Dedication

This volume of the *Journal of Hate Studies* is dedicated to
Eva Lassman, 1919-2011.
The Journal of Hate Studies is published annually by the Gonzaga University Institute for Hate Studies. The purpose of the Journal is to promote the sharing of interdisciplinary ideas and research relating to the study of what hate is, where it comes from, and how to combat it. The Gonzaga University Institute for Hate Studies is operated under the auspices of Gonzaga University in Spokane, Washington. The views expressed in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Gonzaga University Institute for Hate Studies, Gonzaga University, the institutions with which the authors are affiliated, or the editors.

The Journal welcomes unsolicited manuscripts (including essays and shorter pieces) and suggestions for improving the Journal. Manuscripts and other communications should be sent to: Director, Gonzaga University Institute for Hate Studies, Gonzaga University, Spokane, WA 99258-0043.

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Deadline: March 15, 2012

“Hate and Political Discourse”
Journal of Hate Studies
Volume 10, No. 1 (2011/12)

Guest Editor:
Robert L. Tsai, J.D.
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ABOUT THE THEME

Often shielded by constitutional rules and nurtured by political discourse, hate has a mercurial existence in the popular imagination. In the “arena of angry minds,” as Richard Hofstadter called American political life, political actors sometimes choose to condemn hatred, distance themselves from it, appeal to its existence, or foment it.

Even when subjugation, discrimination, or violence is not the goal, the politics of hate can pay off. Rather than seeking its total eradication, many democracies assume the permanence of hate and seek to minimize its excesses or to punish and prohibit specific expressions. Are such assumptions well-founded, and such strategies wise?

Some of the social groups marked through the techniques of hatred have changed over time, as the political dividends for resorting to strategies of hate have shifted, while other groups seem to be consistent targets of hate. Technological advances offer new tools to combat hate mongering even as they can make demagogues more effective.

What are the structural conditions that allow hate to thrive or might permit its isolation? How might inroads be made in the law or politics of inclusion, especially in countries with strong commitments to rhetorical freedom and popular sovereignty?

CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS

The Journal of Hate Studies welcomes original papers treating the theme of “Hate and Political Discourse,” from a wide range of disciplines, including history, law, philosophy, political science, sociology, criminal justice,
social psychology, economics, anthropology, geography, journalism, communications, rhetoric, literature, educational studies, and cultural studies.

We especially encourage original treatments of the following topics:

- Hate and popular sovereignty
- How hate can foster alternative communities and movements
- Cultural foundations of hate
- Historical changes in rhetorical strategies
- Political parties and hate
- Necessary political conditions for hate
- Empirical approaches to the problem of hate
- The role of hate in nation-building
- How literature, rhetoric, journalism or other forms of communication can fuel or discourage hate
- Geographical differences in how hatred is sustained or combated
- Comparative approaches and cross-cultural challenges
- New technologies in combating or fomenting hatred in the realm of political discourse

We anticipate hosting an invitational Symposium in Fall 2012, either at American University or Gonzaga University, in conjunction with the publication of this Volume. Authors published in this Volume would be invited to present their work at the Symposium.

ABOUT THE JOURNAL

The Journal of Hate Studies is a peer-reviewed publication of the Gonzaga University Institute for Hate Studies. The Journal of Hate Studies is an international scholarly journal promoting the sharing of interdisciplinary ideas and research relating to the study of what hate is, where it comes from, and how to combat it. It presents cutting-edge essays, theory, and research that deepen the understanding of the development and expression of hate.

GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSIONS

Submissions are typically expected to be between 5,000 and 10,000 words. Submissions may be made in either of the following ways.

- As an attachment sent by email to hatestudies@gonzaga.edu
- Through the Journal’s online site (http://journals.gonzaga.edu/index.php/johs/information/authors)
Submissions should be made in MS Word format. Please do not submit PDFs.

Submissions should be presented in APA format, with minimal endnotes rather than footnotes. However, legal scholarship may be presented in Bluebook or ALWD.

More information about submission guidelines, the Journal of Hate Studies, and the Gonzaga University Institute for Hate Studies can be found at http://gonzaga.edu/hatestudies.

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Preface

INTRODUCTION

On behalf of the Gonzaga University Institute for Hate Studies and the Journal of Hate Studies, it is our pleasure to offer Volume 9 of the Journal. Herein readers will find a collection of eleven articles, a special interview with a recent Nobel Peace Prize nominee, and a remembrance of a woman whose life and work helped inspire the field of Hate Studies.

The present volume includes selected proceedings from the Second International Conference on Hate Studies, which took place April 6-9, 2011 in Spokane, Washington. These articles exemplify the conference’s theme of “Interdisciplinary Approaches to Understanding the Nature of Hate, Crafting Models for Combating Hatred, and Implications for Practice” and span its four areas of concentration: education, research, practice, and advocacy.

Seven years have now passed since the First International Conference was held in 2004 at Gonzaga University in order to “Establish the Field of Hate Studies.” In many ways, the Second Conference provided a global “altar call” to convene a community of leaders and future leaders in this still-emerging field of study.

The four-day conference brought together more than 250 individuals from two dozen countries and four continents. Leading academics from several of the world’s top-ranked colleges and universities conversed with educators, researchers, human rights experts, law enforcement personnel, representatives of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, journalists and media members, community leaders, activists, students, and many others. The conversation focused on how to better understand and analyze hatred from multiple perspectives, and how to prevent and combat hatred in its various manifestations. The full conference lineup, including presentation abstracts, is available for download at http://guweb2.gonzaga.edu/againsthate/ConferencePresentationAbstracts.pdf.

The conference provided many highlights, beginning with the opening night remarks of Charlene Teters, who spoke on the topic of “Bringing One’s Whole Being to Countering Hatred.” Teters is a Professor of the Institute of American Indian Arts and is also a founding member of the National Coalition on Racism in Sports and the Media. She is known in particular for her stance against the University of Illinois’s use of the “Chief Illiniwek” mascot and logo. On October 10, 1997, ABC News Anchor Peter Jennings recognized Professor Teters as “Person of the Week” and profiled her message, activism, and work on ABC World News Tonight. As
a member of the Spokane Tribe of Indians, speaking at the conference represented for Professor Teters a homecoming and return to sacred land; her Spokane name is Slum Tah.

Though told in different voices, other featured sessions delivered similar messages and impact. Hannah Rosenthal, a Special Envoy of the U.S. Department of State, spoke on the necessity to “confront and combat the many forms of hatred in our world today.” She reminded those gathered of the wisdom of the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., who described hatred as “an unchecked cancer” that “corrodes the personality and eats away its vital unity . . . destroys [one’s] sense of values and [one’s] objectivity” and leads one “to describe the beautiful as ugly and the ugly as beautiful, and to confuse the true with the false and the false with the true.” Rosenthal is the Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism, and the full text of her prepared remarks is available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/rm/2011/160352.htm.

Sharing with the global community his plea for peace in the Middle East and an end to enmity between Israelis and Palestinians, Dr. Izzeldin Abuelaish delivered the Conference’s keynote address. A Nobel Peace Prize nominee in 2010 and a recognized voice for reconciliation, “the Gaza Doctor” has penned the autobiography, *I Shall Not Hate: A Gaza Doctor’s Journey on the Road to Peace and Human Dignity*. Millions worldwide are now familiar with Dr. Abuelaish’s amazing story of resilience in the face of unimaginable heartbreak and tireless travail in pursuit of peace and health for all people. On January 16, 2009, three of his daughters and one of his nieces – all civilians – perished when Israeli tank fire destroyed his home in Gaza’s Jabaliya refugee camp. Dr. Abuelaish recounted these horrible events live only moments later on Israel’s Television 10, for whom he had been reporting daily during the Gaza War (the Israeli incursion of December 27, 2008 through January 18, 2009). U.S. President Barack Obama’s May 19, 2011 address, “Moment of Opportunity: American Diplomacy in the Middle East and North Africa,” referenced Dr. Abuelaish’s life story and his call for peace and reconciliation.

Amid these wonderful moments during the Conference came this sad news: Professor Keith Aoki, one of the featured speakers, would not participate due to ill health. Soon sadness turned to grief, then mourning. Professor Aoki passed away on April 26, 2011, after a private and lengthy battle against a terminal illness. Aoki was a Professor of Law at King Hall School of Law, the University of California at Davis. He was an expert in Critical Race Theory, Asian American Jurisprudence, Intellectual Property, and State and Local Government Law. Aoki and Institute for Hate Studies Director John Shuford co-authored numerous recent articles on immigration law and policy, and Aoki was scheduled to speak during the Director’s Ses-

ABOUT THIS VOLUME

One example of hate activity that has been available in the news of late made its way to the Supreme Court in the recently-decided case Snyder v. Phelps. Members of the Westboro Baptist Church picket near the funerals of soldiers and others, proclaiming that “God Hates Fags,” “God Loves Dead Soldiers,” and “Thank God For Breast Cancer.” Rebecca Barrett-Fox of the University of Kansas became curious about what motivated the group; she also wondered about the emotional attitude researchers should take toward such subjects, whom so many people apparently find highly distasteful. Does it make sense to have empathy toward people who take hateful action, Barrett-Fox wondered, and how does taking a compassionate stance toward them affect ethnographic research? She answers these questions in her article, “Anger and Compassion on the Picket Line: Ethnography and Emotion in the Study of Westboro Baptist Church.” After spending years going to services with Church members, talking with them, joining them on their bus as they traveled to pickets, and watching them in action, Barrett-Fox found that having an emotional connection with her subjects did not make her more sympathetic to their cause, and did make her less likely to be desensitized to their behavior. Barrett-Fox recounts several lessons learned and concludes that “achieving an ethical, workable, and productive rapport may be easier than expected in some cases and, I think, remains an important strategy for comprehending the life-worlds of individuals engaged in hate groups.”

Sarah Steele, of Cambridge University and Flinders University of South Australia, also has concerns about the perception and treatment of those whom majority populations deem to be unacceptable—and their victims too. In “‘Combating the Scourge’: Constructing the Masculine ‘Other’ Through U.S. Government Anti-trafficking Campaigns,” Steele argues that nativism, racism, and anti-immigrant sentiment presented by representatives of the U.S. government in the context of human trafficking leaves both victims and traffickers portrayed as one-dimensional criminals. “Current anti-trafficking regimes,” Steele contends, “embody and restate xenophobic reactions directed against illegal migrant men, while often disguising the role domestic actors have in trafficking.” Additionally, Steele observes, the images presented imply that traffickers are lacking in “proper” masculinity, particularly of the sort embraced by Americans. Steele explains that her article “not only explores how government anti-trafficking statements made
between 1998 and 2010 create and reinforce divides in masculinities based on regimes of racial domination, but also notes particularly how anti-trafficking furthers the domination of white American masculinity.” She describes the ineffectiveness of such an approach and suggests that we must “move beyond racial stereotyping and the immigration frame” if we hope to broaden our definitions and understandings in a way that will deepen our thinking and allow us to see those involved in this trade as multi-faceted and textured human beings, thereby allowing us to pursue social change more effectively.

The stereotyping and dismissal of “Others” described by Steele is also addressed by William Arrocha in his article, “Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070: Targeting the Other and Generating Discourses and Practices of Discrimination and Hate.” Arrocha, an assistant professor at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (a graduate school of Middlebury College), observes that the profiling of those who are presumed to be undocumented immigrants, which Arizona Senate Bill 1070 of 2010 would allow, is likely to exacerbate existing tensions and to foster hate among current residents of the state and nation. Under such conditions, Arrocha contends, “a future in which the common ethos of inclusion and mutual respect is desired can be seriously jeopardized.” He adds that such an environment is also likely to result in an increase in hate crimes. Alternatives to the ways in which immigrants are currently defined, both legally and socially, are presented, as are alternatives to current social and legal institutions; but before these can be implemented, Arrocha notes, we must cease to view the immigrant as “other,” as an alien and a threat. Yet, he claims, the U.S. economy depends upon the maintenance of a racialized, marginalized “other” for purposes of economic exploitation and self-definition. Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently upheld a lower court’s preliminary injunction that prevented Arizona from enacting many of the more controversial aspects of S.B. 1070, Arrocha notes that only the passing of time will tell us how the clash between these conflicting forces will play out. Arrocha’s presentation came during the Director’s Session on “Hate in the Immigration Debate.” Also presenting in this invited session were Latino Critical Legal Studies scholar Professor Steven Bender, now of Seattle University School of Law, and Institute for Hate Studies Director John Shuford.

Terrance MacMullan, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Honors at Eastern Washington University propounds that despite the election of a Black president, racism continues to exist and to be active in the United States. The good news is that racism, particularly among Whites, is often a result of inculcated habits rather than of a chosen stance—habits that range from the “merely stupid and insensitive to the viciously violent,” and can
therefore be unlearned and changed, and replaced with better habits. MacMullan asserts that it is our intellectual inheritance, the categories with which we think, that allows us to behave habitually in a way that oppresses another race. If we are to change these often-unconscious habits, MacMullan argues, we must become aware of them, see their origination and their destination, and change them into choices that are a better fit for the 21st century world. Doing so, he explains, will allow us to direct vague fears of the “other” into actions directed toward building harmonious community.

In “The Community Security Trust – Best Practice in Combating Antisemitic Hate,” Michael Whine, Director of Government & International Affairs at the Community Security Trust, describes antisemitic activity in post WWII Britain and the Jewish community’s response. He also describes legal and political developments in the realm of antisemitism. He recounts how the Community Security Organisation, which in 1994 became the Community Security Trust (CST), was established in an effort to address security issues being confronted by the Jewish community in Britain. Whine details the structure of the CST and lays out its goals and methods. The organization’s activities, which are offered free of charge to the entire community, include providing suggestions and training to community groups and individuals regarding security issues. CST also provides advice to Jewish community institutions and their staff, builds relationships with other minority groups, and works internationally in the realm of hate crimes. Whine concludes that CST offers an example of best practice within the realm of groups combating hate.

Jordan Blair Woods, Ph.D. candidate at the University of Cambridge, also takes a look at hate crime in Britain. In “Policing Hatred: A Case Study of an English Police Force,” Woods examines the attitudes and actions of police officers in a small city within the context of hate crime allegation, investigation, law enforcement, and prosecution. Woods broadens the focus of hate crime research in Britain, which formerly concentrated primarily on cases having to do with race and faith, by including cases that involve, additionally, gender identity, sexual orientation, and disability, which are considered aggravating factors when sentencing takes place. Woods’ goal was to gather systemic knowledge about the real-world enforcement of hate crime laws, which he does through the use of observations and interviews. He found that obstacles to the prosecution of hate crime included a lack of financial resources, high turnover, difficulty of proof and obtaining conviction, and distrust of the police among minority communities. Woods also found that in officers’ minds, hate crimes were strongly associated with race, which could cause alleged cases motivated by other kinds of hatred to be neglected. The study suggests, among other things, the importance of conducting further research regarding the defini-
tions of hate crime, the role of police discretion in the prosecution of hate crimes, and the value of devolving hate crime work onto units specifically trained and assigned to this area.

Special training is also a focus of Tamar Ascher Shai, who contributes “Taking a Stand: The Role of the Early Childhood Teacher in Educating Against Homophobia.” Ascher Schai, who is a senior lecturer at the David Yellin College of Education in Israel, argues that, although many people think that harassment based on sexual orientation is an issue that is confronted by adolescents and young adults, young children also feel the repercussions. Ascher Schai asserts that teachers need to teach children early that sexual orientation and/or behavior that does not fit heterosexual norms is acceptable and legitimate. She contends that unclear terminology and ignorance fuel negative sexual stereotypes and must be eliminated. She describes the effects of homophobia on young children’s development and charges teachers to play a key role in eliminating that homophobia, asserting that teachers who support a diversity of gender identities and behavior “will contribute to children’s sense of trust and faith in the world, their confidence in themselves, and behavior that is characterized by independence and initiative.” She cautions that teachers must create a space where young children, and their families, feel safe. Teacher preparation programs should educate teachers about how to explore their own prejudices and unexplored perceptions, Ascher Schai argues, as well as how to deal with homophobia in the classroom.

Jo Ann Jankoski, an assistant professor in the Department of Human Development and Family Studies at Penn State University, also addresses the topic of tolerance in the classroom. Her article is entitled “Socialization and Hate: Can Higher Education Make a Difference?” Her answer to her own question is a resounding “yes.” Jankoski offers a case study of two college students, both of whom had been reared in homes in which hatred for people of other races, religions, and sexual orientations was the norm and was openly expressed. Using the frameworks of the Cycle of Socialization and the Hate Model, Jankoski describes the intellectual and emotional changes that took place in the two college students as a result of reflecting on course materials and engaging with the teacher, as well as with other students whom they initially had marginalized and harassed. Jankoski concludes that change is indeed possible; to lay the groundwork for it, teachers must explore their own biases, challenge those of students, and educate students about social justice and diversity. Jankoski further recommends that teachers learn about and employ the Cycle of Socialization in their classes to allow students a chance to “question, reflect, and struggle with who they are as individuals, and, more importantly, who they want to become.”

If we are to help people answer those questions and others, “an anthrop-
pology of hate is long overdue,” asserts Jennifer Schlegel, an assistant professor at Kutztown University in Pennsylvania. In her article, “Applied Anthropology and Anti-hate Activism,” Schlegel writes first of the importance of responding to hateful speech and acts with open dialogue. She observes that hate activists look for towns that offer no vocal response to hate acts in order to find recruits. Schlegel tells how her own activism was rechanneled as a result of her fear for her children and her job. Knowing the importance of speaking out against racism and other forms of hate, Schlegel began teaching what she considers an applied anthropology course, called “Hate Across Cultures.” In this course, Schlegel defines hate as a practice rather than just an emotion. Through course readings, response papers, interactions with class members, and guest speakers, students come into contact with and re-assess their own stances in regard to hateful behaviors. Students have reported that the class has influenced decisions they made later in their lives. Schlegel emphasizes the need for ethnographic research that includes historical and community contexts, as well as the practices and suppositions that suppress or allow hate in any given community.

Why is it that people who hate sometimes use violence, but often choose not to? This is the question addressed by Anne Nassauer, a Ph.D. candidate at the Berlin Graduate School of Social Sciences, Humboldt University of Berlin, who is concerned with the possibility of interrupting hatred before it can escalate into violent action. Nassauer’s article, “From Hate to Collective Violence: Research and Practical Implications,” is indeed practical in its examination of the social interactions that lead, or do not lead, to violence. Nassauer argues that emotions, even those as strong as hate, are not enough to overcome our inhibition thresholds when it comes to violence; but that when these emotions are coupled with particular patterns of interpersonal dynamics, violence is more likely to ensue. She examines social demonstrations as offering particularly good examples of the sorts of sequences that often take place in tense situations, arguing that if we clearly understand such sequences and the emotional dynamics by which they are fueled, we can learn to interrupt those sequences and thereby prevent collective violence.

Collective violence is also a concern of Steven Leonard Jacobs, who focuses specifically on genocide. Jacobs, Associate Professor of Religious Studies and Aaron Aronov Endowed Chair in Religious Studies at the University of Alabama, discusses the role of religion as a “participating factor” in genocide. Using the framework of the three Abrahamic faiths—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—Jacobs suggests that tribalism, religious exclusivism, a belief that certain actors have privileged access to the divine, and narrow readings of sacred texts all contribute to religion’s having played a
role in many genocides. Jacobs then offers suggestions for extracting religion from genocide. These include acknowledging the role that religion has played in past genocides; offering anti-genocide education within religious frameworks; recognizing and honoring the common elements and the diversity among religions; acknowledging that no one religion is better than others, and that all religions seek both answers to questions about the meaning of life and encounter with the numinous; rejecting the notion of privileged access to the divine; and reading sacred texts with people of other faiths with an openness to understanding their experiences and interpretations. Jacobs offers these ideas as the beginnings of conversations, conversations whose importance in the movement to end genocide cannot be overemphasized.

Izzeldin Abuelaish also wants to end violence between people of diverse faiths. The Michael & Amira Dan Professor in Global Health in the University of Toronto’s Faculty of Medicine was interviewed by our editor, Joanie Eppinga, at the Second International Conference on Hate Studies. Their conversation is recorded in “‘The Antidote to Hate Is Success’: An Interview With Izzeldin Abuelaish.” Dr. Abuelaish has responded to personal tragedy with a grace and compassion almost beyond comprehension, and in this special interview he describes his ideas for building a peaceful world through education, dialogue, mature behavior and role modeling, and an enhanced sense of connection with all people. Abuelaish also places particular emphasis on the role of women, expressing the belief that women are key players on the road to a global community.

One woman who did indeed play such a role in standing up to hate and reshaping community was Eva Lassman. An honorary board member of the Institute for Hate Studies, a Holocaust survivor, a wife, mother, speaker, friend, and constant inspiration to the Inland Northwest community for more than 50 years, Eva passed away on February 9, 2011 at the age of 91, leaving us poorer in comrades, yet richer in the wisdom she shared and the example she set. The Institute for Hate Studies presents annually two “Eva Lassman Take Action Against Hate Awards,” to individuals and organizations in the Inland Northwest. Jerri Shepard, Associate Professor of Educational Leadership at Gonzaga University, Institute board member, and personal friend of Eva, offers the memorial to Eva that concludes this volume of the Journal of Hate Studies.

THE FUTURE OF HATE STUDIES

After convening two successful International Conferences and producing nine volumes of the Journal of Hate Studies, readers of this volume may wonder: What happens next?
For starters, Volume 10 of the *Journal* will focus on the theme “Hate and Political Discourse,” and Constitutional Law scholar Robert Tsai will serve as guest editor. Tsai, a Professor of Law at American University Washington College of Law, specializes in First Amendment Theory, Democratic Theory, Social Movements, and Law and Culture. More information about *Journal* Volume 10 appears in the “Call for Papers” within the present volume.

Then, in 2013, the Institute for Hate Studies will convene the Third International Conference on Hate Studies, held again in Spokane and hosted by Gonzaga University. We anticipate that the International Conference will become a biannual global gathering.

We also anticipate the creation of new learning opportunities and professional development experiences for those who are interested in Hate Studies. These would include jointly sponsored symposia, regional conferences, faculty workshops, practitioner institutes, special seminars, courses, and research projects.

In time, we envision the development of a membership-based International Society for Hate Studies, expanded student research awards, student scholarships, the development of collegiate academic programs in Hate Studies, perhaps even rotating locations for the International Conference.

Most importantly, we envision the continued growth in numbers, professional backgrounds, and methodologies of those who “do Hate Studies,” for it is clear that our world needs what Hate Studies has to offer.

We hope that Volume 9 of the *Journal of Hate Studies* contributes to your thought and your work. We encourage you to seek ways to become more involved with the Institute and the *Journal*, and we look forward to seeing you at the Third International Conference.

John Shuford
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Joanie Eppinga
Editor, *Journal of Hate Studies*
Anger and Compassion on the Picket Line: Ethnography and Emotion in the Study of Westboro Baptist Church

Rebecca Barrett-Fox
University of Kansas

ABSTRACT

Feminist ethnographic methods stress the role of empathy for research subjects and researchers’ willingness for their work to be useful to their subjects. When the research subjects are “unloved groups,” though—people whose actions or beliefs are hateful or harmful—some ethnographers argue that such empathy and empowerment is misplaced or leads to uncritical scholarship. In this reflection on the author’s ethnographic study of Westboro Baptist Church, a small Kansas-based congregation infamous for preaching its anti-gay theology at funerals, including the funerals of fallen servicemen and -women, she questions the usefulness of denying an emotional connection with “hatemongers.” Instead, she argues for compassion for both the victims and, more challengingly, the perpetrators of hate in order to protect researchers from the threat of desensitization.

Have you, as a scholar in hate studies, had one of these experiences?

• The person in seat 22C on the airplane politely asks what you do. Briefly, you consider saying that you are “in logistics” or something equally ambiguous before you confess that you are an anthropologist of race-based prison gangs and are, in fact, on your way to the Second International Conference on Hate Studies in Spokane, Washington, where you will meet with scholars with similarly dark interests. Seat 22C has no response to this, but cedes the armrest for the remainder of your flight.

• Your mother introduces you as a college teacher. Your mother-in-law, if you have one, ignores your career entirely in introductions, stressing that you come from a good family and secretly wondering why her son couldn’t have married a nice dental hygienist.

• Even other scholars, when they hear about your research on hate groups, ask, “But you don’t believe what they believe, do you?” (Your response: “You study the mating habits of the Madagascar hissing cockroach, but that doesn’t mean you’re attracted to them, does it?”)
Despite the scholarly stigma hate scholars sometimes face and the way that the talk of our work kills conversation at a cocktail party, we love what we do—because it is interesting, if discomforting, to a general public, especially compared with much academic work, and because it is sometimes dangerous and involves complex ideologies, unusual religious theologies, vivid and frightening eschatologies, bizarre rituals, and colorful characters. Additionally—and perhaps it would take an ethnography of hate scholars who use ethnographic methods, though that might be a little too much self-reflection even for a self-reflective field, to prove this—hate scholars may view working with extremists as evidence of their own adventurous spirits, even though, as researchers, they have a privilege that their subjects may lack: the ability to exit the scene. Writing in 2000, Sidney Mintz reminisced about the “occult fierceness, the desire to have ‘one’s people’ viewed as isolated and, hence, legitimate subjects of study” that marked anthropology half a century ago (2000, p. 171; italics in original). Similarly, hate studies scholars may view their work with sensitive topics and “unloved groups” (Fielding, 1982) as a badge of honor—one deserved, I think, given the challenges of ethnographic research on such populations.

We may enjoy this work—the intellectual rigor of it, the challenging methods, the evolving scope—yet this is work that we wish we did not have to do. This is not a mere academic study, but scholarship with a soul and a goal: to alleviate suffering, end institutional oppression, and bring forth justice. Scholars “can no longer afford to live with the comforting illusion that we act upon the world in socially just ways simply by inscribing and cataloging the many ways in which justice is absent, or that we give ‘voice’ to others by writing in our voice about their lives,” wrote Catherine Emihovich in her 2004 presidential address to the Council on Anthropology and Education (306)—though hate studies scholars have never thought that they could.

To combat hatred, our work necessarily gives attention to both the victims and the perpetrators of hate, which requires a critical examination and even, at times, empathy for people whose actions we find detestable. As scholars of hate, though, we know, too, that our understanding of hate and its consequences—and thus our hope for ending hate and its consequences—is limited if we study only victims. We are repeatedly given opportunities to explain the value of this scholarship in the larger pursuit of justice when our friends, family members, colleagues, and even strangers on planes ask us questions such as “Why would you want to do that?” and “But isn’t studying them just giving them the attention they want?” They, rightly, find our research subjects “distasteful” (Esseveld & Eyerman, 1992). Accidentally glorifying or encouraging such groups through academic scrutiny is a “dangerous outcome,” notes Kathleen Blee (2002), “but
the consequences [of not doing the scholarship] are worse” (p. 21). Indeed, such research can be beneficial to opposition efforts. Concludes Susan F. Harding (1991) in her work on religious fundamentalists:

We—situated, implicated, and self-reflexive—can. . . come up with more nuanced, complicated, partial, and local readings of who they are and what they are doing and therefore design more effective political strategies to oppose directly the specific positions and policies they advocate. (p. 393)

To gain an understanding of hate groups, many of us use ethnography. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, and again with the election of the first African-American (and, according to much right-wing rhetoric, Muslim) president in 2008 that coincided with an economic downturn, hate group monitors saw an uptick in anti-Muslim and racist group activity, much of it claiming roots in conservative (if often unorthodox) Christianity (“The Year in Hate, 2001,” 2002; Potok, 2011). Such new activity keeps scholars of hate—and, more specifically, of religiously-inspired hatred—busy.

I. ETHNOGRAPHY AND HATE GROUPS

Ethnography promises to be particularly useful for studying hate groups, whose members do not always leave a tidy written record preserved in a carefully maintained archive; yet “scholarship on the far right generally analyzes right-wing extremism from a distance,” analyzing “the economic, social, attitudinal, or cultural environments that nurture organized racism and right-wing extremism rather than the dynamics of the far right itself” (Blee, 2007, p. 120). Research on hateful behavior, including hate crime, tends to be quantitative and descriptive. About research on hate crimes, Green, McFalls, and Smith (2001) observed, “To a degree unusual in behavioral science, researchers are highly dependent on statistics compiled by government and watchdog organizations” (p. 498), institutions with their own agendas in tracking such data. Ethnographic research is less common, despite the fact that “publicly available data may not accurately reflect the internal ideology of members or even goals of groups” (Blee, 2007, pp. 120-121). Blee’s work on the Klan, Mark S. Hamm’s (1993) work on skinheads, and Rapheal Ezekial’s (1995) work on neo-Nazis and Klansmen have provided models for such research on American hate groups, and Blee (1993, 1998, 2003, and, with Taylor, 2002), in particular, has written extensively about the challenges of ethnographic methods and extremism. Scholarship on European extremists groups has grown since the late 1990s in response to increased xenophobia in northern European nations (see, for
example, Bjørgo, 1997; Klandermans & Mayer, 2006; and Linden & Klandermans, 2007). The April 2007 issue of The Journal of Contemporary Ethnography focused on ethnographies of right-wing groups, providing examples from around the globe for cross-cultural comparison. Still, ethnography remains an underused method for studying hate groups because, as with other kinds of research on hate groups, “the difficulties associated with sensitive research have tended to inhibit adequate conceptualization” (Lee & Renzetti, 1993, p. 7).

These difficulties include extremists’ mistrust of scholars (Blee, 2007, p. 121); scholars’ resistance to establishing “the rapport necessary for close-up studies of those they regard as inexplicable or repugnant, in addition to dangerous and violent” (Blee, 2007, pp. 120-121); or discomfort with the “modes of thought” that inform such groups (Lee, 1995, p. 8), although, as Mintz notes, “some of the best and most trying fieldwork has been done with people with whose values their ethnographers were not in accord” (2000, p. 175; italics in original). Additional barriers include scholars’ “upper-middle-class (postcolonial) distaste for violating cultural and class apartheds” (Mintz, 2000, p. 178); “the difficulties of sharing the daily lives and practices of those one is working with,” especially in contrast to a life in a private sphere that “grows more private” (Harris 2000, p. 183); the difficulty of accessing groups with members whom scholars are unlikely to know through personal contacts (Ayella, 1990); the effort involved in creating a representative sample (Blee, 1996); the challenge of maintaining access to groups that change quickly (Ayella, 1990); concern that subjects who have engaged in illegal activities will be prosecuted (Blee, 1999) or for researchers who work with such groups (Lee, 1995); the ethics of obtaining informed consent from people whose “behavior is so reprehensible or immoral that it warrants exposing” (Thorne, 1980, p. 294); the challenge of interpreting data that may include “deceptive information, disingenuous denials of culpability, and dubious assertions” (Blee, 1993, p. 597) and “mut[es] past atrocities” (p. 601); “ambient danger” that arises simply by researching in a potentially dangerous setting (Lee, 1995, p. 3); culture shock (Ayella, 1990); handling emotional responses to the group, especially rapport that threatens to impede critical analysis (Ayella, 1990; see also Blee, 1998); conversion attempts (Ayella, 19903); and the stigma of investigating a group labeled “deviant” (Ayella, 1990; see also Blee, 1998). Indeed, notes Olivia Harris (2000) with some humor,

Wanting to be [an ethnographer] involves a unique degree of personal commitment to subject one’s own desires to an alien lifeway, to endure a high level of uncertainty and often discomfort, to be ignored or the butt of constant jokes or the recipient of outright aggression. And at the end of
it is an impossible aim: to reorient one’s intuitions so that they begin to coincide with those of the people one is working with. (p. 184)

For those studying hate groups with ethnographic methods, Harris’ “impossible aim” is a threatening specter, and though we often dismiss it with a laugh, we must brace against a thorough reorientation of our intuitions. Early on in my own work on Westboro Baptist Church, a seventy-person Topeka, Kansas-based congregation that is known for spreading its anti-gay message via picketing at funerals, including at funerals of fallen military servicemen and -women, I learned that one of the most influential church members, Steve Drain, had joined the church after he completed a documentary film, originally titled *Fred: The Movie* and later retitled *Hatemongers*, as part of his master’s degree in film and theatre at the University of Kansas, where I was a graduate student. ¹ According to Steve, his dominant worldview was libertarian, not religious, when he began his project. Only after the filming had been completed and he had moved to Florida, where he lived with his wife and two children, to edit and release the film, did he have a religious conversion. With his protesting wife and children in tow, Steve moved his family to Topeka to join the church; soon, the rest of the Drain family joined Westboro Baptist Church, and Steve and his wife, in accordance with church teachings, reversed their use of birth control and had two more children. Steve’s conversion story illustrates the potentially powerful pull of extremist groups, even for people who identify their interest as academic.

A more likely outcome than conversion, though, is desensitization to hate and its effects. Researchers must guard against the possible numbing of outrage at the harm the groups we study cause. Indeed, Blee interpreted her own decreasing outrage at stories of racist violence as a signal that she needed to leave the field and “regain emotional separation from the research” (1998, p. 396). This separation remains a challenge, even as anthropology has come to question the ability of researchers to remain objective and detached from their subjects. In his introduction to *Asylums*, Erving Goffman set a new standard: not just to observe the goings-on of people, but to understanding the meaning they assign to their lives. He writes, “It... still is my belief that any group of persons... develop a life of their own that becomes meaningful, reasonable, and normal once you get close to it.” The purpose of field research is to “get close to it,” which requires the researcher “to submit oneself in the company of the members to the daily round of petty contingencies to which they are subject” (p. ix-x), or, as Murray Wax (1980) defined it, “to enter into the matrix of meanings of the researched, to participate in their system of organized activities, and to feel subject to their code of moral regulation” (pp. 272-273; italics
added). Doing so for a clearly wronged group—victims of racism, for example—is noble, though it is, of course, emotionally difficult, whereas experiencing the daily life of and understanding the symbolic world of the one who is clearly the offender is a different kind of emotional challenge, one that may prompt other scholars to accuse us of misplaced sympathies. Even at the academic level, dualistic thinking pervades, and other scholars may dismiss studies of hate groups as unnecessary, for surely we know enough about members of the Klan or Aryan Nations to know that we don’t need to know more. Or, Harding (1991) warns, “insofar as academic representations of fundamentalists are modern, then disrupting them may provoke charges of consorting with ‘them,’ the opponents of modernity, progress, enlightenment, truth, and reason,” a “risky project” she encourages (p. 375).

Critics of such potentially destabilizing research confuse two kinds of understanding: comprehension and empathy. Ethnographers of hate groups aim for comprehension, and we may use empathy as a tool to achieve it; the goal is not to create an apologetic portrait of racists or antisemites or homophobes, but one that captures the complexities of their lives, and “oral histories are exceptionally sensitive sources for recording the lack of self-consciousness in historical subjects, the sensation of normality and conventionality” of their everyday lives in extremist groups (Blee, 1993, p. 602). Additionally, because oral histories often incorporate life history interviews, “respondents are less likely to present group dogma as personal sentiment” (Blee, 1996, p. 687). Researchers will almost always find that theories that seek to explain hateful behavior by focusing on an individual—even the “lone wolf” assassin or socially outcast mass shooter—explain relatively little. Instead, hate studies scholars are likely to find explanations for hate that implicate whole societies or large swaths of it, as hate finds its nurturance in larger contexts.

Some of the surprising findings that emerge from ethnographies of hate groups—that most members of hate groups are more like members of the general population than they are different; that membership is heterogeneous; that members have rich emotional experiences and that hate groups can provide cultural traditions for members; that latent racism, sexism, and homophobia in the broader society permit and support hate crimes—can be overlooked when ethnographic data is not included in analyses. Reminds Kaye/Kantrowitz (2002), “The power of racist activism derives in part from the causal ordinary racism which permeates mainstream culture”—and the same is true of other prejudices that, in their extreme manifestations, so outrage the average citizens who remain silent about their quieter expressions (p. 4). Examining the extreme fringe can illuminate the center of the spectrum. For this project, as “for nearly every purpose,” fieldwork remains
Fieldwork on hate groups contains ambivalent impulses, though. Hate studies scholars want their research subjects to fail, even as they are invested in the work of hate groups. If we reveal our desire for their failure to our subjects, we risk losing access to them; but feigning sympathy for a hateful position is unethical. And if our subjects fail, we have little to report. Like workers at a weapons factory, we are successful because of conflict, even if we hate war. Untangling our investment while adhering to our professional codes of conduct, which generally stress transparency in our relationships with our subjects, and maintaining access to subjects whose positions we frequently do not respect, even as we may feel genuine concern or even affection for them (Klatch, 1988), is a formidable task, for “in order to understand, researchers must be more than technically competent. They must enter into cathected intimacies, open themselves to their subjects’ feeling worlds, whether those worlds are congenial to them or repulsive” (Mitchell, 1993, p. 55). While some feminist and post-colonial scholars have called into question the ability of elite anthropologists to do this kind of work, drawing attention to what Alcoff (1991-1992) calls “the problem of speaking for others,” others believe in the possibility of “an egalitarian research process characterized by authenticity, reciprocity, and intersubjectivity between the researcher and her ‘subjects’” (Stacey, 1991, p. 112). This dynamic is not always possible, or even desirable, for working with hate groups. Writes Blee (1998),

> It is one thing to seek to understand the world through the eyes of an informant with whom you have some (even a little) sympathy, but a very different matter to think about developing rapport with someone... whose life is given meaning and purpose by the desire to annihilate you or others like you. (p. 388)

Even in those cases, achieving rapport may be “surprisingly, and disturbingly, easy” (Blee, 1993, p. 605). Recalls Blee (1993) of her interviews with women who are part of racist hate groups:

> I was prepared to hate and fear my informants, to find them repellent and, more important, strange. I expected no rapport, no shared assumptions, no commonality of thought or experience. Moreover, I expected them to be wary of me and reluctant to express their true attitudes. But this was not the case. (p. 604)

Indeed, the ease of rapport revealed, for Blee, a “complicated and... disturbing reality” that allowed her to see the apparent normality of racism for
her subjects, an insight that other research methods might not have detected (p. 605). Still, achieving an ethical, workable, and productive rapport may be easier than expected in some cases and, I think, remains an important strategy for comprehending the life-worlds of individuals engaged in hate groups. Doing so requires having a rich content knowledge about the culture being studied, self-awareness, sensitivity, and a stout-heartedness not absent from other kinds of research, but necessary here.

In keeping with the inclination of cultural sociologists “to reflect upon the theoretical and methodological orientations that nurture cultural studies” (Lee, 1999, p. 548) and the reflexivity central to feminist methodology (Taylor, 1998), I share a vignette from my own field research. My fieldwork began informally in 2004 and culminated in formal fieldwork from January to October 2010. I am wary of sharing this anecdote, concerned that it not be misinterpreted as evidence of a special relationship with church members, because it is not, though I maintain a positive relationship with church members, in part because of my interest in and knowledge of the church’s Calvinist theology and in part because my proximity to the church allows for occasional visits, even now. Instead, I share this story as a moment in my field research when I was explicitly aware of the emotional challenge of responding to one of the nation’s most notorious hate groups, which the Southern Poverty Law Center calls “arguably the most obnoxious and rabid hate group in America” (2011). It is my attempt to meet Emerson’s (2001) charge

to present the ethnographer in full, rounded form, not simply as a disembodied textual voice or as a “researcher” but as a whole person with a distinctive personality, preferences and commitments who in part shapes the scene studied and whose life is affected by doing the study

and because “these deeply personal qualities, viewed not as liabilities but as mechanisms enhancing deep, original insight into the lives and concerns of others, should be subject to self-conscious description and analysis in their own right” (p. x).

II. A Scene from Ethnographic Research on Westboro Baptist Church

On October 2, 2006, a heavily armed man entered a one-room Amish schoolhouse in rural Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, released the boys, barricaded the exits, and threatened to sexually assault the remaining female students, ten girls ages six through thirteen. Without making good on his threat, though, Charlie Roberts opened fire, killing three girls immediately; two more died later from injuries, and the remaining five were critically
injured. Roberts then shot and killed himself. The crime was entirely senseless and the gunman apparently mentally ill, claiming that anger at the death of his prematurely-born daughter in 1997 and guilt over molesting his cousins when they were preschoolers and he was a pre-teen could be expunged only through violence directed at the Amish community in the area, a community with which he had, throughout his upbringing in the region and through his work as a milk truck driver, had a positive relationship by all accounts. Notably, the people he claimed to have molested, now adults, denied his claims of molestation.

Amazingly to outsiders, the community was not torn apart, even under the resulting media coverage of the event. In accordance with Amish tradition, nonviolence and forgiveness were required, and the individual sorrow of family members and survivors was surrendered to God. Within days, the schoolhouse was dismantled and the space of the tragedy returned to pasture; eventually, a new schoolhouse, the New Hope School, was built to serve students in the area. When donations began to arrive for the Amish girls who remained hospitalized, the Amish in the community insisted that a fund be opened for the children of the killer. The story of grace and forgiveness was, without romanticizing Amish life, beautiful.

