muslim fringe organizations.” Consequently, the pandering to the “negative emotions” after 9/11 enabled “fringe organizations to transcend their obscurity and humble resources by appealing to the media’s legendary appetite for drama” (51). Therefore, Islamophobic groups capitalized on “shared emotions” of anxiety after 9/11, which “contributed to the solidification” of social networks and a “realignment of the cultural environment” that made anti-Muslim crusades such as the anti-Sharia law campaign gain traction within mainstream Americans (72).

While US mainstream media was enamored by the anxiety-provoking message of fringe groups, these same news outlets “ignored” positive representations about Muslims and Islam (55) despite what Bail claims as the “superior resources and dense social networks” of mainstream Muslim American civil society organizations (such as CAIR and ISNA) (54). These groups, ironically, were accused of being fronts for homegrown radicalization and increasingly, according to Bail’s theory, Muslim Americans were marginalized and disenfranchised from policy making processes and further targeted, stigmatized, and frozen out of the civil society by mainstream political organizations and political figures.

In setting out his methodology and theory for how social organizations create social change, Bail critiques notions the sociological concept of “resonance” that assumes social organizations create social analysis that “fits” preexisting cultural discourse. Finding this theory “circular,” Bail “introduces an evolutionary theory of collective behavior and cultural change” (6). In this respect, the study speaks to and is trying to advance particular data-based sociological theories and methods. This goal and intent has a place within disciplinary discussions, and I suspect it is fascinating and would elicit much discussion among his cohort. However, within the context of a larger academic and mainstream audience, his methodology hurts his study in a variety of ways—not least of which is that Bail’s critique of “resonance,” of cultural, historical, and social ideological dynamics at the heart of all forms of racism, ends up dismissing the volumes of research on relevant topics such as “the fringe network” that could have formed a shorthand and base for this data driven analysis.

More specifically, Bail’s contribution to the study of Islamophobia is damaged by a number of oversights. Most notably, he neither engages the
considerable literature on Islamophobia, which overlaps significantly with this study, nor the social and racial history in the United States. He ignores the major studies regarding Islamophobia in the United States, including the Fear Inc. project sponsored by the Century for American Progress (work that would support Bail’s assertions), and scholarship on Islamaphobia by Deepa Kumar and Nathan Lean, Janet Abu Lughod’s work on gender, Anne Norton’s work on the political history of the “Muslim problem,” anthropologist Nadine Naber’s and fellow sociologists Louise Cainkar’s work on Arab Americans, Evelyn Alsultany and others work on the media, Rana Junaid’s work on South Asian Muslim Americans, Sohail Daulatzai’s and Shermon Jackson’s differing but equally valuable work on Black Muslims, and my own work attempting to understand the ideological underpinnings of Muslim-baiting.

Had Bail integrated rather than dismissed these works, he could have avoided many serious missteps. For example, despite the overall agreement of most historical and sociological studies on race, media, and Islam in the United States, he asserts that, while “Muslim American experienced significant discrimination during earlier periods” (17) and that they “continued to face numerate challenges in the 1970s,” pre-2001 surveys reveal “a plurality of Americans held favorable views of Islam” (17).

Part of the methodological problem in Bail’s study is that he fails to track how anti-Muslim views pre-2001 were expressed not exclusively in terms of Islam but in terms of anti-Arab racism. This would be missed by software searching exclusively for “Islam” and “Muslims” not “Arab,” “Palestinian,” or “Lebanese.” This shortcoming embodies a failure to parse out the shared and overlapping but nuanced histories of Muslim and Arab Americans or to consider how post-9/11 Islamophobia might be a recasting of previous forms of racism (not only anti-Arab racism but anti-Semitism and anti-Black racism) in the United States. Bail blends the racial, social, and class divide between Black American Muslims and immigrant Muslim American communities. For a study that portends to discuss the diversity of civil society groups and rigorously maps them in a rather savvy visual and technological way, there is no substantial discussion of these groups’ demographic, class, or social positions that grossly differentiate organizations like CAIR, which enjoys access to mainstream media and civil society, from other marginalized groups, which he largely dismisses as insignificant due to their lack of reach within the political mainstream.

Bail’s analysis of the data comes from his otherwise ingenious use of plagiarism programs. However, this data is enframed by a series of thinly proved assumptions that form a shaky basis for his analysis and conclusions. The assumption that Muslim American struggled with forms of prejudice prior to 9/11 but that Americans generally held, as Bail states, a
“positive or neutral view” of Islam underpins his central analytic question: How did mainstream Muslim organizations lose so much influence within the American public sphere (14)? This question, coupled with How did anti-Muslim fringe organizations captivate the American public sphere?, is not backed by any quantitative data that authoritatively demonstrates that Muslim American (or Arab American) organizations ever actually had any significant influence on law makers, media, or civil society. In fact, studies by fellow sociologists and anthropologists show the opposite—that Arab and Muslim Americans have continued to be subjected to racist portrayals of themselves in the media and news as well as in policy circles.