Then, inexplicably to most, Westboro Baptists inserted themselves into the story. Insisting that “God Sent the Shooter,” they threatened to picket at the funerals of the dead Amish girls. According to their hyper-Calvinist theology, God is the author of all human action and, because God controls all, everything that happens—death and suffering included—glorifies God. Further, God uses death and suffering to speak to humans, to express his divine anger at individual and collective sin. Although all people, because they are inherently sinful, deserve death, God spares some—his elect—out of his mercy, not because of their worth. This mercy, however, is not something God owes to anyone, and his failure to extend it does not make him unjust or unfair. Indeed, his justice demands damnation for all; his grace exempts some from it. God’s justice is thus proven in the death and suffering of the damned, even as his mercy is proven in his withholding of punishment from the elect. Shirley Phelps-Roper, a spokesperson for the church, viewed the Nickel Mines shooting as one example of this hyper-Calvinism in action, as expressed in an interview with Fox News’ Hannity & Colmes:

COLMES: Do you have any sense of how much additional pain you would be causing these families by protesting at the funeral of these young girls?
PHELPS-ROPER: There isn’t any way to fix that situation for them. It’s not going to be any less painful if we are there or if we aren’t there. They did that to themselves. And you say they’re not involved.
COLMES: What do you mean they did that to themselves?
PHELPS-ROPER: I mean, they sit over there and create their own form of righteousness, instead of—
COLMES: Did those girls deserve to be killed?
PHELPS-ROPER: Well, they did get killed, and they did that. Who controls the hearts of men? It was at the hand of an angry God those girls are dead.
COLMES: They deserved to die?
PHELPS-ROPER: They did deserve to die.

The Amish, argued Westboro Baptists, angered God by attempting to create their own system of salvation, one based not on the grace of God but on their own works, including their adherence to the Ordnung, the unwritten rules of Amish life that govern dress and adornment and their use of technology. This legalism was an arrogant effort to usurp from God his prerogative to damn or save by suggesting that humans can earn their way to heaven by dressing in a particular way or eschewing electricity. In response to this arrogance, God shattered the peaceful confidence that the Amish had in their security, sending a gunman to rebuke them, to catch their attention. Further, God was sending Westboro Baptists to make the message even plainer: God hated their system of false religion, and God hated them. If God wanted them to be saved, then they would hear in the words of Westboro Baptist their only hope: Repent of sinful legalism, leave the Amish life, and join Westboro Baptist Church. If they did not hear this message in the signs and pickets, then God was not speaking to them because God did not want them. Church members would arrive in rural Lancaster County to share the message with the Amish directly, at the funerals of their children, when, in their grief, they would perhaps be humble enough to hear it before God sent another gunman.

Not surprisingly, the public was outraged and the Amish population generally confused. Westboro Baptists were known for their picketing around issues of sexuality, and this situation had nothing to do with that. Indeed, among the Amish, the sinfulness of homosexuality is non-debatable. Further, Amish believers and Westboro Baptists share a number of beliefs and practices, including the practice of adult baptism, the rejection of harmony in worship music, the rejection of birth control, and the mandate that women never cut their hair. For the broader public, though, the Amish of rural Lancaster County, who had just shown such grace and forgiveness to the murderer of their children and compassion for his wife and children, and the Westboro Baptists, with their message of an angry and violent God, could not have been more different.

I was not unfamiliar with Westboro Baptist Church members’ picketing of scenes of national tragedy. They were at Ground Zero shortly after
September 11, 2001, holding signs saying “God is America’s Terrorist” and “Thank God for 9/11” even as smoke billowed behind them. Had the question Would Westboro Baptists picket the funeral of Amish schoolgirls killed in a mass shooting by an insane man? been posed to me hypothetically, I would have said, “Absolutely”—just as they would go on to picket in response to the Virginia Tech killings in 2007 and the murders of six people in Tuscon by Jared Lee Loughner in 2010 in his attempted assassination of Senator Gabrielle Giffords. And, familiar with the church’s theology of disaster, I would have said that such a picket was merely in line with the church’s coldly logical interpretation of hyper-Calvinism.

But this was different: This was my hometown.

I had run through scenes in which my academic life and my personal life could cross in potentially disastrous ways, primarily because both my brother-in-law and sister-in-law were serving in combat zones as I engaged in my fieldwork. Both lived within easy driving distance of the church, and I knew that if either were killed in combat, church members would picket, and I was prepared for that, as much as any Kansan is. But I had not envisioned Westboro Baptist Church coming to my hometown for this reason. Though I have a less romanticized vision of Amish life (having witnessed, for example, the pain that shunning can inflict on individuals as well as a community), the victims here were so clearly vulnerable—Amish, who, because of their pacifism, reject self-defense; children; girls—that the threatened picket seemed extra cruel. Kansans going off to war know that, if they die, their funerals will be picketed; Amish girls going off to school do not.

In imagining moments when I might see Westboro Baptists intrude upon my personal life, I had not expected this one. I had grown up in the area of the shooting; shopped at the Amish dry goods store, hardware store, and furniture store by the school; was baptized in the country Mennonite church only a short distance away. My grandparents taxi Amish school-teachers—young, unmarried women—to their jobs each morning. And I had once been good friends with the wife of the killer, having attended school with her from kindergarten to graduation. We had played in her yard as children, and I had slept over at her house on her birthday, which was at Christmastime. As a high schooler, she had hosted a Bible study at her house that I attended. When she married a man none of us knew—though he lived in the community, he had been home-schooled—immediately after high school rather than pursuing college, for which she was perfectly qualified, we lost touch, but I still mourned for her and her husband when their first child died shortly after birth and kept track of her life’s developments through our hometown gossip network. The thought that members of a community I loved so much—and who were so kind to each other—would
be victimized by my research subjects paralyzed me. Old doubts I thought I’d resolved reappeared: These people are detestable. Even studying them may corrupt you. What good will it do to learn about people who are obviously evil? Will you get sucked into their harmful theology? Will you justify their behavior? How could you explain to your friends and family at home what you are doing? Moreover, new questions emerged. What if they showed up at my child’s funeral? What if there were a shooting at my university? What would I say if I saw church members as I entered the funeral service or cemetery? What would I do if they called me out by name?

Thankfully, a fuller discussion with friends and family at home was curtailed when Westboro Baptists announced that they had accepted an offer of radio airtime on The Mike Gallagher Show, hosted by a conservative who did not support the church’s position, in exchange for canceling the picket. Still, I was ill-equipped to manage my own response to their threatened picket.

Consequently, I stopped researching, unsure whether the break was a hiatus or the end of the project, but hoping that, as Robben (1995) experienced when interviewing the father of teenager who “disappeared” during political conflict in Argentina in the 1970s, “a radical break with my emotions would allow me to regard [the data] as analyzable knowledge” (p. 94). For six months, I left the topic alone, sending a donation to the Amish community and my friend’s children but not processing my own feelings, avoiding news reports about the shooting, the books, and the made-for-TV movie about the event. Friends at home were equally relieved to avoid discussion about the topic, focusing any conversation about the shooting on the inconvenience of the media presence. A few folks asked if I was aware of the threatened picket, and I responded merely by affirming that, yes, I’d heard the news, not explaining the theology behind it as I might have done if the victims had been people I did not know.

I thought, six months later, that, despite having done nothing to actually address the situation, I would be in fine shape to return to my work, and, in most regards, I was. Taking my cue from the Amish, I decided to forgive, as best I could, church members, even if they didn’t want my forgiveness and even though their actions were not taken specifically against me. Perhaps if I had followed Blee’s (1998) advice, that researchers should “probe their own emotional entanglements in fieldwork relationships and . . . analyze these as additional sources of data” (p. 396), I would have been able to process my own anger. Not until nearly four years later—in the summer of 2010—was I aware of how deep it was.

On a long van ride with church members to a military funeral in Omaha, Nebraska, where they would picket and I would observe and interview counter-picketers, Jonathan Phelps, one of founder Fred Phelps’ sons,
asked about my background. For some months, I had been attending church services regularly and observing Sunday morning pickets of other churches in Topeka and had participated in Bible studies and post-Sunday service potlucks. I knew all church members by name, and though they seldom asked personal questions about me, they knew I was a graduate student with a spouse and young children. They were not very interested in my personal life, or in converting me, believing that, if God wanted me, I would hear the truth of their words and join the church. Still, they were consistently friendly, always making sure that, during interviews, I was comfortable and furnished with a drink. They sometimes sent me home with small gifts—a jar of salsa that they’d recently canned, for example—and allowed me access to their homes and families. Still, I had resisted what Robben (1995) terms “ethnographic seduction”—the process of being led astray from one’s research purpose by the conscious or unconscious efforts of one’s research subjects, of trading “our critical stance as observers for an illusion of congeniality with cultural insiders,” thereby subverting “our understanding of social and cultural phenomena by dissuading an inquiry/beyond their appearances” and giving us the feeling that “we have accomplished something profound in the encounter, that we have reached a deeper understanding and have somehow penetrated reality” (p. 86)—and had been careful not to trade personal information about my life or beliefs in exchange for information about church members. Since such information was seldom solicited, this was fairly easy, and, while I had grown to appreciate the relatively happy lives my subjects lived and their willingness to include me in their jokes and chitchat, they were less familiar with me than I was with them. On this trip, though, Jonathan, who had shared some amusing stories of his childhood, took the opportunity to ask me questions about my own personal history. Where was I from? he wondered.

“Lancaster County, Pennsylvania,” I responded. Lancaster Countians are very proud of our county and identify ourselves by county, rather than by town, to outsiders, even other Pennsylvanians, though we distinguish further between those from the Southern End and the northern part of the county among ourselves.

“Never heard of it,” he responded.

Given the church’s threatened picket of the Amish funerals, I knew this was not true.

“Lan-CAST-er,” I tried again, this time pronouncing the county name as an outsider might, with the emphasis on the second syllable.

“Nope, never heard of it,” he said again.

I felt a tightness in my chest, and then a snap. He had heard of it, even if he’d forgotten. In 2006, he and his church had sent the county into an
uproar, inflicting emotional pain on people I loved, merely with the threat that they would picket. Their pain, their preparation to respond to pickets—these were not his memory, had probably never even registered with him.

“Yes, you have,” I corrected, as bold as I have ever been with a church member, the words rushing out. “Nickel Mines is there. In October 2006, some Amish girls were gunned down at their school, and you threatened to picket.” I stopped, fearful that I had raised my voice to overcome the sound of the blood rushing in my head, fearful that, if I didn’t stop, I would unleash anger that I hadn’t realized I still had. At the time, it did not occur to me that, in this moment, I might not just lose access—I might get dumped on the side of the road in rural Nebraska.

Jonathan paused for a moment, then chuckled. “Yeah, then Shirl”—his sister, Shirley, who had been interviewed on Hannity & Colmes—“she did that radio show, right?”

I sat back, stunned. An event that so profoundly affected me, even years later, and my loved ones, was not something Jonathan could even recall without prompting. When he did, it was with a chuckle as he recalled not the pain of the community, but his sister’s radio performance. I remained silent, not because I was so emotionally controlled, but because I could not imagine, for the first time, what to say to someone so heartless.

Soon, Fred Phelps, Sr., the driver, perhaps feeling my anger and confusion, turned the conversation to small talk. “You’ve heard of Lancaster,” he chided his brother. “Steve”—the church member who had converted after producing the documentary about Westboro—“went there for a conference last year. Remember that?” As the brothers recalled pleasant details of their co-congregant’s trip to a tourist-friendly area, I sat in silence, unsure whether I was ready to re-engage and when, if ever, I would be released from my anger.

III. LESSONS LEARNED

“Stressing the social character of fieldwork, we are in a position to see more clearly the variety of personal, interactional, moral, and political processes that lie at its core,” Emerson reminds us (1983, p. viii), and careful consideration of the social character of my fieldwork has provided me with three insights I will share here. Sheryl Kleinman and Martha Copp (1993), in reviewing ethnographers’ accounts of their emotional engagement with their research subjects, note that, when ethnographers tell their stories, the stories frequently imply that “the author transcended any troubling feelings, at least by the time the account was written” (p. 17). That is not the case here, though I wish, for my own sake, it were; and so my reflections are in the tradition of ethnographers who try to “figure out where
they stand in their own depictions of those they study” (Berger, 2001, p. 506). At the same time, some parts of my emotional engagement with church members are settled and stable, and so I offer the following reflections. With time, perhaps more lessons will reveal themselves to me.

Lesson #1: The personal is impersonal, but making it personal might challenge it. Westboro Baptists are concerned with sexuality and religion; they deliver individualized messages linking sexual behavior and eternal damnation to their target audiences. Nothing could feel more personal. For example, when Kevin Oldham, a Kansas native living in New York, died from an AIDS-related illness in 1993, church members sent his parents a note declaring that he was in hell. It included a picture of Oldham’s face and declared that by “defying the laws of God, man and nature, KEVIN OLDHAM played Russian roulette with promiscuous anal sex and lost big time when he died of AIDS March 11.” The experience of receiving the letter was “unbelievable,” Oldham’s mother recalled, and his father reflected that “to lose one, then have to deal with this maniac, is almost more than you can handle” (“Grieving Family Forced to Deal with Phelps,” 1994). The attack on Oldham was intensely personal, addressed to his family and mocking his sex life—and, unlike more recent commentary by the church—it was not concerned primarily with placing Oldham’s death in the context of a morally bankrupt America. Instead, the church focused on Oldham individually and personally. When they picket at military funerals, church members hoist signs that say to mourners, “Your Soldier’s in Hell.” Not soldiers, but your soldier. Your son, your daughter. “God Hates You,” another sign reads simply. It is Jael Phelps’ favorite sign, the young adult daughter of Jonathan and Paulette Phelps tells me, because it sums up the church’s central theological points pretty succinctly.

Yet Westboro Baptists have nothing against you personally. The trip to Nebraska included, in addition to me, an openly gay journalist for a Chicago magazine. Church members were consistently polite to him, never using the language they use on the picket line to describe other gay men to describe him. They were considerate of his needs and encouraging of his questions. Though church members know I am heterosexual, they believe I am equally hell-bound, but they never shared their opinion of the state of my soul with me. Indeed, only once was I ever chastised—for my “shorn hair”—by a church member, and even then, she framed her words as concern that I be fully aware of the scriptural command that women not cut their hair rather than as a condemnation. When church members learned that I was from Lancaster County, they did not share the words that Shirley preached on the radio. In other words, the highly personal, highly hurtful words they said at pickets did not inform our actual personal interactions.

At the same time, I repeatedly heard stories from people who inter-
FIGURE 1.
Jael Phelps’ “You’re Going to Hell” sign “is for everyone,” she says.
acted with church members on a regular basis—teachers in the public school where church children attend, nurses at the women’s health center where women in the church deliver their babies—that personalizing their interactions with church members sometimes ended the personal attacks church members directed even at other Topekans. For example, one woman, a delivery nurse, told a story of how church members had picketed her church one Sunday. As she walked near the picketers, she and a picketer recognized each other from the delivery room. “I went up to her,” recalled the nurse, “and said, ‘Really? After how I’ve helped you? I think you should treat me with more respect than this.’” After that, reports the nurse, the pickets at that church ended. Though the nurse’s rebuke may not have been the reason the pickets ended, I heard similar stories a few times in my research and witnessed, in my own interactions with church members, moments when they could have attacked me personally but did not, just as they did not attack the gay journalist who traveled with us to Nebraska, where they unabashedly and explicitly preached that gay people are vile, “the basest of humans” (though they use this term to describe all kinds of people they believe God hates, including Jews), and hell-bound.

Lesson #2: Research with living subjects allows for surprising findings. Though I was immersed in the primary texts produced by Westboro Baptist Church, which maintains multiple websites, releases podcasts of sermons, and produces web-based news and music videos espousing the church’s theology, reading such texts insulated me from the emotional impact of such messages, which were never directed toward me. In online forums or while reviewing archived documents, I could not witness the delivery of these messages, the haughtiness, passion, indifference, bemusement, anger, callowness, callousness, or humor with which different church members preach their message to different audiences. Without fieldwork, I could not have envisioned the responses of the audience, which frequently included homophobic and misogynist insults that were as vulgar or more vulgar than the words that church members shout and sing on the picket line. Though Westboro Baptists did not target their message at me, when I felt the pain that the church inflicted on people I loved, I became their victim, too—a position in which I was surprised to find myself and that, had I not been engaging church members directly, could have resulted in my missing an opportunity to understand more personally the repercussions of pickets. When we “run aground in the shallowness of the written word” (Robben, 1995, p. 98), field research provides us invaluable and irreplaceable information.

Lesson #3: Our private pains can help us grow in compassion for others. Much writing about ethnography addresses the issue of empathy, or identifying with the feelings of research subjects. Less considers the more
specific role of compassion—co-suffering with those we study. While my research focused on the lived experiences of Westboro Baptists, it necessarily engaged the pain that church members created for others, from Kevin Ohlde’s parents to the people of my hometown. In joining in their suffering, feeling it as my own, though I did not choose to engage this suffering so much as have it thrust upon me, my appreciation of the consequences of funeral pickets, and, potentially, of my own research, grew.

Verta Taylor suggests that the principle of reflexivity, an “epistemological presumption” in feminist methodology, holds that “who we are. . . is spoken into existence in every aspect of the research endeavor” (1998, p. 368). A corollary is that who we are changes because of the research endeavor. For me, the compassion I could feel for targets of Westboro Baptist Church was not merely a strategy to better understand the feelings of mourners at funerals; it was a gift that re-shaped my “who we are.” Further, while my own feelings around the issue of the threatened Lancaster County picket remain, even today, unresolved to a certain extent, in growing in my compassion for targets of pickets, my capacity to care for Westboro Baptists, without invitation, grew, too.

This was illustrated to me on October 6, 2010, the day that the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in *Snyder v. Phelps*, a civil case brought by the father of a fallen Marine, Matthew Snyder, whose funeral was picketed by the church. Originally, a jury had found for the father, Albert Snyder, awarding him nearly $11 million in damages, but the appeals court had reversed the decision and awarded court costs to the church. The case, which was decided on March 2, 2011, in favor of the church, had received wide coverage, with Fox television pundit Bill O’Reilly volunteering to pay the more than $16,000 that Snyder owed the church. Veterans groups and state attorneys general, frustrated with legislative efforts that had not succeeded in curtailing picketing, sided with Snyder, while civil liberties and media organizations, though they recognized the repulsive nature of the church’s message, defended Westboro Baptist Church’s right to free speech. Matthew Snyder was from York, Pennsylvania, just over the Susquehanna River from Lancaster, and his funeral was held in Maryland, so local interest in the case was strong. Very early on the morning of October 6, I arrived at the Supreme Court to join the blocks-long line of people hoping to hear the case.

The day before, Phelps-Chartered, the law firm founded by pastor Fred Phelps and staffed, after his disbarment from practice in state courts in 1979 and practice in federal courts in 1989, by church members (Eleven of his thirteen children are trained as lawyers, and nine of these remain faithful to the church.) had received a suspicious letter. Paulette Phelps, wife of Jonathan, had unsuspectingly opened the letter, which was filled with a
white powder. The Topeka Fire Department and the Joint Terrorism Task Force investigated, part of the office was sealed, and, although Paulette was not quarantined while the FBI analyzed the powder, her clothing was contaminated (Fry, 2010). The arrival of the letter on the day before the Supreme Court arguments was unlikely a coincidence, but the church members who were picketing outside the Supreme Court that morning, including Jonathan, seemed relatively unconcerned.

As I approached him, Jonathan was busily explaining why church members celebrate all death as God’s judgment on evil humanity to a group of students from nearby American University. (“What if your own child was killed in an accident?” one student asked, gesturing toward a young boy who, though too small to hold a sign, was clearly with the church. “That child over there?” Jonathan asked, pointing to his great-nephew. “Well, he’s not my child, but he’s my nephew, and if he was killed in an accident—or if my own child was killed—then I’d say, ‘Thank God,’ because everything God does is for His glory and you have to give God thanks for everything.” The students were duly impressed by his commitment to his theological position, abhorrent as they found it.) Noticing me, he gave a big smile, and I stepped into the small crowd around him. When the students quieted down, I asked about Paulette’s health, wondering if he was as peaceful with his wife’s actual brush with danger as he was with his great-nephew’s hypothetical death. Was she well? And was he worried about her, as he was so far from home? “Oh, she’s fine,” he laughed, expressing his gratitude for my concern. “We just need to give her some training in safe mail handling practices.” And, no, he wasn’t worried—as with all things, if God wanted Paulette dead, there would be nothing he or anyone could do about it, but he was confident that God would keep them safe.

I felt a sense of relief that wasn’t due solely to my distaste for vigilante justice. My concern for Paulette, Jonathan, and the other workers (as well as clients) in the law office was sincere, and, beyond that, I did not like the thought of anyone living under threat of terrorism. I noticed my feelings, glad that, though Jonathan had not been concerned about my feelings regarding the threatened Lancaster County picket, I was concerned for him. I did not feel self-righteous about my ability to care for someone who did not care for me and my community in the same way I cared for him and his, but I felt relief that one of my worst fears about researching this group was unrealized: I had not become deadened to the pain of others, insensitive to the words of the church or the harm they caused. Indeed, I remained sensitive enough to others that that sensitivity could extend even to church members. “Ethnography is our best way not to tear people apart, to remain humane in our vision of humans,” notes Josiah McConnell Heyman (2000,
p. 184), and ethnography had allowed me, even when exposed, for months, to people preaching a hateful message, to remain humane.

Thank goodness, for as I turned from Jonathan, I saw members of Matthew Snyder’s family in line a few feet behind me. Wearing pins on their jackets with a photo of Matthew Snyder in his Marine uniform with the words “My Hero” underneath it, they stood stoically as the sun rose over the United States Capital building across the street. Had they witnessed my concern for Paulette? I wondered. Did I look like a sympathizer with the people who have made their loss so much more acute? I silently asked the family to forgive me if it had hurt them to witness the scene in which I was engaged, to endure my concern for the Phelps, grateful, even now, for that capacity. Approaching them, I introduced myself not as a scholar, but as someone with an interest in the case and concern for their family. “Thank you for being here,” I said, glad that I could, in a very small way, understand their pain a bit better.

### Note

1. Two documentary films about the church have been made by KU students. Steve Drain’s self-produced *Hatemongers* was released in 2000 and is available at http://www.hatemongers.com/clips.html. K. Ryan Jones’ *Fall from Grace* was released in 2007. It has aired on the Sundance Channel and is available for rent and purchase through various outlets.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Among them are hundreds of thousands of teen-age girls, and others as young as 5, who fall victim to the sex trade. There’s a special evil in the abuse and exploitation of the most innocent and vulnerable. The victims of the sex trade see little of life before they see the very worst of life—an underground of brutality and lonely fear. Those who create these victims and profit from their suffering must be severely punished. Governments that tolerate this trade are tolerating a form of slavery. . . . We must show new energy in fighting back an old evil. Nearly two centuries after the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade, and more than a century after slavery was officially ended in its last strongholds, the trade in human beings for any purpose must not be allowed to thrive in our time.

—President George W. Bush, September 23, 2003

President Bush made this public address to the United Nations shortly after the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. In it, he represented trafficking as one of the “important issues” facing Americans and the world in the 21st century and noted that trafficking was a “third challenge” to security, akin to the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and the War on Terror (Bush, 2003). In this speech, trafficking was elevated from a human rights issue on the periphery of international affairs discussions to one of the most pressing national security concerns. President Bush went on to state the view that trafficking posed a threat not because it endangered the physical safety of Americans, but instead because it destroyed the purity of young women and children trafficked around the world. The traffic in men was notably absent from his discussion, in spite of a number of emerging stories and cases that revealed that the problem of “modern day slavery” was broader than sex trafficking and included a specific trade in men and boys.

Almost eight years later, trafficking continues to capture the attention of the international media and politicians. While trafficking is increasingly linked to slavery (see Obama, 2010), it remains an issue because “there are thousands who are trapped in various forms of enslavement . . . Oftentimes
young women who are caught up in prostitution” (Obama, as cited in State Department, 2009, p. 2). A notable challenge to this limited image of trafficking came on August 31, 2010 when the international media reported that the Spanish authorities had arrested two groups of men for trafficking other men into Spain for sexual exploitation. Despite the clear evidence that these men were lied to, drugged, and forced and coerced into performing sex acts, many American news accounts and news blogs adopted non-trafficking terminology to describe the men, labeling them as “prostitutes,” “gigolos,” and “workers.” For instance, the headlines on the websites of the major American news services in August of 2010 read “Police dismantle male prostitution ring in Spain” (CNN.com) and “Spain: Gang Plied Gigolos with Cocaine, Viagra” (cbsnews.com). The effect of such coverage was to obscure these men’s status as victims, instead emphasizing that they were illegal sex workers. While in part the Bush Administration broadly rendered trafficking synonymous with prostitution (Doezema, 2010), it is particularly notable that the euphemisms used emphasized that these men engaged in sex work with women (as indicated by the term “gigolo”) had accepted the continuous supply of drugs, reinforcing the general assumption that men make choices and are less vulnerable than women and children (Doezema, 2010).

The trafficker is represented in similarly shallow ways. Both in the press and in the government-issued materials, he repeatedly is described as “evil” (Bush, 2003). He is, then, by his nature, unmanly and un-human. More than this, he is diseased, “ill,” and a “scourge” on society (Rice, 2010). Coupled with images of traffickers that show these men as foreign, the effect is to problematize the ethnic man not just as a slave, but also as the slave owner. As a result, trafficking relegates both trafficked men and traffickers to the status of “Others” who are risky. Trafficking both reproduces and draws on the stereotypes of non-American men, which suggest that these men negatively affect domestic employment rates, commit crimes, threaten national security, are a risk to “Our” welfare, and even will erode the American national identity (see Calivita, 2007). Current anti-trafficking regimes embody and restate xenophobic reactions directed against illegal migrant men, while often disguising the role domestic actors have in trafficking.

As Moyers (2008) notes, “Words have consequences,” and thus the political material on trafficking recreates a politics of hate around immigration that regenerates the conditions of poverty, restricted movement, and disempowerment driving trafficking itself (p. 1). Although the condemnation of the trafficker and his activities is understandable, the condemnation of him and the victim as foreigners who belong outside because they are inherently inferior and bad, is then deeply troubling. As Holmes notes, vio-
lent language is equivalent to murder and constitutes “verbicide” (as cited in Moyers, 2008, p. 1). Dehumanizing, ideologically based media that creates a fear of the different “Other,” particularly the visibly dark-skinned man, exacerbates racist stereotypes “marketing fear and fault” (Block, 2009, p. 37). This kind of media conceals socio-political conditions that fuel trafficking, instead ascribing blame to individuals. Furthermore, it troublingly narrows discussions of trafficking and other immigration reform in the United States.

Discussing the ways in which current anti-immigrant sentiments are reproduced, specifically through public information campaigns on trafficking run by the United States government, allows for the exploration of the limits in current anti-trafficking thinking and opens up possibilities for reform of both the criminal law and immigration regimes. This article therefore not only explores how government anti-trafficking statements made between 1998 and 2010 create and reinforce divides in masculinities based on regimes of racial domination, but also notes particularly how anti-trafficking furthers the domination of white American masculinity. This masculinity must buttress borders, survey populations, and send home illegal men—acts that have all been implicated in creating migrant vulnerability in the first place (Aradau, 2004). My suggestion is that the current anti-trafficking regime therefore holds little promise for bringing about the end of trafficking violence, and thus discussion of trafficking must move beyond racial stereotyping and the immigration frame if we are to find new ways to attend to the human trade.

II. THEORIZING ANTI-IMMIGRANT SENTIMENT AND NATIVISM IN THE UNITED STATES

Nativism and racism in America, embodied in hate speech directed against ethnic men, dates back to the Colonial period (see Calivita, 2007). Anglo-centric sentiments and concerns about the mobility of indentured servants after their release initiated an anti-immigrant rhetoric from the very beginnings of the United States (Glenn, 2002, pp. 33-34). Such sentiments, which regarded non-Anglo men as inferior and troubling, led to beliefs about the insecurity of racially and ethnically different men, which often infused into politics at the highest levels. Today, “new nativism,” the rebirth of the nativism of earlier periods of United States history, has emerged as a “policy of protecting the interests of native inhabitants against those of immigrants” (Burghart, 2007, p. 1). As Cole (1994) explains, immigrants, specifically immigrant men, are portrayed as overrunning America, taking jobs from Americans, exhausting American resources, destroying the unity of the American people, and not being entitled to con-
stitutional rights (see also Calivita, 2007). The core idea is that threatening persons must be pre-emptively identified and excluded by the police, immigration officials, and military, because these agencies are most qualified to identify whether the person has done something wrong and therefore deserves punishment or deportation. By producing and regulating identities (specifically through creating groups of “us” and “them”), the state constructs both what is to be feared (that is, what forms a threat), and notions of proper belonging (such as citizenship) and correct behaviors (such as nationalism or patriotism) (Campbell, 1998). It creates and restates categories of “Us” and “Other.”

While the United States guards its borders between “Us” and “Other” intensely, not all foreigners are treated in the same manner. As Ancheta (1998) notes, a process of “outsider racialization” is occurring. This process is twofold, involving, firstly, the categorization of some individuals as foreign regardless of citizenship (such as Asian, Latino, or Arab Americans), and secondly, the assumption that all immigrants derive from these racial groups. Some groups are accepted because of their whiteness, while others are immediately regarded as aliens. Crucially, white and whiteness are not rigid classifications, but instead evolving notions that have shifted since the colonization of America (Haney, 1994). White privilege is then a “historical fabrication” that is changeable and contingent (Haney, 1994; see also Jacobson, 1999). Nevertheless, being white continues to be a marker of capability, safety, and power. By contrast, ethnic men were regarded as unfavorable, savage, and even infantile, being demarcated as dangerous (see Spivak, 1985, 1988; Ihme, 2008; Connell, 2005; Hooper, 2001). This led to a social order in which, as Spivak detailed, “white men are saving brown women from brown men” (1988, p. 296).

This notion of the foreigner man as peculiarly and inherently risky has been examined extensively in the fields of hate studies, criminology, and international relations (see, for example, Jacobson, 1999; Mink, 1990; Calavita, 2007; King, 1999; Hansen & King, 2001; Dikotter, 1998; Aradau, 2004, 2006; Cole, 1994, 2003). Quite centrally, this literature increasingly notes that the foreign man is increasingly being formed as a “threat” through the ever-expanding process of “securitisation” (see Wæver, 2004). This process, according to the Copenhagen School, is a discursive practice, in which texts position specific entities or issues as posing a threat to a particular group, thereby justifying special treatment of the supposedly dangerous group. Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998) suggest that the labeling of issues as “threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them” (p. 21). The foreign man comes to be exceptional (Agamben, 1999; Huysmans, 2004; Walker, 2006) and separate from ordinary society (Stumpf, 2006). Categories of belonging are then reinforced, as citizen and
foreign man are lined up against attributes such as innocent/guilty, admitted/excluded, and legal/illegal (Stumpf, 2006); “nonmembers are cast out of the community by means of borders, walls, rules, and public condemnation” (Stumpf, 2006, p. 44).

Militarization of border protection thus becomes a normalized function of white masculinity. Militarism, as Enloe (2000, 2007) details, not only prioritizes masculine values, but also injects cultural and racial beliefs into military regimes. What she suggests is that masculinity is made synonymous with white manhood, which is a version of manhood that dominates military and state institutions (Enloe, 2000, pp. 23, 26). Integrally, then, race, immigration, and crime are interwoven through discussions of foreign men threatening America through trafficking in weapons, drugs, and even people. Castro (2007) spells out this link, suggesting that “terrorism, drug-trafficking, and illegal immigration . . . [become] a unified threat to national security” (p. 12). Borders emerge not only as security zones, but also as places where criminality occurs, resulting in what Stumpf (2006) labels “crimmigration” regimes. In these regimes, criminal law and immigration law come together to exclude the risky “Other.” Both areas of law impose sanctions to reinforce and support this lower positioning of illegal men (Stumpf, 2006). The law reaffirms and justifies aggression against undocumented men while reaffirming the status of white men to adjudicate belonging and enforce borders. As Kraska summarizes:

> The interwoven scripts of militarism and masculinity provide the cultural foundations for organized forms of violence by militaries and police, and their taken-for-granted scripts furnish a more diffuse, but still pervasive social network of threatened and real violence among individual men. (2001, p. 154)

Anti-immigrant sentiments embodied in anti-trafficking regimes that drive militant and enforcement policies thus extend violence, rather than ending it—a point which I consider in the sections that follow.

III. WOUNDED WIMPS AND ALIEN WORKERS: CONSTRUCTING THE TRAFFICKED MAN

The centerpiece of the government’s anti-trafficking campaign is the annual Trafficking in Persons Report (“TIP Report”), issued by the Department of State as required by the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000. These reports summarize all government anti-trafficking activities and provide a public account of trafficking both in America and globally. Integrally, these reports present a series of fictional “victim stories” as “testimonies” that are “meant to be representative . . . and illustrate the many
forms of trafficking and . . . the myriad forms of exploitation that define trafficking and the variety of cultures in which trafficking victims are found” (State Department, 2008, p. 4, 2009, p. 4). Also, the reports contain images, country narratives, and summaries of state-sponsored media campaigns, all of which are intended to inform agencies, non-government actors, and the public about what trafficking is. They are authoritative sources that guide funding and even inform the president’s decision to place sanctions on countries that fail to live up to America’s anti-trafficking standard.

Despite the focus on women in the presidential accounts detailed in the Introduction, in recent years, an increasing number of trafficking testimonies have appeared in the reports that detail the experience of trafficked men. The 2008 TIP Report, for example, provides the following account of the experiences of a trafficked man in China:

A man at a local train station offered 16-year old Shen, from a small Chinese farming community, a well-paying job in a nearby city which he eagerly accepted. Within hours, he and 12 others were bundled into a minivan and dumped at a brick yard where they were beaten, barely fed, and forced to perform heavy labor for 20 hours per day. Guards at the kiln would beat them with iron bars and wooden staves when they worked too slowly, at times smashing brick [sic] across a worker’s head or body. Guard dogs kept Shen and the other slaves living in fear. (State Department, 2008, p. 8)

An even more graphic and brutal account of trafficking to the United States follows:

Thirty-two year old “Sandro,” from the interior of Mexico, found himself in a migrant shelter in Tijuana. A recruiter approached him in the shelter and urged him to come to the U.S.-Mexico border to “take a look.” As they neared the border, the recruiter (knowledgeable of the shift change in the border patrol), pushed him over the border and instructed him to “run.” Sandro was guided by Mexican traffickers to a “safe house” where he was tied to a bed and raped about 20 times. He was then transported, at gun point, to another “safe” house in San Diego and forced into domestic servitude. Eventually, he was taken to a construction site during the day. His pay check was confiscated by his traffickers. He felt he had no recourse since he lacked even basic identification papers. His abuse continued when one of his traffickers forced him at gunpoint to perform sexual acts. (State Department, 2008, p. 6)

Notably, in both of these accounts, exposure to physical cruelty is brought to the forefront, with being beaten and raped emerging as core victim experiences. This does not suggest that these victims were subjected to “manly”
violence, but evidences that they were subjugated and rendered entirely unable to escape.

Indeed, the legal framework and executive actions repeatedly highlighted that physical violence is used to elicit services or labor, both from men and women. For example, the TVPA section 102(6) identifies that victims are often forced through physical violence to engage in sex acts or perform slavery-like labor. Such force includes rape and other forms of sexual abuse, torture, starvation, imprisonment, threats, psychological abuse, and coercion.

The act goes on to suggest in section 102(9)–(10) that trafficking includes all the elements of the crime of forcible rape when it involves the involuntary participation of another person in sex acts by means of fraud, force, or coercion. Trafficking also involves violations of other laws, including labor and immigration codes and laws against kidnapping, slavery, false imprisonment, assault, battery, pandering, fraud, and extortion.

The effect of such statements is to buttress the claim that trafficking is inherently damaging and criminal, and thus the TVPA is reinforcing existing legal prohibitions and previous agreements on despicable conduct. Similarly, President Obama, who stated in his January 4, 2010 address that victims are “often suffering from horrible physical and sexual abuse,” affirmed the destructive effects of trafficking. In light of both law and policy, the State Department surmises that the “impacts of human trafficking are devastating. Victims may suffer physical and emotional abuse, rape, threats against self and family, and even death” (State Department, 2009, p. 5).

For men, this experience of rape is troubling not only because it is violent, but also because it interrupts the usual constructions of masculinity and men’s embodiment. In particular, the notion of male brutalization and rape constructs the man’s body as unbound, violable, and subject to harm. This marks a clear departure from the usual construction of masculinities, wherein men are (usually) conceptualized as the penetrator (see Butler, 1993). Indeed, the penetration of the man (either through the violation of him sexually or of his skin) is regarded as particularly abhorrent because it violates the normal expression of masculinity wherein (heterosexual) men by definition desire to penetrate “the other” (e.g. a woman) and therefore are resistant to being penetrated by “the same” (e.g. a man) (Butler, 1993; cf Anderson, 1982; Hickson et al., 1994; Stermac et al., 1996). The brutalizing and penetration of the male victim’s body thus takes away both integrity
and autonomy from the victim, who becomes entirely impotent at the hands of the trafficker.

The male victim deserves special treatment and protection because he is violated and unable to defend himself. The state’s intervention is necessary both to save him and to restore the normal gender order. As a result of being wounded and in distress, the male victim requires extraordinary treatment. He stands both as an “illegal alien” and as a “true” victim in need of aid and refuge. As the 2005 Department of Justice information brochure entitled “Distinctions Between Human Smuggling and Human Trafficking” suggests, “Persons smuggled are violating the law. They are not victims . . . key component[s] . . . that will always distinguish trafficking from smuggling are the elements of fraud, force, or coercion” (2005, p. 4). The victim’s conduct is de-criminalized not because he is truly innocent—for he has clearly violated the law or the border—but because he deserves to be pitied (Aradau, 2004, 2008). He is absolved of his wrongful conduct because of his suffering (Aradau, 2004).

By emphasizing the physicality of suffering, trafficking in men becomes concerning because of the “physically demanding” nature of exploitation. Like the female victim, the male wholly succumbs to the violent trafficker and is therefore both objectified, and even feminized. His inabilities and powerlessness reaffirm not only his subordination, but also his inability to perform the idealized hegemonic masculinity. Unlike real men who are supposed to resist violence, the male trafficking victim is expected not to have resisted his traffickers and to not resist United States law enforcement and prosecution endeavors (see Christie, 1986; Aradau, 2008). Men are victims only if they are unable to do anything but cooperate; they are utterly passive, and during their experience of trafficking, they are wholly “unfree.” Men, then, must be “captives”: something that implicitly requires force or violence. This wording was adopted by Susan E. Rice, the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, in her March 25, 2010 speech in which she called for “us [to] rededicate ourselves to the mighty task of setting free the captive—and to ensure that all make the journey from slavery to freedom.” While the TVPA does not require physical force, accepting that psychological coercion is enough for trafficking, continual reminders that the victim is bonded or dominated occur in discussions of trafficked men. For example, the TIP reports use words and phrases to this effect throughout the report. Male trafficked persons become victims by being “lured” into the exploitative situation. For example, there are 24 instances of the use of the word “lured” in the 2009 Report and 22 instances in the 2010 Report. Most often, the word is used in the country narratives section with reference to how people are convinced to travel for jobs. It is employed in circumstances where individuals are captured with-
out force, but where their consent was fraudulently obtained, and thus highlights the ignorance and innocence of the victim.

This innocence is further illustrated by accounts of victims’ being “abducted” or “forcibly recruited.” Words such as “kidnapped” and “abducted” appear 5 and 24 times respectively in the 2009 Report, but both are overwhelmingly used with reference to women and children, and only with regard to men and boys when they are in warzones. The country narratives use the word “abducted” to describe the experience of men and boys in the Darfur region who were “subjected to forced labor in agriculture, herding, portering goods, and domestic servitude,” emphasizing the particular invisibility and vulnerability of those present as civilians during conflict (p. 266). Similarly, “forcibly recruited” is used throughout the 2009 and 2010 TIP reports with reference to child soldiers. Notably, while “recruited” suggests an element of consent, the use of “forcibly” here works to erase such consent and make the child completely unable to exercise agency (see State Department, 2009, pp. 102, 107, 264, 2010, pp. 97, 108, 171, 358). It is also used in reference to girls and prostitution, again to emphasize the lack of agency (State Department, 2009, p. 109).

The lack of agency is reinforced by the suggestion that men are retained by being “locked” up. This word appears in five different testimonies included in the 2009 Report, detailing victims who were locked into rooms, houses, and apartments and thus were effectively held and “chained” (see pp. 17, 34, 38, 199, 220). In the 2010 Report, references are made to rooms, cells, and warehouses. It is also detailed that men are “trapped.” The 2009 Report uses this word once (p. 2), but implies it several times throughout, stating that victims are often “trapped without assistance” (see p. 162). Prominently, CdeBaca, in his introductory letter in the 2009 Report, stated, “Globally, there are countless persons who labor in bondage and suffer in silence, feeling that they are trapped and alone” (p. 2; see also State Department, 2010, pp. 2, 23, 37). The use of the word “bonded” reinforces that the trafficker is the person curtailing the liberty of the victim. This word is used 56 times in the 2009 Report and 74 times in the 2010 Report, and notably is used primarily alongside labor or work. It implies a clear difference between trafficking and consensual employment, and brings to the forefront the subjugation of the individual. This linking of complete powerlessness to bondage is explained explicitly in the 2009 Report (State Department, p. 16). Combined with the suggestion that men are often “forced at gunpoint,” the effect of these words and phrasings is to emphasize the condition of complete subjection and pain.

It is notable that the reference to guns is made only once in the 2009 Report with reference to the forcible giving of blood by a man who was trafficked for organ removal (State Department, p. 17). The overt use of an
immediate threat against his life highlights how his consent was completely absent due to an external stimulus, thus voiding it entirely. Such an account of organ trafficking sits in stark contrast to the research and scholarly articles, which suggest that most organs are acquired by payment and coercion rather than by overt violence (see Scheper-Hughes, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2008). However, armed men are also brought to the forefront in a victim testimony in the 2010 Report, with reference to men forced into labor onboard boats. Again, the noting of guns is used to suggest why a man was trapped upon a fishing boat—a place where most labor is assumed not to be coerced. The experience of violence in these accounts is so severe that it overwhelms and devastates the capacity to exercise any choice, and as such, victims perform labor or cross the border completely under the trafficker’s control (Srikantiah, 2007, p. 194).

The male victim, then, is differentiated from other criminals and undocumented migrants in that he is not coerced merely by circumstance, but rather “by the actions of an individual wrongdoer: the trafficker” (Srikantiah, 2007, p. 192), discussed in the section that follows. Like the female victim, he is not simply coerced, but is hunted, and his treatment is something more akin to the treatment of an animal than a human being: He is “prey.” This word is used prolifically in government reports, including the 2009 TIP Report, and is often engaged with explicit reference to the external agent—the trafficker—exploiting a weakness and exerting power over the victim (see pp. 8, 33, 36, 44, 191, 248, 260, 275, 278; also see Bush, 2006; USAID, 2004; Department of Justice, 2008). Trafficking in this sense is about the denial of his humanity and involves “egregious human rights abuses” (Office of the White House Press Secretary, 2000; see also Obama, 2010). Highlighting his injuries and suffering in this way not only induces sympathy, but also constructs the affront against him as an affront against humanity as a whole.

Notably, this rights-cased formulation mirrors the depictions of old chattel slavery, wherein the focus is on the slave’s being chained and bonded (Azmy, 2002, pp. 982-983). This analogy was made explicit by Luis CdeBaca, Ambassador-at-Large of the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons of the Department of State, in his Opening Statement to the House of Representatives, wherein he pointed out that “as old as the practice of slavery may be, the criminals that bind these people’s hopes by force, fraud, and coercion are looking for new ways to commit these crimes,” and therefore the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons is guided toward “freeing more people from the shackles of modern slavery and preventing this human rights abuse in the first place” (2010a, p. 18). The binding of the modern victims has not only a descriptive function, detailing the frequent discovery of victims who are locked up or physically
restrained, but also a metaphorical function, linking trafficking to the image of antebellum slavery. This configuration not only acts to affirm that trafficking has a link to rights and international development, as it emphasizes a direct violation of the Constitution and the American principle of abolitionism, but also directly couples trafficking with race, as well as gender.

Most notably, by emphasizing bondage in concert with physical brutality, the analogy suggests that trafficking marks the placement of the trafficked man outside of normal American society. Because regular men possess freedom both of choice and of movement (see Connell, 2005), the use of violence and torture to restrict the male victim makes his experience exceptional and anomalous. His suffering, pain, and desperation stand in stark contrast to the normal male experience, wherein men are expected to control both their emotions and their environment. Because proper masculine performance involves self-reliance, it is “unmanly” to be dependent and seek help (Struve, 1990). The “ideal man” is silent, robust, and in charge of his emotions, and thus is not to talk about his abuse or to seek help (Mills, 1993). “Real” men are stoic, or aggressive, when faced with insecurity and emotion, and thus the male victim’s insecurity and misery make him a lesser entity, and his expression of masculinity is rendered improper and inferior (Goffman, 1963, p. 128). The suggestion is that the proper ordering of things can be repaired only through the provision of the liberal regime to the male victim and through the implementation of liberal-democratic principles in the countries where trafficking takes place. Rather paradoxically, freedom is achievable only through an offer of protection from the state, making a regime that resembles colonialism appear normal. Integrally, though, protection requires submission to state processes and treatments, and thus submission to the state is required and discursively bolstered.

The absolute submissiveness of the victim to the state is reinforced by the T visa scheme set out in the TVPA. Under this scheme, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS), along with other services, must file, process, and certify victims. The Department of Health and Human Services (n.d.) states that

the certification process typically takes only a few days after HHS is notified that a person has made a bona fide T visa application or has been granted continued presence status (both of these actions are done by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security). ("The Certification Process," para. 1)

While on its face this procedure attends to the fact that many trafficked individuals do not speak English, it also implies the complete incapability of the victims, who cannot file their application, even in their own lan-
guage, which could later be translated and reviewed. Foreign victims lack any resourcefulness or expertise: They are by their very nature helpless, even infantile, which reinforces many of the assumed stereotypes projected during the eugenics movement that held salience in the 19th and early 20th centuries (see Calivita, 2007). More than this, the victim lacks any credibility, and gains status as an authentic victim only through the state, which can determine whether his story adequately assigns him the position of innocence and helplessness. Only once a man is certified can he gain special rights and legal status, which will re-masculinize him and place him as a real man—that is, as an American man. The United States must educate and heal him. Although he has succumbed to the trafficker and therefore has been a troublingly subordinate entity, the state has the capacity to save him and other incompetent ethnic men from other evil ethnic men who wish to exploit them, and through visa status and compliance with the American state offer him the possibility of belonging.

IV. A ‘Special Evil’ and a ‘Scourge on Society’: Constructing the Trafficker as a Threatening Deviant

By focusing on trafficking as the exploitation of a passive victim, the actor enslaving him or her—the trafficker—becomes central in anti-trafficking discussion. Because trafficking is regulated as a criminal transgression, rather than as an economic or a development issue, the focus is taken off of the conditions in which trafficking happens. The current regime obscures other causes of trafficking, such as disparities in development and lack of legal migration options (especially for women who have a role in producing trafficking) (Berman, 2003). Instead, an active perpetrator is blamed. As the TVPA section 102 notes:

Traffickers primarily target women and girls . . . Traffickers lure women and girls into their networks through false promises of decent working conditions at relatively good pay . . . Traffickers also buy children from poor families and sell them into prostitution or into various types of forced or bonded labor.

Responsibility for exploitation is located with the offender, who “targets,” “lures,” and “buys” his way into the illicit market, reaffirming the complete innocence of this victim (Christie, 1987; Doezema, 2010, pp. 115-116).

However, little is said about who traffickers actually are, other than that they are “cruel individuals,” including “mobsters” and “organized criminals” who are exploiting women and must be stopped. When a photograph of a trafficker is provided, it is generally blurred across the eyes, or the face is obscured by positioning the camera behind the individual. Such
positioning is particularly apparent in the 2006 TIP Report at page 14, which shows images of a trafficker dragging a victim to a vehicle. The photo does not show the man’s face.

Since key facial features are obscured, the reader and the public must deduce, or imagine, who might form this class of offender. Because there is no human face on the trafficker, the figure becomes elusive and monstrous as a result of its obscurity. The effect of face hazing is not only to protect the offender’s identity, but also to depersonalize and “strip” him of his “human background” (Doyle, 1998, pp. 100-101). The text accompanying the image states that the offender belongs to a Japanese gang; however, the public is not told who he actually is. In part, this is because the government wants the public to look for trafficking everywhere. The public is told repeatedly that traffickers come from all walks of life, with the reports’ images confirming this diversity both in men and in the women they exploit. As Ambassador CdeBaca suggested in a CNN interview on April 4, 2010 in answer to the question “Who are the traffickers?”:

There’s not necessarily one profile. For every case we get, which involves, say, for instance, the stereotypical, you know, Russian-organized crime boss or something like that, you have an opportunistic, abusive employer . . . at the end of the day, we’re looking at a vulnerable victim and somebody who is willing to cross that line into enslaving someone else. (2010b, para. 208)

Just as the images depicting only men as traffickers suggest that the offender can be generalized as male, this account suggests that they are also different from good men and can be identified because they are a “special evil” (Bush, 2003).

Because the public do not know what the trafficker looks like, they must work from the characterizations of the trafficker provided by the government and media. These campaigns clearly depict the trafficker as bringing his victims to America, and thus a core characteristic assumed is that he
is foreign. Images like that of the Japanese man act to confirm this attribute in the minds of the public. But because his face cannot be seen, the suggestion is implicitly that the trafficker could be any foreign man. Constant surveillance and directed border control techniques are necessary to protect Americans, as these can detect suspect characteristics and isolate the trafficker. All incoming foreigners must be observed and checked. Crucially, this supports the U.S.-VISIT program, wherein everybody is fingerprinted and photographed indiscriminately either at the time of applying for a visa or for those on visa-waiver programs at the United States’ border, and matched against law enforcement databases, both national and international (State Department, 2004b). Every arrival is a risky body. However, men are especially risky, as evidenced by the requirement implemented in 2002 that they fill out the additional Supplemental Non-immigrant Visa Application (DS-157). This form is required of all male non-immigrant visa applicants between the ages of 16 and 45, regardless of nationality and regardless of where they apply, and requires men to provide a detailed family, employment, and service history (Powell, 2002). The effect of such a regime is specifically to delineate young foreign men as most threatening. Coupled with repeated allusions to the trafficker’s being black and “dark,” the view presents the public with the notion that traffickers are ethnic men, not Americans.

The blackness of the trafficker is not only physical, but also metaphorical. The trafficker is morally corrupt, as he is engaged in the “the dark trade” (State Department, 2009, p. 31). In the State Department’s 2009 TIP Report, for instance, the trafficker is presented as a person who engages in activities that are “horrific” (p. 15), “cruel” (p. 175), “heinous” (p. 27), a “nightmare” (p. 8), a “debasement” (p. 2), and “repugnant” (p. 24). The person who engages in trafficking, in short, is wicked and an “evil” that is both “special” and “old” (State Department, 2004a, pp. 5, 12-13, 2005, p. 9). This government mirrored this depiction in anti-trafficking materials distributed in South America that stated, “I asked God to help me leave my country, and the devil heard me. Don’t Be Fooled, you could be a victim of human trafficking.”

A similar representation was made by Representative Neil Abercrombie in his speech advocating the signing of the TVPA on May 9, 2000, wherein he stated that trafficking is

an evil . . . one of the worst human rights violations of the contemporary world. . . . Traffickers use rape, starvation, torture, extreme physical brutality and psychological abuse to force victims to work in horrible conditions as prostitutes, in sweatshops or domestic servitude. (Section 13)
While violence is not by itself always regarded as wrong, as it is central to masculine performance, the violence described here as enacted by the trafficker is wrongful because it is undertaken in the wrong context and with improper aims. It is not enacted to protect women (and thus affirm gender privilege and orderings), but instead is abnormal, extreme, and committed to make money (see Connell, 1995, 2005). As Nancy Murphy said to the House Committee on International Relations on June 25, 2003, “As horrific as it is, traffickers see good business in this pool of human misery and take great advantage of it” (p. 55). The trafficker is fundamentally greedy, and thus sinful.

Government statements reiterate his immoral disposition. For example, Mark Lagon, then-Ambassador and Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State, suggested that “some societies treat minorities as disposable . . . which allows victims to be enslaved as sadistic and greedy exploiters go unpunished” (2008, para. 2). Similarly, Condoleezza Rice, former Secretary of State, in her letter in the 2007 TIP Report, identified that “perpetrators prey on the most weak among us, primarily women and children, for profit and gain.” The trafficker is not impoverished or acting out of desperation, but is instead money-hungry and materialistic (see CdeBaca cited in State Department, 2009, p. 2). The 2009 Report encapsulates this view, holding that “poverty alone does not explain this tragedy [e.g. trafficking], which is driven by fraudulent recruiters, employers, and corrupt officials who seek to reap profits from others’ desperation” (p. 9). This perspective is supported by an image that appears in the 2010 Report, which depicts the trafficker surrounded by money and wearing jewels.

The suggestion is that the trafficker engages in the ruthless business of
exploiting others simply because he has the capacity to make a vast income. He, and by proxy the outsider, is a callous profiteer. The trafficker’s conduct is not, then, a manifestation of the market, but rather corrupts it. He disrupts the economic system by undercutting normal costs, and is ruthless in his search for wealth. More than this, he uses his money for sinister purposes. As the Congressional Research Service (CRS) (2010) reports, “Human trafficking is now a leading source of profits for organized crime syndicates, together with drugs and weapons, generating billions of dollars” (“Summary,” para. 1).

This confirms, as discussed above, that foreign men are involved in a host of entwined practices that not only threaten national security, but also are criminal. The state must then intervene not only to punish them, but also to prevent attacks on America. By seizing the trafficker’s assets, the state can prevent him from using them for corrupt ends such as sponsoring terrorism or other crimes. As Murphy observed to the House Committee on International Relations on June 25, 2003:

> Trafficking is a profound form of terrorism directed against women and children worldwide. Not unlike the victims of 9/11, these women and children are leading normal lives by their own cultural standards when a sudden, unexpected blow comes from outside that not only destroys their individual lives at the “point of impact” but also sends shock waves shuddering through their families, villages, and whole societies. Like any form of terrorism, the victims are targeted not as individuals, but as members of a vulnerable group whose destruction or exploitation the terrorist
desires. Like any terrorist, the human trafficker must be flushed out and punished. (p. 56)

By connecting traffickers with terrorists, the trafficker is, in moral terms, quite firmly depraved and dangerous. Because the terrorist is already conceived as foreign, risky, and wicked (Butler, 2008), the connection is to affirm that the trafficker is equally as “dark.”

Recurrent references to the trafficker as “dark” imply specifically that he is non-white in appearance. Whereas the TIP reports often picture Anglo men as punters and sex tourists, overwhelmingly traffickers are pictured as Asian, black, or Slavic European. Although a great variation in skin color is therefore apparent, the implication of ascribing to traffickers the status of being dark is to represent them as a group who—irrespective of their skin color—are essentialized as “ethnic.” In pictorial depictions, the trafficker is directly placed as ethnic and nefarious, capturing and exploiting “good,” “innocent” victims against their will (Aradau, 2004; Doezema, 2005). As depicted in the poster on page 29 of the 2010 TIP Report (provided above), the trafficker is not only Asian in appearance, but is also a “puppeteer” exercising complete control over the victim, who is clearly pale and white. It is notable that although the competition and distribution of the stamp was in Serbia and the trafficker has blue eyes, the person is clearly androgynous and made to resemble Eastern European/Central Asian characteristics, implying that the individual is non-Western. The slant-eyes suggest an Asian background and clearly imbue a racial bias when compared with the white women dangled, who do not have similarly Asian features. The pictures on the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons website confirm this depiction, showing traffickers cloaked in darkness approaching a young victim, who sits in the light.

Such blunt images, designed to capture the public’s attention and sympathy, invoke familiar binaries of evil/good and dark/light. In doing so they reaffirm the good/bad, male/female, dominant/subordinate, trafficker/trafficked divides discussed above.

In line with the post-colonial theories (Spivak, 1985; Said, 1979), there is a discursive suggestion that trafficking happens in dark, exotic, dangerous places, and thus generally is something that happens outside of America. It is even suggested that traffickers engage in voodoo rituals and other “dark” arts to support their trade, implying that the trafficker is both religiously and ethnically different in his practices.

Since he is ethnic, the trafficker is supposed not to fit in in “traditionally” white places. He is an external threat to white American privilege, which is imagined in terms of its civility, efficiency, sexual control, and morality (see Hubbard, 2005). When white men are pictured, they are
Nigerian authorities raided voodoo magician Gooday Akhimiona’s shrine and found a register containing the names of young girls sold into prostitution using juju/black magic. (State Department, 2006, p. 16)

located in places with black or Asian women, and are instead demarcated as “sex tourists,” as set out above. The effect is therefore to locate trafficking as something done by “alien” men or something done in overseas places. As Robert Moossy (2008) informed the National Institute of Justice, Department of Justice, and Office for Victims of Crime:

"Trafficking is in some respects a hidden crime, perpetrated in alleys, brothels and illicit massage parlors . . . Because offers . . . are not made to outsiders . . . officers must identify and recruit people who operate at the fringes of these sex trafficking ventures . . . . The success of this approach hinges, of course, on an agency’s ability to identify potential confidential informants."

Traffickers undertake their crimes in seedy or dubious locations. They are dark and they operate in the darkness, which makes them invisible and insidious. Many of the assumptions about black/white interactions made during the colonial period and by the eugenics movement are implicitly reaffirmed, and dark men are discursively marked out as troublesome and risky (Aradu, 2004).

In this view, the trafficker is a “bad” force that can be revealed or illuminated only by good men. The Anglo man is understood to be a civilizing force (Spivak, 1985; Said, 1979). The capacity of America to spread
goodness becomes particularly evident in the 2005 and 2006 TIP reports, which suggest that the media “shines a light on an issue typically shrouded in darkness” (State Department, 2005, p. 7; see also State Department, 2010, p. 1) and claim that the “report probes even the darkest places” (State Department, 2006, p. 44). It marks out America as, to use Ronald Reagan’s infamous quote, “a shining city upon a hill whose beacon light guides freedom-loving people everywhere” (cited in CFACT, 2008, para. 1). However, because light can be corrupted by darkness, border controls that regulate the flow of black men into white places emerge as necessary (see Said, 1979). Because the trafficker is a “challenge to our conscience . . . hidden from view . . . a special evil” (Bush, 2003, para. 27), and a “scourge” on society (Obama, 2010, para. 4; Clinton as cited in State Department, 2010, p. 1), there is a suggestion that he is omnipresent and insidious—a plague that must be kept out and eradicated.

By suggesting that the trafficker is a plague, such sources imply that he is diseased and therefore also causes illness. As one who engages in abnormal and extreme violence (including rape), he is not simply an offender, but also defective and unwell. Indeed, “rape” is mentioned 156 times in the 2009 TIP Report, for example, and often is not used simply to describe sex trafficking, but as reference to one of the ways in which traffickers dominate their victims, who may be being sold for labor. As Republican Congressman Chris Smith suggests, the trafficker is “one sick individual” who is willing to use “the physical gain of another [which] is tragic” (as cited in Burns, 2008, para. 2). In this formulation, the trafficker’s acts are anomalous manifestations, attributable to a perversion or a sickness. While motivated by greed, the trafficker also is driven by his perverted desired to violently, often sexually, dominate his victim. Although male dominance of the feminine is encouraged and authorized by the state, the trafficker diverges from the norm in that he does not gain consent through soliciting tacit agreement, but instead by placing the victim’s body in pain (Young, 2000, 2003; see also Stiehm, 1982). He is unsympathetically brutal, which evidences his failure to assume the proper protective masculinity. As Young (2000) notes, those who deviate from the white, straight, “tame,” and cognitively unimpaired notion of sex are generally placed outside of mainstream society and politics and have difficulty accessing it; they are clearly discriminated against. The trafficker masculinity is both dubious and irregular, and like sex tourists and sex offenders more broadly, he is positioned in ways that incite particular condemnation and repulsion (Schulz, 2005). He engages in, as the Congressional Record suggests, a “monstrous practice” (Lantos, 2006, p. 9), and thus he is to suffer both theological damnation and social segregation. Although the concept of the monster has clear biblical
and historical foundations as an unnatural deviant (see Davidson, 2001), in modern times, as Foucault (2003) suggests,

Monstrosity . . . is no longer the undue mixture of what should be separated by nature. It is simply an irregularity, a slight deviation, but one that makes possible something that really will be a monstrosity, that is to say, the monstrosity of character. (p. 73)

The trafficker, in enjoying causing others pain or harm, is inhumane and different from persons of good character, and therefore a deviant.

Because of his bad character, the trafficker is always at risk of recidivism, and thus he must be isolated and treated. His violent and sexual conduct diverge considerably from normal expressions of sexuality, and therefore he becomes deserving of disgust and segregation, as his illness disturbs American “identity, system, order” (Kristeva, 1982, pp. 358-359). The manifestation of his illness—trafficking—is enough to justify his exclusion, with no further interrogation needed. Indeed, the image of the monster elicits immediate “disgust,” while suggesting a possibility of contamination to “us” (Nussbaum, 1999). Disgust, although a universal human emotion (see Miller, 1997; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 1993), is here also a social expression (Nussbaum, 1999). It is not simply a physical manifestation, but also a social response. As William Ian Miller (1997, pp. 8-9) suggests, disgust has “intensely political significance. . . . [It] work[s] to hierarchize our political order. . . The world is a dangerous place where the polluting powers of the ‘low’ are usually stronger than the purifying powers of the high.”

The suggestion is implicit that anyone can be tainted by the slave trade or the sexual deviancy of the trafficker. USAID (2008, p. 3) makes explicit this proposition, stating that trafficking is “a stain on the humanity of us all” (emphasis added). Any entity that comes into contact with traffickers has its “purity” disrupted. The touch of the trafficker is a blemish that remains, perhaps even permanently (Nemeroff & Rozin, 1994). Applying Nemeroff and Rozin’s (1994) research on disgust, most North American research subjects expressed a belief in the transferability of the harmful and disgusting characteristics of disagreeable people (through contact with their possessions and objects), and suggested that their harmful characteristics could be treated through washing or sterilizing, especially where “interpersonal-moral contagious entities” were involved (p. 178). Physical or symbolic purification is revealed, in this study, to be deemed insufficient to remove the stain of the moral contagion, and thus nothing short of isolation or destruction of the contagion can suffice. With trafficking, the moral stain is particularly irremovable from the psychologically or physically affected
victim, who must be treated and assisted (see the TVPA, s. 102). Anything or anyone that the trafficker has come into contact with is indelibly contaminated, and therefore quarantined and treated to prevent further spread.

This treatment regime requires the participation of experts who can diagnose and remedy the defect. Law enforcement officials, psychologists, and doctors are needed to direct intervention, isolation, and therapeutic care. Foucault (2003, p. 56) highlights this point, observing, “When the monster violates the law by its very existence, it triggers the response of something quite different from the law itself. It provokes either violence, the will for pure and simple suppression, or medical care or pity.” Indeed, the trafficker’s deviance attracts the outright condemnation of law and hefty penalties, while those whom he has touched become the concern of public health bodies who must correct the damage he has done.

The involvement of public health bodies affirms that trafficking is a pathogen that is spreading. The trafficker, as a disgusting individual or thing, says Miller (1997, p. 89), “is marvellously promiscuous and ubiquitous,” and thus will ignore boundaries and controls. As Condoleezza Rice stated in the 2008 TIP Report, “Trafficking and exploitation plague all nations, and no country, even ours, is immune” (p. 1; see also, TIP Report, 2004, 2005, 2007). Trafficking is then a global threat, existing in epidemic proportions worldwide. Even from the early stages of the United States government’s discussions of trafficking in persons, statistics were produced (that is, they were often “estimated”) that suggested that the crime was widespread and growing (see discussion in CRS, 2010). Despite a lack of concrete data on the phenomenon, traffickers were said to be “rife” and operating globally (USAID, 2006, 2007; CRS, 2010). This rhetoric again reinforces that no one is safe from contamination by trafficking.

Repeated suggestion that the trafficker employs technologies that traverse borders emphasizes his reach. Not only does he use transportation developments to his advantage, but he also uses the internet to recruit victims and to distribute pornography involving slave subjects or children. For example, the PROTECT Act s. 501(8) states that “child pornography circulating on the Internet has, by definition, been digitally uploaded or scanned into computers and has been transferred over the Internet, often in different file formats, from trafficker to trafficker.” The internet thus acts as a network where traffickers can both communicate and drive up their profits. It also evidences their truly global reach and marks the capacity for their insidiousness to reach into any home, workplace, or even school. Herein lies a fundamental belief about the core characteristics of the trafficker: the notion that he is sneaky, shapeless, omnipresent, and always lurking.

The trafficker is, therefore, also “predatory.” For instance, in Repre-
sentative Chris Smith’s (Republican) speech to the House of Representatives on May 1, 2007, traffickers are described as

new mobsters, many of them former KGB operatives, . . . on the scene buying and selling young women as commodities. . . . the prospect of making billions of dollars has enticed some of the most unsavory and cruel individuals, including and especially organized crime, into this nefarious trade. (“Observing the 200th Anniversary of the Abolition of the British Slave Trade (H. Res. 158),” paras. 11, 16)

This account focuses on traffickers as fundamentally different and therefore outside of normal, civilized society. As Representative Smith suggested, America must then wage a war on traffickers to ensure their exclusion, the end of trafficking, and therefore the (supposed) assurance of American values such as liberty (see discussion in Berman, 2003; Jeffrey, 2004). Law enforcement, consular officials, and lawyers must work at the international, national, and local levels to address the multi-tiered, cross-border complexity of trafficking and coordinate efforts to bring traffickers to “justice” (TVPA, s.102). Ending trafficking in the United States, therefore, is about heavily regulating the movement of all foreign men across American borders.

V. A MUSCULAR PROTECTOR: THE STATE AS DEFENDING THE NATION BY KEEPING THE “OTHER” OUTSIDE

By pursuing legal intervention as the core method of preventing and addressing trafficking, the state places itself at the heart of the anti-trafficking framework. The inclusion of provisions in the TVPA that require the Executive Branch to implement, the Legislative to re-appropriate or reauthorize, and the Judiciary to prosecute and review, all act to reinforce the predominance of the government in responding to exploitation. The state projects itself as the ideal authority to prevent the abuse of the victim, because its laws are supposed to provide for equality and rights through a coherent logic that is transcendent and divorced from the social world and the market (Smart, 1989, pp. 12-13). The government suggests that, through implementing the rule of law, it can objectively intervene to mediate belonging, and thus prevent trafficking. As Mark Lagon, then-Director of the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, summarized:

In order to fight human trafficking we need democratic justice—fully enforced. And we must replace corruption with rule of law so that officials “on the take” all over the world stop enabling those exploiters . . . Human trafficking represents the antithesis of the women’s empowerment needed to make democracy whole . . . It shouldn’t be regulated or
merely mitigated; it must be abolished. The exploited should be treated as victims to be helped, not as criminals or illegal aliens. Exploiters must be stigmatized, prosecuted, and squeezed out of existence. (2007, paras. 32, 34, 35)

Following this formulation, a hard-line, institutionalized approach, centered on specifically the courts, is required. Claims in tort and the confiscation of assets allow the state to directly remove any benefits and proceeds the trafficker may gain, and penalties act to increase the costs. As CdeBaca suggested in the 2010 TIP Report, “Enslaving someone still carries too little risk. Remediation, fines, or warnings are too small a price to pay—those who would profit by stealing freedom should lose their own” (p. 2). The state can dissuade traffickers from exploitation if it makes the risks outweigh the possible profits of the activity.

However, the authority of governments to direct anti-trafficking efforts is not universally applied. Certain countries are rendered as complicit with traffickers and therefore are positioned as “evil” and incapable. Instead of holding the authority to dictate the response to trafficking, these states are regarded as illegitimate and therefore are the rightful targets of American intervention and sanctions. What emerges then is a distinction between capable/incapable, us/them, here/there: binaries that are engaged in such a way as to place the United States in a position of superior ability. As Professor Laura Lederer (2000) suggested to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations:

Trafficking often originates in countries with poverty and few opportunities for women. But regardless of the root causes, it is important for countries to draft, pass, and enforce strict laws prohibiting trafficking and its surrounding activities . . . The United States is perhaps the only country right now that can play a leadership role in encouraging countries to address the problem of trafficking. U.S. leadership is important not only because of our interest in promoting basic human rights, but also because it serves the American national interest . . . We are the people who can help young women and girls . . . by drawing attention to their plight, helping nations strengthen their laws to catch and prosecute traffickers, and finding the ways to prevent and protect young women and children from commercial sexual exploitation. (Conclusion)

In this formulation, the American government is the nucleus of international measures because of its special capacity for global outreach, dedication to human rights, and expertise in identifying victims and traffickers.

Such a role empowers the United States to engage in a “civilizing mission,” through which certain rights are afforded to those who comply and enact American-authorized performances of race, gender, religion, ethnic-
ity, and so forth (Grewe, 2000, p. 457). Both the trafficked person and the trafficker are characterized and conceived from the perspective of the government, as opposed to being given a voice, as evidenced by the use of authored testimonies in the TIP reports rather than authentic victim accounts. This categorization erases the complexity of the individuals, placing the authority to determine belonging and to incarcerate or expel “Others” with the government. Indeed, those individuals deemed to belong, including both citizens and certified victims, are repeatedly compelled to enact proscribed cultural and social norms through the threat of sanctions. These sanctions are, however, rarely enacted on citizens and remain largely reserved for outsiders, including guilty migrants and traffickers (Kapur, 2002, p. 1). This process of creating and reinforcing categories in binary form makes law’s distinctions and borders appear as natural and even immutable, and the government’s place in regulating the human trade appropriate and beneficial even in the neoliberal space wherein government is supposed as separate from the market. The denial of rights to foreign men appears acceptable because the United States government is a good masculine protector, and thus a properly civilizing, democracy-spreading, liberal force.

In eliciting citizens’ consent to reduce rights, theories around the mobilization of fear provide some insight. These theories argue that to create the need for citizens to give up some of their freedom in exchange for safety, the state must invoke a sense of alarm in citizens. The protector requires a sense of being needed to hold a position of authority and a sense that law must be invoked because otherwise citizens would be at risk or in a position of danger (Young, 2003). But as Young (2003) points out, such a construction fundamentally erodes many of the democratic values that these societies espouse. She points to John Keane (2002), for instance, who suggests that democratic societies frequently utilize and incite fear, but observes that

> fear is indeed a thief. It robs subjects of their capacity to act with or against others. It leaves them shaken, sometimes permanently traumatized. And when large numbers fall under the dark clouds of fear, no sun shines on civil society. Fear saps its energies and tears and twists at the institutions of political representation. Fear eats the soul of democracy. (p. 235)

By creating a sense of urgency and danger, anti-trafficking is thus not about questioning, exploration, and enquiry, but instead about action (Butler, 2008). The public are told to suspend their critical skills in order to be safe. Questioning racialized notions of insecurity is therefore essential not only to reinvigorate the anti-trafficking project, but also to explore the promises
and limits of democracy and security themselves (Aradau, 2008). In engaging
the logic of protectionism, there is quite notably an eroding of many of
the values supposed to underpin the Western legal system and whole classes
of unequal persons are created, largely conceived along the lines of race and
gender (Berman, 2003). This marks violence in our thinking about trafficking,
rather than the end of violence proposed in anti-trafficking accounts.

As a result of exposing this narrowing of our understandings of traffick-
ing and describing the unstated assumptions around masculinities, there
is an opening up of the possibilities for reconsidering patterns and relation-
ships of power. If we depart from narrow assumptions about the rightfulness
of robust borders, new spaces for debates and new possibilities
regarding the ending of trafficking may be identified. Changing our angle to
more fully explore the multiplicity of identities interacting in the trafficking
space, including avoiding racial and gender stereotyping, will reveal novel
approaches that can promote broader social change and empowerment.

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Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070: Targeting the Other and Generating Discourses and Practices of Discrimination and Hate

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ABSTRACT

The state of Arizona, through its Senate Bill 1070, has made legal the practice of profiling as one of the key tools to regulate migration and differentiate those who are presumed to be residing in the state without legal documents. The state is encouraging xenophobia and empowering the groups with a strong anti-immigrant sentiment to become directly involved in the monitoring of such practice. History has shown us that when the state and large sectors of civil society exclude the “other” and criminalize his/her presence, hate toward the “other” is the most common result. The consequences of such a dynamic can result in an increase in racism, segregation, and an intensification of social violence and state repression. By tearing down the social and economic relationship between those who can legally reside in the state and those who are excluded, a future of a common ethos of inclusion and mutual respect is seriously jeopardized.

I. INTRODUCTION

The very relationship with the other is the relationship with the future.
—Emmanuel Levinas (Levinas Reader, 2001, p. 44)

On May 6, 2010, a 44-year-old, third-generation Mexican-American native-born U.S. citizen, Juan Varela, was watering a tree in his front yard when Gary Thomas Kelly confronted him, pointed a snub-nosed revolver at his face, and fatally wounded him with a single shot to the neck. According to initial police reports, Kelley, who also threatened Varela’s brother, Antonio, had shouted, “Hurry up and go back to Mexico or you’re gonna die” (quoted in Ferraresi & Kiefer, 2010, p. 1). Much to the dismay of the Monterey Institute of International Studies is a Graduate School of Middlebury College. Correspondence concerning this article may be directed to William.arrocha@miis.edu.
Varela family, the Maricopa police department hesitated to characterize the shooting as a hate crime. However, on June 9, the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office alleged that this was a hate crime—one more of the 1,950 hate crimes reported by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) in Arizona since 1992 (The majority of these crimes have had as offenders White males and as victims Hispanics) (“Hate Crimes Add an Element of Bias,” n.d).

The characteristic of this crime, and particularly of the derogatory remark made by Kelly, is that it reflects a dominant, or hegemonic discourse and practice, in which Hispanics in general, and Mexicans in particular, are perceived as intruders or, as the mainstream media has characterized them, “aliens,” “invaders,” or, even more specifically, as a very popular TV anchor, Lou Dobbs, referred to them, “an army of invaders” (Dobbs, 2006). And history has shown us that invaders can be killed in defense of the nation. Although there is not a clear consensus on the morality of killing in self-defense or even in the defense of a nation, States, through custom and written law, have often granted citizens and state agents the legal and moral capability to kill those subjects who are considered as violating their sovereignty (Walzer, 1977; Thomson, 1991). Thus, by characterizing immigrants (with or without legal residence) as “aliens,” many sectors of civil society and its dominant institutions automatically define them as being the Other—those whose lives are generally perceived as less valuable. Thus, taking away their life is justified not only as an act of self-defense, but also as the last resort to protect what is understood through the dominant or hegemonic discourse to be the essential values and racial/cultural traits that make up the “true” citizen of the nation.

The state of Arizona, through its Senate Bill 1070 (SB 1070), has made legal the practice of profiling as one of the key tools to regulate migration and differentiate those who are presumed to be residing in the state without legal documents. Through the institutionalization of so-called racial/cultural differentiation, the state is encouraging xenophobia and empowering those groups with a strong anti-immigrant sentiment to become directly involved in enhancing such discourse and practice. The mandate to enforce SB 1070 to the fullest extent possible is reinforced by a provision allowing for any legal resident of Arizona to collect money damages by showing any official or agency of this state or county, city, town or other political subdivisions of this state that adopts or implements a policy that limits or restricts the enforcement of federal immigration laws to less than the full extent permitted by federal law. (SB 1070, Sec. 2. Title 11, para. G, 2010)
History has shown us that when the State and civil society exclude “the other” and criminalize his/her presence, hate toward the later can develop, particularly among those members in society who consider “the other” or the “alien” as a threat to their existence (Perlmutter, 1999). The consequences of such a dynamic can result in an increase in racism and segregation, an intensification of state repression and social violence, and a deeply divided society with a loss of unity and historical direction (Perlmutter, 1997).

One of the critical consequences of tearing down the social and economic relationship between those who can legally reside in the state and those who cannot—or are perceived as not being allowed to, due to their “race”/ethnicity/culture—is that a future in which the common ethos of inclusion and mutual respect is desired can be seriously jeopardized. Furthermore, the most dangerous consequence of what seems to be a national trend (there are now more than 20 states discussing bills similar to Arizona’s SB 1070) is that the institutions, discourse, and practice of segregation will inevitably create an environment in which fear of the Other may push people to increase hate crimes.

I will attempt to show that such a perverse dynamic, which is a product of false consciousness, exacerbates a political economy in which, in Gramscian terms, those who control the state institutions in this particular Historic Bloc are reaping material benefits (Gramsci, 2000). It is a well-known fact that the Hispanic population receives lower wages than any other minority (Kazis & Miller, 2001). Nevertheless, a large number of non-Hispanics from the working and middle classes are now seeing their jobs and wages declining at the same time that they see the American Dream evaporating (Peterson, 1995). In the meantime, those in control of capital have thrived from the increasingly unequal political economy; yet their survival depends, at least in the short term, on the creation of a scapegoat that they know is needed by all those who still want to believe in the American Dream. But as history has shown us, the ultimate consequences of instilling hate can be socially, politically, and economically unsustainable.

Unfortunately, today, there are seemingly many individuals and organizations that are ready to act out their deep frustrations as Kelly did. There may also be many Hispanics and undocumented workers who might take actions of resistance beyond pacific protests through streets and avenues. Such a situation of civil unrest could lead to increased State violence, which would then become a major story on every news outlet, a situation that could, in turn, catalyze even greater and more generalized social unrest.

Therefore, if the American ethos is still to be grounded on the peaceful co-existence of multiple cultures under one nation, making a change in the
way migrants are defined legally and socially is imperative. In order to achieve this, a counter-hegemonic response that could lead to the creation of alternatives to the present immigration policies at both the federal and state levels would be needed. Some of the possible alternatives will be explored in this paper.

However, if the hegemonic idea is to control potential social unrest through the collaboration between civil society and the police forces so as to maintain the present social and economic structures of inequality, then what is needed is a serious redefinition of the present political economy. This would also necessitate making fundamental changes in social and political institutions—a situation that might jeopardize the very basis of civil and political liberties inherent in the American Constitution.

II. THE MAKING OF THE MEXICAN/ILLEGAL ALIEN/OTHER

Perhaps the most compelling definition of “the other,” for the purposes of understanding its construction as applied to immigrants in general and Mexican migrants in particular, could be the one put forward by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, in which “other” can be understood as “disturbingly or threateningly different: alien, exotic” (Merriam-Webster.com, n.d.). This definition has been at the core of the legal, political, and social differentiations between what the dominant discourse has considered as a “true American” versus an “Alien,” the later regardless of his or her legal status. Regarding the creation of the discourse of hate toward Mexican migrants, such an “other” has now been elevated to an “invader,” which dismantles the political and social construct of the immigrant and redirects the legal debate to equating migration with a threat to the national security of the State, and in our particular case, the security of Arizona as a sovereign state within the United States.

From the time that the United States was formed and consolidated as a federal republic, there has been constant tension between the federal government and the states on the following key question: Can the core principles of American exceptionalism and the discourse that supports them, as identified by Lipset (1997), be sustained if the largest flow of migrants, of which the political economy has created a continuous demand, is identified as a threat to such principles? This question, particularly when seen through the legal construct of “the other,” has been prevalent since the passing of The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, of which the Alien Enemy Act has remained intact as 50 U.S.C. § 21-24. The importance of this Act is that it is the first document to define a non-U.S. citizen as an “alien,” not just an “immigrant”; and an alien, in the context of American exceptionalism, is not just a foreigner owing allegiance to another government, but a subject
who, due to his or her cultural or physical characteristics, can represent a potential threat to such exceptionalism.

In legalistic terms, one could suggest that the issue can be resolved by an individual’s pledging allegiance to the United States and its apparent core values. However, if a socio-legal analysis is conducted, it becomes apparent that history has presented the following conundrum to the dominant classes and political elites: Should the U.S. Constitution and its first, tenth, and fourteenth amendments give the same rights to the Other? Can the political economy that supports the idea of American exceptionalism permit the same level of social mobility to the Other? Can capital accumulate at the same rate as if the Other were not fully included?

Even though many national groups that do not relate in sociological terms to the dominant Anglo-Saxon-Protestant culture have suffered from social and economic exclusion related to the questions above, the two most targeted populations regarding these questions have been the Native Americans and the Mexicans (Johnson, 1998). Although Mexicans have been perceived as a threat to American exceptionalism since the United States’ expansion based on the theory of Manifest Destiny that concluded in territorial terms with the 1846-48 war with Mexico and the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, practically all major changes in U.S. migration laws and policies, at both the federal and state levels, have created excessively restrictive conditions for them to legally migrate into the United States (Horsman, 1981). These conditions are particularly severe for Mexicans migrating from depressed rural areas. This phenomenon has been compounded by the fact that the rural oligarchies and political elites in Mexico have also marginalized the mestizo and indigenous communities as an inferior “other.” The result is that in both states, the mestizo and the indigenous peoples are valued only as the cheapest of the factors of production.