Bail’s claims that Muslim American organizations failed to make inroads into the mainstream media and influence mainstream public opinion after 9/11 because they offered “complex, dispassionate statements” that were “easily overshadowed by the pithy emotional auguries of anti-Muslim organizations that warned of a looming clash of civilizations between Islam and the West” (57). This leads to one of the most problematic assertions of the book: that Muslim American organizations “mistook” the prevalence of sensationalist and visceral Islamophobic stories in the media—due to the inroads of fringe groups—for a rise in anti-Muslim perception in American public opinion. As a result, these Muslim American organizations spent more time and resources on condemning anti-Muslim rhetoric and sentiment than “condemning terrorism” (58).

Here, Bail’s narrative, otherwise clear and well-written, serves to blur and displace issues. He overplays the visibility and impact of hacks like Walid Phares, Emerson, and other outside rightwing news outlets and Republican circles. The mainstreaming of fringe discourse was not responsible for but occurred concurrent to the prosecution of Muslim American activists and philanthropic organizations (such as Holy Land Foundation or Sami al-Arian, who is not mentioned) by the United State Attorney General. These prosecutions were independent of and, indeed, preceded, in many cases, the rise of the fringe in the media and public circles.

Likewise, training of federal and police counterterrorism agents was not the result of the influence of the anti-Muslim fringe. Rather, the accessibility, cultural legibility, and political relevance of an Islamophobic and Orientalist canon (authored by those such as Bernard Lewis, Raphael Patai, and slew of ideologues influenced by Leo Stauss, Samuel Huntington, and Francis Fukushima) filtered into official circles and state programs not through Islamophobic activists but through mainstream politicians (Dick Cheney, John Ashcroft) and advisors (Elliot Abram and Douglas Feith) who created laws and policies based on Islamophobic discourses. In this regards, the book grossly fails to locate the rise of Islamophobia within a global and national moment, particularly against the backdrop of the rise of
the neocconservative movement and neoliberal globalization and the new vision of the Middle East within those two imaginations.

This is precisely where Bail’s “new theory” breaks down because it ignores the centrality of the state in establishing institutional Islamophobia as the centerpiece of the Homeland Security discourse, which targeted, isolated, pilloried, incarcerated, intimidated, spied on, and entrapped Muslims with the full resources at the disposal of the American government, especially in (but certainly not limited to) the Bush years. This is not to mention overlooking the impact social history of race, religion, gender, class, and ethnicity on Orientalism, Islamophobia, and anti-Arab sentiment in the United States. In this regard, the work fails to properly address the ideological, cultural, and social underpinnings of Islamophobia, not to mention its political effects and purposes. Bail’s qualitative work could have easily been put in dialogue with these critical and established understanding how Islamophobia functions in the post-9/11 moment as a means to further particular political agendas while also feeding on pre-existing Islamophobic perceptions and policies already at play within American culture and polity.

Not to be petty, but the potentially valuable study is plagued by a number of distracting factual errors, such the claim that Cat Stevens is an American Muslim. (He’s actually British.) Likewise, the “Islamic Jihad” credited with the attack on the Multinational Forces (the Marine and French barracks) in Beirut in 1983 and hijacked TWA flight 847 should be distinguished as Islamic Jihad Organization, which is different from the current Islamic Jihad as the former was really a minor group with some high profile successes that should actually probably be ascribed to Hizbullah. The Arab American Anti-Discrimination Committee is not the AAADC but the ADC. The JDL was not only “implicated in the bombing of the Boston headquarters of the AAADC [sic] as well as the assassination of its chairman in 1985” (24). More correctly, the JDL blew up the Boston office of the ADC (injuring two) but killed in a separate attack Alex Odeh, the West Coast regional director of the ADC in a bombing of the ADC office in Santa Ana, two cases that have not yet resulted in the arrest or prosecution of all of those involved in the violence.

Christopher Bail’s Terrified offers interesting qualitative information along with a handful of fresh anecdotes and tidbits into how social change occurs through various media. Its brief theorizing of the role of Twitter and Facebook is circumspect and explores out how social networks are formed and morph with shifts in technology. The quantitative data is at time fascinating and surprising, offering a critical rejoinder to previous understanding of, say, the surprisingly low level of funding fringe groups might have.
These strengths carry the study and make it a respectable contribution to the growing academic work on Islamophobia despite its shortcomings.

NOTES

1. Reviewer Dr. Stephen Sheehi is the Sultan Qaboos bin Said Chair of Middle East Studies at the College of William and Mary.
Eighty-two years after Hitler became Reich Chancellor of Germany, seventy-seven years after Kristallnacht, seventy years after the liberation of Auschwitz: time makes no difference. The Holocaust remains an inexplicable phenomenon, the catastrophe of catastrophes, an omnipresent stain on the soul of humanity.

In his thoughtful book, Dan McMillan attempts, with remarkable success, to demystify the Shoah, to explain how it happened and why. In doing so, McMillan is well aware of the pitfalls: to explain means to understand; to understand, to render the incomprehensible comprehensible, is to challenge the special status of the Holocaust as unique.

McMillan goes to great pains, then, to make distinctions, to inform the general reader why the Holocaust can be explained and yet still maintain its uniqueness. In Chapter 2, “A Genocide like No Other,” he lays out the differences. Rightly acknowledging that comparisons are gratuitous when addressing the suffering of the victims, he nonetheless asserts that it is possible to distinguish motives and governing ideologies—and thus to understand what happened. To that end, McMillan writes that the Holocaust “constitute[s] history’s most uncompromising assault upon the principle that every human being deserves to live” (18). Other genocides, he argues, were perpetrated for “some concrete purpose: for political power, out of perceived military necessity, to seize land and riches, or to enforce religious conversion. Only during the Holocaust have we come to murder a huge population solely for the sake of killing them” (18). In all other mass murders, McMillan continues, at least some proportion of victims could save themselves. In the Holocaust, no such salvation was possible.