This said, one would presume that in times of economic hardships, most Americans would not mind taking a job in the labor markets dominated by those who are considered as inferior “others.” Furthermore, it is puzzling and paradoxical that, beyond carrying out raids and other punitive measures, there are no federal or state programs promoting and supporting jobs in the industries where such “others” work. Moreover, the vox populi has deeply integrated into its popular narratives the notion that such “others” standing at the corner on Main Street, washing dishes in their favorite restaurants, landscaping their gardens, taking care of their children, making their beds in hotels, washing their cars, building their fences and houses, working in the most unsanitary meatpacking facilities across the country, and of course, picking their fruits and vegetables, should be pitied as well as feared.

The Other has become one of the most important factors of production
for those economic sectors that could not maintain a high rate of capital accumulation if they were to follow the apparently treasured and unmatched American rule of law. This means that the wages and working conditions that are inferior to those regulated by the state can be maintained only by ensuring the “illegality” and “otherness” of such a labor force. As De Genova (2004) eloquently states:

Mexico has provided US capitalism with the only “foreign” migrant labor reserve so sufficiently flexible that it can neither be fully replaced nor completely excluded under any circumstance. However, the US nation-state has historically deployed a variety of different tactics to systematically create and sustain “illegality,” and furthermore, has refined those tactics in ways that have more thoroughly constrained the social predicaments of undocumented Mexican migrants. (p. 166)

Enforcing the conditions above, a myth has prevailed of the Mexican migrant as the Other not willing to integrate and embrace the values and principles of an American exceptionalism rooted in an Anglo-Saxon-Protestant weltanschauung. And through the fetishism of the law, the Other is perversely a necessary evil to maintain the present social relations of production. And the discourse of that threat, in opposition to understanding the “illegality” as a link to a system of exploitation similar to that of the American system of indentured servitude that lasted until the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in 1865 (Morgan, 2000) but without the stigma of slavery, can be found in reductionist theses of why the Mexican/illegal alien/Other has to be understood as a potential “disturbingly or threateningly different” “other.” As Samuel Huntington (2004) bluntly states regarding such “threat”:

No other immigrant group in U.S. history has asserted or could assert a historical claim to U.S. territory. Mexicans and Mexican Americans can and do make that claim. Almost all of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, California, Nevada, and Utah was (sic) part of Mexico until Mexico lost them as a result of the Texan War of Independence in 1835-1836 and the Mexican-American War of 1846-1848. Mexico is the only country that the United States has invaded, occupied its capital—placing the Marines in the “halls of Montezuma”—and then annexed half its territory. . . . Demographically, socially, and culturally, the reconquista (re-conquest) of the Southwest United States by Mexican immigrants is well underway. (pp. 4, 7)

For those who see such an immigrant group as a threat, integration and assimilation will always be problematic, if not impossible, though not necessarily a problem if a certain lifestyle is to be maintained. The reaction will
be to continue finding a balance between maintaining the deportability of the “illegal aliens,” and hence a legal frame that responds to this, and generating a discourse that ensures that both the federal and state governments find ways to embrace the popular discourse of mistrust and hate toward the Other as they keep their repressive policies within the limits of what the dominant classes and ideology consider “politically correct.” This balancing act has never been an easy one, particularly when the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act abolished the National Origins Formula, establishing a quota system with an annual limitation of 300,000 visas for immigrants, including 170,000 from Eastern Hemisphere countries, with no more than 20,000 per country. By 1968, the annual limitation from the Western Hemisphere was set at 120,000 immigrants, with visas available on a first-come, first-served basis. As shown by Calavita (1995) and Papademetriou (2004), the demise of the Bracero Program in 1964 (pointedly described by Justin Akers [Akers & Davis, 2006, p. 139]) as a “twentieth century caste system,” added to the inability of the Mexican economy to satisfy its demand for labor and the increase in the demand for cheap labor in the U.S., would result in a constant and substantial increase in the number of undocumented Mexican migrants.

The “illegal aliens” would become the deportable “illegal invaders” of the 21st century. Moreover, the latter would become the subjects of what is now one of the tensest legal and political debates between the federal and state governments regarding which level of government is to be in charge of “defending” the borders of the Union while preserving the sovereignty of its states. On the other hand, the political economy, apparently rooted in the notion of exceptionalism, is failing to deliver the “American Dream” to those who have embraced it as a quasi-religious act (Cullen, 2004).

III. INCREASING THE RESTRICTIONS FOR MEXICAN LEGAL MIGRATION WHILE TARGETING THE OTHER: FROM CALIFORNIA’S PROPOSITION 187 TO ARIZONA’S SB 1070

Although states have been involved at many levels in managing certain aspects of migration policies (Akers & Davis, 2006), California’s Proposition 187 was one of the contemporary precursors for resuscitating the interpretation of the Tenth Amendment with regard to the powers it can delegate to states and their people to defend themselves, in our case, against the so-called “illegal aliens/invaders.” One of the ways in which the Tenth Amendment was used by then Governor Pete Wilson (1991-1999) was to confer the powers not explicitly delegated to the federal government on the “people” and the “state” of California. The 1994 ballot initiative, introduced by Assemblyman Dick Mountjoy as “Save Our State” (SOS), was based on
a discourse of self-defense in which the “illegal aliens” were considered a threat to the survival of the state and to American exceptionalism. Section 1 of the Proposition stated that:

The People of California find and declare as follows: That they have suffered and are suffering economic hardship caused by the presence of illegal aliens in this state. That they have suffered and are suffering personal injury and damage caused by the criminal conduct of illegal aliens in this state. That they have a right to the protection of their government from any person or persons entering this country unlawfully.

The proposition was explicitly designed to deter the so-called “illegal aliens” from entering the country as a first step in ending what was referred to by Stanley Mailman (quoted in Bustamante, 2001, p. 3) as the “illegal alien invasion.” As a matter of fact, regardless of the tensions between the federal government and the states derived from the Supremacy Clause, Governor Wilson went on to sue the state. Wilson would state in the lawsuit that “the massive and unlawful migration of foreign nationals . . . constitutes an invasion of the state of California against which the United States is obligated to protect California.” The suit cites Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution, which states: “The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion” (Weintraub, 2001, p. 1).

Although Proposition 187 was defeated by an appellate court judge, it received very strong support from 59% of voters. Furthermore, the discourse that it created in characterizing the undocumented workers as “invaders” became the new way to relate to the Mexican migrant. And it is that characterization that has triggered the far-right from most of the Southwest to construct a discourse of hate that, after September 11, 2001, would be shore up by the obsession with absolute security through the absorption of immigration matters into the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Migration in general, and particularly the “illegal” migration, would become part of the National Security discourse and policy of both the federal and state governments. This shift in dealing with a socioeconomic phenomenon, in a climate of fear and economic uncertainty, was to revive the debates and policies of exclusion at both the federal and state levels.

Regardless of the fate of Proposition 187, its discursive power resided in the fact that the majority of Californians, through a democratic process reflecting the principles of the Tenth Amendment that can delegate powers to the people, embraced a dominant discourse as if it were theirs, yet controlled by the dominant classes of the state that were to produce further illegality and hence increase the deportability and exploitative conditions of undocumented workers (Akers & Davis, 2006). Paradoxically, it is quite
possible that if the Proposition would have gone through, the savings incurred by employers and society in general would have made even more attractive the already very cheap labor of undocumented workers that has been one of the most important factors in the agribusiness of California that supported Governor Wilson and Proposition 187 (Garza, 1977; Chacón & Davis, 2006). As a matter of fact, according to Papademetriou (2004, p. 51), “From 1980 to 1994, migration from the surveyed rural communities to the United States increased by 95 percent” and by 2002, migration to the United States was 452% higher than in 1980, with California’s industries that had supported Governor Wilson being among the main receptors of a surge of immigrants from Mexico.

The federal response to Proposition 187, Operation Gatekeeper, was an initiative of President Clinton that, according to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, was intended “to restore integrity and safety to the nation’s busiest border” (quoted in Nevins, 2002, p. 3). According to a White House press release, Operation Gatekeeper was launched on October 1, 1994, almost a year after NAFTA was enacted as the most important comprehensive agreement to stop “illegal immigration” (“Remarks by President Clinton,” 1993). This policy would focus on closing the five westernmost miles of the border, extending from the Pacific Ocean to the San Ysidro checkpoint. U.S. migration routes immediately shifted eastward, and the use of professional smugglers increased. In May 1995, the Border Patrol initiated Operation Disruption to target smugglers, known as coyotes or polteros, and established new checkpoints on interior highways (Nevins, 2002). These measures resulted in a substantial increase in the flow of undocumented migration through Arizona.

According to the Department of Homeland Security, Arizona had one of the fastest-growing undocumented immigrant populations in the country, increasing from approximately 100,000 in 1994 to 560,000 by 2008 (Fernandez & Robinson, 1994; Hoeafer & Baker, 2008). Such a staggering increase in mostly Mexican undocumented immigrants, within a context of an increase in anti-immigrant sentiment among a large number of Arizona’s residents, added to a struggling economy and economic anxiety during the late 2000s, could only result in a strong push from conservative politicians and anti-immigrant pundits to promote strong anti-immigration laws packaged as public safety bills. And if there is a state where sheriffs or former sheriffs have been involved in crafting, implementing, and operationalizing discourses and practices of discrimination, Arizona would be in the forefront.

In an interview on National Public Radio on March 12, 2008, two years before he personally promoted the SB 1070, the former Deputy Sheriff of the Maricopa County, then State Representative and chair of the Ari-
zona House Appropriations Committee, Russell Pearce, declared the following:

I believe in the rule of law, always have. I’ve always believed in the rule of law. We’re a nation of laws. . . I will not back off till we resolve this problem of this illegal invasion. Invaders, that’s what they are. They’re invaders on the American sovereignty and it can’t be tolerated. (Quoted in Inskeep, 2008, para. 6)

If one could personify the combination of American nativism and xenophobia, it would be Senator Russell Pearce. If one were to take him at face value, he would seem to represent a naive view of American exceptionalism that sees in the Other a “disturbing” or “threatening” alien to be feared and expelled at all costs. However, as naive as he may seem, he has been one of the most powerful contemporary politicians in Arizona and the foremost zealous promoter of the most controversial anti-immigrant laws implemented in the state. He has also shown that, regardless of the Supremacy Clause, states can enact many laws that affect immigration policies.

Senator Russell has been one of the most successful promoters of state bills that have exacerbated the perception of the Other and reinforced discourses and practices of hate, not just within Arizona but across the United States. Before promoting SB 1070 or The Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, he was a strong supporter of Proposition 200, also called Protect Arizona Now. This initiative, which passed in 2004 with 56% of the vote, requires individuals to produce proof of citizenship before they may register to vote or apply for public benefits. The Proposition also makes it a misdemeanor for public officials to fail to report persons unable to produce documentation of citizenship who apply for these benefits, and allows citizens who believe that public officials have given undocumented persons benefits to sue for remedies. Senator Russell, now President of the Arizona Senate, has pledged to push to reform the Fourteenth Amendment so as not to grant automatic citizenship to children born on U.S. soil and to make English the official language of the United States (Russell, n.d.). But beyond the strong support Senator Russell’s initiatives have received from the majority of voters, state legislators, the state governor, and many media outlets, it is fundamental to understand the deeper and far-reaching links between what seem like local initiatives, yet are concerted efforts from a complex web of a very tight and well-organized historic bloc. In this bloc, the dominant classes have extended their power to all levels of government, key economic sectors, and the most powerful corporate media. Yet for most voters, SB1070 was just an Act to protect them from the Other who, according to the dominant discourse, has represented the main threat regarding public safety and the economic downturn—an Other who apparently has to
be hated for his/her perceived disdain for the American Dream and his/her longing to retake his/her historical land.

The day SB 1070 was signed into law by Governor Jan Brewer, little was known of the backstage process behind what was perceived as an Act emanating from the people’s will. At face value, American democracy was at its best: Of the voters in Arizona, 59% voted for it; it passed the Arizona House of Representatives by a 35-21 party-line vote, and the revised measure then passed the State Senate by a 17-11 vote that also closely followed party lines. The killing of a 58-year-old rancher, Robert Krentz, and his dog, who were apparently shot by an “illegal alien” on March 27, 2010, while Krentz was doing fence work on his large ranch roughly 19 miles from the Mexican border, was to find some kind of resolution through a Bill that was actually going to be named after Krentz. No suspect was ever found, but in the imagination of many Arizona residents, Krentz was one of the first victims of the “illegal invaders” from Mexico (Thornburgh, 2010). The fact is that Mr. Krentz was just an unfortunate scapegoat for a piece of legislation reflecting a deeper and more disturbing national sentiment toward the Mexican/illegal alien/Other.

Although SB 1070 was an idea born from a man operating from a deep nativist and anti-immigrant sentiment, it was crafted primarily by a very pragmatic and well-educated individual with no direct ties to Arizona, who nonetheless was very committed to making immigration laws extremely restrictive: Kris Kobach. Mr. Kobach, who is now the Secretary of State of Kansas, is a young attorney and law professor with a very high level of education from the American Ivy League. There is no question that he could be the poster boy for the nostalgic image of the American Anglo-Saxon-Protestant who staunchly believes in American exceptionalism. In 2008, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) classified Mr. Koback as one of the most influential nativists promoting racial discrimination through discourses and practices of hate. But how is Mr. Kobach linked to the dominant class that promotes a hegemonic discourse against so-called “illegal aliens”? Mr. Koback, who has focused on working with local and state governments, is engaged with the Immigration Reform Law Institute (IRLI). The IRLI is the legal arm of the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), listed as a nativist hate group by the SPLC (Beirich, 2007). Although FAIR represents itself as a non-partisan nonprofit whose main mission is merely “to examine immigration trends and effects” (“About Fair: Mission Statement,” n.d.) It was founded by Dr. John Tanton, who still serves on its Board of Directors. Dr. Tanton has been known nationally as one of the major architects of the U.S. contemporary nativist movement who, according to the SPLC, 20 years ago, was already warning of a destructive “Latin onslaught” heading to the United States (Beirich, 2007,
Moreover, Mr. Kobach, in addition to Senator Russell, has been an active member of the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), which is an extremely conservative nonprofit membership association of state legislators and private sector policy advocates. Among many of its activities, the ALEC assists its members in developing “model laws” for state legislatures and serves as a powerful networking apparatus for fellow legislators to share and anchor their ideological perspectives and policy goals. ALEC is perhaps the most powerful institution that conservative state legislators at both levels of government have used to attempt to accelerate the process of granting more powers to local and state governments. These powers are generally related to maintaining what they consider to be the fundamental principles of American exceptionalism. FAIR and ALEC were the main institutions where Arizona’s SB 1070 was politically and legally drafted, not the office of Senator Russell.

In the wake of the passage of SB 1070, for instance, FAIR advanced a copy of its new report on the alarming cost of illegal immigration in Arizona to Fox News. On May 17, Fox reported that “Arizona’s illegal-immigrant population is costing the state’s taxpayers even more than once thought—a whopping $2.7 billion, according to researchers at the public-interest group that helped write the state’s new immigration law” (Barnes, 2010, para. 1).

But how would Kobach reach the more “liberal” sector of the dominant political elites? On April 29, 2010, the New York Times published an op-ed by Kobach in which he questioned the criticism of the Bill with a set of reflections on why state government can, and needs to be, involved in immigration issues. Kobach put on the spot two organizations that not only are considered progressive, but also have defended Latino immigrants in general and Mexican immigrants in particular. He stated, “Predictably, groups that favor relaxed enforcement of immigration laws, including the American Civil Liberties Union and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, insist the law is unconstitutional” (Kobach, 2010, p. A31).

He then went on to explain what he understood as the constitutionality of the Bill and the “urgent” need for Arizona to implement it:

While it is true that Washington holds primary authority in immigration, the Supreme Court since 1976 has recognized that states may enact laws to discourage illegal immigration without being pre-empted by federal law. As long as Congress hasn’t expressly forbidden the state law in question, the statute doesn’t conflict with federal law and Congress has not displaced all state laws from the field, it is permitted. That’s why Arizona’s 2007 law making it illegal to knowingly employ unauthorized
aliens was sustained by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

In sum, the Arizona law hardly creates a police state. It takes a measured, reasonable step to give Arizona police officers another tool when they come into contact with illegal aliens during their normal law enforcement duties. And it’s very necessary: Arizona is the ground zero of illegal immigration. Phoenix is the hub of human smuggling and the kidnapping capital of America, with more than 240 incidents reported in 2008. It’s no surprise that Arizona’s police associations favored the bill, along with 70 percent of Arizonans. (Kobach, 2010, p. A31)

It is no coincidence that the American Civil Liberties Union and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund were singled out. These organizations have been in a direct political and legal confrontation with the anti-immigration groups linked to the complex web of xenophobic, nativist, and openly racist organizations of which FAIR is one of the largest and most powerful (“Anti-Immigration Groups,” 2001; Larsen, 2007).

This extremely controversial piece of legislation was supported and promoted by these national organizations because of their members’ profound disdain for Mexican undocumented immigration and what it represents for their idea of America—not because of their concern regarding the so-called “economic burden” of immigration. It should be no surprise that many anti-“illegal immigrant” activists, members of the media, and local and federal governments have directly used, and benefit indirectly every day from, the cheap labor of such “disturbing” and “threatening” Others. Therefore, the most significant connection for our understanding of why these individuals and organizations are so important, to understand their influence regarding the exacerbation of the Other and the manufacturing of a hegemonic discourse of hate and practices toward the Mexican/illegal alien/Other, is that they have been linked to white supremacists who have been pushing to confront what they consider “an invasion of illegal aliens” and particularly, what they perceive as a threat from the Mexican migrants (Sullivan, 2010).

One certainly cannot conclude that all legal and political actions taken toward undocumented workers are intended to target the Other and “produce” more illegality. However, the overall benefits that these actions have on capital accumulation are vital for a system that can no longer sustain social stability based on an ideal type void of a formal system of segregation. To prove the perversion of this notion, it is important to bring into our analysis an additional key party involved in the drafting and implementation of SB 1070: the American private prison system, particularly the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA). We will see how CCA was the most powerful actor behind SB 1070—a situation that sheds light on Gram-
sci’s contention that the dominant classes and their hegemonic expressions of power are more significant in determining the power relationships and social structures of a political system than the state itself (Gramsci, 1995, 2000).

In what was perhaps a surprise to those who believe in the transparency of American democracy, Laura Sullivan, National Public Radio’s police and prisons correspondent, broadcast on the national airwaves what had also been investigated by other journalists such as Beau Hodai from *In These Times*: The most important goal for the ingenuously called The Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act was to increase the profits of CCA (Sullivan, 2010). As disturbing as this may seem, it can only make perfect economic and legal sense if one is to believe that the American system is one in which the Rule of Law is diligently applied and that free markets are at the base of its economic system: If undocumented workers are considered “illegal,” “criminals,” mind you “invaders,” and the law needs to be enforced, then they need to be locked up, so the logic of applying the Rule of Law goes. And if there is a market that can respond to the demand for prisons to enforce the law so as to maintain the markets’ thriving and state deficits’ being under control, why not ensure that such demand is met and legitimized by the people? Why would this disturb the law-abiding American citizen? Therefore, if one is to take into account public opinion polls, why be surprised if the SB1070 has had an overwhelming support of 55-80%? In a state poll conducted by Arizona State University’s Morrison Institute and aired by *Fox News*, on September 1, 2010, it seems that the aim was to target the Mexican/illegal alien/Other as a potential criminal. The questions and results were as follows:

**Question: Should people be required to produce documents verifying legal status?**

Among registered voters polled, 81% said they approve of the provision within SB 1070 that requires people to produce documents that verify their legal status.

While there are differences in levels of support by political affiliation, the vast majority of each political party supports the provision: 92% of Republicans, 79% of independents and 68% of Democrats.

**Question: Should police be allowed to detain anyone unable to verify their legal status?**

This provision of SB 1070 receives solid support, with 74% of respondents in favor of allowing police to detain anyone who is unable to verify legal status.

There are, however, wide differences of opinion about this provision based upon party affiliation. While 93% of Republicans and 73% of
Independents favor detaining those who are unable to verify their legal status, only 50% of Democrats favor it.

**Question: Should police be allowed to question anyone they think may be in the country illegally?**

Some 68% of voters surveyed in the poll favor the provision of SB 1070 that would allow police to question anyone they think may be in the country illegally when stopped as a suspect or arrested for a crime.

Almost nine in 10 registered Republican voters (87%) believe the police should be allowed to question anyone they think may be in the country illegally, compared with 67% of Independents and 48% of Democrats.

(“New poll: Majority of Arizonans favor SB 1070 provisions,” 2010)

The importance of this poll, which reflects similar questions and results as later nationally applied ones, is that it clearly illustrates that, regardless of the stipulations in the SB 1070 regarding its adherence to the Fourteenth Amendment, most Americans do not perceive that their rights would be threatened by granting such powers to the police forces. There seem to be only two logical answers to this matter: Either Americans do not know their constitutional rights and take for granted that they will never be subject to the powers they are supporting, or they have no doubts as to who the target of these measures is. If the media and its constant pounding on the threat that “illegal aliens/invaders” pose to their rights and freedoms, and the government, at both the state and federal levels, keeps referring to the national security threat posed by the southern border, why would any American citizen who does not have the racial profile of a Latino or a Mexican even be concerned about the fact that he or she is giving extra-constitutional powers to the local police? This has not just been patent in the minds of those who drafted SB 1070, it was also a fact that the CCA would rejoice at hearing; for regardless of the constitutional challenges that this bill has presented, it has secured enough legal and political support to ensure the latter’s present contracts plus many more in Arizona and all other states that, through their legislative members in ALEC, are carrying on with copies of the SB 1070. For CCA, more inmates are a must in order to keep their profits high as the largest private correctional corporation of which stock is traded in the New York Stock Exchange. As one of their statements in their United States Securities and Exchange Commission Form 10-K for the Annual Report Pursuant To Section 13 or 15(d) of The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (2009) bluntly states regarding their constant need to increase their demand:

A decrease in occupancy levels could cause a decrease in revenues and profitability. . . We are dependent upon the governmental agencies with which we have contracts to provide inmates for our managed facilities. We cannot control occupancy levels at our managed facilities. Under a
per diem rate structure, a decrease in our occupancy rates could cause a decrease in revenues and profitability. When combined with relatively fixed costs for operating each facility, regardless of the occupancy level, a decrease in occupancy levels could have a material adverse effect on our profitability. (p. 25)

For CCA, which is the main correctional corporation that works with the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the more SB 1070s are implemented nationwide, the better off the value of their stock. It is of course understood that economically, politically, socially, and logistically, the local police forces, the ICE, and the CCA are unable to lock in the more than 10 million undocumented workers in the U.S.—although doing so would be a dream come true for CCA. But as SB 1070 has proven, ICE can shore up their data on detentions, thereby increasing their legitimacy vis-à-vis the American citizens who believe that there is a measurable threat to their security; local police can appear as sensitive to the American population living under fear of being attacked by an “illegal alien/invader,” and CCA keeps its shareholders satisfied. Hence the “production of Mexican/migrant ‘illegality,’” so eloquently referred to by De Genova (2005, pp. 160, 177), takes an even more dreadful twist as the political economy of the American private prison system capitalizes on a hegemonic discourse that finds in the present historic bloc support unmatched since the penitentiary system in the U.S. was privatized (Todd, 2005; Zito, 2003).

So how did CCA try to meet its demand through the SB 1070? According to an in-depth investigation by Laura Sullivan of National Public Radio (NPR), the whole power structure of the government of Arizona has been heavily influenced by the private prisons system. According to Sullivan, the governor’s top advisers, her spokesman, and her campaign manager are former lobbyists for the private prison companies; Senator Russell Pearce and 35 Arizona legislators who voted en mass for SB 1070 belong to ALEC, with Pearce being an executive member of ALEC’s Public Safety and Elections Task Force, and the private-sector executive members of this task force including CCA (Sullivan, 2010; Hodai, 2010). In a very revealing interview between Sullivan and the city manager of Benson, Arizona, a small town 60 miles from the Mexican border, it is quite appalling how forthcoming CCA executives are with regard to their longing to increase profits through the incarceration of undocumented immigrants. In the interview, the city manager mentions receiving an offer for “a prison for women and children who are illegal immigrants.” He also mentions that they “talk [about] how positive this was going to be for the community,” and “the amount of money that we would realize from each prisoner on a daily rate.” The city manager later asked, “How would they possibly keep a prison full for years—decades even—with illegal immigrants?” The answer was blunt:
They “talked like they didn’t have any doubt they could fill it” (Sullivan, 2010, paras. 5-7).

When Governor Jan Brewer was signing the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act on April 23, 2010, she stated that her decision was based on the following arguments:

Border-related violence and crime due to illegal immigration are critically important issues to the people of our state, to my administration and to me, as your governor and as a citizen . . . We cannot delay while the destruction happening south of our international border creeps its way north. We in Arizona have been more than patient waiting for Washington to act. But decades of federal inaction and misguided policy have created a dangerous and unacceptable situation. Yesterday, I announced the steps I was taking to enhance security along our border. Today—-with my unwavering signature on this legislation—Arizona strengthens its security WITHIN our borders. (Brewer, 2010, p. 1)

Even though Governor Brewer tried to dissipate any criticisms regarding the racial profiling that this bill could clearly produce when she stated that she would “NOT tolerate racial discrimination or racial profiling in Arizona,” (Brewer, 2010, p. 1) she was also signing a “blank check” to the CCA. What is more, she was empowering those who believe their security is seriously at risk due to the “illegal aliens/invaders” crossing through the southern border. Senator Russell Pearce was quoted in an interview with NPR’s Sullivan:

“Enough is enough,” Pearce said in his office, sitting under a banner reading “Let Freedom Reign.” “People need to focus on the cost of not enforcing our laws and securing our border. It is the Trojan horse destroying our country and a republic cannot survive as a lawless nation.” (Sullivan, 2010, para. 16)

It is patent that the governor’s wording in her statement about SB 1070 (and the Senator’s statement on the nature of the southern border and his description of undocumented immigrants as a “Trojan horse”) takes us back to our first thesis regarding the exacerbation of the Other so as to ignite in the imagination of those who still believe in the American Dream a deep fear about their individual and collective security. The Mexican/illegal alien/Other re-conquering his/her land starts being perceived as a real threat—one that, if it cannot be dealt with by the federal or state governments, will have to be dealt with by “the people.” And it is precisely the idea of the powers that can be delegated to the people, expressed in the Tenth Amendment, that has elevated the local sheriffs and other anti-immigrant organiza-
tions to take into their hands what they consider to be a “war” against the “illegal alien/invaders.”

IV. FROM STOPPING THE “ILLEGAL INVADERS” TO PUNISHING THE “CRIMINAL ALIENS”

The Other has been clearly identified through the media, the state and federal legislative bodies, and the vox populi; the state and federal laws are clearly drafted on the belief that the Southern Border and its constant flow of undocumented immigrants are a real threat to the United States’ National Security and Public Safety. Hence, what seems like the logical response to this belief is to secure the border by building a fence and militarizing it and, if the “illegal invaders” get to “break down” such defenses, to criminalize them to deter more “violations” of the United States’ sovereignty. If this is the logic that constructs the discourse supporting the federal response through operations such as Gatekeeper (1994), Endgame (2003-2012), Front Line (2004-2005), and Return to Sender (2006-2007), and bills like the 2006 Secure Fence Act and state responses with propositions like California’s 187 and the very popular SB 1070, then how can we expect from those who adhere to such discourse that they will not have different levels of reactions that will border on hatred, or openly embrace hatred toward those who are considered invaders and the number-one public safety enemies?

Perhaps the most powerful legal bridge between the federal and local governments in empowering the local governments to pursue immigration enforcement, is the not so well-known to the public Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act. As the U.S. and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) states:

The 287(g) program, one of ICE’s top partnership initiatives, allows a state and local law enforcement entity to enter into a partnership with ICE, under a joint Memorandum of Agreement (MOU). The state or local entity receives delegated authority for immigration enforcement within their jurisdictions. (n.d.)

Although certain limitations are present in the implementation of such delegated powers, SB 1070, and the House Bill 2162, which modified the former with the amended text stating that “prosecutors would not investigate complaints based on race, color or national origin” (HB 2162), clearly reflect such powers. In addition, they enhance the goals of federal operations to deport or incarcerate the now-called “illegal criminals.” One of the difficulties that immigration agencies such as ICE, or the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (USCBP), have is that, even though they have expanded
their mandates and expanded their operations under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), they do not have the personnel to meet their goals. Therefore, there was a need to establish strong partnerships with local enforcement agencies. These partnerships are extremely controversial, for most law enforcement agencies have had neither a mandate nor the training to protect the sovereignty of the state and control immigration. Besides, local law enforcement agencies have to rely on a high level of community trust to carry out their mandates efficiently, and such trust cannot be sustained if these agencies represent a threat to the community, or large groups within the community.

However, once the “others,” regardless of being part of the community, have been legally framed as the main threat to the public safety of the “legitimate” community, the local law enforcement agencies can use their force to carry out multiple operations to minimize or eliminate the threat posed by those who become criminals as a result of not having proper documentation. However, the only way this can happen at a collective level is if the federal and state laws can create or expand the legal concept of what constitutes criminal acts and the subjects that commit such acts. To immigrate without the required documentation has not been considered a criminal act by most states, yet the U.S. federal laws as well as state laws have expanded their codes to consider such violations as acts that can carry a conviction. In addition, once an individual or a group of individuals is labeled as “criminal,” there is a social stigma that confines the scope of their activities since their presence is considered harmful to the general population or to the State. And those who apply the terms of “crime” or “criminal” intend to assert the hegemony of a dominant group, or to reflect a consensus of condemnation for the identified behavior and to justify any punishments prescribed by the State (Quinney, 1970, 1977). The most efficient political and legal structure to create such consensus and operationalize such controversial partnerships between the federal government and the state and local governments has been the institution of the sheriff’s office. Why? In the United States, the sheriff is usually the highest law enforcement officer of a county, as well as the commander of the militia in the county where he or she has been elected. Therefore, sheriffs have an unusual power to create or recreate hegemonic discourses and practices as to how the law is to be enforced within their county.

So how does SB 1070 respond to the above logic? The SB 1070 starts by using language that seems to reflect an antebellum status in which the “enemy” or the threat has to be removed before the situation escalates and the losses to the state or the community become too high to bear. SB 1070 states that its normative intent is “to make attrition through enforcement the public policy of all state and local government agencies in Arizona (SB
1070).” It then identifies the target of attrition by stating that “the provisions of this act are intended to work together to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States” (SB 1070, Section 1). In other words, the state of Arizona, through all its law enforcement agencies, will create an environment in which undocumented immigrants either leave the state or accept being marginalized in and segregated from the state’s formal economic structures.

Such language can only instill a deep fear and mistrust among the Latino population, and the Mexican one in particular, regardless of its members’ residency status. As a result of this fear, the former will further segregate themselves from the rest of the community so as to protect the more vulnerable members of their community, with the unintended consequences of pushing them deeper into the shadows. This of course will result in greater exploitation, for the fear of deportability increases exponentially. In addition, this scenario might cause immigrants to flee their neighborhoods, towns, counties, or the state, due to the increased stigmatization and potential harassment.

Regardless of the fact that some of the most egregious clauses in the bill have been blocked by a federal court injunction, putting on hold provisions that would require police to check the immigration status of someone they stopped while enforcing other laws or allowing for warrantless arrests of suspected illegal immigrants, criminalizing the failure of immigrants to carry registration papers, U.S. District Judge Susan R. Bolton has allowed other portions of the law to stand, including requiring police to work with federal officials in enforcing immigration laws. This last “requirement” still gives an enormous amount of power to Arizona’s law enforcement agencies to enforce immigration laws through their MOUs with ICE. Furthermore, the injunction does not question the criminalization of undocumented immigration that can include incarceration as stated in the US Code, Title 8 Section 1325.

Therefore, even if certain sections of SB 1070 have been blocked, the tension between the federal government and states has been resolved to a great extent by the MOUs that cities and counties have signed with ICE. These MOUs have been used extensively, with strong popular support by the offices of the sheriffs. In Arizona, the most strident use of these MOUs has been made, without a doubt, by the Maricopa County’s Sheriff’s Office, led by a man who is a state and national hero to those who believe that the American Dream is being threatened by the Mexican/illegal alien/Other, Sheriff Joseph M. “Joe” Arpaio. First voted into office in 1992, Sheriff Arpaio has promoted himself as “America’s Toughest Sheriff” and is known, with the support of the local and national corporate media, as the
person who has taken the most outspoken stance against undocumented immigration. This is a sheriff who exemplifies the romanticization of the American militia (Malcolm, 1983) as representative of people’s power, a power that gives the sheriff the authority to articulate the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. He has been the leader of a posse of more than 3,000 voluntary members dedicated to searching for and catching undocumented immigrants, as well as those who smuggle them in. The “Illegal Immigration Posse,” as Arpaio calls it, is a militia that has attracted the collective and individual imagination of Americans beyond Maricopa County. For example, one of Arpaio’s very popular news releases referring to the swearing in of volunteers for his posse mentions, with great fanfare, that:

Hollywood actors and real life law enforcement professionals Steven Seagal, Lou Ferrigno (The Hulk) and Peter Lupus (Mission Impossible) all signed on to work this detail. A retired Chicago police official aptly named Dick Tracy who now lives in Arizona has also joined this posse. And Wyatt Earp, a local resident whose uncle was the famous lawman, is joining the posse as well. (“Sheriff Joe Arpaio Launches Illegal Immigration Posse,” 2010, para. 8)

For Sheriff Arpaio, as well as for many right-wing anti-immigrant organizations in Arizona and across the country, the only solution for managing undocumented immigrants is a punitive one. The idea, quite disturbing, is to exacerbate the threat of the so-called “illegal alien invaders” or “criminal aliens” to the point of degrading them, as did Glenn Spencer, the chairman of one of the most active anti-immigrant organizations, American Border, by referring to them as “cancers” (“American Border Patrol/ American Patrol,” 2011) and incarcerating all undocumented workers in facilities where the conditions are as humiliating as federal and state laws can permit, like the tent prisons of Sheriff Arpaio. Two extremely disturbing tactics are used by Arpaio in his tents (which are actually Korean War tents): One is to make both male and female prisoners wear pink underwear and old-fashioned black-and-white striped uniforms, and the other is to broadcast, on July 4 in full volume during the whole day, so-called patriotic songs to make the immigrants remember what freedoms and privileges they are missing by being incarcerated for various crimes and so as to remind them of what this country is all about—freedom within the boundaries of our laws and our brave military men and women who fight to keep us free. (Maricopa’s County Sheriff’s Office, 2007)
These extreme tactics demonstrate a perverse expression of nativism and xenophobia that can come only from a deep fear and hatred toward the Mexican undocumented immigrants. In a statement that cannot keep us from remembering the fascist years when the Nationalist Socialist party in Germany was developing the concentration camps system for the “others,” Sheriff Arpaio’s blunt response when asked how to deal with the “others” coming from the south was, “The United States federal government should consider building tent cities across the border, lock up those who enter illegally rather than simply deport them and be more aggressive in finding and arresting illegals who have managed to make it undetected into the interior of the United States” (quoted in King, 2011, para. 5). What cannot be forgotten with this very twisted response toward a social and economic phenomenon that is not atypical due to the extreme economic asymmetries between the two countries bound together under a free trade agreement open for goods and services yet closed for the free movement of labor, is that without going to such extremes, SB 1070 is only one more piece of legislation in a legal and political puzzle that targets the Other, further segregates him or her, and ignites both individual and collective hatred that sees it as permissible to humiliate or even exploit such Others who are perceived as a serious threat to their culture, public safety, and the sovereignty of the nation-state.

Garry Thomas Kelly’s act was undoubtedly a hate crime; his action was one resulting from a deep fear, anger, and frustration that has been building up in many individuals as a result of a combination of many disturbing factors that are a direct product of the following: a political economy that evidently favors a very small yet powerful ruling class of which Garry would like to think he is a part; a dominant class that, regardless of its party affiliations at both the federal and state levels, is deeply controlled by private interests of which Garry would also like to feel he is a part; a corporate media that is driven by enormous profits made in targeting the Other and instilling fear and hatred in a population that is terribly paranoid about the new idea that they are the victims in a “War on Terror” that has no borders or time limits; and finally, a population that needs to hold on to the idea of exceptionalism as its last resort as it sees what its members perceive as their inherent right to the American Dream being destroyed with the passage of time.

All of those who have suffered the same fate as Juan Varela, as well as their families, are the victims of a history that was never able to fully integrate their culture into the hegemonic discourse—a discourse that cannot recognize that the United States, as a nation-state, was forged by controlling, eliminating, and conquering the peoples and the land of those who did not fit the Manifest Destiny. At the same time, it is a discourse that pro-
promotes freedom, democracy, and liberty for those who deem themselves the “natural” inheritors of such “divine” destiny that, as of today, is still tacitly synonymous with being a White-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant or WASP.

But the WASP, as an ideal type, confronts several dilemmas: The WASP depends on the Other’s disposition to be exploited. The WASP needs the Other to be linked to its past. The WASP needs the Other for its future. Can such dilemmas be resolved by targeting, exploiting, segregating, and hating the Other? Only the future will enlighten us.

NOTES

1. In this paper “the other” with a capital O (Other) will mean the Mexican/illegal alien/illegal invader as expressed by certain media, political pundits, government officials, anti-immigrant organizations or civil society groups, certain corporations as well as the vox populi.

2. In this article we refer to the “dominant discourse” in terms of Antonio Gramsci’s (1995) work on hegemony. Gramsci defines hegemony as the exercise of “moral, political, and intellectual leadership” in a society. He conceptualizes this exercise of power beyond the traditional notion of the state as the singular institution that rules through force. Gramsci contends that the state does not rule through force alone, but cultivates consent through “a multitude of other so-called private initiatives and activities [that function] to the same end—initiatives and activities which form the apparatus of the political and cultural hegemony of the ruling classes” (p. 258). Hegemony, therefore, is a process by which “educative pressure [is] applied to single individuals so as to obtain their consent and their collaboration, turning necessity and coercion into ‘freedom’ ” (p. 242).

3. For Gramsci (2000), the historical bloc is an alternative interpretation of the relationship between the elements of the social structure: a dialectical one, stressing “the dialectical unity of base and superstructure” (p. 424). Gramsci clarifies this when he states, “The material forces are the content and ideologies are the form, though this distinction between form and content has purely indicative value, since the material forces would be inconceivable historically without form and the ideologies would be individual fancies without the material forces” (p. 200). Hence, the conjectural alliances between social structure composed of the economic base and the ideological superstructure are what Gramsci refers as the historical bloc. The two levels remain basically the same, except that Gramsci calls the levels of the superstructure political society, corresponding to the State, and civil society, “the ensemble of organisms commonly called private, i.e. the sum of social activities and institutions
which are not directly part of the government, the judiciary or the repressive bodies (police, armed forces)” (p. 420).

4. According to FAIR, “Criminal aliens” are “non-citizens who commit crimes that are a growing threat to public safety and national security, as well as a drain to the scarce criminal justice resources of the state.” See http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=iic_immigrationissuecenters0b9c.

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Habits of Hate: A Pragmatist Analysis of Habits of Racism and Nativism

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I. INTRODUCTION

During the 2008 presidential race and the early days of his historic presidency, many commentators and pundits wondered aloud whether the nomination and eventual election of Barack Obama signified that we, as a nation and a culture, had finally purged the miasma of our original sin of racism and had even transcended race. Leaving aside the common assumption that overcoming racism and transcending race are the same thing, the last two years have shed a harsh light on this fantasy by proving that, yet again, our particularly American form of race-based hate has adapted and survived.

There are many different ways of recognizing, describing, and combating racism. This essay extends my previously published research on the topic of whiteness and habit to advance the argument that A) racism (by which I mean primarily white supremacist racism directed against people of color) still exists as a corrosive impediment to the realization of a truly fair and democratic American community, and B) it is best understood as a network of flexible, persistent, yet correctable habits (MacMullan, 2005, 2009). The primary value of seeing racism in America as being a problem of bad habits rather than as conscious actions or attitudes is that it helps white people understand that we are all, to greater or lesser extents, vessels for hateful and uncivil habits even if we consciously reject the ideology of white supremacist racism. Further, by using a pragmatist framework of habits, we can reconstruct these habits and effect positive social change.