In McMillan’s view, the “Nazi’s striving for complete biological extinction of the Jews has no parallel in history” (19), and he explains why the genocidal actions against the Armenians in Turkey and the Tutsi in Rwanda differ not only in magnitude but also intent. The Turks stopped their murderous actions against the Armenians while they still held political power; the Hutu leaders had no plans to murder Tutsis who lived outside of Rwanda’s borders (20). Finally, while it may be difficult to attribute motives to the governments then in power, it is possible to say, as McMillan does, that both the Turkish and the Rwanda governments were threatened by an imminent loss of power, leading them to lash out against and then
exterminate the minority populations living within their borders. In contrast, the minority of Jews living within the Germany and the millions living outside of it “posed no plausible threat” to the German government. Furthermore, according to McMillan, the Nazi killers acted “not in a mood of fear and desperation, but rather in one of exhilaration and joy” (21).

McMillan does, then, uphold the “special status” (12) conferred on the Holocaust. At the same time, he maintains that explaining what happened is possible and a necessary corrective to the common notion that it’s just not possible to understand, that the questions raised by the Holocaust have no answers.

McMillan devotes the rest of his book to detailing the factors that led to the Holocaust. Among these are Hitler’s rise to power and his enormous influence over the German people, the fragile nature of the young Weimar democracy (making it easy to overthrow), the impact of World War I on the generation of German men who came of age in the 1920s and 30s, the psychological factors in play that allowed men to murder defenseless civilians, other factors that led tens of millions of Germans to look away, and the rabid nature of religious anti-Semitism when mixed with a new brand of science called race theory.

Of primary importance to his argument is McMillan’s view that in Germany, unlike France, Britain, and the United States, the democratic process did not have enough time to mature. Making the transition from a monarchy to a parliamentary government, he writes, “has been a difficult and often dangerous undertaking for nearly every nation that has attempted it” (42). That the Weimar government failed and Hitler was able to wrest control from Hindenburg was due in large part to timing and the sad fact that there was no sustainable parliamentary process in place to oppose him. It was not due, in McMillan’s view, to a flaw in the German character or to a particularly German pathology (40-41).

Another contributing factor was the impact of combat during World War I upon thousands of German men. Although the vicissitudes of war led many to become pacifists after 1918, many others went on to glorify war. According to McMillan, “[T]he brutalizing combat of World War I gave birth to a genocidal cohort made up of hundreds and even thousands of men who had enjoyed combat, as well as many from the generation that followed who were too young to have experienced the war’s horrors, but old enough to worship the hardened men who had” (72).

Thus emerged “the newly forged ideal of the coldblooded soldier who calmly accepted the war’s massive slaughter” (75). Pausing to summarize his complex argument half-way through the book, McMillan writes in both a poetic and prophetic tone:
The ghastly battlefields and massive slaughter of World War I produced a generation of violent and hardened men, men who could accept the deaths of millions as a normal fact of political life. Yet men of many nations fought in the war without becoming murderers. It took the special role of nationalism and anti-Semitism in German politics, and the intensification of both in wartime Germany, to give these men the political convictions that made them so dangerous. It took the polarizing impact of the war on Germany’s already dysfunctional political system, the crushing blow of Germany’s defeat, and the political and economic chaos that followed to make Hitler’s rise to power possible. Only then could the horror of the trenches find its fatal echo a generation later in the death camps and killing fields of the Holocaust. (77)

In the 1930s, as Hitler’s political power increased, so did his power over the hearts and minds of the German people. Der Furher became “a mythic figure. . . whose every command deserved obedience” (119). McMillan links Hitler’s success to a number of factors:

The longstanding hope. . . that a charismatic leader could heal the nation’s divisions. . .; the German people’s desperation amid the terrible crisis of the Great Depression; Hitler’s gifts as a public speaker; the new medium of radio which brought his voice into German homes; the skillful use of propaganda. . .; and above all,. . . Hitler’s astonishing run of dramatic successes, beginning with the suppression of socialism and communism in early 1933, and ending only with the failure of German armies to capture Moscow in December of 1941. (120)

Hitler’s “astonishing success” led to unconditional loyalty on the part of his party members, the SS, the rank and file of the Wehrmacht, and the general populace. According to McMillan, “Hitler’s role as the source of law dissolved legal and moral norms and radicalized [his] subordinates by encouraging them to take actions they thought he would approve,” (135), sadly turning soldiers into murderers.