II. PART I: RACISM AND NATIVISM IN THE AGE OF OBAMA

The election of Barack Obama as the 44th president of the United States was hailed as a great milestone in American history generally, and especially in our history of overcoming racism. Many commentators, including me, hoped aloud that the election of a person of color to our highest elected office signified that perhaps we had overcome the demons of racism, genocide, and slavery, and had made real progress toward a great American Community (Bai, 2009). For example, I penned the following
Race remains a divisive issue in the United States, and racism still festers as a poorly understood problem. However, an array of signs indicates that we live in a moment of special opportunity during which we might yet grow true communities and heal the wounds of racism. The maturation of a generation of thinkers born after the civil rights movement, the success of dynamic political leaders of color such as President Barack Obama at rallying multiracial citizen-coalitions, widespread disaffection with self-interested and mercenary notions of citizenship and identity, and the ebbing of white democratic majority all hearten us to finally realize the long-deferred promise of healing and community. (MacMullan, 2009, p. 1)

Of course, we now know that this hope was, if not unfounded, at least premature. In fact, Obama experienced the briefest of presidential honeymoons, since he was quickly set upon by a small but boisterous minority who looked at Obama’s unique place in American history as reason for suspicion, fear, and hatred. Indeed, before he was even sworn in as president, he had already faced a highly organized movement of so called “Birthers,” including at least one senator, who asserted that Obama was not born in the United States but was in fact born in Kenya (Hollyfield 2008; Evans, 2010; Burghart & Zeskind, 2010). To this we add the allied conspiracy theory that he was a kind of Manchurian candidate or “secret Muslim” hell-bent on destroying America (Moseley, 2009). His first State of the Union debate was also the first such address in modern history blemished by an ugly outburst from a sitting member of Congress. Of course, the low bar for rude rhetoric directed at our first president of color was likely set by the song, widely emailed among Republican groups and frequently played on conservative radio programs, titled “Barack the Magic Negro” (New York Times, 2009). Perhaps the most important milestone for this rhetoric of hate directed at Obama occurred on July 28, 2009, when the media personality Glenn Beck appeared on the Fox News morning program Fox and Friends and calmly asserted that since President Obama decried the arrest of Professor Henry Louis Gates, he had exposed himself as “a guy who has a deep-seated hatred for white people or the white culture” and, even more plainly, “This guy is, I believe, a racist” (Politico, 2009). This last bit of commentary appeared on the most watched cable news channel and elicited absolutely no criticism on the show at the time or the network at any subsequent time. It was treated as if it were just any other run-of-the-mill political assessment. As disturbing as these instances are, they are but a very
small sample of the ever-increasing list of recent statements and actions that frame people of color as being somehow “Other” than “real Americans.” While I believe that we have made real progress vis-à-vis racism and race-based hate in this country, we are far from having expunged the miasma of white racism that defined the core of American identity and was codified in our laws for the first 175 years of our nation’s existence. It is essential to understand the current resurgence of hate, anger, and suspicion directed at people of color in the context of our long history of white supremacism that dates back to the first days of the American colonies and was first codified into law in 1790 when the First National Congress passed a unique immigration law that essentially linked whiteness and American identity. It reads in part:

All free white persons who have, or shall migrate into the United States, and shall give satisfactory proof, before a magistrate, by oath, that they intend to reside therein, and shall take an oath of allegiance, and shall have resided in the United States for one whole year, shall be entitled to the rights of citizenship. (United States, 1857, Vol 1., p. 184)

This simple law wove tightly into the tapestry of our civic life the idea of Whites as a superlative and privileged racial group. It extended full citizenship to the poorest immigrant from Europe while casting people of Asian, African, and indigenous descent into a legal limbo where they were unable to represent their interests, regardless of how long they or their family had lived in America.

The habitual residue of white privilege in America, by which I mean the assumption on the part of European Americans that they have the sole privilege of defining who or what counts as American, is not seen just in the anger directed at President Obama. I contend that these cognitive and behavioral habits are at play in a span of racist conduct, ranging from the merely stupid and insensitive to the viciously violent. Recent examples that illustrate this phenomenon of habituated racist acts that do not appear as racist to the people who commit them include calls to repeal the 14th Amendment in order to deny citizenship rights specifically to Hispanic children born within the United States, the demonization and criminalization of Hispanics seen in the debate regarding Arizona Senate Bill 1070, and public statements describing all Muslims as terrorists and the public anger surrounding the Cordova House (often called the “Ground Zero Mosque”).

III. PART II: A PRAGMATIST UNDERSTANDING OF RACISM AS HABIT

In order to explain my understanding of the present problem of racism in America, I need to set aside the present problem and explain the concep-
tual tools that I believe are best suited to understanding and reconstructing these habits of hatred. This section uses primary sources as well as more contemporary secondary sources to detail Dewey’s theory of habit formation and explain the advantages of using a pragmatism framework for understanding and reconstructing these habits.¹

It might seem odd to turn to such a plain idea as “habit” when trying to address the sorts of socially, culturally, and historically thorny questions that are implicated in the problem of whiteness. However, the pragmatic conception of habit—introduced by William James, elaborated upon by John Dewey, and put to work by Jane Addams and W.E.B. Du Bois—is a crucial conceptual tool for developing an apt response to the continued problem of whiteness. These habits—by which I mean sets of behaviors that are pre-conscious responses to an environment that rely upon inherited categories—have persisted long after the Civil Rights Movement removed whiteness as a legal category designed to protect white privilege. Reading race through the lens of habit in a fully pragmatic sense, we see that it is not an ahistorical essence that we all carry in our blood that is packed with ready-to-use meanings (though it does maintain that racial propositions and identities do rely on certain physical traits as markers). At the same time, this method of interpreting race rejects the so-called “color-blind” approach to racism that assumes that since the conceptions of race have no direct genetic or biological correlates, the idea of race is merely a cognitive error that can be remedied by purging our lexicons of any terms that lack scientific proof. Instead, this reading characterizes race as a meaningful feature of our experience. Race is a network of meaning that is made up of features that emerge from biology (namely the morphological features that are the signs of the different racial categories) as well as culture (the inherited but contingent ways of reading and responding to these features). On this reading, race is a phenomenon that organizes our behaviors, thoughts, and experiences of the world both consciously and pre-consciously. From a Deweyan perspective, race is “real” though not “given.” An analysis of whiteness that pertains to the role of habit suggests that the best path toward a society free of invidious racism and hate leads through a period of conscious reconstruction of these habits through inquiry.

Emphasizing their fundamental role in our development as organisms, Dewey argued that “habits may be profitably compared to physiological functions, like breathing [or] digesting . . . in requiring the cooperation of organism and environment” (Dewey & Boydston, 1976a, p. 15). As this passage indicates, habit formation is not only a basic human function, but is also a function that is inherently interactional. Habits form a connection between our broader biological, cultural, or social environment and us.
Thus, since human interaction is widely affected by cultural forces, habit formation is also a function that enables us to make sense of the world. It is that kind of human activity which is influenced by prior activity and in that sense acquired; which contains within itself a certain ordering or systematization of minor elements of action; which is projective, dynamic in quality, ready for overt manifestation; and which is operative in some subdued subordinate form even when not obviously dominating activity. (Dewey & Boydston, 1976a, p. 31)

In addition to the method of using impulse to change habit, Dewey gave us the broad outline of our goal. Again in *Human Nature and Conduct*, he states:

> What is necessary is that habits be formed which are more intelligent, more sensitively percipient, more informed with foresight, more aware of what they are about, more direct and sincere, more flexibly responsive than those now current. Then they will meet their own problems and propose their own improvements. (Dewey & Boydston, 1976a, p. 90)

Habituation rather than conscious decisions becomes the focal point of Dewey’s moral philosophy. In particular, he argued that we should examine and reconstruct our bad habits: those that continue to function in our behaviors, but have somehow fallen out of harmony with their environment.

> A bad habit suggests an inherent tendency to action and also a hold, command over us. It makes us do things we are ashamed of, things which we tell ourselves we prefer not to do. It overrides our formal resolutions, our conscious decisions. When we are honest with ourselves we acknowledge that a habit has this power because it is so intimately part of ourselves. It has a hold on us because we are the habit. (Dewey & Boydston, 1976a, p. 21)

Moving from Dewey’s theory of habit to the present problem, we can fruitfully read racial whiteness as a network of interrelated habits that gives meaning to what Dewey called “native tendencies,” such as pugnacity, fear, pity, and sympathy (Dewey & Boydston, 1976a, p. 79). It is a pattern that involves both biological and cultural components. It is not biological in the way that scientists 200 years ago believed race was biological: a set of fixed behaviors, attitudes, and propensities that emerge, Athena-like, fully dressed from our flesh. Instead, race is, in part, a biological phenomenon in terms of the embodied aspects of human life and our perceptions of the morphology of people around us. Race is at the same time a cultural pattern by virtue of the ways in which we give meaning to native impulses (such as
fear or nurturance) and how we make sense of changes to our embodied experiences. One of my primary claims is that much of the current racial and nativist hate that has worsened in the last two years is best understood and resolved as habitual patterns of suspicion and aversion that originate from much earlier, often forgotten and ignored, chapters in the history of North America. To see why, let me discuss briefly Dewey’s analysis of prejudice.

Dewey defined prejudice as “something which comes before reason and cuts it short; it is a desire or emotion which makes us see things in a particular light and gives slant to all our beliefs” (Dewey & Boydston, 1976b, p. 243). He further argued that race prejudice derives from an instinctual “universal antipathy” toward anything or anyone different from our habituation (Dewey & Boydston, 1976b, p. 244). Dewey asserted that after a cursory examination of human anthropology, “We are struck by the instinctive aversion of mankind to what is new and unusual, to whatever is different from what we are used to, and which thus shocks our customary habits” (Dewey & Boydston, 1976b, p. 243). It is this apparently universal aversion to the strange that serves as the impetus behind racial prejudice. As Dewey and Boydston put it, “The facts suggest that an antipathy to what is strange (originating probably in the self-protective tendencies of animal life) is the original basis of what now takes the form of race prejudice” (1976b, p. 245).

Dewey claimed that the root of racial discrimination does not have to do with race per se. In language that we will later see shares much with Du Bois’ assessment of the relationship of race and racial friction, Dewey argued that

this friction is not primarily racial. Race is a sign, a symbol, which bears much the same relation to the actual forces which cause friction as a national flag bears to the emotions and activities which it symbolized, condensing them into visible and tangible form. (Dewey & Boydston, 1976b, p. 253)

There is nothing inherent about people of African, Asian, indigenous American, and European descent that necessitates violence between the groups. Instead, our political, economic, and social interests, as pressing parts of our social environments, become cashed out along the lines of racial and ethnic categories, much as these factors were cashed out along denominational lines for Europeans during the Reformation. Our original aversion to the different becomes infused with these other factors and, over time, becomes racial prejudice. Much of the fear and suspicion that we see manifesting along race lines is a product of different social, political, and economic vectors, including the extreme stress caused by the current great recession,
the gradual but momentous demographic trends that are literally changing the face of America and, yes, the election of the first president of color.

A Deweyan analysis does not hold that some or many white people are doomed to be bad neighbors to people of color when they are stressed out. Instead, it would look to the history of race in America and argue that white people, by and large, inherited bad racial habits (bad in the sense that they don’t at all fit or work within the requirements of a pluralistic democracy) from earlier ages. These habits lead people to think and act as if non-white people and experiences are assumed to be suspect and to act and think that white people alone are entitled to decide what is fair, who belongs, and above all, who is a true American. None of this is necessary, but to correct these habits we need to study them, examine how they mediate the interaction of impulses and the environment, and, above all, reconstruct them into newer habits that meet the requirements of a pluralistic and just society.

In the context of the United States, it is crucial to note that different groups developed raced habits differently. Since before our polity was founded in the late 18th century, European-Americans defined themselves according to the legal category of racial whiteness that was granted a great number of exclusive legal, social, political, and cultural privileges and rights (Harris, 1993). Therefore, in this social environment, racialized habits “worked” not in some absolute or moral sense, but in the fact that one needed to know how to read race in order to fit with the rest of society. For people of color, this meant having to navigate white spaces with a great deal of suspicion and caution, whereas white interactions with people of color were marked by habits of entitlement, privilege, and licensed cruelty. One of the most important elements of a pragmatist analysis of race as a series of habits is the recognition that though all explicit and legal supports for white supremacism have thankfully been abolished, the habits largely remain.

This is why Dewey explained racial prejudice according to his theory of human instincts by noting, “We are carrying old political and old mental habits into a condition for which they are not adapted, and all kinds of friction result” (Dewey & Boydston, 1976b, p. 252). He claimed that most people will achieve a rational control of instinctive biases through “a change not only in education, and in the means of publicity, but also in political and industrial organization” (Dewey & Boydston, 1976b, p. 253). However, it is useful at this point to see how Dewey’s conceptions of habit and racial prejudice might make sense of a current and disturbing phenomenon that clearly involves racial prejudice and hatred: the various political and legislative campaigns to stop the “invasion” of would-be construction, hospitality, and agricultural workers who cross the political border that has relatively recently bifurcated the land that has been part of Latin America
for 400 years, attempts by people to exercise their freedom to worship and assemble, even if they are Muslims in New York City, and the unique level of suspicion and distrust directed at our first African American president.

IV. Part III: Habits of Hatred

This section uses the theories outlined in Part II to understand the resurgence of racist rhetoric and practices mentioned in Part I. In particular, this section will show that when we look at the current resurgence of hate and nativism through a pragmatist lens, we see that these are manifestations of habits of entitlement and habits of antipathy to the strange: that is, negative and antagonist reactions against people and cultures deemed as Other by a self-determined white mainstream. This section will also show that these habits are far from new and can be seen in slightly different forms throughout American history, including the demonization of Native Americans and Mexicans during the 18th and 19th centuries, fears about the “Yellow Terror” in the 19th century, and anti-German and anti-Irish discrimination on the grounds of protecting American religious freedom against Catholic Papism.

The Greek philosopher Socrates is said to have argued that all evil is done out of ignorance. That is, to the fool, evil acts appear good. A pragmatist analysis of racism as a failed habit gets at much the same point: To the person with racist habits, acts of cruelty, incivility, and even hate seem apt. Furthermore, an analysis of racism as habit helps us to understand and address a critical component of the problem, namely that the people who say and do these things invariably see themselves as being in the right, just as slave owners saw themselves a protectors of civilization, imperialists saw themselves as nobly bearing their “white man’s burden,” and perpetrators of genocide against native peoples were heeding the call of Manifest Destiny. This does not exculpate or explain away these acts. Quite the opposite; a pragmatist analysis of racism as a series of habits helps us see that these acts of hate occur in large part due to our failure to see and correct these habits. While some perpetrators of hate acts of racism do so out of a conscious and fully aware doctrine of white racism, many more commit racist acts because they are acting according to age-old habits of race that date to the time when white supremacist racism was accepted, even celebrated, as the law of the land.

In previously published work I refer to the three primary problematic habits of whiteness as habitual antipathy to what is strange, habits of entitlement, and habits of guilt (MacMullan, 2009, p. 170). I argue that it is fruitful to understand the current resurgence of racial hatred and animosity as being manifestations of the first two habits. The habitual antipathy to
What is strange is a wide-ranging and complex habit that affects white responses to issues or experiences that white folk perceive as being racialized. It is basically a habitual aversion to people, experiences, and things that are seen by white folk as being racialized. The phrase itself is borrowed from one of the rare passages in which Dewey addresses the question of race. It is worth being quoted at some length here, since it not only identifies one of the crucial impulses that need to be reorganized into new habits, but also even highlights how fears regarding race and economics underpin nativist movements, both in Dewey’s America of the 1920s and in ours of the 21st century.

The facts suggest that an antipathy to what is strange (originating probably in the self-protective tendencies of animal life) is the original basis of what now takes the form of race prejudice. The phenomenon is seen in the anti-foreign waves which have swept over China at different times. It is equally seen in the attitude of the earlier immigrants to the United States toward later comers. The Irish were among the first to feel the effects; then as they became fairly established and the older stock became used to them and no longer regarded them as intruders, the animosity was transferred to southern Europeans, especially to the Italians; later the immigrants from eastern and southeastern Europe became the suspected and feared party. And strikingly enough it has usually been the group which had previously been the object of hostile feelings which has been most active in opposing the new-comers, conferring upon them contemptuous nicknames if not actually abusing them. Witness, for example, the fact that it was largely the Irish who took the most aggressive part in persecuting the Chinese upon the Pacific coast. (Dewey & Boydston, 1976b, p. 245)

This habit is the deepest root of racism and it stretches back to the very earliest days of European colonization, when myriad laws did not just encourage, but enforced the separation of Europeans from Natives and people from Africa. One of its earliest legal manifestations is the rule of hypodescent, or the “one drop rule,” which defined whiteness as a “pure” racial category that could be sullied by even one drop of non-white ancestry. Historically we see this habit in the violent response that the European colonists had toward the indigenous people of this continent. We also saw it in the myriad laws and insults directed at people of African descent by Europeans, as well as in the selective interment and property theft reserved only for Asian Americans during World War II, to name just a few.

It is important to note that not all acts of racial hate or prejudice can be called habitual. Some people commit acts of racial hatred that are so calculated and planned that they cannot fairly be called habitual. Nonetheless, these few self-consciously racist and prejudiced people are able to greatly
magnify their ill effects on society by stoking the fears and anxieties of the much larger number of people who do not harbor any explicit ill will, indeed, many of whom are careful to say that they eschew racism, but nonetheless are still vessels for these age-old habits of race.

Despite our contemporary pretensions to colorblindness and worldliness, as well as our appropriate abolition of legalized white supremacism, the habit of antipathy to what is strange still affects the interactions between white folk and all other folk in America. The total manifestations of this habit are far too numerous to list, but we see it at work clearly in many of the recent acts of hatred and incivility directed at people of color by white Americans. We see this habitual aversion at play in stupid comments, for example when a Fox News commentator wondered if the Obamas’ fist bump was in fact a “terrorist fist jab” (“Fox News’ E.D. Hill Teased Discussion of Obama Dap,” 2008), or when commentators on the same network ridiculed as “most peculiar” the traditional Yaqui blessing given by Dr. Carlos Gonzales of the University of Arizona College of Medicine at the memorial service for the victims of the mass shooting in Tuscon (Powers, 2011). Most times, the habit of antipathy to the strange does not sink to the level of hate. However, it is in many ways a trigger or pre-condition for acts of hate because it is an unconscious behavior that assumes and encourages both the isolation of white folks from others and the assumption, on the part of whites, that their positions and opinion are normative and that others are somehow uniquely “racialized” or “ethnic.” However, the most dangerous instances of race hate, I would argue, are found at the confluence of this habit and the habit of entitlement.

The second relevant habit of whiteness we need to examine and reconstruct is the habit of entitlement, which is the habit on the part of white Americans to think and behave as if it were our sole purview to decide who or what counts as American and who or what should be seen as an outsider. Its origins also date back to before our republic’s founding when many laws explicitly limiting crucial rights, such as those affecting property, marriage, travel, and legal representation, were reserved exclusively for people deemed white (Harris, 1993). We see this habit in the widespread attitude among many whites that multiculturalism has gone too far. We see this second problematic habit in the thinking that leads white Americans, most of whom descend from immigrants who settled illegally on Native lands, to believe that Latinos do not belong in places with names like San Francisco and San Antonio.

Virtually every act of racial hate in our history can be understood as a dangerous combination of the habit of entitlement and the habit of antipathy to the strange: an assumption on the part of white people that they unilaterally decide what is just and who belongs, coupled with a habitual aversion
toward people beyond the ken of whiteness. We saw these habits combine to deadly effect whenever white settlers razed Asian communities in the West out of fear of a supposed “Yellow Terror.” We saw these habits combine when white Americans used violence for centuries to deny African Americans their lives, liberties, and property. Indeed, the act that for centuries served as the paradigmatic expression of white violence and domination, lynching, combines both of these habits. It is the habitual antipathy toward African Americans on the part of some whites that makes them the target of disproportionate attention. It is a habitual response triggered by the gross stereotypes that reinforced the idea that they were different or The Other.

Moving to our present day, Tony Horowitz, in his essay “Immigration – and the Curse of the Black Legend,” described how politicians such as J. D. Hayworth of Arizona, and Tom Tancredo of Colorado (who was, during the Bush Administration, the chairman of the House Immigration Reform Caucus), frame Latinos/as as invaders hell-bent on destroying America and Western civilization. We see both the habit of entitlement and the habit of antipathy to the strange at work when we read that “Hayworth proposes calls for deporting illegal immigrants and changing the Constitution” so that children born to them in the United States “can’t claim citizenship” as when he tars those who “oppose making English the official language,” saying they “reject the very notion that there is a uniquely American identity, or that, if there is one, that it is superior to any other” (Horowitz, 2006, p. 3). Tancredo is even more disturbing, saying that “the barbarians at the gate will only need to give us a slight push, and the emaciated body of Western civilization will collapse in a heap” (Horowitz, 2006, p. 3). Sadly, these extremely hateful public statements by elected officials are only timid versions of the “reconquista” conspiracy theory proposed by many of the people involved in the Minutemen vigilante projects, which holds that Mexico is quietly infiltrating a fifth-column of revolutionaries into the United States with the purpose of territorial conquest. Moreover the infiltration is being accomplished with the treasonous collusion of various “liberal elite” institutions, e.g. the Catholic Church and the Ford Foundation, and the applause of muddle-headed multiculturalists. (Center for New Community, 2005, p. 5)

This pattern of treating Mexican and other Latin American people as if they were somehow uncivilized clearly demonstrates what I call the habitual antipathy to what is strange, because these people are seen as strange by these commentators, who clearly are operating from an extremely myopic cultural reference point. The willingness on the part of these commentators to frame them all, out of hand, as dangerous invaders of a land that was
Mexican long before it was part of the U.S., demonstrates what I mean by the habit of entitlement since they appropriate unto themselves the sole privilege of deciding which immigrants get to be heroes (the ones from Europe) and which ones are villains (the ones from Latin America).

The most visible example of the recent resurgence of habits of whiteness involves Arizona’s “Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act” (often called AZ 1070). Even though the law has a clause that prohibits racial profiling, it nonetheless charges law enforcement officials with investigating people who appear to be in Arizona illegally, which is to say, only people who appear to be of Hispanic descent. Mary Bauer of the Southern Poverty Law Center writes of this law’s supposed color-blindness that

people with brown skin – regardless of whether they are U.S. citizens or legal residents – will be forced to prove their legal status to law enforcement officers time and again. One-third of Arizona’s population – those who are Latino – will be designated as second-class citizens, making anyone with brown skin a suspect even if their families have called Arizona home for generations.

Bauer makes the link between AZ 1070 and the habits of whiteness even more troublingly explicit when she points out that

the law was drafted by a lawyer for the legal arm of the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), whose founder has warned of a “Latin onslaught” and complained about Latinos’ alleged low “educability.” FAIR has accepted $1.2 million from the Pioneer Fund, a racist foundation that was set up by Nazi sympathizers to fund studies of eugenics, the science of selective breeding to produce a “better” race.

It is clearly in any nation’s self-interest to minimize, as much as possible, undocumented and illegal immigration. One of the very many odd parts of this saga is the fact that in modern-day America, where even very left-leaning politicians are obliged to speak and enact policies in favor of capitalism, it occurs to no one that the solution to undocumented immigration is to better facilitate the free movement of labor to satisfy the demands of the market by drastically increasing and facilitating legal immigration to the U.S. These habits are so strong that they even trump the “free market” ideology of otherwise very pro-business thinkers and politicians.

We also can see both of these habits behind the resurgence of nativism that has coincided with the Obama presidency and is, in fact, largely directed at him. Writing on the re-emergence of nationalism among some elements of the Tea Party movement, Devin Burghart and Leonard Zeskind
of the Institute for Research & Education on Human Rights (IREHR) argued:

It is a form of American nationalism, however, that does not include all Americans, and separates itself from those it regards as insufficiently “real Americans.” Consider in this regard, a recent Tea Party Nation Newsletter article entitled, “Real Americans Did Not Sue Arizona.” Or the hand-drawn sign at a Tea Party rally that was obviously earnestly felt. “I am a arrogant American, unlike our President, I am proud of my country, our freedom, our generosity, no apology from me.” It is the notion that President Barack Obama is not a real natural-born American, that he is some other kind of person, that abounds in Tea Party ranks and draws this movement into a pit of no return. (Burghart & Zeskind, 2010, p. 68)

We see clear evidence of the habit of entitlement on the part of these protesters who claim for themselves the right to frame the duly elected president of the nation as somehow non- or un-American. Unfortunately, the same report provides ample evidence of the antipathy on the part of these largely white groups toward other groups they deem strange, foreign, or hostile, including African Americans, Hispanics, and Jews (Burghart & Zeskind, 2010, p. 57). These expressions of hostility range the gamut from grossly racist signs and caricatures to the white nationalist calls for a return to legalized white supremacy (Burghart & Zeskind, 2010, p. 59).

Since the traumatic and horrible attacks of 9/11, we have experienced a great increase in hate and anger directed at Arabs and Muslims that clearly stem from these habits. We see these habits most clearly when Americans channel the fear and anxiety triggered by genuinely disturbing terrorist attacks and foiled plots into explosions of irrational behavior. Take for example the angry protests, local as well as on cable news and in the blogosphere, against proposals to build mosques in at least six different states (Goodstein, 2011). Of course, the greatest anger was directed at the proposed construction of the Cordova House in Manhattan, which came to be known as the “Ground Zero Mosque” (Blumenthal, 2010). Even though the religious leader behind the new center, Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, had headed a mosque 12 blocks from the World Trade Center for more than a decade, had worked for President Bush as the director of global Muslim outreach, and was uniformly described as a moderate Muslim whose leadership was crucial in countering extremist Islam, he was nonetheless smeared in the media as an “unrepentant militant Muslim” (“Washington Times’ Kuhner Baselessly Smears NYC Imam,” 2010).

The arguments against letting American citizens develop their private property in order to exercise their rights of assembly and worship ranged from the paranoid (that is, that the mosque was a terrorist training facility)
to the merely misguided (that it was insensitive to the victims of 9/11 and their families to have a Muslim house of worship so close to Ground Zero). Nonetheless, whether mild or violent, these reactions against this proposed house of worship, as well as against many other mosques around the nation, demonstrate both of the primary problematic habits of whiteness.

First, that many white folk in America react toward Muslims and Arabs with antipathy is, sadly, all too well documented. John L. Esposito and Sheila B. Lalwani (2010) report that mosques or proposed mosques in at least six states have either been vandalized or opposed in just the last year, and Laurie Goodstein (2001) reports that protesters in Temecula, California “intentionally took dogs to offend those Muslims who consider dogs to be ritually unclean” (p. 2). Further, we can see that the present-day hate directed at Muslims and Arabs emerges from age-old habits of whiteness when we compare the charges directed at Muslims and Arabs—that they are a fifth column of an imminent global jihad to which all Muslims subscribe, that Muslims in American are so intolerant of other religions that our intolerance toward them is justified, that they are irredeemably dangerous—to almost identical charges leveled at immigrants from China, Japan, Latin America, and Ireland. Peter Walker, in his essay “Islamophobia and Anti-Catholicism—Two Sides of the Same Coin,” shows that we’ve seen this same irrational and unthinking hate before when he writes,

Those who speak of a “clash of civilizations” between Islam and the West might not realize it, but they are echoing fears that Europeans and Americans harbored towards Roman Catholicism for hundreds of years. Of course, religious prejudice is nothing new, but the similarities between the Islamophobia of today and the anti-Catholicism of the past are striking. Early modern Protestants would have recognized many of the specific arguments today advanced against Islam and would have responded to much of the language, imagery and symbolism of contemporary fears of an alien, aggressive, domineering, intolerant and illiberal “Other.” Contemporary Islamophobia needs to be seen not as something that took root in America only after 9/11, but as part of a tension between Western nation-states and religious minorities that stretches back to the sixteenth century. (2010, para. 2)

Islamophobia also rests on habits of entitlement in that it manifests in attempts to truncate the rights of Muslims and Arabs according to the prejudices of a white majority. We see this habit of entitlement in the very fact that people are even discussing whether certain people should be allowed to exercise their rights. Just as white supremacist laws in this nation for years limited rights to Protestants of European descent, the current mosque opponents presume that Muslims and Arabs should not be allowed to do what white Christians are allowed to do unless it is acceptable to the
white Christian majority. Linking this particular nexus of prejudice to the larger resurgence discussed earlier in this essay, Larry Gellman in his essay “How Low Can We Go?” writes that for many people on the right, the only real racists in our country are now people of color. President Obama, Van Jones, Sonia Sotomayor, and Shirley Sherrod. There are apparently no white racists any more. And every economic, law enforcement, and national character problem Americans face can be directly linked to our socialist Black president, dark-skinned Mexican immigrants, and Muslims (every one of whom is assumed to be a terrorist or embrace a religion that’s focused on death and destruction). Not a single one of our national ills can be traced to the behavior of the rest of us. The job of Real Patriots and Real Americans (white people) is to be increasingly outraged and point out how “we” are the victims of “them.” (2010, para. 7)

In concluding this section, my primary argument is that our communities are still tainted by residual, habitual racism that often appears reasonable to the people operating according to these habits, but in fact are expressions of habits that are out of sorts both with the requirements of a truly just and pluralistic community and with the intentions of those who live out these habits. If we see how much of the ugly resurgence of race-based prejudice, nativism, and Islamophobia in the last few years can be explained as a return to old habits of race, then we may well understand that in order to solve this problem we need to reconstruct these habits into new ones that fit with our values and the requirements of a pluralistic society.

**V. Part IV: Reconstructing Nativism into Community**

This section demonstrates how we might apply Dewey’s theory of habit formation to our current problems of hatred directed toward Hispanics, Muslims, and others. In particular, it argues that once we understand the relationship between genuine economic distress and inchoate impulses of antipathy and dis-ease, we can take these latent and unformed feelings of fear and uncertainty and reconstruct them into different habits of social justice and community building that would not only have a better chance of affecting the real economic and social problems, but would actually be in line with our community’s democratic ideals. In Dewey’s work on the relationship among concepts, habits, and social relations, we find a valuable but underused tool with which to reconstruct our social relations into patterns more in line with the requirements and promise of democratic community. However, in order to fully leverage this tool, we need to put into action his idea that bad habits cannot be
ignored or willed away: They must be reconstructed through careful inquiry. Assessing whiteness as a bad habit (bad meaning out of alignment with our commitment to democracy and human equality) moves our discussions on race away from the defensiveness and recrimination that perennially impede our ability to reach some kind of meaningful agreement on race. It would move us away from the issue of intent (such as the pointless “You’re a racist!” “No, I’m not!” back-and-forth), and toward the more productive question of “How do we, white people especially, actually treat each other, apart from our conscious beliefs about race?” Such an understanding of racism as a set of habits would enable us to see how racism in the post-Civil Rights era survives primarily by not being noticed, and that people might have the best intentions in the world and even consciously reject the explicit idea of white supremacism (or for that matter, sexism, heterosexism, ageism, ableism, or environmental irresponsibility), but if they have not inquired into how their habits affect actual practices in the world, then they might well be a vessel for age-old and withering venom.

The deleterious habit that I called the habit of entitlement is problematic because it entails channeling the impulse of pride, which like any other impulse is inherently neither good nor bad, into habits that are harmful to community and out of bounds within a society based on the ideal of human equality. Therefore, a reconstruction of this habit will require us to find a better channel—better in all senses of fairness, fitness, and feasibility—for the feelings of pride that are necessary for a happy human life.

The American philosopher Richard Rorty wrote about the need for appropriate and considerate pride within any country:

Like every other country, ours has a lot to be proud of and a lot to be ashamed of. But a nation cannot reform itself unless it takes pride in itself—unless it has an identity, rejoices in it, reflects upon it and tries to live up to it. Such pride sometimes takes the form of arrogant, bellicose nationalism. But it often takes the form of a yearning to live up to the nation’s professed ideals. (Rorty, 1999, p. 253)

Our problem is not that we have too many people who are proud of being American. The problem is that we have too many people who are proud of an old, outdated view of America that is based upon a nostalgic, inaccurate, and Eurocentric view of history. The trick here is to find a vehicle for this necessary pride that is free of the arrogance and cruelty that long has manifested through the habit of entitlement.

We can channel the impulse of pride away from its traditional conduit—which for white folk means pride in the nationalistic and explicitly white supremacist history imagined by many of the people expressing hatred for Hispanics, Muslims, and others—and toward new, more complex
socio-cultural identities. In order to address the problem of whiteness, we need to find a way to decolonize the minds of white Americans by asserting the differences within whiteness. Doing so will help to facilitate a greater recognition of human equality by eliminating the exclusionary dynamic within whiteness.

In “Hablando cara a cara/Speaking Face to Face,” Marfa Lugones offers a distinction that proves salient to our discussion. She points out that a genuine and even fierce pride in one’s people or heritage need not be racist.

“Ah, how beautiful my people (or my culture, or my community, or my land), how beautiful, the most beautiful!” I think this claim is made many times non-comparatively. It is expressive of the centrality that one’s people, culture, community or language have to the subject’s sense of self and her web of connections. It expresses her fondness for them. In these cases, the claim does not mean “better than other people’s,” but “dearer to me than other people’s communities, etc., are to me.” . . . Similar claims are made many times comparatively and invidiously and I think that only then are they ethnocentric. (1990, p. 52)

Lugones’ insight reiterates the need to find the best vehicle for this feeling of pride in order to remedy our current habits of whiteness. White Americans must carefully develop a responsible pride in our own cultural particularities without relying on racial exclusion. I mean a recovery that, accepting that it might be impossible to recover every moment and strand of one’s cultural past, strives to recover enough that one has a rich enough sense of history to steel against the dangers of amnesia and nostalgia. Not only will these multiple, non-antagonistic identities offer more compatible alternatives than practices borrowed from other cultural traditions, but they will serve to disintegrate the racial dualities that allow white racial oppression and violence to take place. By learning to have pride in our traditions, while engaging in a contextualization of our location within structures of class, gender, and race, white Americans can begin to decolonize our minds and participate fairly in our democracy.

Finally, we need to redirect the impulse of antipathy behind the habit of antipathy to the strange. In order to correct this still-functioning habit, white folks first need to be aware of whatever feelings of antipathy we might feel toward other people and then find another conduit for these feelings. Instead of habits of antipathy to the strange, I suggest we should cultivate habits of antipathy to suffering, or more succinctly, habits of compassion. If Dewey is right to say these impulses cannot be gotten rid of, and that we must instead sublimate, or more intelligently incorporate them into our lives, then we need to find a way to teach white folk (and indeed all
folk) to revile not each other, but each other’s pain. On the one hand, this reconstruction takes hold of the impulse that is most tightly connected to the most problematic aspect of racism: the aversion that drives a wedge between people. On the other hand, it takes this impulse and seeks to harness it in a way that heals the wound that the idea of racial superiority numbed: the social and psychological wound caused by cruelty. The cruelty was rationalized in many false ways: We can kill them because they are mere savages, we can enslave them because they are animals, we can deny them equal rights and human dignity because they are not enlightened or legal citizens. Yet this wound affects both the socially dominant group and the socially dominated groups and impedes our ability to realize a healthy community.

Here I am suggesting only that this racialized dimension of our lives follow the pragmatist re-imagining of ethics and moral philosophy of the last two decades that was well articulated by Richard Rorty and others when they asked us as philosophers and people to think less about objectivity and much more about solidarity. Habits of antipathy to the strange throw up barriers between people that prevent the development of human community. Habits of antipathy to human suffering humanize us to each other, and remind us that the human community requires us to overcome the brute animal instinct to avoid our own pain in order to realize that noble human potential of enduring pain for the sake of the other.

Note

1. Several passages in this essay were previously published in Habits of Whiteness (MacMullan, 2009).

References


Jewish ex-servicemen returning to Britain at the end of the Second World War were confronted by renewed antisemitism on the streets of London organized by supporters of Sir Oswald Mosley, who had been released from prison in 1943 after having been interned for three years on account of his Nazi sympathies.

Having spent six years fighting against Nazism and Fascism, the ex-servicemen were unwilling to accept this renewed incitement against their community. They therefore established the 43 Group, which successfully beat Mosley’s thugs off the streets. In parallel, the official body of Jewish war veterans, the Association of Jewish Ex-Servicemen (AJEX), developed a policy of seizing the street pitches before the fascists could do so (Beckman, 1993; Sugarman, 2010).

Twenty years later, when supporters of Colin Jordan’s National Socialist Movement and Spearhead (its paramilitary offshoot) began to attack Britain’s synagogues and its growing Afro-Caribbean community, activists within the Jewish community developed a similar response, creating the 62 Committee (Copsey, 2000; Williams, 1967).

The Jewish response was also successful in helping to stop racist violence, although it must be noted that at no time did the far-right extremists ever achieve any electoral successes. But while their activities were marginal to Britain’s overall political life, the far-right were not marginal to the life of Britain’s Jews who believed, with some justification, that the governments of the time were not interested in dealing with the intimidation and violence that minority communities were experiencing and cared only for the maintenance of public order. English law has always regarded racial incitement as a public order concern, rather than an offense against the rights or dignity of minorities.

When the Public Order Act was passed in 1936, as a direct response to pro-Nazi provocation, the most important provision, Section 5, made it an offense “to use threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour at a public meeting, with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace was likely to be occasioned.” It did not address the
consequences of intimidation for the Jewish community (Malik, 2009; Brownlie, 1968).

The Jewish community’s representative body, the Board of Deputies of British Jews, composed of elected representatives of all synagogues and communal institutions, but led in those days by the Anglo-Jewish aristocracy, was also active in lobbying government to crack down on the extremists’ violence (Langham, 2010; Tilles, 2010).

Despite public differences over strategy and tactics, the Board, 43 Group, 62 Committee, and AJEX all shared a capacity to penetrate the Nazis’ and neo-Nazis’ organizations and learn their plans. Their occasional public disagreements, however, did not stop them from sharing their information with each other, and, on occasion, the police (Thayer, 1965). Then, and later, the Jewish community groups were also willing to share their information and experiences with others who were prepared to combat racism and hate.

These distinct streams within the community, and the differing tactical approaches they adopted, were merged in the late 1980s as a consequence of new strategic thinking and changes in legislation. The Jewish groups felt that the far-right, which had been the primary historic source of antisemitism, was unlikely to fade altogether, but that it was being replaced by threats from new and different directions. The political and social antisemitism that had, for example, limited Jews’ membership in the higher professions, or in the commercial institutions of the City of London and certain golf clubs, were slowly fading as a consequence of the Holocaust, the creation of the State of Israel, and a more muscular and self-assured Jewish community, which had played a disproportionate part in defeating Nazism and Fascism.

Now, a resurgent anti-Zionist left, the overspill of Middle East tensions, and Islamism provided new directions from which Jew-hatred was flowing. Not every criticism of Israel and Zionism was viewed as antisemitic, but on many occasions such comment served to mask antisemitism. Moreover, from the late 1960s until the mid 1980s, terrorism posed very real dangers to Jewish communities around the world. Terror attacks were perpetrated not only by Palestinian secular groups, but also by neo-Nazi and white supremacist groups, and by far-left groups as well. Iranian proxies, and Hizbollah in particular, also threatened Jewish communities, as the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires proved. Although terrorism from these sources peaked in the mid-1980s, at least in numerical terms, it was replaced after 2000 by the threat of terrorism from Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and supporters in the global jihad movement (Community Security Trust, 2011a).

The Jewish community also wanted to demonstrate a commitment to
aiding newer immigrant communities and fighting racism generally. The Board of Deputies had successfully campaigned during the 1960s for legislation that guaranteed equality on the one hand, and criminalized incitement to hate on the other. The legislative outcome of this political campaign had been the 1964 Race Relations Act, which, *inter alia*, made it a crime to discriminate on racial grounds, and the 1986 Public Order Act, which criminalized incitement to racial hatred. Of course, the Board was not the only champion in these areas, but it did play a major part in drawing public attention to the malign consequences of discrimination and racism (“Improving Race Relations,” 1969).

In 1986, therefore, the Board of Deputies’ Community Security Organisation (CSO) was established. With its creation, the CSO absorbed and adopted the activism of the 62 Committee and AJEX, along with the political defense work of the Board’s Defence Department. In 1994, the CSO became the Community Security Trust (CST), a stand-alone body, after changes in charities legislation facilitated the establishment of a stand-alone, not-for-profit body focused on security and defense for the Jewish community. In granting the CST charitable status, the Charities Commission had insisted that it incorporate in its instruments a reference to aiding other communities. Indeed, CST did precisely this, thereby formalizing its belief that, while antisemitism is a singular and unique hate form, the fight against antisemitism must be carried out in partnership with others, and that the experiences and techniques gained in doing so should be shared with other victim groups (CST, 1994).

II. Legal and Political Developments

In parallel with these internal developments, the British government and its criminal justice agencies were also forced to make substantial changes to their response to hate crime, from the mid 1990s onward, which benefited the Jewish community. The catalyst for this process was the publication in 1999 of the “Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report” by MacPherson.