But, not without the spark of anti-Semitism. In Chapter 9, “Why the Jewish People?” McMillan lays out the complex historical, religious, and political contexts that Jews confronted as they settled throughout Europe and made their ways into professions and political movements. Citing only two of these strands here, suffice it to say that what McMillan refers to as “Jewish [financial] success” and “the belief that Jews promoted Marxism” – diametrically opposed ideas – were important contributing factors that fueled anti-Semitism and built the momentum that led to the Holocaust. Yet, as McMillan explains, jealousy of Jewish financiers on the one hand and fear of Jewish intellectuals, socialists, and communists on the other was not sufficient to create the Holocaust: Also necessary was the belief that
Jewish people constituted a race that was biologically distinct from the rest of all humanity and genetically predisposed to behave destructively. This way of seeing Jews could only have happened in the twentieth century, the high-water mark of racist thinking in world history. (152)

Once differences among ethnic groups were assumed to be scientifically verifiable, the “lower” races were viewed as polluters of society and, consequently, deemed “unworthy of life” – making the Holocaust possible.

McMillan’s overarching explanation ultimately boils down to the notion of a perfect storm: “[I]t took an almost impossible combination of dangerous ideas, ruined people, and unimaginably bad luck to make this catastrophe possible” (205). Had Germany become a democracy fifty or more years earlier, had Hitler not come to power when he did or at all, had the 2,000 years of religious anti-Semitism not met up with an uncompromisingly rabid form of racial science, it is unlikely that events in Europe would have led to the Holocaust.

But one remaining factor still needs to be addressed. All of the above-mentioned conditions help to explain the causes that led to the Shoah. But it took millions of people to support it, to put the machinery in place, to do the killings. It is here that McMillan wants readers to understand that those who added fuel to the fire were ordinary citizens, not unlike the rest of humanity. It was this “lack of a moral compass” (170) on the part of the perpetrators and the bystanders that, along with the above conditions, made the Holocaust possible.

In the end, McMillan wants the Holocaust and the indifference of the majority of the German people to serve as a corrective for those of us living in its aftermath. It is, he asserts, all too easy to blind ourselves to atrocities, especially when they happen on foreign soil or to people who exist outside of our own “universe of obligation.” If anything, McMillan’s book is a call to the citizens of democratic countries to speak out – and to act – when atrocities are being committed. McMillan would encourage us to develop a new muscle, one reacts quickly and responds to a notion of “collective responsibility,” to the idea that we must become “our brother’s keeper” (204).

It is here that McMillan’s views intersect with my own. As the founder and director of the Holocaust Educators Network, I, too, seek to use the lessons of the Holocaust to address current acts of injustice. In his preface, McMillan states, “The Holocaust frightens people like no other event in history, evoking an instinctive horror and loathing that almost compel us to look away from it” (ix). The teachers I work with have chosen to do the opposite. They turn toward the Holocaust in an attempt not only to understand it but also to think hard about how to bring its lessons to students
across the US. It is a daunting task. As Eva Hoffman warns in *After Such Knowledge: Memory, History, and the Legacy of the Holocaust* “Stand too close to horror, and you get fixation, paralysis, engulfment; stand too far, and you get voyeurism or forgetting” (Cambridge, MA: PublicAffairs, 2004, 177). Finding the right distance from which to teach about the Holocaust so that students can develop the muscles that will enable them to speak out against genocide is our shared task. McMillan’s book, by making the Holocaust explainable, will be of great help along the way.

Bianca Gonzalez-Sobrino & Matthew W. Hughey

In Beyond Hate, C. Richard King and David J. Leonard present a critical, virtual ethnography that examines the relationship between popular culture, media, and white supremacy. Their efforts center on the exploration of the intersections of white power and popular culture in the virtual world as articulated in the context of the contemporary United States. In specific, King and Leonard explore how white nationalists come to utilize the digital realm of popular culture as a clarion call to cleanup a society “polluted” by the rise of nonwhite populations, the proliferation of liberal ideology and to the supposed demise of the traditional white family. The authors trace how white supremacists use virtual, public forums, like blogs, chatrooms, and websites, to construct the boundaries of a white community full of virtuous, cultural warriors. Moreover, Beyond Hate examines how participants in these spaces labor to incorporate these ideas into a meaningful and legitimate part of the public sphere.

After a short introduction on the popularization of white power, the second chapter presents a provocative thesis: past research and popular media have framed white power in ways that prevent the understanding of the complexity of race and power. The authors argue that the bulk of previous scholars have neglected to study white nationalists as more than deviants or ideologues, effectively blinding them to a view of the white supremacist and nationalist projects as a socio-historically grounded practice and reaction to sociological shifts in society. It is within this critique, that while true is a bit overstated (King and Leonard ignore many of the prescient works on white nationalism that have emerged in the past decade), that the authors lay out their approach to the study of white power. Drawing from the “new racism” perspectives, they contend that white power movements now embody three (sometimes overlapping) forms: (1) they are persistent, (2) they are resurgent, and (3) they are veiled.

The third and fourth chapters of Beyond Hate explore music and television in relation to the consumption practices and ideologies of white supremacists. Chapter three explores what the authors call “white power rock.” This genre and style of music has, the authors contend, become “a space for community, for disseminating the grammar, tropes, and narratives of white supremacy, and for cultivating a white nationalist worldview” (29). While white power music has declined in popularity and acceptance, it continues to function as a tool for recruiting members into white supremacist
movements. In chapter four, the authors concentrate their attention on the role of television and how white supremacists view and understand the content presented in television programming. King and Leonard explain how white supremacists view television as a threat. To these white supremacists, whiteness is portrayed in a negative manner, and any chance of promoting a pro-white stance is crushed under the combined weight of multiculturalism and political correctness. Moreover, white nationalists tend to understand television as a multifaceted threat, in terms of: (1) anti-white television controlling interests, (2) anti-white television content, and (3) the overall and implicit guiding ideologies of these representations.