The lamentable failure of the Metropolitan Police Service to properly investigate the murder of black teenager Stephen Lawrence in April 1993 had set in motion a series of investigations and attitudinal changes that led to a radical revision in policing, and the manner in which the Police Service responds to hate crime. These are still working their way through the criminal justice system.

The 1936 Public Order Act (which had been passed to counter the rise in pre-War pro-Nazi activities) and the 1964 Race Relations Act (which outlawed racial discrimination) were not designed to address the growth of
“institutional racism,” which the authors of the “Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report” defined as follows:

the collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people. (Macpherson, 1969, pt. 6.34, p. 28)

The Inquiry made 70 separate recommendations that went to the heart of police responses to hate crime, and that were designed “to increase trust and confidence in policing amongst minority ethnic communities.” Among them was an agreed definition of a racist incident, as follows: “A racist incident is any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person.” This is now known as the “Stephen Lawrence test.” Other recommendations included: having a code of practice for police and criminal justice agencies that would allow the reporting of racist incidents 24 hours a day at locations other than police stations; sharing information on racist incidents among the relevant agencies; creating a practical guide for responding to racial incidents; improving liaison with victims and their families; holding a rebuttable presumption that the public interest test be in favor of prosecution for hate crimes; and conducting training reviews for all police officers and scenes of crime officers. The latter would come to include racism and cultural diversity training (Macpherson, 1969, pp. 327-335).

In 2001, the Crown Prosecution Service commissioned a Diversity Monitoring Project, under the leadership of Professor Gus John, to investigate its own institutional practices, and to ensure that these were not contributing in any respect to the denial of justice, or to a lack of public confidence in prosecution systems on the part of black and other minority communities. The investigation found no evidence of racial discrimination in prosecution decision-making, but it did point to some worrying trends about the way in which racist crimes were prosecuted, and formulated 10 recommendations to address shortcomings. Among them were the establishment of a common standard for case work management, provision of a competency framework for prosecution advocates, creation and nurturing of an improved management culture, appointment of specialist prosecutors for racist and religious crimes, and the adoption of a holistic approach across the criminal justice system (Crown Prosecution Service, 2003).

This latter recommendation persuaded the Attorney General to establish a taskforce to analyze the context in which racial crimes occur, to consider improvements in training, and to devise strategies for good practice.
These include the development of common reporting methods for the police, to include the use of same categories and definitions, common protocols, online reporting of hate crimes, more effective police training, systematic victim and defendant monitoring by ethnicity, and training for prosecutors and judiciary.

To oversee the recommendations, the Office for Criminal Justice Reform established the Race for Justice Delivery Board, composed of senior representatives from the criminal justice agencies, to be advised by a small committee of civil society representatives, guided by an independent chairman. Following the formation of the Coalition Government in 2010, the committee names were changed to the Hate Crime Advisory Board and Advisory Group. They had already moved their affiliation from the Home Office to the Ministry of Justice, from where both continue to meet quarterly (Attorney General’s Office, 2006).

The second substantive development to affect Jewish communal concerns was the “Report of the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism” in 2006. This was chaired by the former Minister for Europe, the Rt. Hon. Dr. Denis MacShane MP, and its membership was drawn from all parliamentary parties. None of the members was Jewish, or represented any significant Jewish constituency, in order to obviate any charges of bias. Over the course of 12 months, they heard evidence from government, police, Jewish organizations, Muslim groups, Jewish day school principals, journalists, and many others. The initiative for the Inquiry came from the chairman of the All-Party Parliamentary Group Against Antisemitism (PCAA), John Mann MP, who realized that the nature of antisemitism was changing in the wake of Middle East developments, as was the direction from which it was now coming.

The Inquiry made 35 recommendations across a range of issues, which included recommendations that: the EUMC Working Definition of Antisemitism (see below) be adopted; greater government support for the Jewish community’s security needs be provided; the low number of prosecutions for antisemitic criminal acts be investigated; cooperation between the police and CST be intensified; academic research on the correlation between conflict in the Middle East and antisemitic attacks be commissioned; the government take action on internet sites that promote antisemitism; an academic working party to investigate and take action against antisemitism on British campuses be established; inter-communal dialogue be increased; and a special high-level envoy on antisemitism be appointed, among others (“Report of the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism: Government Response,” 2007).

Two particular recommendations concerned the Crown Prosecution Service, which was asked to investigate the low level of prosecutions for
crimes motivated by antisemitism, such as incitement, and to conduct a review of cases that had been brought before the courts in order to see what lessons could be learned. Again, an inquiry was established to which the CST gave evidence, with other Jewish organizations. The inquiry established that 69% of cases from the small sample investigated did not progress because of the failure to identify suspects. However, in 58% of cases that could have been prosecuted, it was the reluctance of witnesses or victims to support a prosecution by, for example, not wishing to give evidence in court, which resulted in cases’ being dropped. This clearly had implications for the prosecution service and the police, who were failing to pursue cases, but both needed the assistance of CST to encourage victims of crime to report the offenses, and to provide counseling where necessary. In this area, CST is well-placed, having earned the trust of members of the Jewish community over many years (“The Crown Prosecution Service Response to the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism,” 2008).

The Parliamentary Inquiry also required action by government, and that progress be reported. The government’s responses have therefore been published on an annual basis over three years and reflect the progress made in combating antisemitism across a wide spectrum of public life (“All-Party Inquiry into Antisemitism: Government Response, One Year on Progress Report,” 2008; “All-Party Inquiry Into Antisemitism: Government Response, Three Years on Progress Report,” 2010).

The CST played a substantial part in the antisemitism inquiry, both in the evidence that its staff gave and in assisting other witnesses, such as the representatives of the Board of Deputies and the Union of Jewish Students, to frame their evidence. It continues to play a major role in its participation in the Cross-Governmental Working Group to Tackle Antisemitism, which reviews the progress being made.

III. CST FRAMEWORK

CST’s work is carried out by approximately 3,000 volunteers, managed by a professional team, based in offices in London, Manchester, and Leeds, and overseen by a management board. It is entirely self-financing and raises the funds it needs from within the community, although it has received two government grants in the past two years. (See below.) Its work covers the entire community, from secular to strictly orthodox. In this respect, it is almost unique among Anglo-Jewish institutions, as the latter community engage only to a minimal extent with other Jews. CST also makes no charge for its services so that no part of the community should be excluded (Community Security Trust, 2010).

Security work is subdivided into two areas. The first is the provision of
security advice and training for community members and institutions. Threat assessments, based on the expected participants, guest speakers, and local environment, are made for major communal events, and, where necessary, teams of trained volunteers provide security. In this respect, they often work closely with the police and venue management, establishing joint command and control infrastructures where appropriate.

The second area of security work is the provision of advice to Jewish community institutions and the staff who work in them. This includes technical advice for community buildings, and particularly for new buildings, on the basis that security hardening is more effective, and cheaper, at the design stage, than is adding it on retroactively. Three years ago, after analyzing the nature of terror attacks on synagogues in other countries and finding that the majority of injuries and fatalities were caused by bomb blast from terrorist attacks, CST embarked on a multi-million-pound project to shatterproof the windows of all synagogues and Jewish day schools. At the end of 2010, the UK government agreed to provide substantial funding for Jewish schools’ security needs, at CST’s urging, having accepted that the Jewish community faces particular terrorist and violence threats (Michael Gove, MP, personal communication, December 8, 2010).

The provision of information on political and physical threats to the community is a substantial part of CST work. Its customer base for information is the community leadership itself, law enforcement and government, and it has developed longstanding relationships with many of its customers who have come to rely on the quality and timeliness of its analyses.

A third area, and one that has grown in response to growing needs, is that of advocacy, public affairs, and communications. Among its many areas of engagement, CST is the primary author of communal submissions to government inquiries on the related matters of hate crime, counterterrorism, and legislation; participation in police, central government, and municipal authority advisory groups; and advice to minority faith groups. Two years ago the CST began to publish an annual report on antisemitic discourse, and more recently has developed a blog, on which staff members comment on current issues of concern to the Jewish community.

On its own initiative, or in response to requests for advice and assistance, CST has provided training on security and responses to hate crimes to National Churchwatch, a similar but much smaller body than CST that serves the Anglican Communion, various Hindu temples, Sikh gurdwaras, and, as of 2010, a number of Muslim communities and their mosques who have been victims of hate crime attacks perpetrated either by anti-immigrant groups or by radical Islamists.

Indeed, CST’s relationship with Hindu and Sikh national and local
bodies has developed in recent years to form a close, mutually supportive relationship. This is not a consequence of the growing diplomatic and commercial ties between Israel and India, but rather a result of the three ethnic-religious groups’ frequently adopting common public positions and sharing a common outlook on many social or political issues. As a result, occasional meetings are held between the communities’ professional and lay leaderships, and CST has provided developmental and infrastructure advice to the Hindu community, in particular, for more than 15 years.

IV. REPORTING HATE CRIME

CST has recorded antisemitic incidents in the UK since 1984, although the system was changed in 1990 to ensure consistency and greater accuracy, and to bring it into line with UK criminal justice system classifications and international moves to regularize the gathering of data by Jewish communities. Incident reports are gathered from the victims themselves, from press reports, and from the police. CST has an investigative capacity that has been used by the police on occasion, and regular meetings are held with national and local police agencies to facilitate information exchange and consistency of reporting. The CST annual Antisemitic Incidents Report has been cited by the British government as the definitive source of information on the subject for a number of years, although the police began to collect their own data, and published the first set of official figures in November 2010.

As a result of its experience, CST has long urged Jewish and other communities to standardize data collection and analysis, and it plays an active role within international agencies in educating law enforcement agencies and NGOs (Whine, 2009; Community Security Trust, 2011b).

In September 2009, the Home Office awarded CST a substantial grant from the hate crime section of its Victims’ Fund to assist its work with victims of antisemitic hate crime. This marked the first time that CST had received any government funding. The award was one of 10 made by the Fund to help support a range of organizations working on behalf of hate crime victims. This is a core element of CST work, and the money helped staff and volunteers to support victims, as well as advertise its services more widely through, for example, public advertising on bus stops in Jewish areas. At the end of 2010, CST received a second, smaller grant from the same fund. On this occasion, the money also was used to fund a booklet for other communities on reporting and responding to hate crime. The booklet provides a range of practical suggestions based on CST experience (“Grant Payment to Community Security Trust (CST),” 2010).

In early 2011, UK police services launched a national online hate
crime reporting system known as True Vision (see http://www.report-it.org.uk/home). This system enables victims to report hate crimes without having to visit police stations, recognizing that some may be fearful or unable to visit themselves. In doing so, it meets one of the recommendations urged by the Macpherson Report. True Vision also facilitates third-party reporting to enable them to report on behalf of victims, a system pioneered by CST in conjunction with some police forces. The online system provides safeguards to protect information, automatically refers reports to local police forces, and guarantees a 24-hour initial response. Website sidebar icons enable victims to access CST reporting mechanisms, and CST will in turn facilitate referrals to True Vision, in due course.

V. INTERNATIONAL WORK

In early 2011, CST received a substantial grant payable over two years from the European Commission for its proposed Facing Facts project to be carried out in partnership with the Brussels-based European Jewish Information Centre (CEJI) and the Netherlands-based Centre for Documentation and Information Israel (CIDI).

The project aims to distill the analytical and pedagogical knowledge gained by three experienced Jewish bodies, and extend it to smaller Jewish and other minority communities across Europe. It will focus on establishing national non-governmental infrastructures and methodologies for collecting data on antisemitic and other hate crimes.

This is not a new venture for CST, though the scale of its involvement is certainly novel. CST has maintained relations with Jewish community monitoring bodies for a number of years and routinely exchanges data with them. Indeed, a glance at the product of some European and Commonwealth equivalent bodies illustrates strong similarities in their names, organizational logos, and presentation styles (see, for example, Service de Protection de la Communauté Juive [France], http://www.spcj.org).

The dearth of reliable data on hate crimes, including antisemitism, is regularly criticized by the two main monitoring bodies, the European Union Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA, the successor body to the EUMC) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).

For example, ODIHR noted in its 2009 Annual Report on Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region that:

The full extent of hate crime in the OSCE region continues to be obscured by a lack of adequate or reliable data. Although data collection by both governments and NGOs improved in 2009, it is clear from the
information provided to ODIHR that significant gaps in data collection remain a major obstacle to understanding the scope and nature of hate crime within most participating States and across the OSCE as a region. (ODIHR, 2010, p. 7)

CST has sought to involve itself in the process of collecting and analyzing data at the international level; indeed, aside from its liaison with and support for other Jewish community agencies, CST plays an active role within international agencies. The EUMC commissioned a report on antisemitism in 2004 that drew heavily on CST data, and the organization continues to provide data and analysis through the University of Warwick, which acts as the FRA National Focal Point on hate crime data (FRA, 2009).

CST also participated in the drafting of the EUMC Working Definition of Antisemitism, a specific outcome of the 2004 report that had noted:

The basic premise for a valid monitoring and analysis of a phenomenon is an adequate definition; and the basic premise for comparability is the common use of such an adequate definition within a country, or even better, within the EU. The country-by-country evaluation has shown explicitly that neither is the case . . . . future data collection and assessment should be commonly based on the proposed definition of antisemitism. (EUMC, 2004, p. 24)

Both the U.S. State Department and the ODIHR now recommend the use of the Working Definition, which can be found at http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/AS-Main-report.pdf.

An indirect outcome of the PCAA’s work was the establishment of the Inter-Parliamentary Coalition for Combating Antisemitism (ICCA). In February 2009, the British government hosted its first conference and summit for parliamentarians from around the world, which produced the “London Declaration on Combating Antisemitism” (ICCA, 2009). With this document, parliamentarians agreed to press their governments to honor international agreements, such as the OSCE Berlin Declaration, that focus on combating antisemitism. In November 2010, the ICCA held its second conference in Ottawa. The result of this occasion was the Ottawa Protocol, which noted the alarming resurgence of anti-Jewish libels, such as blood libels and the publication of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, and affirmed the calls from the London conference for governments and international agencies to take effective action to combat antisemitism (ICCA, 2010).

In both conferences, CST played a substantial role, providing administrative support and direction, as well as expert presentations for the partici-
pants. For the first conference, in London, CST organized the parallel Experts’ Forum.

Within the Jewish world, CST was involved in the early discussions that led to the formation of the Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism and Racism at Tel Aviv University, the primary agency for the collection and analysis of data on antisemitism. CST staff draft the UK contributions to the annual Antisemitism Worldwide Report and participate in the bi-annual meetings of the contributors to the Reports. CST analyses also inform the reports of the Monitoring Forum, as well as the annual report delivered by the Israel government (see http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/).

CST staff also provide advice and assessments for the World Jewish Congress, the representative body for Jewish communities, and its European affiliate, the European Jewish Congress. CST staff have also participated in all the meetings organized by the Israeli government-sponsored Global Forum against Antisemitism (www.gfantisemitism.org), again providing expert presentations and advice.

VI. ASSESSMENT

In the above-listed areas, CST provides an example of best practice for Jewish and wider communities. It provides much needed security advice and training to a community whose members continue to suffer from physical and political attacks. The nature of these threats has changed since the post-War years, but they continue to undermine the community’s self-confidence. The Chief Rabbi, Lord Sacks, has spoken of the continuing concern of many British Jews, namely feeling the need to look over their shoulders while at the same time participating fully and successfully in political, social, and cultural life in Britain (Sacks, 2011). Neither he, nor CST and its leadership, see any inconsistency in this. Indeed, Jews have come to play a not inconsiderable part in civic life, while recognizing that they must remain vigilant in safeguarding their position.

The terror threat to the UK, and indeed to other western states, will require a continuing high level of security, and CST expertise in confronting such threats is not only in demand by the Jewish community, but also recognized in a very real way by government and the police. CST expertise in training civil society to provide its own security as an adjunct to that provided by the state and its agencies meets the needs of these communities, as well as of the state itself.

Occasional testimony from senior police officers testifies to this outcome. In 2005, the then Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service, Sir John Stevens, expressed the opinion that “The Community Security
Trust is one of the finest examples in the world of an effective crime prevention partnership that really works hard to make the community safer"; and Assistant Commissioner Sir David Veness noted, “If the Community Service Trust didn’t exist, we would have to invent something very much like it” (Community Security Trust, 2005).

The Board of Deputies and CST have taken a lead in lobbying for legislation that guarantees freedom from discrimination on the one hand, and freedom from incitement on the other. It has used its historical experience to inform and propel its substantial contribution. Of course, changes that have been made in British laws in these related fields would not have been possible were it not for a wider concern, and the general review and changes brought about by Britain’s acceptance of international conventions and legal instruments that came about as a consequence of the Second World War and the universal acceptance of human rights norms.

But the Jewish community has seized the opportunities that events have provided to campaign for improvements that strengthened both its security and that of others. It could not have taken these initiatives without changes in British society, and in particular changes in legislation that recognize the social harm that incitement to hatred brings; recognition that racism must be confronted; and, more recently, encouragement by government of a culture that consults and involves civil society to a greater extent than in the past.

Of course, CST could spread itself too thin and take on more tasks that extend beyond its capacity. The recent move into international work provides many opportunities, but also some dangers in this regard. It is also too easy to assume that the norms and standards that apply within the UK might apply elsewhere. Or CST might too easily fall into the trap of seeking to impose its own high standards in an unsympathetic manner, or on communities and groups that do not have the long history of self-organization that prevails within Jewish communities.

The CST is very much an events- and client-driven organization that responds to the needs of the Jewish, and, increasingly, some other minority communities. It draws on the strengths of its predecessor organizations, but it is also clear that it could not have achieved what it has achieved without the parallel political and cultural initiatives that have persuaded successive recent governments to reform and modernize legislation and involve civil society in the criminal justice system and in combating hate crime.

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Policing Hatred:
A Case Study of an English Police Force

Jordan Blair Woods

Each year, hundreds of thousands of people in the United Kingdom believe that they have been victimized because of their race, gender, religion, sexuality, or disability status (BCS, 2008; Stonewall, 2008). Although police officers have the critical responsibility of enforcing hate crime laws, little is known about how the British police apply these laws to everyday situations (Gerstenfeld, 2004). The concept of hate crime has gained force within the United Kingdom only during the past decade, and therefore, hate crime research from the United Kingdom is limited (Hall, 2005). Research on hate crime policing is especially rare (Hall, 2005; Chakraborti & Garland, 2009).

This article makes an important contribution to the field of hate studies by advancing the understanding of hate crime policing in the United Kingdom. The article presents an ethnographic case study on hate crime policing within a small-city police station in England. The study focused primarily on the police station’s Community Cohesion Unit (CCU), which was responsible for supporting hate crime informants, and for monitoring and assisting police officers handling hate incidents and hate crimes. For ethical reasons, I use pseudonyms for people and place names, including the name of the police station itself (“Lakeview Police Station”).

Various factors motivated me to perform the case study. The recent surge of hate crime laws enacted in the United Kingdom during the past decade shows that policymakers now view hate crime as a serious problem. But hate crime laws have limited practical utility if the police do not enforce the laws properly. Bell explains that police officers can “effectively nullify hate crime statutes through nonenforcement, thereby reducing the statutes to an empty symbolic gesture” (Bell, 2002, p. 2). Improving the enforcement of hate crime laws requires an understanding of the difficulties that police officers face, and the special considerations that arise, when applying these laws to actual situations.

Furthermore, a substantial proportion of empirical researchers who investigate hate crime are too reliant on official statistics, which have many

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methodological shortcomings (Perry, 2010). Due to underreporting, these statistics contribute to an underestimation of the true extent of hate crime victimization. Current hate crime statistics from the United Kingdom are also vastly underinclusive because they include race and faith only, and exclude sexual orientation, gender identity, and disability. These limitations illustrate the need for researchers to investigate hate crime through other methodological approaches, such as ethnography.

Two additional qualities contribute to the novelty of the case study. First, unlike existing studies on hate crime policing in the United Kingdom, which focus primarily on race and faith hate crime, the case study focuses equally on hate crimes motivated by race, faith, sexual orientation, gender identity, and disability. Taking this broad approach enabled me to investigate potential differences in policing based on hateful motivation. Second, the case study focuses on hate crime policing in a small city outside the jurisdiction of the London Metropolitan Police force. The study location allowed me to investigate whether hate crime policing in smaller cities differs from hate crime policing within London or other major British metropolitan areas.

The case study is mostly descriptive and exploratory in nature. Its primary objective is to provide needed insight into the inner workings of a police unit in order to obtain systematic knowledge on how hate crime laws are enforced in real-world settings. The study does not aim to present a new theory of hate crime policing; but in gathering fresh data from a new source, the study suggests potential directions for future empirical work and theoretical inquiry.

Part I of this article summarizes hate crime definitions and hate crime laws in England and Wales. Part II synthesizes existing research on hate crime policing in the United Kingdom. Part III explains the study’s methods, data collection, and research setting. Part IV presents the study findings. Part V discusses and reflects upon these findings in relation to themes that are relevant to hate crime policing.

I. HATE CRIME DEFINITIONS AND LAWS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

A. Defining Hate Crime

The Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) have agreed upon broad and inclusive working definitions of “hate incidents” and “hate crimes” in England and Wales. These working definitions include disability, race, religion or belief, sexual orientation, and gender identity (ACPO, 2005). A hate incident is defined as “any incident, which may or may not constitute a
criminal offence, which is perceived by the victim or any other person, as being motivated by prejudice or hate” (ACPO, 2005, p. 9).

Two points concerning these working definitions are worth highlighting. First, the definitions reflect law enforcement’s stated commitment to tackle both hate incidents and hate crimes within England and Wales (ACPO, 2000, 2005). This commitment is not a universally accepted policing pledge. In the United States, for instance, hate incidents are rarely recorded by the police, and official police data include statistics on hate crimes only, not hate incidents (see FBI, 1995-2008). In fact, the FBI’s definition of hate incidents is inherently tied to criminality; the number and type of criminal offences that are involved in a hate-motivated occurrence define a “hate incident” (FBI, 2008).

Second, the working definitions of hate incidents and hate crimes in England and Wales are broad. Under these definitions, the “perception of the victim or any other person is the defining factor in determining a hate incident” (ACPO, 2005). Even when police officers believe that an incident is not motivated by hatred, they should treat it as being so motivated if a victim or a witness perceives that it is. Prioritizing victim and witness perceptions in hate crime definitions is also not a universal police practice. In the United States, police officers are instructed to record a hate crime only if they reasonably conclude, after reviewing all of the evidence, that a suspect’s actions were actually motivated by hatred (FBI, 2008). Researchers note that this difference results in significantly higher numbers of reported hate crimes in the United Kingdom than in the United States (Gerstenfeld, 2004; Hall, 2005).

B. Hate Crime Laws

Although the specific term “hate crime” does not appear in English law (Hall, 2005), various criminal statutes prohibit hate-motivated crimes including violence, harassment, property damage, and public order offenses.

1. Race and Religion

In England and Wales, any criminal offense that is motivated by racial or religious hatred can result in more severe criminal penalties. Sections 28-32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 create separate criminal offenses for assault, criminal damage, public order offenses, and harassment motivated by race and, following amendment by the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, motivated by religion. The Act defines racial group “by reference to race, colour, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or
national origin” (Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Section 28(4)), and includes all religious groups as well (Hall, 2005).

Section 153 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 applies to offenses other than those listed in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998: assault, criminal damage, public order offenses, and harassment. This provision requires courts to consider racial and religious hatred motivations as aggravating factors when determining punishment, rather than creating separate criminal offenses. Additionally, statutory provisions prohibit incitement to hatred, nuisance, and other hostile behavior motivated by racial and religious hostility. The Public Order Act 1986, Part III, ss. 17-23, bans certain acts intended or likely to stir up racial or religious hatred, including displays of any threatening written material and the use of threatening, abusive, or insulting words or behavior. The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 also creates criminal offenses for certain activities motivated by racial and religious hatred, including using words or behavior; publishing or distributing written material; the public performance of a play; distributing, showing, or playing a recording; broadcasting programs; and the possession of offensive material.

2. Disability, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity

Unlike crimes motivated by race and faith, no separate criminal offenses exist for crimes motivated by disability or sexual orientation. However, Section 146 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 requires courts to treat bias stemming from victims’ perceived or actual sexual orientation or perceived or actual disability (mental and physical) as aggravating factors when determining punishment. Any other hostility associated with the offence is “immaterial” (Section 146, Criminal Justice Act 2003). Hall (2005, p. 124) explains that “the expression of prejudice, however strong or in whatever way, is the key issue.” Additionally, the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 amends the Public Order Act 1986 by banning activities that are intended or likely to incite hatred, nuisance, and other hostile behavior on the basis of sexual orientation.

Hate crime laws in England and Wales currently exclude gender identity. This is a matter of special concern, given that research shows that transgender people are frequent victims of violence and harassment across their lifetime (Stotzer, 2008, 2009).

II. HATE CRIME POLICING IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

In general, existing studies identify various institutional and individual factors that affect hate crime policing in the United Kingdom. Institutional
factors include: (1) official policing strategies, (2) police structure, (3) hate crime policies and procedures, (4) police agenda priorities, (5) police culture, and (6) community resistance (Bowing, 1999; Ray and Smith, 2004; Hall, 2005; Iganski, 2007, 2008; Chakraborti & Garland, 2009). Individual factors include: (1) the criteria that officers consider when identifying hateful motives, (2) individual resistance to enforcing hate crime laws, and (3) formal hate crime training (Maynard & Read, 1997; Bowling, 1999; Macpherson, 1999; Gerstenfeld, 2004; Hall, 2005).

Five major studies have investigated hate crime policing within the United Kingdom. In 1997, Maynard and Read (1997) from the Home Office Police Research Group conducted one of the first government studies on hate crime policing in the United Kingdom. Through a postal survey of all 43 police forces in England and Wales, the investigators gathered information on racist incidents recorded during 1996-1997. They then performed in-depth interviews of 72 officers and analyzed police paperwork to examine how four of the police forces handled a sample of 88 racist incidents.

Maynard and Read (1997) found great variation in the handling of racist incidents by the police forces. Some forces did not view racist incidents as a special type of incident and processed racist incidents in the same way as other incidents. Other forces prioritized racist incidents and created special procedures for processing them. In some of these forces, racist incidents were given to a specialized unit that exclusively handled their investigation and follow-up. Maynard and Read discovered that in these units, racist incidents were often marginalized from front-line policing because officers would hand them over to hate crime units with no investment in the cases. Other forces that prioritized racist incidents did not create a special unit, but rather designated a specialized officer to monitor the handling of all racist incidents. The researchers found that in these units, more officers involved in front-line policing were aware of the problem of racist incidents and felt that tackling these incidents was a priority.

Maynard and Read (1997) also uncovered disagreements between officers and victims’ interpretations of case facts. In 9 of the 88 cases, officers disagreed with victims’ perceptions that an incident was racially motivated. Despite this conflict, the officers followed the requirement to record these incidents as racist incidents. However, it is unclear from the study whether officers’ handling of the incidents differed from their behavior in cases in which they agreed with victims’ perceptions of racial hatred.

Furthermore, the investigators found that 42 of the 72 interviewed officers received training on racist incidents (Maynard & Read, 1997). Officers’ attitudes toward training differed. Although the investigators did not quantify how much these attitudes differed, they reported that some
officers viewed training on racist incidents as excellent and useful, whereas others viewed it as unnecessary. Three officers stated that training did not prepare them for the anti-police sentiment that they often experienced from racial minorities on the streets.

Although Maynard and Read’s 1997 research provided useful insight into hate crime policing, there are many reasons to be critical of the study. Tens of thousands of hate incidents are reported to the police in England and Wales each year (Home Office, 2010). It is unlikely that meaningful generalizations can be made across all police forces in England and Wales from a sample of 88 incidents. In making generalizations, the investigators also seem to ignore policing differences between rural and city areas. It may be that different organizational structures and procedures respond to the needs of police forces in rural and city areas.

The second major study, the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (Macpherson, 1999), is accepted as the groundbreaking and most influential report on hate crime policing within the United Kingdom (Bowling, 1999; Hall, 2005). The Inquiry criticized the London Metropolitan Police for its inadequate handling of a racially charged murder of a Black male teenager. The Inquiry found that the investigation was “marred by a combination of professional incompetence, institutional racism and a failure of leadership by senior officers” (Macpherson, 1999, para. 46.1). The Inquiry exposed flaws in the police’s handling of the crime at every step of the process, including the disorganization of the initial response, the inadequate arrest attempts and searches, the inappropriate actions and inactions of the senior investigating officers, and failure to retain records and notes. Based on these troublesome findings, the Inquiry put forth 70 recommendations for investigating and prosecuting racially motivated crime, which resulted in significant changes to policing racial and ethnic minorities (Hall, 2005; Rowe 2007; Hall, Grieve, & Savage, 2009).

Many view the Inquiry as a “landmark” in policing history (Bowling, 1999, p. xv), but the report contains many shortcomings. Bowling (1999, p. xvii) explains that the fundamental flaw of the Inquiry is that it “lacks a coherent analysis of the problems of violent racism and the failures of the state response to it.” He further states that the Inquiry is “replete with statements of principles, evidence, and recommendations for action that are not reflected anywhere in the 335 pages” (p. xvii).

Bowling (1999) thus conducted his own study on violent racism in the London Borough of Newham in order to provide a greater context for the Inquiry and its recommendations. Bowling found that of community member respondents, only 9% were very satisfied, and 44% were very or fairly satisfied, with the way in which the police handled their incidents. These rates were lower than British Crime Survey figures from that year on satis-
faction with the police handling of crime in general (22% very satisfied, 60% very or fairly satisfied).

Bowling also discovered that after combating racist incidents was made a priority within the force, racist incidents received more attention from beat officers and investigators, which improved the recording and monitoring of racist incidents. When identifying racist motives, officers used “objective criteria,” such as racist language or racist graffiti. However, officers categorized racist incidents as crimes only when they were serious crimes (homicide, serious assault); minor crimes, such as assaults, threats, or abusive behavior, were rarely defined as racist crimes, and therefore hardly ever resulted in formal charges’ being filed.

One shortcoming of Bowling’s study is that it focuses on racist incidents, and therefore, does not provide insight into the police handling of incidents motivated by faith, sexual orientation, gender identity, and disability. Moreover, since Bowling’s study focuses on one London borough, its findings may not apply to rural or smaller policing areas outside of London. The study was also conducted during the late 1990s, when racist incidents were near the top of the policing agenda because of the Lawrence investigation. It is unclear whether the findings apply today, more than a decade later.

Very few studies examine hate crime policing in the post-Macpherson era, which highlights the need for further research in this area. Hall’s (2005, 2009) two studies provide needed insight. Hall’s (2005) first study provides a descriptive overview (as opposed to a critical analysis) of the Met’s post-Macpherson approach to combating hate crime. The study found that after the Lawrence Inquiry was conducted, the London Metropolitan Police changed its approach to policing hate crime. The most significant change was that the Met devolved hate crime policing responsibilities to 32 localized Community Safety Units (CSUs) that received extra training to respond to, investigate, and monitor hate crimes. The Met also increased hate crime training for police officers, conducted more hate crime prevention programs, and developed multi-agency partnerships to combat and to tackle hate crimes.

In the second study, Hall (2009) used participant observation, interviews, and document analysis to explore hate crime policing in a London CSU. The CSU was composed of twelve members and was responsible for responding to and investigating all hate crimes and domestic violence. The study found that the CSU’s workload was “exceptionally and consistently high,” which prevented the unit from engaging in proactive policing (Hall, 2009, p. 222). Officers were overwhelmed with paperwork and felt that they had been exposed to so many policy documents that it was impossible for them to read and keep track of current hate crime policy. Not all of the
CSU officers received hate crime training, and those who had received training had mixed attitudes regarding its usefulness.

One shortcoming of Hall’s research is that it does not provide insight into whether hate crime policing may differ based on crime motivation. His analysis focuses on race and general themes, such as workload, policies and procedures, policing priorities, training, and multi-agency partnerships. Moreover, since his empirical research examines one London CSU only, the findings may not apply to other CSUs within the jurisdiction of the Met. The findings may also not apply to rural or small-city policing jurisdictions outside Essex, where the number of hate crimes are not as great (Hall, 2005).

III. THE RESEARCH SETTING, METHODS, AND DATA COLLECTION

A. Research Setting

The policing jurisdiction of the Constabulary is divided into multiple divisions. Lakeview’s policing division includes a City Centre, where Lakeview Station is located, and many rural villages. The population is diverse and is expanding rapidly. It includes wealthy and deprived communities, a large student population, and communities of various faiths and races. Many areas of Lakeview’s policing division are easily accessible, creating ideal locations for business and commerce. A transient workforce of foreign nationals is present in rural areas. The City Center also attracts millions of tourists each year.

Lakeview Police Station is one of the main police stations in its division. The station houses an enquiry office, a custody unit, a reactive unit, neighborhood policing teams, and various specialized crime units. The Lakeview Community Cohesion Unit (CCU) is a specialized police unit with the primary role of building community cohesion throughout the entire division. At Lakeview Police Station, the CCU has a large room with desks and computers, and two smaller private offices, one for the CCU sergeant and one for the inspector.

The CCU becomes involved in incidents that can heighten conflict or fear within and among particular communities. Handling hate incidents/crimes is a major, although not exclusive, part of the unit’s work. The unit used to handle hate crime investigations entirely, but it now functions to assist police officers (both reactive officers and detectives) who become involved in hate crime cases. The CCU did not have its own reactive officers or investigators.

When the study commenced, the CCU had six members: an inspector, two sergeants (one soon to retire), a police constable (PC), a faith police
community support officer (PCSO), and a community cohesion support officer. With the exception of the faith PCSO, who had been with the unit for five years, each of the CCU members had been with the unit for less than one year. The inspector, sergeants, and PC each had more than ten years of prior experience in other police units.

B. Method and Data Collection

The research design included three qualitative methods: (1) participant observation, (2) semi-structured and unstructured interviews, and (3) case file and official document analysis. I shadowed the Community Cohesion Unit (CCU) every weekday for four to seven hours per day from April to August 2010. I conducted over 150 unstructured interviews, which “are the most common in ethnographic work” (Fetterman, 2010, p. 41). I also conducted 60- to 90-minute semi-structured one-on-one interviews with CCU members and relevant officers of different ranks within a private setting at the police station. I analyzed 195 hate incident and 89 hate crime files that were stored on the computer crime database from April 2009 to August 2010. The Lakeview police did not store copies of reports of hate incidents or hate crimes on its computer database prior to April 2009. Finally, I analyzed more than 100 restricted and public documents, including hate crime policy manuals, the CCU business plan, training materials, local policing plans, and statistical reports.

For observations and interviews, I took handwritten notes. Although more accurate, I concluded that tape recorders would have caused police officer respondents to feel uncomfortable, lie, or hesitate to reveal information (Fetterman, 2010; Murchison, 2010). For these reasons, researchers have used handwritten notes during interviews with police officers to explore hate crime policing (Bell, 2002). This data collection limitation made it impossible to record extensive direct quotes from officer respondents. For this reason, I have summarized respondents’ answers.

I read and coded the data by hand on a printed copy of the record. I divided data analysis into three phases: deconstruction (open coding), construction (axial coding), and confirmation (selective coding) (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). These distinctions were analytical only; the phases interwove in practice (Gobo, 2008). To validate my hypotheses, I used two forms of triangulation. First, I read and compared the data from a single method to assess whether a hypothesis was supported by the method at different stages of fieldwork. Second, I read and compared the data from all three methods to assess whether a hypothesis was supported by all three methods.

During the study, I was exposed to highly sensitive information about
crime victims and suspects. Furthermore, I was exposed to highly sensitive information about the inner workings of police stations and the personal thoughts of police officers. To avoid reputational harm, I agreed to use pseudonyms for the names of geographical locations, police officers, the police station, and the constabulary. I also agreed to keep descriptions of particular incidents general enough to protect identities.

IV. FINDINGS

The findings below describe how the Lakeview CCU and the Lakeview police force generally handled hate incidents and hate crimes. This descriptive analysis provides needed and structured insight into how hate crime laws are enforced by the British police.

A. Hate Crime Policies and Procedures

Special policies and procedures applied to hate incidents and to hate crimes at Lakeview. If an incident was labeled as a hate incident by the control room operator, or was identified as a hate incident by a reactive officer, then it would receive additional oversight by a detective sergeant (DS) in the reactive team. The CCU was also notified of the incident and was expected to provide additional support to officers and to informants. Although dispatch officers in the control room could dispose of certain incidents, such as traffic offenses, only the DS in the reactive team could dispose of hate incidents.

In addition to a standard 32-step investigation plan, special policies and procedures applied to hate crimes. A DS in the Crime Management Unit (CMU), which allocated resources for criminal investigations, reviewed hate crimes every week. Unlike other crimes, no hate crime could be filed without his approval. Additionally, a CMU inspector reviewed the open hate crime cases every day to make sure that a full investigation was planned and that no possible lines of investigation were missed. The CCU was notified of all hate crimes, and was expected to provide additional assistance to officers and informants.

Hate crime policies and procedures did not necessarily result in hate crime charges. In fact, the majority of the cases (73.0%) were filed because of insufficient evidence or because the victim declined to prosecute suspect(s) (see Table 1). Case file analysis revealed that charges were raised in only 12.3% (n = 11) of the criminal cases.

Police discretion undermined the effectiveness of hate crime policies and procedures. Five CCU members complained that officers did not document their actions on the computer crime database, which hindered the
Table 1.

Actions Resulting From Hate Crime Investigations at Lakeview
April 2009 to July 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Volume</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Filed – Insufficient Evidence</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filed – Charges Dropped</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charge</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caution</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Warning</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reprimand</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>89</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Lakeview Crime Files, April 2009-July 2010*

CCU from having an awareness of police activity on certain cases. At times, CCU sergeants felt that the CMU inspector and CMU sergeant did not place enough pressure on officers to investigate hate crimes promptly. The sergeants expressed that it was not uncommon for a hate crime to go an entire week without any updates from officers. Case file analysis provided some support for the sergeants’ claims. There was no indication of CMU DS or inspector review in 41.2% (n = 37) of the hate crime case files. However, 88.4% (n = 46) of the crimes that received CMU DS or inspector review were reviewed within one week of the crime report.

Miscategorization also undermined the effectiveness of hate crime policies and procedures. CCU members frequently expressed frustration because hate crimes were labeled as other crimes, such as common assault or rowdy nuisance. Three CCU members read all incoming incidents regularly and relied upon certain criteria (see the next subsection) to identify potential hate incidents. Because of this monitoring practice, the CCU became involved in many hate incidents that were originally labeled as other incidents during the research period. Incomplete information in the case files, however, made it impossible to quantify the number of hate incidents and hate crimes that were miscategorized during the research period.

B. Identifying Hateful Motives

Hateful expression was the most common indicator of hateful motivation. Of the police cases filed, 88.2% (n = 172) contained explicit references to hateful speech or symbols. In three case files, informants stated that they were unsure whether the incident was motivated by hatred because the suspect(s) did not use hateful language. Moreover, all of the inter-
viewed officers, both inside and outside of the CCU, stated that hateful comments or symbols were the key pieces of evidence that they looked for when identifying hate crimes. For one officer inside the CCU, hateful expression was the determining criterion; the officer felt that a crime could not be a hate crime without the presence of hateful speech or symbols.

Hateful motives were not always easy to identify. All six of the CCU members acknowledged that hateful motives often do not surface during the initial interaction between victims and law enforcement. The CCU members were also fully aware that hate incidents were often miscategorized. Members of the CCU read the incident and crime log daily and relied upon a series of indicators to identify potentially miscategorized hate incidents and hate crimes. These indicators included incident type (neighborhood disputes, violence, and rowdy behavior were viewed as potentially hate-related), victim names (“ethnic” names could indicate potential victimization), and neighborhoods (certain neighborhoods had higher minority populations).

Miscategorization was not the only factor that posed problems in terms of identifying hateful motives. Four CCU members stated that some victims perceive incidents to be motivated by hatred when they are not, especially when the victims suffer from mental illness. Two CCU members expressed that some informants deliberately lie about being targeted by hatred in order to get quicker access to services from the local council. During the research period, for instance, an informant who lived in council-owned housing lied about being targeted at his residence because of his sexuality in order to avoid being put on a long waitlist for other council housing.

C. Hate Crime Training and Official Policy Guidance

All CCU members viewed training as useful, but none of them received training on hate crime or community cohesion issues upon joining the unit. Five CCU members believed that the force was educated about hate crimes in an abstract sense, but felt that additional training would provide more practical guidance on identifying and handling hate crimes. Two CCU members stressed that the job required training on issues relating to child protection, mental health, learning disabilities, and domestic violence. Although the Constabulary did not offer formal training, four CCU members took it upon themselves to attend external training courses on relevant topics that appealed to them, such as mental health, vulnerable adults, and religion.