Chapter five offers an exploration of the interpretive readings of Hollywood films by white nationalists, culled from websites, blogs, discussion groups, and other content found on the Internet. King and Leonard maintain that one of the dominant themes utilized by white supremacists is the framing of Hollywood movies as anti-white propaganda, focusing on the alleged distorting of history and “natural” racial hierarchy alongside the promotion of “racial-mixing.” These themes are repeated two chapters later in chapter seven, whereby white nationalists are revealed to frequently understand video games as a threat to white dominance because of their supposedly multicultural and morally-corrupt ideologies. However, the authors also explore a series of video games produced by white supremacists produced to recruit new members to the white power movement.

Next, chapter six explores the intersection of white power and sports. King and Leonard argue that white nationalists often focus on the supposed natural criminality of black bodies, endangerment of white femininity, and yet again, the role of popular culture as “anti-white” propaganda. The chapter drives home the point that white nationalists see sports coverage as a potential site whereby white supremacist and nationalist ideologies can be promoted and where they are most likely to find resonance with the public: “sports... unfold as a fundamental, and often unrecognized, domain for the forceful reiteration of white power ideologies” (108).

Lastly, chapter eight examines social media as tools for recruitment and virtual boundary formation. White nationalists stress the important of the future of the Internet in their recruiting efforts and toward the creation of a virtual community that extends beyond national and state borders. The authors argue that the use of social media has also fostered an essentialized white racial identity and sense of pride in the creation of this new virtual community. This essentialized identity stems from framing white nationalists as the consummate victims of a new racial order turned unnaturally on its head.

The authors conclude with an analysis of the 2012 murder of six Sikh
men in Milwaukee at the hands of a white nationalist. King and Leonard argue that popular media nearly always frames white nationalists as “deranged lunatics” and explain how these portrayals do not fully represent (and may actually obscure) racism in the United States. King and Leonard also explain that white nationalists are obsessed with popular culture and partake in the consumption and production of it. For these reasons, the authors argue, it is important to study the relationship between white power and popular culture because, “without an understanding of it we cannot grasp the complexities of white nationalism or their place in a broader field of racial discourse” (166).

The authors attempt to take an interdisciplinary approach to the study of white power through cultural studies, media studies, anthropological, sociological, and literary techniques. This broad-brush investigation has payoffs but, as constructed, may have come at the expense of specificity; many recent studies within particular fields—most notably sociology—have already examined the mainstreaming attempts of white power and the victimhood identity politics of contemporary white nationalism. Without deeper engagement with the extant empirical and theoretical corpus and lacunae in the aforementioned scholarly fields—and larger scholarly discourse—we were left wondering what specifically new Beyond Hate: White Power and Popular Culture affords. So also, the lack of an overt plan and guide for methodological decisions, coupled with seemingly mismatched analysis whereby society-wide generalizations about white power are drawn via non-representative techniques and data, generate more questions than answers.

Those critiques notwithstanding, we are sure that many readers unfamiliar with white power (in both its supremacist and nationalist variants) will learn from Beyond Hate. The continued allegiance to a liberal model of “hate” qua cognitive, individual-level, prejudice distracts from understanding the operations of racism as systemic, banal, and normative—a key aspect of how white power normalizes itself and appeals to those that would join its ranks, even under the best of intentions. Through their critique, King and Leonard show that “these conversations and the Internet in general have been fundamental to the growth of a white nationalist movement, and that the panics induced by conversations about contemporary popular culture, and conversations about themselves, serve as a foundation for these imagined virtual communities” (10).
NOTES

1. Reviewer Bianca Gonzalez-Sobrino is a PhD student in sociology at University of Connecticut, and reviewer Dr. Matthew W. Hughey is a Visiting Scholar with the Center for the Study of Ethnicity and Race at Columbia University and Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Connecticut, where he serves as Affiliate Faculty in the Africana Studies Institute and the American Studies Program.
The Nazis Next Door: How America Became a Safe Haven for Hitler’s Men by Eric Lichtblau

Monique Laney¹
Auburn University


The Nazis Next Door is a follow-up to a breaking news story Lichtblau authored in 2010 when an unredacted version of a 600-page report chronicling the activities of the U.S. Department of Justice’s “Nazi hunting” Office of Investigations was leaked to the New York Times. The fact that the United States has been harboring Nazis, some of whom were war criminals, has not been news at least since the 1970s, but as Lichtblau explains in his 2010 article, the report “goes further in documenting the level of American complicity and deception,” especially the CIA’s involvement in using Nazis for postwar intelligence purposes, as Lichtblau wrote in The New York Times.

Lichtblau describes not only how America became a “Safe Haven” for Nazis but also how it has been trying to correct this mistake more or less successfully. In a titillating prologue, Lichtblau introduces the reader to the Nazi war criminal-turned-CIA operative, Tom (Tscherim) Soobzokov, whose relationship with the CIA was more clearly revealed with the 2007 declassification of CIA records relating to Nazi and Japanese Imperial Government war crimes. Soobzokov’s outrageous story reappears throughout the book, illustrating the peculiar nature of the relationships between these CIA operatives and their handlers as well as the substantial compromises US officials made in the name of fighting Communism. While the book focuses mainly on those former Nazis used to spy for US intelligence agencies after the war, Lichtblau dedicates several chapters to the stories of the rocketeers Wernher von Braun and Arthur Rudolph in addition to the space medicine expert Hubertus Strughold. Because these accounts are less dramatic and add little to what we already know, they distract somewhat from the otherwise original content.

Following the initial chapters that outline the ways in which many of the Nazi war criminals were able to enter the country, the book recounts the history of how the OSI came into being. Accordingly, protests denouncing “Nazi war criminals in our midst” (77) in the 1960s, along with the INS’s
apparent inability to effectively deal with some of the accused individuals, eventually led to enough publicity to bring the complaints in front of Congress, which in turn led to the creation of the Justice Department’s Office of Special Investigations (OSI) in 1979 as well as the approval of the Holtzman Amendment. Together, these new measures were intended to put more emphasis on, and authority behind, the investigation and denaturalization of U.S. citizens who had been able to enter the United States by lying about their involvement with Nazi war crimes. Despite the new process, some of the offenders could still not be prosecuted. The CIA evidently not only knew about some of their operatives’ past involvement in Nazi atrocities but, by documenting their knowledge, made it practically impossible for the OSI to prosecute those who could argue that they had told the truth about their pasts. The rest of the book depicts the OSI’s struggles in prosecuting Nazi war criminals.

Lichtblau’s monograph joins a list of similar books on the topic written by investigative reporters, including Tom Bower’s *The Paperclip Conspiracy: The Battle for the Spoils of Secrets of Nazi Germany* (London: M. Joseph, 1987), Linda Hunt’s *Secret Agenda: The United States Government, Nazi Scientists, and Project Paperclip, 1945 to 1990* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), Annie Jacobsen’s *Operation Paperclip: The Secret Intelligence Program that Brought Nazi Scientists to America* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 2014), Richard L. Rashke’s *Useful Enemies: John Demjanjuk and America’s Open-Door Policy for Nazi War Criminals* (Harrison, N.Y.: Delphinium Books, 2013), and Christopher Simpson’s *Blowback: America’s Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War* (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988). What is different, apart from some of its content, is that it reads more like what journalists call a “human interest story.” Lichtblau dramatizes scenes and creates the illusion of being in the room with his characters, sometimes turning the main character into the narrator and quoting dialogue he could not possibly have overheard. That would not be acceptable among academically trained historians because it distorts the facts, but it is an effective strategy to engage the reader.

The story Lichtblau tells is generally correct, although his statements sometimes lack precision that can be misleading, as Robert Huddleston has pointed out in his review of the book for *History News Network*. For his recap of “Project Paperclip,” with which I am most familiar, I wish he had relied on professional historians rather than on other investigative journalists. This military operation, which provided jobs and U.S. citizenship for several hundred German and Austrian scientists, engineers, and technicians after World War II, has received attention from professional historians who were generally ignored by Lichtblau, including Clarence G. Lasby’s *Pro-
ject Paperclip: German Scientists and the Cold War (New York: Atheneum, 1971, which, while dated and not including many files that were not yet declassified, is still the only comprehensive scholarly account of the operation, and John Gimbel’s article “Project Paperclip: German Scientists, American Policy and the Cold War” in Diplomatic History (14 (1990): 343-65), which is a direct corrective of the conspiracy claims made by the authors that Lichtblau cites. I was also missing more analysis that might help his non-specialist readers understand what all of this means and why it is important, other than to incite moral indignation. Why were American officials so willing to embrace former Nazis? What exact role did the Cold War play in this history? Were most of the OSI’s cases as bizarre as the ones cited here? What are some long-term implications of this history? Why did the U.S. Justice Department not want to release the report chronicling its activities? Since we keep finding war criminals among immigrants, what can we learn from the mistakes outlined in this book?

The Nazis Next Door is a good read that makes this history interesting and therefore more accessible for a larger audience. That said, I hope the report that stimulated Lichtblau to write this book receives another, more scholarly, treatment in the future.

NOTES

1. Reviewer Dr. Monique Laney is assistant professor of history at Auburn University.
On September 6th, 2015, Indian Country Today publicized a story that did not make mainstream news but resonated throughout Indian Country: a Navajo/Maidu student, Chiitaanibah Johnson, was ejected from her California State-Sacramento history class after asking the instructor to address the genocide of Native peoples in his coverage of American history. The instructor claimed that Native peoples had simply died of disease and that she was “hijacking” his class when she insisted (Schilling). Meanwhile, amid the protests of 50 different California tribes, Pope Francis made headlines when he canonized the controversial figure Juniper Serra, one of the leaders of the Spanish mission system that was known for its forceful abuse of the Native peoples it attempted to Christianize – a system that many California Native peoples now characterize as genocide (Burke). Both of these examples illustrate how critical the conversation around the concept of genocide has become to Indigenous peoples and how difficult it is to get the wider public to care. It is within such ongoing conversations that Alex Alvarez has published *Native America and the Question of Genocide*. His motivations stem from a concern that it is increasingly “fashionable” to use the word *genocide* to describe American Indian experiences and that the term should not be overused lest it lose its power (4-5). Alvarez endeavors not only to “shed light on the varied experiences of indigenous populations, but also to illustrate some of the definitional and conceptual ambiguity of the concept of genocide itself”(4).