Official hate crime policy guidance from the Home Office and the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) was not communicated to the
CCU. CCU members were unfamiliar with the hate crime manuals published by the ACPO, which are the main policy documents intended to guide hate crime policing in constabularies within England and Wales. One of the CCU sergeants was unaware of any existing hate crime manuals, but learned after sending emails to other inspectors in the constabulary that a new manual was soon to be released. The sergeant did not know that the last manual published by the ACPO was sitting on the CCU inspector’s bookcase, only a few doors away.

D. Dividing Hate Crime and Other Community Cohesion Work

Hate crime, community outreach, and counterterrorism were the three major items on the CCU’s agenda. The CCU had no systematic approach to dividing the time that it dedicated to each item. Sometimes, this caused the CCU’s work to be lopsided toward one or two agenda items. During the research period, there were weeks when the CCU’s work focused mostly on counterterrorism and community outreach, and rarely on hate crime.

Although the CCU promoted itself as a unit that resolved tensions between communities, in practice, it had no strategy to increase communication or resolve tensions between communities. Most outreach work involved resolving tensions within particular communities, especially when two members of a community were involved in a disagreement. Moreover, the CCU’s outreach efforts were heavily slanted toward race and faith. During the research period, the CCU conducted very little face-to-face community outreach in the area of disability, and no face-to-face outreach in the area of sexuality or gender identity. However, the CCU did have relationships with local advocacy organizations in these areas.

E. Client Sensitivity

All six CCU members acknowledged that many hate crime informants feel vulnerable and frightened, especially when it is their first time interacting with the police. During each client interaction that I observed, CCU members made a deliberate effort to use sensitive language. CCU members would explain informants’ options and prioritize what informants wanted out of reporting an incident. CCU members did not push informants to press charges. Two CCU members expressed that informants from minority communities commonly fear that pressing charges will harm their reputations within their communities.

CCU members were also aware of the consequences that stemmed from their visible presentation. One year before the study was conducted, the unit decided to stop wearing police officer uniforms regularly on the
job. Two CCU members stated that uniforms made some informants apprehensive and reluctant to reveal information. These members also believed that it was easier to do community outreach in “plain clothes.” They felt that community members viewed the CCU when in uniform as “enforcers” as opposed to “community cohesion builders.” When travelling to homes, the CCU also used police-owned vehicles that looked like ordinary cars, not police cars. Two CCU members said that they used ordinary cars when visiting clients in order to shield them from reputational harm in their communities for interacting with the police.

F. CCU Culture and Management

The atmosphere of the CCU was generally positive. All of the CCU members believed that the unit served an important purpose. Three CCU members said that the unit showed a less aggressive side of policing, which they believed was critical to building bridges between communities and the police. Two CCU members also felt that without the CCU, victim service would decline, and in many cases, victims’ perceptions of the police would deteriorate.

Despite this high internal perception of the unit, all CCU members felt that many frontline officers and investigators did not know that the CCU existed, or were confused about what the unit did on a daily basis. Five CCU members identified lack of promotion as a major weakness of the unit. These CCU members also felt that the unit was underutilized by frontline officers. Evidence of CCU involvement in hate crime cases appeared in only 47.2% (n = 42) of the police case files. However, it is possible that CCU members did not record their involvement in the files that do not mention any CCU involvement.

CCU members had good working relationships and respected one another. All CCU members felt as though they worked as a team and helped each other. At the same time, they recognized that each person in the unit had different connections and worked on certain projects independently. This created the perception among CCU members that each person brought something new to the unit.

The inspector avoided aggressively micromanaging the CCU because she felt that the nature of the unit’s work demanded flexibility. Two CCU members said that they valued her management style and enjoyed the flexibility of their positions. However, not all of the CCU members were happy with the unit’s management. Two other CCU members felt that members work so independently that they are often unaware of what other members are doing. One member said that because of the lack of management, outreach was determined by CCU members’ personal connections to particular
communities. This member felt that certain communities were left out of the CCU’s outreach as a result, especially in the areas of sexuality and disability.

G. Monitoring Hate Crimes and Exposing Poor Performance

On the computer crime database, CCU members could see when crimes were not being dealt with promptly and when officers had taken wrong steps during hate crime investigations. CCU members also used the system to task officers to take additional actions and to record any actions that the unit had taken. One common problem was that it sometimes took many days for officers to record actions on the computer system, which prevented the CCU from having an awareness of what was happening with certain cases. CCU members did not feel that these omissions were deliberate, but rather felt that officers often did not have the time to enter information because of their high caseloads.

CCU sergeants and the CCU inspector spoke to frontline officers and supervisors when a case was not being handled properly. Because of their rank, other CCU members did not feel that it was their place to speak to another officer’s supervisor about the handling of a case. They did use the computer crime database to task officers to take additional specific actions, which officers rarely ignored. All of the CCU members said that if an individual is tasked to do something, and a problem occurs that is traced back to that task, then the blame falls on the individual. At times, the CCU sergeants felt that some officers viewed them as intruding upon their territory when they exposed an officer’s poor performance, especially when a case involved a specialized unit. But for the most part, they felt comfortable speaking to an officer or a supervisor when something went wrong during a case. They said that the most common problems were that officers did not update their actions on the computer database promptly and that officers sometimes took too long to perform certain tasks during investigations.

H. Other Challenges

The CCU was constrained by limited resources. Limited time, staff, and funding made it impossible for the CCU to reach out to many communities in the Division. Since the CCU did not have its own car, it had to borrow vehicles from other units. Sometimes cars were unavailable, which meant that the CCU had to delay its work or use alternative modes of transportation, such as bus or bicycle. Not having a car made it especially difficult for the CCU to do community outreach in rural areas of the Division.

Turnover was another challenge. Five out of six of the CCU members
had been in the CCU for less than one year. On the one hand, CCU members felt that this gave them the opportunity to rebrand the unit. On the other hand, many CCU members said that they felt they had started their positions from scratch and without any guidance or feedback. Nobody knew who would take over the work of the CCU sergeant who was soon to retire.

The CCU also faced external challenges from minority communities. Some community members were reluctant to talk to the CCU because of their distrust of the police. One CCU member who had ties with local Muslim communities stated that it took years for her to develop those relationships. Furthermore, language barriers hindered the CCU from conducting personal outreach to many communities in the Division. The Faith PCSO spoke many South Asian dialects, which helped to build many bridges between South Asian communities and the CCU. However, language barriers prevented the CCU from reaching out to non-English-speaking Chinese and European communities; most of the outreach to Chinese communities was handled by a PCSO outside of the CCU who spoke Mandarin. It was also difficult for the CCU to reach out to communities, such as Buddhist communities, that were dispersed throughout the division and had no community centers or public places of worship.

V. DISCUSSION AND REFLECTIONS

The study findings have implications for improving hate crime policing. Although the study findings confirm some of the hypotheses made in existing research, they also challenge other assumptions and raise new questions. As a result, the findings suggest promising directions for future research on hate crime policing. The following analysis focuses on three broad topics: (1) the influence that the content of hate crime definition of hate crime definitions and hate crime laws has on hate crime policing, (2) the role of discretion in hate crime policing, and (3) the specific responsibilities of hate crime units.

A. Definitions, Laws, and Hate Crime Policing

The working definitions of hate crime in England and Wales are broad because they (1) require law enforcement to record a crime as a hate crime if the victim (or any other person) believes it is motivated by hatred, and (2) require law enforcement to record and to respond to hate incidents and hate crimes. Hall’s research (2005, 2009) found that these broad definitions caused hate crime units in London to have high caseloads, which made their work difficult to manage. This research raises the issue of whether hate crime definitions in the United Kingdom should be narrowed.
CCU members did not feel that the broadness of the current hate crime definitions made their workloads unmanageable. Unlike the studies conducted in London, the findings of this study demonstrate that police forces in smaller policing areas can manage their caseloads under the current definitions. Some clear benefits deriving from the scope of the current hate crime definitions arose during the study. For instance, CCU members stated that responding to hate incidents helped Lakeview officers to identify victimization patterns in particular neighborhoods. Moreover, in responding to incidents, officers did not have to wait for actual crimes to occur before they could resolve situations between hate victims and perpetrators.

Furthermore, the study findings suggest that the devolution of hate crime responsibilities may enhance caseload management under the current hate crime definitions. In many ways, the devolution of hate crime responsibilities at Lakeview helped the force to manage hate crime caseloads. Since the Crime Management Unit (CMU) handled only crimes, and the responsibility to investigate hate crime was devolved throughout the entire force, the CMU could allocate resources to respond to and to investigate hate crimes in a way that did not overwork a single unit. This differs from Hall’s research (2005, 2009), in which a single unit handled all aspects of every hate crime case. As a result, the study findings imply that devolving certain hate crime responsibilities, such as investigations, may be an alternative to changing the current definitions in order to help police forces manage hate crime caseloads. More rigorous studies on hate crime caseload management are needed to determine whether this is a viable alternative, especially within major city police forces where there are large volumes of hate crimes that are reported to the police (Ministry of Justice, 2010).

The study findings also raise important questions about the law’s influence on officers’ conceptions of hate crime. Race and faith were included in hate crime laws years before sexual orientation and disability were included; gender identity is still not included in these laws. From officers’ use of language and terminology at Lakeview, it became clear that race was inextricably linked to officers’ conceptions of hate crime. This finding is not unsurprising given that hate crime laws in England and Wales originated from very public events involving race, such as the Lawrence Inquiry.

At the end of the research period, I sensed that certain hate crimes, especially those motivated by sexual orientation, disability, and gender identity, were not being categorized as hate crimes because they did not fit officers’ narrow conceptions of hate crime. The study findings thus indicate that the historical origins of hate crime laws may be perpetuating underinclusive hate crime categorization practices. Future research is needed to assess whether the historical origins of hate crime laws are hav-
ing similar effects in other British police stations. Although policy recommendations should be viewed tentatively due to the exploratory nature of this study, the findings suggest that hate crime training may necessary to broaden officers’ conceptions of hate crime in the post-Macpherson era.

Furthermore, English law creates separate criminal *offenses* for certain crimes motivated by racial and religious hatred only. The law does not create separate criminal offenses for crimes motivated by sexual orientation and disability, but courts may consider hateful motivation to increase criminal penalties. Academics have presumed that these legal differences do not have any tangible effect on hate crime policing (Gerstenfeld, 2004; Hall, 2005).

The study findings suggest otherwise. At Lakeview, differences in hate crime laws may have caused race and faith hate crimes to receive greater oversight. Lakeview police performance was measured by detected and undetected *crimes*, indicating the importance of having a hate crime criminal *offense*. Moreover, the Constabulary’s hate crime performance reports included figures on racially aggravated *offenses* only. Concrete actions, such as internal reports on the detection of racially aggravated *offenses*, stemmed from these figures. The study findings therefore challenge the current presumption in the literature that legal differences based on hate crime motivation have no tangible effect. Future research, however, is needed to explore whether differences in hate crime laws are creating disparities in hate crime policing inside other police stations.

### B. Police Discretion

Discretion had a major role in hate crime policing at Lakeview. To be charged as a hate crime, an incident had to pass through a series of decisions made by different officers, each of whom had great discretion in making those decisions. As a result, the study findings support the notion that hate crimes are made and constructed through a “process” of policing events (Martin, 1999; Bowling, 1999; Bell, 2002; Hall, 2009).

The study findings also show that attempts to limit officer discretion are not always effective. Lakeview implemented hate crime policies and procedures to limit officer discretion that could hinder hate crime responses or investigations. However, many officers were unaware of or ignored these policies and procedures. Some officers identified the computer crime database as a deterrent to misbehavior since the system forced them to record their actions in a space that could be seen by superiors. However, the success of this system was undermined when officers did not input information promptly.

Although researchers have endorsed the use of hate crime policies and
procedures to limit officer discretion (Walker & Katz, 1995; Martin, 1995), the study findings illustrate that rigid procedures can sometimes deter hate crime policing. For instance, three CCU members felt that the rigid set of questions that the police telephone operators were required to ask hindered the operators from probing more deeply in order to determine whether an incident had been motivated by hatred. As a result, allowing for police discretion in some circumstances may improve hate crime classification.

Placing these findings in the context of previous research, effective hate crime policing seems to depend on limiting “bad” discretion that may hinder hate crime policing and fostering “good” discretion that may enhance it. Since policing varies among localities, police stations may have to adopt different policies and procedures to provide this proper balance. Consequently, this exploratory case study cannot put forth recommendations that apply to all policing areas. However, a few provisional recommendations arise from the study findings. Policies and procedures that take the form of topical bullet points or broad processes, as opposed to rigid and detailed action plans, may give officers the flexibility that they need to handle hate crime cases appropriately and to ensure that they do not miss important aspects of the case. Moreover, establishing systems of accountability, as was the case with the computerized crime system at Lakeview, may help to reduce officer misbehavior that can obstruct hate crime cases. Stations must work within their forces, each with specific cultures, to motivate officers to follow existing policies, procedures, and systems of accountability.

C. Hate Crime Unit Responsibilities

One important distinction between this case study and previous studies is that this study examines a hate crime unit that does not handle all aspects of hate crime cases. The analysis above addressed the relationship between devolving hate crime responsibilities and hate crime caseload under existing hate crime definitions. The analysis below discusses additional topics relating to hate crime unit responsibilities and hate crime policing.

Hall’s (2009, p. 236) study of a hate crime unit in London found that proactive policing within the unit was weak because the unit was overburdened with hate crime investigations. Conversely, the Lakeview CCU was able to prioritize proactive policing on its agenda because the unit was not burdened with other aspects of hate crime cases. All of the CCU members felt that the proactive aspect of their agenda would disappear if the unit took on an investigatory role. Although limited resources prevented the CCU from reaching out to many communities, proactive policing was a major component of the CCU workload and enabled the unit to
develop relationships with many members of minority communities that have tense relations with law enforcement. Future research is needed to explore whether proactive policing is compromised when hate crime units take on investigatory responsibilities.

The study also raises the question of whether devolving hate crime responsibilities can improve officers’ attitudes toward hate crime units and hate crimes generally. The Faith PCSO of the Lakeview CCU expressed that when the CCU had handled hate crime investigations in the past, other officers were extremely hostile to the unit when it needed help with investigations. The Faith PCSO also felt that the CCU was disrespected and that officers handed hate crime cases to the unit without any sense of investment. These findings are consistent with Maynard and Read’s 1997 study described above. Three CCU members believed that officers’ perception of the unit was greatly improved now that it plays an assisting, rather than investigatory, role. They also felt that frontline officers were more invested in hate incident and hate crime cases because it was now their job to handle them appropriately.

Furthermore, the study findings illustrate some of the benefits of having hate crime units handle community cohesion work. In smaller policing areas such as Lakeview, where the number of reported hate crimes is relatively low, it may be a more efficient use of police resources to broaden the role of hate crime units to include general community cohesion work. All CCU members stated that if the CCU did not take on a broader role, then the Lakeview police would likely miss resolving a lot of tensions within communities that are created by crimes other than hate crimes.

But the study findings also highlight some of the serious risks of having hate crime units handle broader community cohesion work. This broad responsibility diluted the unit’s focus on hate crimes specifically. Proper management and communication are thus critical to ensure that hate crimes do not disappear from agendas. Hate crime units must plan carefully to determine how they will balance hate crime work with other agenda priorities.

VI. Conclusion

One shortcoming of any case study is that it is difficult to determine whether the results apply to other contexts. This case study does not claim to provide a universal account of hate crime policing. It is highly unlikely that such a universal account exists. Organization, culture, available resources, geography, and population demographics vary among police departments. A police department may tailor and particularize its hate crime policing strategy based on these variables.
Despite this limitation, the case study is an important contribution to the field of hate studies because it provides systematic knowledge on a topic that is relatively unexplored in the United Kingdom: hate crime policing. By investigating policing in natural settings, this article provided insight into the difficulties that law enforcement may face, and into the special considerations that may arise, when applying hate crime laws to actual situations. It is my hope that this study’s methods and findings can facilitate and supplement future empirical research and theoretical inquiry on hate crime policing.

REFERENCES

Taking a Stand: The Role of the Early Childhood Teacher in Educating Against Homophobia

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ABSTRACT

This article focuses on early childhood educators’ readiness to address controversial issues in the classroom related to gender and sexual identity in young children, with a special focus on homosexuality and homophobia. The terms gender, sexual identity, sexual orientation, homosexuality, and homophobia are defined in relation to the part they play in the lives of young children and their families. The role of early childhood teachers and consequently the roles played by individuals who train teachers (teacher trainers) are also presented for discussion.

Keywords: Early Childhood Education, Homophobia, Teacher Training

I. INTRODUCTION

“We will have to repent in this generation not merely for the hateful words and actions of the bad people but for the appalling silence of the good people.”

—Martin Luther King Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail, April 16, 1963

There is a widespread belief that issues of sexual development pertain predominantly to adolescents and not to young children (Blaise & Andrew, 2005; Grieshaber & Ryan, 2006). However, several studies have illustrated that even young children experience verbal and physical harassment with regard to gender and sexuality (Denver, Sorenson & Broderick, 2005; Renold, 2002). Unfortunately, various personal and social barriers prevent teachers from effectively reacting to and confronting homophobia in their classrooms. Cultural and possibly religious attitudes can also affect a teacher’s willingness or ability to face alternatives in sexual development (Haekerle, 2006). In teacher education programs, it is essential that aspiring teachers be encouraged to overcome these boundaries in order to create a safe social and learning environment for all children and their families.

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Teachers of young children need not only to set strong limits to reduce hurtful or even violent behavior towards other children; they equally need to make a clear educational statement on the legitimacy and acceptability of choosing a non-heterosexual identity, or of adopting behavior that is not heterosexually gender typical. This is true with respect to the development of the child’s own sexual identity as well as that of his or her parents or legal guardians. In responding to the needs of children whose parents or legal guardians are gay or lesbian, teachers will face further challenges (Robinson, 2002; Souto-Manning & Hermann-Wilmarth, 2008). Many of these challenges can be met by relating openly to families in a way that includes the alternatives that nonconventional families suggest. This may appear to be an obvious and even simple solution, but its complexities will become evident as they are discussed in this paper.

In many cases, teachers (and teacher trainers alike) lack a clear understanding of terms such as *sexual orientation* and *sexual identity*, terms that are often mistaken for one another, and words like *homophobia*, which is often perceived in its simplest form only, such as its expression in violent hate crimes. Imparting concise information regarding the terminology used is of utmost importance (Straut & Sapon-Shevin, 2003), since confusing terminology and ignorance are often at the base of stereotypes that form part of homophobia, and will be the focus of the next section.

II. Terms Defined

**Gender** is a term used to describe a person’s perception of roles that are identified as typically male or female. Masculine behavior versus feminine behavior is defined as such in an attempt to classify a person’s gender identity (Cass, 1984). However, the perception of gender has developed and changed within modern society, and although once gender identity was a type of a “social contract,” today we can find this term disarmed of its conventional conception, and in its place we will encounter a much wider spectrum of ways to define masculinity or femininity (Arnot & MacGhaill, 2006). Nonetheless, seeing that we are dealing with social change, which by nature takes place over time, along the way we will still meet many men and women who continue to embrace conventional perceptions of gender roles and identity, and among these men and women will be quite a few educators—teachers of young children, as well as teacher trainers in colleges and universities.

**Sexual identity.** Similar to notions regarding gender, ideas about sexual identity are equally influenced by social norms and perceptions, through which the person defines him or herself (Gittins, 1997; Robinson, 2002). A person’s sexual identity will describe his or her feelings of belonging to a
social community, one that can be heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual, or transgender. This social identity will be distinguished by the person’s self-awareness with regard to personal goals and aims, and the individual’s place in society and in the world (Cass, 1984).

**Homosexuality: Sexual preference and sexual identity.** Sexual preference, or alternatively sexual orientation, defines a person’s preference in relation to his or her choice of a sexual partner, and will not always coincide with his or her sexual identity. It is important to be clear regarding the difference between sexual preference and sexual identity, as this will explain how a person with a homosexual orientation may opt to live a heterosexual life style, marry a person of the opposite sex, and live his or her life invested and involved in the heterosexual community (Zucker & Bradley, 1995). In another attempt to stress the difference between the two, Savin-Williams (2001) describes sexual orientation as a form of “biological or psychological truth,” whereas sexual identity will be based on the person’s social context, culture, and history. In most cases, openly homosexual people will have a corresponding sexual preference and sexual identity, meaning they will identify with the homosexual community and will choose homosexual partners. With this in mind, the widespread correlation between homosexuals and nothing but their sexual lives disregards the larger significance of the social and cultural context in which the person is living.

**Homophobia.** Among the many attempts to define homophobia, Robinson and Diaz’s (2006) definition gives a clear picture of its meaning:

Homophobia is the prejudice, discrimination, harassment or acts of violence against sexual minorities, such as gays and lesbians, or those perceived by others to be gay or lesbian, based on the non-conformist ways in which they act as boys and girls, men and women. (p. 182)

Despite living in an age of enlightenment, the unfortunate truth is that homophobic behavior of adults toward young children still occurs and is most commonly seen in situations where children fail to act within the conventional framework of gender-typical behavior. For example, when a child takes on roles that are typically associated with the opposite sex, such as a boy showing special sensitivity and empathy toward another, eyebrows may rise in judgment and apprehension that this boy is acting gay (Haeberle, 2006). In this case, the child may experience being judged and possibly rejected for his behavior, thus encountering one of the more socially accepted forms of homophobia. Sullivan (2003) describes this behavior of hatred of or aversion to homosexuality, noting that it will usually be accompanied by stereotypes and cultural or personal prejudice against homosexuals. Gilligan (1996) points to this social attitude as forming the primary and
Homophobic behavior finds its expression through three main phenomena: The first is discrimination in the public domain, for example in creating work relationships or being accepted for a job, finding rental opportunities, and lack of legal recognition of single-sex marriages and gay or lesbian parenthood. A second phenomenon is seen in aggressive behavior on an interpersonal basis, this being verbal or even physical violence toward gays and lesbians (Herek, 1991), as we have witnessed in brutal hate crimes all around the world to this very day. And finally, the third phenomenon is the most concealed but also the most common one: silence, where homophobic behavior is ignored or simply not confronted. This last type of homophobic behavior is possibly the most insidious, and the kind that we most often meet within our education system, in particular in early childhood education. This is often the case when there are no sanctions put upon those who use the terms “faggot” or “homo” as a way to curse another, or when children are not reprimanded clearly for ridiculing a child who may not be acting in line with conventional and traditional gender-typical behavior. Instead of recognizing this behavior as abusive and violent, educators will quickly conclude that these children are too young to know what they are doing or saying and that this behavior is best ignored. This silence will be legitimized by the claim that it is developmentally inappropriate to discuss notions regarding sexuality with young children. By making it so difficult to address the subject of homosexuality with young children, we are encouraging the silence and thus making room, possibly inadvertently, for homophobia to develop (Robinson, 2005; Souto-Manning & Hermann-Wilmarth, 2008). Such reactions can lead to serious fears among children, and may even cause long-term damage to the child’s self-image and sense of safety (Kissen, 2003). A school survey conducted in 2005 in the United States reported that 64% of the participating students claimed they felt threatened in their schools with regard to their sexual identity or that of their parents (Souto-Manning & Hermann-Wilmarth, 2008). Almost one-third of adolescents who turn to alcohol or drug abuse, or even to suicide, are reacting to experiences of homophobic cruelty (Bochenek & Brown, 2001).

III. THE EFFECTS OF HOMOPHOBIA ON YOUNG CHILDREN’S SOCIAL-EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Most theories in developmental psychology stress the central influence the adult caretaker has on the child’s social emotional development (such as theories by Erikson, Bion, & Winnicott). Baker (2002) uses Erikson’s
psychosocial stage theory as a basis to illustrate how homophobic behavior of a young child’s parent or caretaker can harm the child’s emotional development throughout all of Erikson’s stages. This next section examines the first three stages, which are relevant specifically to very young children.

In the first stage of emotional development, which describes the experience of infants and young children to the age of approximately one and a half years, Erikson (1993) describes how infants cope with building trust versus feeling doubt with regard to their primary caretakers. The quality of the relationship between infant and caretaker/parent will reflect the degree to which the child can feel that “all is well” in the world, and although such quality is difficult to measure, Erikson uses criteria such as empathy, consistency in reactivity to the child’s needs, eye contact, and reciprocity. The trust relationship of the child is apt to be damaged if the caretaker/parent exhibits a negative approach toward him or her; this harmful approach might be caused by homophobic feelings. For instance, if the male infant cries frequently and clings a lot to his mother, the parent might feel and show some disappointment over his or her little boy’s not being strong enough, as would be typically expected from little boys. Another example could be one of a boy who responds fearfully to new situations or things, and this behavior might be interpreted as the child being weak, a “scaredy-cat” or a sissy, thus likening him to the negative stereotype of an effeminate male. In this case, the child receives the message that he is not living up to the parent’s expectation and that something is wrong with him.

Baker (2002) emphasizes the importance of having a relationship of trust for the very young child grow out of feelings of acceptance and containment, free of prejudice, recognizing the individuality in each child’s temperament and personality. Rigidity in the perception of gender roles regarding children as young as one year of age may very well be an indication of homophobic attitudes.

The second stage described by Erikson discusses the way children until the age of three years (approximately) handle the confrontation between their desire for independence and their feelings of shame. In this stage, it is common for the child to defy parental authority, to seek independence and control over his or her body, and to crave opportunities to make choices and to experience having some degree of influence on the world (Erikson, 1993).

Baker (2002) points out that if during this second stage parents fail to grant their child the independence that he or she so badly needs, they are likely to cause serious harm in terms of the child’s development. Such parental discontent and even condemnation may be caused by situations in which the child prefers to play games or chooses toys that are not in line with the conventional gender-typical behavior (for instance a boy wanting
to play with dolls or a girl preferring trucks and action figures), or when the child picks clothes that contradict traditional expectations (for instance a girl refusing to wear dresses or a boy who likes pink clothes or enjoys dressing up with skirts and high heels). A parent’s intervention that indicates that the child has made a bad or unacceptable choice will most likely have a negative effect on the child’s developing sense of self and self-confidence.

Erikson (1993) relates the third stage to children until approximately six years of age, and this stage is defined by the young child’s struggle between taking initiative and having feelings of guilt. During this stage, children seek free experiences of their own making; they develop self-confidence with regard to their capacity to initiate on their own, and to express themselves and their abilities through role-playing, fantasy, and imagination. Should a parent convey homophobic judgment around topics or scenarios that the child is enacting, this is of course very likely to contribute to the increase in the child’s feelings of guilt. Baker (2002) draws our attention to the fact that at this stage the child’s peer group becomes more influential than before. Children whose play and behavior do not fit gender stereotypes are bound to become victims of ridicule and rejection by their peers, which in turn will become an additional source for the development of guilt feelings. This is the place where the early childhood teacher must take responsibility for his or her role in influencing and guiding young children’s social interactions, and take some responsibility for preventing mockery and cruelty toward children who do not act according to stereotypical gender norms.

IV. THE ROLE OF EARLY CHILDHOOD TEACHERS IN EDUCATING AGAINST HOMOPHOBIA

A. Developmental Appropriateness

Within the context of educational environments, the early childhood teacher takes on an important role in the lives of the young child, side by side with that of the child’s parents. Levin (1995) goes as far as to classify the child’s interactions with his or her caretakers and teachers in daycare centers and kindergartens as being extremely influential in all areas of the child’s development. This emphasizes once more the significance of the negative impact that homophobic tendencies in early childhood teachers are liable to have on the young children in their care. Teachers who are able to support individuality and make room for diverse gender behavior will contribute to children’s sense of trust and faith in the world, their confidence in
themselves, and behavior that is characterized by independence and initiative.

The widespread claim that issues of sexual identity are to be entrusted to those educating adolescents, and that these issues are not developmentally appropriate or are simply irrelevant in regard to young children, will further support early childhood educators in avoiding and ignoring homophobic behavior (Blaise & Andrew, 2005; Grieshaber & Ryan, 2006). However, not only are young children indeed sexual beings, who should be recognized as such (Blaise & Andrew, 2005), but by the age of six, boys in particular have been found to already have a set and rather intolerant notion regarding what they consider behaviors that do not fit existing sexual stereotypes (Honig, 2000). Although most literature dealing with sexual assault and homophobia focuses on adolescents, some research shows evidence that preschool-aged children already experience verbal and physical abuse relating to sexual identity (Denver, Sorenson & Broderick, 2005; Renold, 2002).

Research has been conducted showing that in situations in which children are engaging in behavior that is not heterosexually gender typical, their teachers tend to invest their energy in questioning the child’s developing sexual identity, instead of devoting themselves to breaking down heterosexual stereotypes. It is important that these teachers understand and keep in mind that young children have a more flexible perception with regard to gender, and are inclined to be less rigid as they test a variety of behaviors (Lipkin, 2003). Popular beliefs regarding common behavior of young children will surely also have an influence on these teachers; this reality, together with cultural or religious customs and mindset, means that many educators are faced with great difficulty in dealing with sexuality or alternatives in sexual identity development (Haebeler, 2006). Nonetheless, the role of early childhood teachers is one that demands they confront homophobia: When facing homophobic behavior such as ridicule or verbal or physical assault, teachers must take a stand that goes beyond limiting these behaviors as such, and vocally make clear educational statements acknowledging and legitimizing differences in sexual identity and gender roles.

V. A TIME FOR SILENCE, A TIME TO SPEAK UP

Although teachers of young children are being called upon to take a stand and to speak up in defense of diversity, they also need to be sensitive to when it is necessary to keep quiet. Children will choose to keep their silence in protecting secrets or their own privacy, and this silence needs to be respected by their teachers (Van Mannen & Levering, 1996). A distinction must be made between the type of silence that children keep to protect
their own, inner quiet place, where reflection and learning about one’s self takes place (Silin, 2005), and the silence that stems from dreading the reactions from the surroundings. The latter silence is an expression of shame and fear in the process of forming one’s sexual identity. This pattern of silent behavior is typical in children who grow up in surroundings that are intolerant and possibly even hostile toward non-stereotypical gender behavior (Brod & Kaufman, 1994), as well as in children who are dealing with issues concerning homosexuality in their early childhood years, as would be the case with families with gay or lesbian parents. The children’s silence in those cases is usually something they have learned from their parents, who themselves are fearful of rejection or hostility from their social environment and lack any sense of security or safety within the educational setting, and therefore will promote an attitude of silence and secrecy in relation to their sexual identity (Robinson, 2002). Tolerating the silence in this situation would be promoting a sense of secrecy based on fear. This is where the teacher/educator needs to take a stand, in order to create a safe environment for the child (and his or her parents).

VI. Creating a Safe Environment

In most cases, gay or lesbian parents prefer to send their children to settings that proclaim openly their stance on social pluralism, as well as their commitment to fighting all forms of discrimination based on religion, race, gender, or sexual identity. In such settings for young children there are ample opportunities for the teachers to put forth such assertions in the privacy of parent-teacher meetings and in the forum of the entire class (with parents present), as well as in the form of declarations regarding the topics that will be taught throughout the school year. When teachers make a clear statement regarding their dedication to educating children toward mutual respect of one another and acceptance of differences and social diversity, parents are most likely to feel comfortable and safe enough to open up to the teachers in kind (Robinson, 2002; Souto-Manning & Hermann-Wilmarth, 2008).

It is important to keep in mind that most gay or lesbian parents have experienced both open and latent homophobia during their lives, including dealing with people’s ignorance and rejection, as well as with outright hatred and violence. They will do all that is in their power to protect their children from such experiences, and therefore need to know with complete certainty that their children are being left in the hands of teachers who are committed to treating the topic of homosexuality appropriately, and who are concerned with their children’s safety, their emotional growth, and their social development.
The responsibility rests on the shoulders of teachers to help families feel safe enough to present themselves openly. Children with gay or lesbian parents need to feel that their families are as legitimate as all other families; it is not enough to take note of their existence on Mother’s Day or Father’s Day—family life is a daily experience, and finds its expression in young children’s dramatic play, in creative activities, and in their conversations with their peers and teachers.

Nonetheless, parents and children have the right to keep their private lives private, and to choose to keep silent regarding the makeup of their families. Teachers, however, do not share that luxury. They must be held accountable with regard to the social climate they build, and must be concerned with creating an educational environment that is safe for all children and their families. It is their task to discern that a family’s silence is taken on by choice for privacy, and not out of fear of homophobic reactions. Among the skills that need to be taught throughout a teacher’s training program are knowing how to create such an atmosphere of acceptance and respect for all existing identities in our diverse society, and knowing how to respond to and intervene in situations of intolerance, ridicule, and aggression toward others (Rubin, 1995; Straut & Sapon-Shevin, 2003).

VII. PREPARING FUTURE TEACHERS OF YOUNG CHILDREN: CHALLENGES

Despite the changes in the makeup of today’s society, teacher education programs contain minimal curricula focusing on homosexuality or homophobia (Lipkin, 2003). Teachers (heterosexual and homosexual alike) are often not aware of their own perceptions or stereotypes or homophobic feelings until they meet a child who is either struggling with his or her sexuality, or living in a family with gay or lesbian parents. Very few will seek help or advice from peers or supervisors in dealing with issues of this nature that arise (Souto-Manning & Hermann-Wilmarth, 2008), which makes it even more important that the topic of homosexuality and homophobia be uncompromisingly confronted in teacher education programs.

Just as teachers of young children in the field will need to overcome their personal barriers of ignorance and homophobia, as well as their cultural or religious preconceptions, the university- or college-employed teacher trainers face the same challenges. Lecturers with a heterosexual orientation or identity might fear being associated with or mistaken for homosexuals when openly addressing issues of homophobia and homosexuality. On the other hand, their lesbian or gay counterparts might fear being accused of putting forth their personal agenda instead of focusing on general course material (Robinson, 2005). In addition, both groups of lecturers
will have to deal with the claim that the topic of sexual identity is irrelevant to the field of early childhood education.

In tackling homophobia in the classroom, Straut & Sapon-Shevin (2003) highlight three essential steps of teacher education preparation:

1. Deliver concise information regarding terminology and demography on sexual orientation, gender, and homophobia;

2. Raise consciousness and understanding that homophobia must be confronted within the context of early childhood education; and

3. Teach active listening skills and how to facilitate discussions that models respectful and tolerant behavior towards individual differences for children to follow.

Although it would appear most appropriate to discuss issues of homosexuality or homophobia in the context of college courses dealing with sexual and social development, it is my belief that many more courses can and should integrate this topic into the course content. Courses on classroom management, for instance, ought to prepare teachers for dealing with situations of verbal or physical violence stemming from homophobic beliefs; courses on social and emotional development should expand their course matter to the development of sexual identity in young children; courses that discuss relations between the professional staff and the school community or the children’s parents might emphasize the special care that needs to be taken in making their school environment a welcoming and safe place for all families, with specific mention with regard to the sensitivity that should be shown toward lesbian and gay families.

VIII. THE NEW FAMILY: AN EXAMPLE

In Israeli society today, a society with strong moral codes and religious traditions, more individuals are openly choosing to live their lives in accordance with their sexual orientation. More impressive is the ever-increasing growth of single-sex families. According to Israel’s family survey conducted in 2007, there are 18,000 families headed by gay or lesbian parents (Rosenblum & Peleg, 2007). The evolution of a more multifaceted Israeli community has led to the need for and consequent development of a semester-long course entitled “The New Family.” This course was designed and is currently being taught by the author of this paper, an openly gay parent and educator; it has been taught for the past four years at David Yellin Teacher’s College of Education in Jerusalem, Israel. By analyzing the
course content, an application of the three main points stressed in the section above can be illustrated:

1. **Deliver concise information regarding terminology and demography.**
   The course introduces a variety of family structures, while taking particular care to clearly define each of these families. The focus is on the experiences of children growing up in families that do not fit the conventional mainstream, such as single-parent families, divorced families, families with gay or lesbian parents, adoptive families, families with children with special needs, or new immigrant families.

2. **Provide consciousness-raising and understanding that it is in fact necessary that these topics be confronted within the context of early childhood education.**
   Within the context of the course, a great deal of time is spent on detecting and verbalizing existing stereotypes and preconceived notions that cause society to relate to such families in the way that it does. Guest speakers visit the class at different points during the course, telling their own and their family’s life stories, thereby bringing the students closer to a tangible reality and breaking down stereotypes. Students participating in the course are invited to share their family stories as well; the assumption is that upon making the acquaintance of people living in different types of families, one’s consciousness and awareness regarding prejudice and stereotypes will be heightened.

   In considering that the topic of homosexuality is barely addressed in any of the courses specified for training teachers of young children (Lipkin, 2003), this course gives special attention to families with gay and lesbian parents. In following the example of Johnson (2009), a professor of social psychology who introduces herself as a non-biological lesbian mother, the author also presents herself as the guest speaker on the topic of single-sex families. According to Johnson, the personal disclosure allows for the recognition of differences and the confrontation of prejudice. In her opinion, which I share, the personal story often has a much more meaningful pedagogical impact than can be evoked by a theoretical and hypothetical discussion. Such disclosure can serve as a strong example for an educator who is dedicated to creating a safe environment for all, and consequently has found that this has made room for her students to speak freely and courageously.
3. Teach active listening skills as well as proficiency in facilitating discussions that model respectful and tolerant behavior toward individual differences for children to follow.

The main project demanded of the students in this course is to prepare creative educational tools for work with young children, aimed at dealing with the topic of families. Examples of such projects have been original storybooks, interactive posters whose content can be manipulated and changed when necessary, games (such as lotto, memory games, board games), a compilation of video clips, and songs. Some students have brought in their own guest speakers and have interviewed them in class as their project presentation; others have videotaped people telling their life stories. As the students present their projects in class, they receive feedback from their classmates regarding the content and style of their presentation; they participate in the discussion of how to deal with questions and behaviors that may arise in the classroom when actually using the tool they have created. This process of presenting and being the audience for the presentation of others, participating in giving feedback in a respectful and serious manner, and experiencing the facilitation of the discussion regarding their presentation, all serve to prepare the students for similar work in the classroom.

IX. Conclusion

Teaching children about social justice and tolerance has an important place in early childhood education. Although multicultural education and tolerance for religious differences are already being dealt with in most teacher education programs (in Israel), the topics of diversity in sexual identity, homosexuality, and homophobia need to be given equal attention in preparing future teachers for their work with young children. Considering that as society is changing, teachers of young children will be encountering more and more families with gay and lesbian parents as well as children experimenting with gender roles and sexual identity, they need to be prepared to address issues of homophobia and homosexuality in early childhood education. If these issues are dealt with during early childhood, we stand a better chance of preventing intolerance and homophobia in later years, in children and their parents alike, as with the educational staff. Children will feel secure and free enough to be open to themselves and to their peers, and if they choose to keep their private lives silent, this will truly be a choice and not the result of shame and fear. Alternatively, avoidance and silencing of the topic of sexual identity will promote the message that we
are dealing with something that is not legitimate, or at the very least, surely not desired. Such silence is just one more form of homophobia, and the harm it can cause in the developing child is not to be disregarded.

Lecturers involved in training future teachers play a crucial role in creating a model for discussing the topic of homosexuality and confronting issues concerning homophobia. Personal and social awareness are the conditions for creating such change in the behavior of educators across the board (Bedford, 2003). Teachers and lecturers in early childhood education have to be prepared to confront their own prejudice and preconceived notions. They have to be open to establishing an understanding regarding the cultural and religious influences in their lives, which may have presented them with only one “right way” to develop sexual identity and to compose a family. This is where the notion of “having the courage to confront the topic” arises, as noted by Straut and Sapon-Shevin (2003), when future teachers are given the opportunity to experience and copy a model of courage and responsibility shown by their own university and college professors.

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Socialization and Hate: Can Higher Education Make a Difference?

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ABSTRACT

What happens to students when their “Cycle of Socialization” clashes with their academic discipline and higher education? This qualitative participant observational study is grounded in the Hate Model and its intersection with the Cycle of Socialization as it clashes with social justice in higher education.

How do we become who we are? What shapes our thinking, our values, and our beliefs? How are our “social identities” shaped? What happens to students when their “culture of socialization” teaches them to hate? What happens when individuals who have deeply rooted feelings of hate are exposed to the groups they have been taught to hate, and confronted by others regarding their beliefs?

Two female students boldly proclaimed their hatred of “certain types of people.” Hate, one young woman reported, was “learned at an early age,” adding that she saw no reason to change. I asked both students to consider what would happen when their beliefs clashed with their chosen academic programs in the social science field and the academic freedom of higher education. This paper addresses their journey and provides answers to these questions.

In this qualitative participant observational study, I monitored two undergraduate female students who shared their experiences of struggle, questioning, and change. Before discussing their journey, I will discuss the Cycle of Socialization and the Hate Model, two concepts upon which this research is based.