Alvarez writes from the perspective of a scholar in sociology and criminal justice, and so his interest and analytical lens are defined by historical and legal definitions of genocide, beginning with Raphael Lemkin’s work after the Holocaust, the United Nations’ contributions, and the work of contemporary genocide scholars. He structures his work as a general historical narrative of contact in the Americas between European and Native peoples, tracing out the consequences of this contact with strategic examples to illustrate the ways in which the complex concept of genocide, from a legal standpoint, may or may not apply. Alvarez arranges this narrative thematically in terms of “Beginnings” (his take on the Bering Straight theory and the populating of North America); definitions of genocide and the complicated nature of them (“Genocide”); the ideological structures of ethnocentrism and Europe’s history of war, pre-contact (“Destructive Beliefs”); the
consequences of the introduction of European diseases to North America ("Disease"); some selected case studies including the Sand Creek Massacre, the first Wounded Knee, and California state policy regarding Native peoples ("Wars and Massacres"); the Navajo Long Walk ("Exiles in Their Own Land"); and U.S. education policy and boarding schools ("Education for Assimilation"). He concludes with a reflection on specialized language and its relationship to the existing suffering of many Native communities today ("What’s in a Name?").

Alvarez’s project is ambitious, and he himself admits that it is beyond the scope of one book to address how genocide may or may not apply in each individual historical encounter for 567 federally recognized communities and even more state-recognized communities. His summary of the concept of genocide and its complicated history is illuminating for readers who do not specialize in this topic, and the attention to the broad ideological attitudes of Europeans preceding colonization helps to avoid placing Europeans as mere villains in the narrative. What I particularly appreciate about his analysis is his desire to avoid glossing over differences between Native nations and their unique experiences under colonization. As scholars in Native studies know well, the writing of U.S. history has had a bad habit of lumping all indigenous peoples together, and Alvarez works to respect the historical and cultural differences between the Native communities represented in his chosen examples. As scholars of Native history know, the details of these encounters and relationships are rarely black and white, and there is considerable detail that should be considered when understanding the consequences of those encounters. Similarly, his concern over rhetorical hyperbole with some activists’ desire to equate what has happened to Native peoples with the Holocaust is to an extent warranted, as these histories are not directly equivalent.

At the same time, there are rhetorical and material consequences to Alvarez’s choices in how to address the questions he raises about the appropriateness of how to talk about genocide in relationship to colonization, past and present. Though Alvarez does not want to overtly state a definition of genocide by which to measure Native experiences – nor should he – over the course of the book it becomes clear that what he wants, if we are to use this term, are clear-cut cases of historically documented intent to kill or destroy and clear-cut cases of successfully carrying out that endeavor over a clearly-defined time period. Naturally, that is the “best-case” scenario when defining and applying the concept of genocide, but the end result is that because history is complex, most of the time he does not wish to use it to describe what happened to Native peoples—though he admits at times that the events may be “genocidal” but not “genocide” (106). Ironically, given that none of the events he chooses as case studies
lack in historical documentation, his overly-brief narrations of the events tend to do the simplifying that he desires to avoid with his application of genocide. Finally, purposefully or inadvertently, however much Alvarez claims that he writes this book as a way to more accurately describe individual Native histories, the structure functions to examine and then to dismiss (at least in most cases) what many Native peoples claim in their experience to be genocide or genocidal. The book could have just as easily have been written the other way around, in support of historically and legally accurate applications of genocide while demonstrating what may not qualify; instead, it reads more as a counterargument to Native peoples’ claims. The result is a book that appears to privilege the “scholarly discussion” over real-world consequences. Given this orientation, the most useful way this book could be used is in context with other recent scholarship such as Roxanne Dunbar Ortiz’s recent *An Indigenous Peoples’ History of the United States* or a well-documented case study that can do better justice to historical events, such as Brendan C. Lindsay’s *Murder State: California’s Native American Genocide, 1846-1873*.

In his conclusion—which in some ways is the most interesting part of the book—Alvarez concedes that the reason many use the term *genocide* is because it has become a rhetorical “shorthand for the worst possible kind of violence and criminality” (162) meant to communicate the scope of atrocities to the general public, and it is used because “the vocabulary of atrocity was and still is quite limited” (163). Yet he follows this concession with the concern that it is too easy to use “genocide” as a way to “elevat[e] one people’s suffering over that of other similarly victimized groups” toward an “exalted victimhood” (164). Such potentially offensive characterizations of Native peoples’ use of the word aside, Alvarez claims that “the reality is that the term used to describe a people’s suffering and/or victimization is ultimately irrelevant to their lived experience as human beings,” and thus “the fact that academics, scholars, and activists argue definitional issues related to genocide doesn’t take anything away from those who lived through the events briefly reviewed and described in this book.” I would beg to differ. In a time when a university instructor can try to remove a Native student from class for using the term and when a contentious historical figure who participated in a sharp legacy of Native oppression can literally be made a saint, these conversations are more meaningful than ever. They should be connected to Native communities, in support of Native communities, and not just be had in the abstract about them.
NOTES

1. Reviewer Dr. Lisa King is Assistant Professor of Rhetoric, Writing, and Linguistics at University of Tennessee-Knoxville.

REFERENCES


Lindsay, Brendan C. Murder State: California’s Native American Genocide, 1846-1873. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2012.

Black women became a mighty force rising up against white supremacy in the mid-nineteenth century. Through sexual exploitation, racially charged violence, and employment discrimination, the imposers of slavery and the oppression that followed sought to destroy black women. A small yet savvy group of women defied the powers of institutionalized racism and pressed forward to create and sustain institutions for African Americans. In A Forgotten Sisterhood: Pioneering Black Women Educators and Activists in the Jim Crow South, Audrey Thomas McCluskey uncovers the lives and educational contributions of four extraordinary women: Lucy C. Laney, Mary McLeod Bethune, Charlotte Hawkins Brown, and Nannie Helen Burroughs. McCluskey argues that the quartet of women believed that education was not so much a means to racial equality but the most successful route to undermining and nullifying the damaging effects of white supremacy and achieving a better life for the black community as a whole. During the turbulent era following Emancipation, these women sought to design schools that would secure young black men and women a place in a new and developing society.

Since the late 1980s into the 1990s scholars have published numerous books outlining the history of black clubwomen, highlighting the more prominent women in the movement. The importance of Thomas’s work lies in the “sisterhood” and “forgotten” aspects of her study. Thomas rightly defines her four subjects as “daughters of slavery,” situating them in their respective time period, regional culture and history, and gender construct expectations. While the women all came of age in the nineteenth century, two prior to Emancipation and two shortly after the end of Reconstruction, each woman was raised in homes where education, and access to it, was of primary concern. Even though there is nearly a thirty year gap between the births of Laney and Brown, the eldest and youngest of the group, the sisterhood began in the home. Thomas asserts that in the struggle against white supremacy, these women wholeheartedly agreed that encouraging the highest educational standard possible was the portal to the freedom blacks so desperately demanded during the years after Reconstruction.

As grown women, Thomas’s quartet of advocates belonged to a segment of the clubwomen’s movement whose teaching philosophies stretched
beyond rhetoric to actual implementation and administration of educational curriculum. However, the women were quite aware of the multiple routes to achieve the very freedom black people desired. All of the women created curriculum that addressed basic learning objectives. Bethune faced criticism early for implementing domestic science for young women, a line of curriculum that seemed to funnel women into housekeeping positions. As the liberal arts and business courses developed at her school, Bethune still believed that the curriculum teaching domestic science was important because women needed to earn a living. Burroughs also prepared her young students for the employment market, stating that black women of the time worked in the domestic sciences, and it would be a problem if she did not prepare them for the present day reality. Survival and uplift became the dual components of education to which all the women subscribed.

At the height of their success as school founders, what is forgotten was the often daunting task of finding support for their schools. In the most intriguing chapter, “The Masses and The Classes: Women’s Friendships and Support Networks among School Founders,” McCluskey explores the women’s ability to network and navigate during this time period, which was phenomenal. McCluskey begins with Laney, the matriarch of the quartet, analyzing how she stitched together funders, students, and other support for her Haines Normal and Industrial Institute school. In particular, McCluskey focuses on the strong networks developed by both Bethune and Brown. Brown founded the Alice Freeman Palmer Memorial Institute, utilizing an impressive network that covered the entire eastern seaboard, from New England to North Carolina. In addition to the communities of clubwomen in the region, Northern donors, both men and women, saw fit to sustain Brown’s Palmer Institute. Raised in Massachusetts in a more racially tolerant environment, Brown consistently received financial aid from her mentor’s family and white sympathizers. To help support her Daytona Educational and Industrial Training School for Negro Girls, Bethune mined the local white Palmetto Women’s Club, populated by wealthy whites Northern vacationers, to fill her supervisory board. Bethune also tapped into the black women’s support system. Burroughs cultivated deep connections with the National Baptist Convention to support her National Training School for Negro girls in the nation’s capital. Burroughs could boast that her status was supported more often than not by black men and women of the National Baptist organizations. Regardless of whether the surrounding community supported the schools, the women understood the importance of soliciting support from those with much to gain from its existence.

Though Thomas gives us a gift in bringing these historical women’s contributions together, A Forgotten Sisterhood is weakened by dated scholarship. A consequence of this is that the examination of the women’s edu-
cational philosophies is two-dimensional, citing DuBoisian and Washingtonian ideologies most often, though there are many recent published projects that speak to the diversity of thought that impacted the vision of many nineteenth century black women, including clubwomen’s use of Garveyism and Pan Africanism. In the end, McCluskey’s work successfully introduces the “forgotten” component of these women and examines the complexities. Education for them was business. The ways in which they financed the building of facilities, nurtured relationships with wealthy donors, strategized around government and religious institution funding, and tackled mounting debt demanded a business management mindset and savvy multi-tasking many other educators did not have. In order to build, manage, and grow these educational institutions for African Americans, the women’s ability to maneuver around racial and gender norms was tested at every side. Conquering the violence, retribution, and uncertainty of their time accentuated their understanding of the importance of networking with like-minded supporters while operating in a system of white supremacy and oppression.

NOTES

1. Reviewer Doretha K. Williams is Project Director of the D.C. Africana Archives Project in the Africana Studies Program and Gelman Library at The George Washington University.