I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY

This research is grounded in two theoretical frameworks—the Cycle of ...
Socialization (Bell, 1997; Harro, 2000) and the Hate Model (Schafer & Navarro, 2003). Bobbie Harro discusses the Cycle of Socialization by focusing on the “specific set of social identities that we are born into” (p. 15). Her discussion of the Cycle of Socialization addresses how the process occurs, the sources from which it derives, how it affects our lives, and how we as individuals perpetuate the cycle. Early on in life we are taught that we are different in many ways—skin color, gender, ethnicity, religion, political beliefs, sexual orientation. In this way, we are socialized, brought into society with preconceived notions that allow us to internalize the narratives, values, symbols, and codes that exist, thus ensuring the continuity of our society over time. Our parents assist us in this process of socialization into the larger world.

We are taught to see and experience the world through the lenses of our first teachers—our parents. According to Harro, the Cycle of Socialization is a recursive process experienced by all individuals; that is, it repeats itself generation after generation. Early messages, stereotyping, myths, and misinformation are reinforced by many other entities—educational and religious institutions, books, movies, other forms of media, governments, family, friends, and so forth. This socialization process continues until someone questions misinformation, takes a stand, and consciously chooses to break the cycle. As all of us continue to grow into young adults and then adults, we continue to express and live the messages we have learned, which have been reinforced by our families, the media, religious organizations, political parties, music, schools, and so forth. According to Lee Anne Bell (1997), the socialization process is “pervasive (coming from all sides and sources), consistent (patterned and predictable), circular (self-supporting), self-perpetuating (intradependent) and often invisible (unconscious and unnamed)” (p. 15).

Hatred (or hate) as defined by Merriam-Webster (2010) is “an intense hostility and aversion usually deriving from fear, anger, or sense of injury”; it is an “extreme dislike or antipathy.” It may occur in a variety of contexts, from hatred of inanimate objects or animals, to hatred of oneself or other people, entire groups of people, people in general, existence, or everything.

FBI Special Agents John Schafer and Joe Navarro (2003) describe hate as a complex subject in which there are two basic subdivisions. They refer to the first as rational hate in which the hate is inspired by an unjust act. In the second type, irrational hate, the hatred of a person is based on the person’s race, religion, sexual orientation, ethnicity, or national origin.

A. Coding Framework

A coding framework for this research was established and based on the
Cycle of Socialization and the Hate Model. Five coding symbols were derived from the identifying markers for the Cycle of Socialization—it is pervasive (PER), consistent (CON), circular (CIR), self-perpetuating (SP), and often invisible (INV). The Hate Model developed by John Schafer and Joe Navarro (2003) is a seven-stage model that describes how hate groups define themselves and how they target their victims: the haters gather (S1), the hate group defines itself (S2), the hate group disparages the target (S3), the hate group taunts the target (S4), the hate group attacks the target without weapons (S5), the hate group attacks the target with weapons (S7), and the hate group destroys the target (S7).

II. METHODOLOGY

In this qualitative descriptive participant observational case study, I closely observed two female students who self-disclosed that they were active members of local hate groups so that I could understand how the Hate Model and the Cycle of Socialization collided with the ethos of higher education. I wanted to determine whether there were any observable cause-and-effect relationships exhibited by these two students as I introduced them to the concept of the Cycle of Socialization. I wanted to gain a deeper understanding of how hate is learned, how those who hate interact with others whom they were taught to hate, and whether, as adults, they were willing to challenge some of their early social identities. Journaling, direct observations, interviews, and participant observations the methods of data collection used in this study.

A. Research Questions

There were several research questions to be answered in this qualitative case study: (a) How was hate learned by these participants? (b) Does teaching about the Cycle of Socialization affect preconceived notions of hate? (c) How would these participants interact with those they were taught to hate? (d) Were these participants willing to challenge learned hate?

1. Participants

Two female students who proudly announced active membership in a local hate group self-selected to participate in this qualitative participant observational study. Each student agreed to participate in the following manner: (a) maintain a personal reflective journal for one academic semester 15 weeks in length, (b) participate in three individual interview sessions throughout the semester, and (c) check in with me should any in-class con-
conversation become too uncomfortable. I used observations; kept detailed
field notes; debriefed with a research assistant who is not associated with
the institution these students attend; and reviewed pertinent documents
shared by the two students. These various approaches contributed to the
wealth of information gathered in this study. These two students were sec-
ond-semester sophomores majoring in a social science field.

2. The Setting

This Cycle of Socialization plays out in our classrooms every day,
leading to the questions: Do we see it? Are we aware of its existence? As
this Cycle of Socialization plays out in our classrooms, students are chal-
enged to either take action—which may involve great changes in their
lives—or to do nothing—thereby permitting the cycle to continue.

The journey of two white students, followed through the process of
reflective learning, allowed me to examine how the Cycle of Socialization
creates discord, not only in the classroom, but also within the students’
personal lives. Reflective learning, as defined by Evelyn M. Boyd and Ann
W. Fales (1983), is a process whereby a person internally examines and
explores an issue of concern, an issue that is generally triggered by some
experience. This process creates and clarifies meaning in terms of self, and
it results in a changed conceptual perspective. A great contributor to the
Cycle of Socialization is the location in which an individual is born and
reared. Therefore, a description of this location is appropriate at this point.

a. Location. The campus these students attend is located in a small
county in a mid-Atlantic state. The rural nature of the county and the sur-
rounding areas makes the region amenable to the obscurity many hate
groups seek. I believe these groups have had a great influence on the social-
ization of many students. This belief was substantiated by statistics pre-
pared by the Southern Poverty Law Center (Southern Poverty Law Center
[SPLC], 2008).

b. Campus demographics. The campus, located close to the geo-
graphic center of the county, is within driving distance of a major mid-
Atlantic city. There are nearly 150,000 county residents living in approxi-
mately 800 square miles in an area designated as part of the Appalachian
Region of the country (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006). Of the individuals living
in the county, 95% self-identified as White; 4% self-identified as Black;
others self-identified as Native American or as being of Asian, Hispanic, or
Latino descent. As of 2000, 76% percent of the county residents were high
school graduates; this compares to an 82.5% nationwide average. At the
time of this study, only 11% of the county’s residents held a bachelor’s or
higher degree (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006).
The campus is a miniature replica of the larger countywide community; according to the registrar at Penn State, 93% of the students reside in the county (Germaine Fotta, personal communication, October 8, 2008). There is a similarity of appearance among the students, particularly in their attire. The majority of these students report that they will never leave the local area, while a very small minority “can’t wait” to move to a large urban area. Demographically, this university is a commuter campus with an enrollment of 1,106. Of this total enrollment, 456 (41%) are male, and 650 (59%) are female. The student body is predominantly White (85%). The average age of the students at this undergraduate institution is 24.8 (Germaine Fotta, personal communication, October 8, 2008).

c. The course. The two students in this case study were enrolled in a diversity-related family development class. Thirty-five students were enrolled in the class. Of that number, four females were non-traditional African-American students. Three of the students were male and under the age of 25 (traditional). Of the remaining female students, two were non-traditional White women; the remaining 26 female students, including the participants in this study, were traditional-aged students. Diversity, social justice, and family relationships were the primary concepts addressed in this class. The class met twice a week for 15 weeks; each class was 75 minutes in length. One of the objectives of the course was to enhance critical thinking skills, particularly as they applied to diverse family situations.

In this particular course, as in the others I teach, I asked the students at the beginning of the semester whether they were willing to participate in a collaborative conversation, one that might at times be uncomfortable for them. The students had the right to say no, at which time I would have suggested that they drop the class. In the class under discussion, not one student declined to participate.

d. Local hate groups. The SPLC (2008) is a civil rights law firm internationally known for its tolerance education programs, legal victories against white supremacist groups, and tracking of hate groups. The SPLC has recently reported activity among many known hate groups in this and surrounding mid-Atlantic states. The campus is within a 90-minute drive of 13 of these groups.

B. The Journey

My attempts to expose students to the concept of diversity have proven to be very challenging. I am not alone in this challenge. Kressel (2002) studied global mass hatred and reported that institutions of higher education are routinely envisioned as being environments that are more tolerant and liberal, places where critical thinking is developed and where opinions are
honored. However, Kressel and Blee (2002) have found that this is not universally true. Institutions of higher education neither guarantee an acceptance of arguments for equality and tolerance nor offset the racist attitudes their students experience outside the campus environment. Students are only repeating what they have learned as they progressed from young children to college-aged students.

To that end, I presented “hate” as a topic of discussion. I posed several questions to the class and asked the students to define hate. Then, I asked them to reflect on the following question: Is hate innate or is it learned? After much discussion, the class determined that hate is learned. “Who initially teaches us about hate?” I inquired.

During the initial conversation, I observed two female students seated in the last row in the corner of the room. They were laughing with each other; they were loud and boisterous; they wanted to be noticed. (Rarely do I have students who act in this manner in my classes.)

I questioned the cause of their laughter. They were quick to respond and clearly identified who taught them to hate. “My parents,” proudly stated Kathy (not her real name). Kathy and Sally (not her real name) then began to play off one another as they made additional statements: “Hate is one of our family values!!”, “They [her family members] are very clear about the message they shared with me about niggers, Jews, faggots, dikes, and Christians. Those people have no place in our society.” I observed many other students shaking their heads in agreement and heard a male voice say, “Yeah, she’s right.”

While taking in what I had just heard, I glanced at the four non-traditional African American students sitting in the diagonally opposite corner of the room. These four students were the only ones in the class who could not be identified as “white, non-Hispanic.” One of the four students exclaimed, “No she didn’t!” in disbelief at what had just been said. Another of the four students yelled, “You don’t even know me. You’re judging me by the color of my skin instead of the type of person I am.”

This exchange led to an explosion of comments from a variety of students. One shouted, “I am a Christian and proud of it. I will pray that God forgives you and your sins that you have committed against him and his people.” Another student asked, “Why are you majoring in a social science field if you hate everyone?” One very quiet and withdrawn student muttered, “Everyone hates me because I’m different. I didn’t ask to be this way!” It was only after class that this student disclosed to me that he was questioning his sexual orientation. He said he did not feel safe saying anything in class, fearing retaliation from the two female students whose comments began the original verbal confrontation.

It should be noted that Kathy and Sally were not alone in their think-
While discussing local and national current events, the general response of the class regarding those who were “different” from themselves indicated an intense dislike of those differences. I heard this response from many, if not the majority, of the students. I noted that the four African-American students were not negative in their statements concerning people different from themselves.

I asked Kathy and Sally to stay for a few minutes after class. After a few comments concerning my interest in their previous comments, I asked them to “teach me” about how they had learned to hate. Kathy proudly and loudly stated:

I heard my grandpa tell my dad that niggers are dirty, stinky, and lazy. Our family has been part of the KKK for as long as I can remember. I don’t think I should have to be in the same class as those niggers. I have my own hood and robes; I’ve attended Klan meetings where they planned to attack niggers and faggots. We have to rid ourselves of those people; if not, they’ll be taking over our country.

Sally, aged 20 at the time of this conversation, explained:

My pap told me I should stay away from those kind. They’re lazy, worthless, and, besides, they stink. White people have to take a stand against those people. White people have to fight for what’s right. I was raised in a racially conscious home.

The initial comments shared by Kathy and Sally are what Schafer and Navarro, identified as the first stage (S1) of The Hate Model—the Haters Gather. Regarding the Cycle of Socialization experienced by these two students, their statements indicate that the messages of socialization are consistent (CON) in that the messages did not vary; they were reiterated by various family members. The process is circular (CIR) in that it was passed from family member to family member, old to young and young to old. It is also invisible (INV) in that the messages are part of everyday family conversations. It is pervasive (PER) in that it is part of the fabric of their lives and it is self-perpetuating (SP) because they continue to use the language to embrace the ideology, language, sayings, and music of their cultures.

Kathy remarked, “We hear that niggers are lazy from our parents, the members of our group, the music we listen to, the stuff we read. It’s everywhere”; whereas Sally repoted, “I hear the same comments here, niggers are dumb; our pastor tells us every day Sunday that faggots, dikes, queers, carpet munchers are wrong and those sinners must die!” (It should be noted that both students attend the same “weekly services” of a non-denominational organization whose leader is self-proclaimed and not ordained in any
religious sense.) We are no different from these two students and others; we are surrounded by messages important individuals convey. These people of influence have a profound impact on a person’s self-concept and self-perception. We as a society are inundated with misinformation, prejudicial attitudes, and biased statements through the internet, newspapers, radio, language, cultural practices, and holidays.

These women’s comments, both in class and in conversation with me, indicated that they share their thoughts openly in order to encourage others to “come join” their cause. On the cover of Sally’s notebook, I observed the number 311. When I inquired about the number, both students laughed. Finally, Sally stated, “We have nothing to say.” Upon further investigation I later learned that 311 is a numeric symbol for the Ku Klux Klan. The 11th letter of the alphabet is the letter “K”; thus, 3 times 11 yields “KKK,” or Ku Klux Klan. This numeric symbol is sometimes used as a greeting to demonstrate membership in the KKK or simply sympathy with the Klan and its ideology (Anti-Defamation League, 2005a). According to the model of Schaffer and Navarro, these two individual students met the requirement of the second state (S2) of the Hate Model; they, as members of a group, defined themselves.

One of the assignments for this diversity-family development class required that the students keep an individual reflective journal. They were to write about and reflect on any concept, class discussion, or reading assignment that resonated with them. With the permission of these two students, I discussed their journal entries with them. As I read the students’ journal entries, I found examples of what Harro (2000) and Bell (1997) call the first socialization. At this level, individuals look to those persons who are most important to them—parents, grandparents, aunts, and uncles—who, we believe, know “everything,” whom we seldom question, who set the foundation of rules, roles, values, and beliefs and put into motion our developing selves. “This is who I am,” stated Kathy. “I don’t know any other way to think about those people. My mom and dad have never lied to me; why would I not believe them? Why should I believe you?”

However, I noted from reading the young women’s journals that the questions raised in class, the confusion expressed by classmates, and the experiences expressed by other acquaintances were beginning to collide with the early messages and stereotypes established by the powerful influences in these two students’ lives. While in class, they immediately spoke defensively, protecting their parents, blaming others—the schools, churches, “niggers,” “faggots,” “Christians”—for their strong feelings of hatred. “If we could eliminate those people, the white race would be stronger and America would truly be the greatest country in the world.”

I took note of an interesting situation: When the two students were
together, they appeared to be very bold and confident as they made offensive comments; however, when either student was in a one-to-one situation with me or in class without the other, neither would say anything inappropriate. Schafer and Navarro (2003) reported that either type of hate—rational or irrational—is a sign of personal insecurities. As Schafer and Navarro reported: “Not all insecure people are haters, but all haters are insecure people” (p. 1).

I believe that only through the introduction of the Cycle of Socialization in a non-threatening context can students begin to look at themselves, reflect on the messages they received while growing up, and examine the assumptions they may have about particular target groups. The reflective process includes both the intrapersonal and interpersonal aspects that allow students to grapple with new information while the conflict rages inside. As one journeys through life, social and self identities continue to be formed and messages from significant institution—schools, churches, religions, music, the media, and others—preserve or change the roles, values, and assumptions that have been introduced early in our lives.

My reading of the journals of Kathy and Sally made me more aware of the power of the messages we receive and how those messages affect us through stereotypes, privilege, use of language, and deliberate or undeliberate levels of awareness. At one point, Kathy wrote in her journal: “How did he make a better grade than me? He’s a nigger, and niggers aren’t smart. All they’re good for is selling drugs and making babies. Damn, he’s probably on welfare. I don’t understand.” Sally wrote similar epithets in her journal. It was painful to witness the struggles both women experienced.

On the unconscious level, the messages Kathy and Sally received reinforced their thinking. They had been introduced to a musical group, Prussian Blue, and reported “liking the melody and rhythm” but “never listening to the lyrics of the song” they enjoyed. The group Prussian Blue consists of twin sisters, Lamb and Lynx Gaede. While preteens, they gained recognition in white supremacist circles by singing about Nazi heroes and the preservation of the White race. The name Prussian Blue was chosen because it also was the term used to refer to the blue residue left over by the use of Zyklon B, the poison the Nazis employed to kill millions of Jews and others in concentration camps during World War II (Anti-Defamation League, 2005b).

We often hear music, but do we really listen to the lyrics? When I asked Sally about this group, she was unaware of the meaning of Prussian Blue; she had no idea of its connection to the deaths of millions of Jews. I asked her whether she knew about the Holocaust. “NO!” she responded. When I shared with her a thumbnail explanation, her response was, “SO!!
What’s the big deal? We should kill more people who cause us problems!!"

Sally made an entry in her journal about the “wonderful” song written by Abel Meeropol and made famous by Billie Holiday—“Strange Fruit.” “I love that song,” Sally wrote, “looking at the group of Klansman hanging a nigger in a tree gives me such a rush.” During the interview, I asked Sally about her comments in her journal; I inquired about her feelings as she saw an individual hanged. “It’s not an individual, it’s a nigger; and that’s what we do to them,” Sally replied. As we continued our discussion, Sally shared that hating “those people” made her feel “really good” as a person. “I am an American,” she explained. “This is a white country; there is no room for niggers, faggots, Jews, or Christians.” Sally’s comments are an example of the third stage (S3) of Schaffer and Navarro’s Model of Hate. From their journal entries and our one-on-one conversations, it was clear that both students had internalized the stereotype descriptions taught by their family and their KKK associations. Their self-reported behavior was very prejudicial and oppressive.

Initially, both individuals avoided introspection. As the semester progressed, each individual, in her own way, started to examine her thinking, struggled with new information, and confronted the stereotypes and mistruths she had been taught, while trying to hold on to what she knew. Kathy shared in her journal, “The nigger was elected to be president, now what? What is going to happen to our world? But, he doesn’t look dirty or lazy; he’s a lawyer [sic]. I never knew that they were that educated.” When I was with Kathy, she reported her struggle regarding whether to attend a Klan meeting, because she was “not feeling comfortable” at a meeting. Schaffer and Navarro asserted, “Time cools the fire of the hate, thus forcing the hater to look within” (2003, p. 4). Both Kathy and Sally were very resistant and hesitant on every assignment and reflective journal entry; yet they shared pages and pages of their thoughts.

While I identified the first three stages of the Hate Model in the actions of these two students, I also noted through their journal entries that they were struggling, questioning, and confronting the rhetoric they had heard for so many years. Neither student shared, nor did I observe, any activity associated with the last four stages of the Hate Model—the hate group taunts the target (S4), the hate group attacks the target without weapons (S5), the hate group attacks the target with weapons (S7), and the hate group destroys the target (S7).

During the semester following this study, the two students visited my office together. They were very concerned that their journals would fall into the “wrong hands”—other faculty members, members of the Klan, their family members. To allay their fears, I shredded their journals in their pres-
ence. I believe this was the beginning of their realization that what had been learned over the years might be incorrect; they were adamant that their associates—family and Klan—not read the contents of the journals.

Although these two students committed to work with me for one 15-week semester, they continued to visit my office (unannounced) after the end of the semester to discuss and to process what they had experienced in class. They admitted that they were beginning to change their way of thinking and acting. Both individuals were one year from graduation and, according to their own reports, had “grown” as a result of the seeds planted in the diversity-related family development class. Sally stated that she was learning that she could change her beliefs. She chose to interact with and view persons different from herself. Kathy said she was having a “hard time” hearing the “N word,” stating that it “nauseated” her to hear it. Nonetheless, she reported that she continued to attend Klan meetings, stating that she had to do so. She added, “I don’t think I will ever get out until I move away.”

III. Conclusions

Several research questions were posed in this qualitative case study. From reading their journal entries and engaging in one-on-one conversations with the two participants, it became evident that the answer to the first question—How was hate learned by these participants?—was quite simple. They were taught to hate by their parents and their family association in the KKK, and their stereotypes were reinforced by other social institutions, such as education, the media, and internet. Their parents reared them within their own sense of “normal” and “culture.” No one is to blame; we pass on what we have been taught; that’s all we know. This was evidenced by their statements that they “learned at an early age” to hate those who are different. They were taught by family members: “my parents,” “hate is one of our family values,” “I heard my grandpa tell my dad that . . .,” “my pap told me . . .,” “I was raised in a racially conscious home.”

The second research question—Does teaching about the Cycle of Socialization affect preconceived notions of hate?—can be answered in the affirmative. This correlates with the work of Harro (2002) and Bell (1997) in that the core within each of us, through the socialization process, is filled with ignorance, confusion, fear, and insecurity. Hate is learned, and it is only through a daily struggle to look within that we can change. This reflective process includes questioning learned assumptions; confronting our own stereotypes, biases, and prejudices; participating in open and honest dialogues; and demonstrating a willingness to reach beyond our own personal “comfort zone,” thus risking vulnerability. Through this process, we can
become secure individuals who are free to ask questions about people, places, and things that are different from those we have experienced.

Both Sally and Kathy chose to go beyond their personal “comfort zones” to learn about themselves and others. At this point in their lives, they have chosen to look within and to question many of the mistruths. They were able to learn about the Cycle of Socialization. They are still learning about how their beliefs were shaped and molded by their associations and their fear of the unknown.

Sally reported that she is uncomfortable using the words “nigger” or “faggot”—“I have learned how hurtful those words are. I never put a face to a name; the people I was belittling were faceless to me, until now.” Kathy shared that she is struggling with religious differences:

I never believed in God. I was taught there was no God, but how did this earth come to be? I have to be honest: I am still growing, and my growth has caused some major friction within my home. My dad told me if I liked niggers I should move out and live like one of them. Guess what, I moved into my own apartment.

The third research question—How would these participants interact with those they were taught to hate?—can be answered by viewing the attitudes and actions of Kathy and Sally from the beginning of this study through their visits with me during the following semester. Initially, both students would make audible and boisterous comments when anyone made a statement that challenged their thinking and beliefs. They tried to recruit other White students to join their cause. They would laugh or make loud derogatory comments when other students, African-American or White, made statements that challenged their ways of thinking. They were, however, respectful of other White students when they made statements with which they (Kathy and Sally) agreed. Throughout the class, these two students sat in the farthest corner, near a door, with at least several chairs between them and the other students in the class.

I began to notice, however, that small changes occurred as the semester progressed. Kathy and Sally slowly began to talk and interact with other students in the class; perhaps they were beginning to feel that the classroom was a safe environment. Toward the end of the semester, Kathy and Sally became less boisterous and less intrusive when others were speaking.

In the tenth week of the semester, I showed the movie The Laramie Project. The movie is based on the 1998 kidnapping and murder of Matthew Shepard, who was severely beaten and left to die while tied to a fence on the outskirts of Laramie, Wyoming. Five weeks after Shepard’s death, Moisés Kaufman and fellow members of the Tectonic Theater Project went
to Laramie and, over the course of the next year, conducted more than 200 interviews with people of the town. From these interviews they wrote the play *The Laramie Project*, a chronicle of the life of the town of Laramie in the year after the murder (Tectonic Theater Project, n.d.). At the point in the movie where Reverend Phelps of the Westboro Baptist Church and his followers were protesting outside the courthouse, and the “angels” surrounded the group, backs turned to the protestors and arms upraised, I noted that Kathy had tears in her eyes. Sally had a strange look on her face, and later she wrote in her journal that she saw herself as one of the protesters and questioned the pain she had caused others.

The final research question—Were these participants willing to challenge learned hate?—also can be answered in the affirmative. After the course, the students continued to visit me to discuss the changes they were seeing in themselves or the questions with which they were still grappling. Sally said, “I’m not the same person today as I was when I walked into your class several months ago.” Kathy expressed the opinion that “if I can change, anyone can change if they are given the opportunity to explore themselves and others.”

The following example answers both the third and fourth research questions. Earlier in this paper, I commented that an African American student responded to the outbursts of Kathy and Sally by stating, “You don’t even know me. You’re judging me by the color of my skin instead of the type of person I am.” A year after the class, Sally reported that she and that student sat over lunch and talked with each other. I have no knowledge of the content of their conversation; however, I believe that it is important to report the change in Sally’s behavior regarding an individual whom she had been taught to hate.

IV. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

First, I want the reader to know that I experienced a great deal of discomfort in this class. If I wanted my students to be reflective, then I too had to undertake that journey. I had to confront my own feelings and “isms” and come to understand why I became so internally enraged when the students used the “N” word; referred to homosexuals by derogatory terms; expressed callous disregard for the loss of life in the Holocaust; had intense conversations on topics ranging from abortion to euthanasia, political differences, immigration, single parenting, and welfare recipients. Although I had to contain my feelings in class, I realized I had to be reflective so that I could be more secure in my own beliefs.

As I witnessed the struggle and discomfort experienced by Kathy and Sally, I realized that it is our responsibility, as leaders in the classroom, to
teach about the concepts of diversity and social justice. It is our duty to challenge our students’ ideas about stereotypes and their assumptions about “others.” We, as faculty members, must “know” ourselves and the messages we send our students regarding our own beliefs concerning gender, religion, politics, ability, sexual orientation, and the like. It is never easy to examine ourselves. To teach students to be accepting of others, we must first learn to accept others as we wish to be accepted.

Faculty members in higher education have an ethical responsibility to introduce critical thinking in all areas of the curriculum, especially on diversity-related and social justice issues. It is not our job to change people; it is our job to present alternative ways of thinking and seeing the world and helping our students to live and work in a diverse world. I do not think that all faculty members should introduce hot topics in their classrooms. Because of the critical nature of the outcomes of such discussions, only those faculty members who are prepared to respond to the variety of student behaviors and statements should take on the risk and responsibility of doing so.

Even when we, as faculty members, change, we are often reluctant to pass that change on to our students. bell hooks (1994) stated that

many teachers who do not have difficulty . . . embracing new ways of thinking may still be as resolutely attached to old ways of practicing teaching as their more conservative colleagues. . . . Even those of us who are experimenting with progressive pedagogical practices are still afraid of change. (p. 32)

In the 21st century, many faculty members still struggle with, are uncomfortable with, or have not been trained in social justice education. They are unaware that each of us is “born into a specific set of social identities, such as age, gender, religion, sexual orientation, ethnicity, skin color, ability status and language” (Harro, 2000, p. 15), which then are reinforced by powerful influences.

As educators, we must find “teachable moments” in which to plant seeds for our students’ reflection, so that they can examine their own beliefs and begin the process of making their own assumptions and decisions about differences. Does any one of us have the power to change the thinking or behavior of another? I do not believe so; however, we can challenge others’ thinking. How can anyone say that Kathy is wrong when the information she believes to be true was taught by individuals she loved and respected, individuals who did their best to educate her and share their knowledge with her? Kathy and Sally need to make choices. They can continue the Cycle of Socialization, teaching others what they have been taught, or they
can make changes to learn about others in order to become the social change agents we need in this world.

Many faculty members are not aware of the Cycle of Socialization; yet they encounter many students like Sally and Kathy who regularly sit in their classes. If we truly want to teach critical thinking skills, faculty members at all levels must first learn about themselves and how they were socialized and then incorporate the Cycle of Socialization into their classes, allowing students to question, reflect, and struggle with who they are as individuals, and, more importantly, who they want to become.

REFERENCES


Applied Anthropology and Anti-hate Activism

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines my journey from activist, to educator, to researcher, and back, and the implications the journey has for developing effective anti-hate collaborations and educational practices. After being notified that my name and contact information had been posted on a white supremacist’s website, I re-considered my role as an anti-hate activist and turned to teaching. Combining my activist experience with my anthropology background, I developed a course, “Hate Across Cultures.” Using multi-disciplinary academic resources and featuring guest lectures from representatives of various government agencies, this class provides a space for students to learn and talk about the origins of hate, hate across cultures, and hate in their own region. Students apply their knowledge and develop strategies to combat hate in their everyday lives. This has inspired me to begin a research project on local hate practices with the ultimate goal of developing and implementing more effective local anti-hate strategies.

Keywords: anti-hate activism; applied anthropology

I. COMMUNITY OVERVIEW: COUNTY, CITY, AND TOWN

Berks County, Pennsylvania, located in the southeastern part of the state, has experienced well-publicized acts of hate. Criminal investigations into terrorism, harassment, intimidation, and vandalism have led to some prosecutions and convictions. Of national and legal significance was the injunction against Ryan Wilson, founder of Alpha HQ for the 1998 internet harassment of Bonnie Jouhari, a fair housing specialist in the city of Reading, the county seat. Wilson was ordered to pay Jouhari 1.1 million dollars (Southern Poverty Law Center [SPLC], 2000). Jouhari also won a judgment of intimidation against the late Roy Frankhouser, Jr., the well-known and oft-arrested local leader of the local Ku Klux Klan offshoot, the United Klans of America. The settlement required Frankhouser to pay Jouhari 10%

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of his annual income for a decade (SPLC, 2000). I do not believe Jouhary ever saw a nickel from either case.

The demographic, economic, cultural, and social diversity found in the city is not found in the outlying areas. Though culturally and linguistically diverse, the city has less economic and educational diversity, with higher rates of poverty and crime and fewer people who have completed high school or attended post-secondary school. The city is able to provide additional services that are not found in the outlying areas, including a city Human Relations Commission. There had been a county-wide Human Relations Council, for which Jouhari worked. During her tenure at the Council, Jouhari established a conflict resolution task force to monitor bias and hate activity in the county. In 1998, Jouhari fled Berks County as the result of threats made against her and her daughter, and the task force came under new leadership. In the same year, I became a member of the task force, representing the Boyertown Area Unity Coalition.

The task force was both proactive and reactive in its work; it was proactive by organizing, facilitating and conducting educational trainings geared toward specific community stakeholders, including elected officials, law enforcement, non-profits, the business community, and educators. Among the trainings held were a 1999 gang-related training for law enforcement, elected officials and non-profits; a 2001 symposium addressing safe schools for school administrators, student leaders, and law enforcement; and a 2003 Muslim, Sikh, and Arab cultural awareness training for law enforcement and elected officials.

The task force was reactive by responding to specific incidents that occurred within the city and county. The task force responded to city and suburban schools that were experiencing bias and tension by facilitating the SPIRIT program developed by the United States Department of Justice. The task force worked closely with local community groups, such as the Boyertown Area Unity Coalition, and state agencies, including the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission and its own Pennsylvania Inter-Agency Task Force on Civil Tension.

When the non-profit council folded in 2005, members of the task force, including local, state, and federal law enforcement officials, local educators, businesspeople, clergy, and elected officials, continued to meet and focus primarily on implementing training programs to increase cultural awareness and sensitivity in the various communities represented in the area. I assumed the chairperson position in 2005. Without a budget, a building, or administrative support, the task force continued to pursue its work, managing to pull off an immigration symposium entitled “Rights, Responsibilities and Realities in Diverse Communities” in 2007. Despite requests to the county for administrative support for a new Greater Reading Task Force
on Civil Tension, the task force was unable to find an administrative home and eventually disbanded.

The brief history of the Reading-Berks Human Relations Council and the Conflict Resolution Task Force are necessary to provide some context for understanding the collective efforts organized in the county seat. These efforts did not always reach the outlying areas. The issues facing the more rural areas reflected a different experience with hate and bias incidents. These communities and their affiliated school districts have experienced non-criminal acts such as the distribution of racist, anti-Semitic, and anti-gay literature; conflicts over symbols such as the Confederate flags; the public appearances of members of organized hate groups; and the criminal act of an attempted cross-burning. The more rural areas of the county respond positively to the proposition that local problems have local solutions. It is in these outlying communities that I have most of my experience as an anti-hate activist. I would also offer that it these types of acts, and not the higher profile acts, that more frequently affect small-town communities in the United States negatively (Levin & Nolan, 2011). I now turn my attention to one such small town.

II. SMALL TOWN REALITIES

A. Ethnographic Context

Boyertown is a small community of approximately 4,000 residents in southeastern Pennsylvania, about 20 miles from the county seat and 50 miles from Philadelphia. Originally settled by Germans and by Swiss and French Huguenots in the 18th century and later established as a center for forging iron ore, the town diversified and became known for its carriages and caskets. An economic downturn hit the area in the waning days of the 20th century with the closing of the Casket Company (1988) and the Auto Body Works (1990). Although the town is still facing an uncertain economic future, it has secured monies to revitalize the downtown and has invested in marketing itself for economic development.

It is an overwhelmingly white town. According to the 2000 U.S. Census, 98.8% of the Boyertown population identified as white. Including the population of the greater Boyertown area, which encompasses the entire school district, there are approximately 17,000 people, with 96.9% of the population identifying as white and 2% of the population identifying as Black or African American.

Despite, or perhaps because of, the perceived homogeneity of the town, racial tensions do exist. What follows is a brief description of selected incidents that occurred over a fifteen-year period. In September
1994, following what is described as an altercation between a black student and a white student at the local high school, an estimated 65 to 75 males, or five to six truckloads of white men and boys, “went looking” for the black student, wielding baseball bats and uttering racist slurs (Bell, 1994). Police were contacted and the white men and boys were turned away, and the black student returned to school. It was this incident that inspired local community leaders, under the direction of the school district, to establish a coalition of stakeholders to band together to address the racism and intolerance that were gaining momentum in the area. Later during the same academic school year, Tom Blair, a self-professed member of the Aryan Nations, was appointed to a school board committee on class size; the committee was later disbanded. Mark Thomas, another person vocal in the local community and the leader of the Pennsylvania Aryan Nations, pleaded guilty in 1997 to plotting with the Midwest bank robbers to fund the work of the Aryan Republican Army in its attempt to overthrow the United States government (Devlin, 1998). And the Ku Klux Klan began public recruitment at the center of town, with robed members handing out literature and talking to drivers and passengers waiting for the lights to turn green. Members of the Klan appeared periodically at the main intersection in town during the years 1995-2002. Three members of the National Socialist Movement appeared on the same corner in May of 2005.

Perhaps the most alarming hate event occurred in late October, 2004, when a white man attempted to burn a cross on the lawn of an African American family. A white neighbor thwarted the suspect’s effort to ignite the cross. The hate crime caused great distress for the family, and concern was expressed in the school district and the community. After a three-and-a-half-month investigation, police arrested a 42-year-old white man who reportedly had ties to the Ku Klux Klan (Erdman, 2005). The suspect, Richard D. Rick, Jr., died of natural causes before the case could go to trial. Several events related to the cross-burning occurred in the area, including the appearance of threatening racist graffiti in a junior high bathroom (Van Dyke, 2005). The school district responded by establishing a Diversity Steering Committee to address racism in the schools, as recommended by the Philadelphia office of the Anti-Defamation League.

These events did not occur without public notice and concern. The 1994 event prompted the school district to spearhead the formation of a coalition of people representing various sectors of the community. This group became known as the Boyertown Area Unity Coalition. The Boyertown Area Unity Coalition responded to the growing number of hate and bias events that were affecting the local community. Among other activities and events, the Unity Coalition successfully implemented “Project Lemonade.” For this project, citizens of Boyertown and the surrounding area
pledge money for every minute that the Ku Klux Klan distributed literature in town, raising more than $11,000 for pro-diversity and pro-tolerance groups such as the SPLC, the ADL, and the NAACP, as well as the local library (Schlegel & Stahl, 2006). The Unity Coalition also organized the first Martin Luther King, Jr. community service project and worked with the local religious association to establish a commemorative service. Along with the local library, the Unity Coalition organized a read-a-thon for children on Martin Luther King, Jr. Day, featuring books recommended by the Coretta Scott King Foundation. The Unity Coalition, working hand-in-hand with the victims of an attempted cross-burning, established what is now an annual Unity Walk.

Response to pro-diversity, anti-hate activity was not always well-received. In 1997, a group of people associated with the Unity Coalition attended a Boyertown borough council meeting to ask the council members to support a resolution speaking out against what were then nearly weekly appearances of members from the local branch of the Ku Klux Klan. Several people associated with the Unity Coalition spoke passionately about the issue, including a Holocaust survivor. The council members sat behind their nameplates in complete silence while concerned citizens spoke. Following the public comment period, the solicitor for the council read a statement on the council’s behalf recognizing the community’s concern and the Klan’s first amendment right to free speech. In other words, in order not to violate the Klan’s first amendment rights to free speech (and open itself to a lawsuit), the council decided that the best course of action in response to the public presence of the Klan was to refrain from addressing the issue; they chose self-censorship. Following the meeting, Unity Coalition members and others gathered outside the borough hall in utter shock that the council could chose silence as a strategy for dealing with the Klan. This was my first foray into local anti-hate activism.

By the time of the borough council meeting, Boyertown was not in an economic or a social position to market itself as an opportune site for commercial or residential development. The very public silence performed by the borough council amounted to the disquieting silence of complicity: The hatemongers had the floor. Although the borough council’s interest in self-censorship was not believed to have been aligned with the Klan’s interest in speaking, it had the net effect of granting the Klan the discursive space to speak about whiteness, blackness, and racism in the town.

As Robin Sheriff (2000), an anthropologist who examines racism in Brazil, points out, “Different groups... have markedly divergent interests at stake in the suppression of discourse.” She calls on anthropologists to deconstruct silence in such a way “that these interests are explicitly located
within a range of differentiated and opposed social positions in which both linguistic and nonlinguistic forms of power are distributed” (p. 114).

III. THE COMPLICITY OF SILENCE: INDIVIDUAL, POLITICAL, AND CULTURAL CENSORSHIP

“Silence is the welcome mat for hate,” says Ann Van Dyke, assistant director of education and community services from the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. Ms. Van Dyke uses this line frequently as she travels the commonwealth addressing communities that have felt the presence of organized hate. It is a line she has used in Boyertown on more than one occasion, and one that bears repeating.

Silence and censorship are areas of anthropological concern, and much is made of the relationships among silence, power, and contestation. Silence can oppress, liberate, shame; silence can be welcoming or, ironically, disquieting. Sheriff (2000) identifies a particular type of silence that she calls cultural censorship (2000). Sheriff notes,

Sheriff is suggesting that we deconstruct silence as we do discourse to unveil its power. At the very least, anti-hate activists are already attending to the critical nature of silence.

Cultural- and self-censorship in Boyertown provide a discursive arena whose void is filled by those who are comfortable talking about hate and race. In this overwhelmingly white community, those who do choose to speak out include the members of the Unity Coalition and those opposed to the Unity Coalition. The Unity Coalition members recognize the history and presence of organized hate in the community and respond to it, whereas those opposed to the Unity Coalition blame the coalition for the presence of organized hate and accuse it of “promoting” the visits of such groups (Turchanik, 2003).

A third voice, legitimized by those opposed to hate activity, was that of the adult male victim of the 2004 attempted cross-burning. He became an authorized voice, allowed to speak on behalf of the unbiased citizens in the town, based on his victimhood and presumed ease in talking about race as a perceived black man (He identifies himself as Caribbean-American and was
referred to in the press as “African-American.”). He was invited to speak at the Martin Luther King, Jr. religious service. He became what Hill (2008, p. 23) identifies as an “honorary white.” He became the singular authority on race, hate, and the true good nature of the town. He did the work that the borough council and others chose not to do.

A day or two after the attempted cross-burning, I received a phone call from Ms. Van Dyke concerning the hate crime. She suggested that I mobilize community leaders to respond to the needs of the family and to publicly condemn the act. One of my first calls was to a leader with a local outreach association. I asked whether he had spoken with the family. He had not. I asked when he was going to call the family, and he said he did not have plans to do so. This type of vocal restraint, a “wait and see” approach, was reminiscent of the borough council meeting.

In the absence of any other leadership, the Unity Coalition, with the full participation of the family that was victimized, organized a Unity Walk with the dual purpose of publicly supporting the family and demonstrating that Boyertown would not tolerate such acts of hate. In a move whose symbolism still resonates with me, it was the family that was victimized that brought the sound system, including a microphone, amplifier, and speakers, to the walk so that others could speak loudly in response to the hate crime. Inspired by the family and conscious of the complicity of silence, I, as chairperson of the Unity Coalition, was able to address the crowd and began by saying, “If silence is the welcome mat for hate, then your presence here speaks volumes: that hate and prejudice have no place in the Boyertown area.”

The public voicing of anti-hate discourse is not the solution to the problem of hate. It can, however, be effective in combating hate, because it is the impact of self-censorship, a public silence, to which recruiters attend. Floyd Cochran, a former Aryan Nation youth recruiter turned anti-hate activist, recalls strategically recruiting in communities that remained silent following his own surreptitious acts of hate. He would locate a town and paint a swastika, for example, and wait. If the town remained silent, he stayed to recruit. If there were no letters to the editor condemning the graffiti, he stayed to recruit. Taken together, hundreds of acts of silence, of refusing to speak, come to exemplify communal censorship.

A. Political Self-censorship and Cultural Censorship

The 1997 borough council meeting is an obvious example of political self-censorship. Their decision directly counters the advice given to elected officials by Ms. Van Dyke. Ms. Van Dyke advises elected government offi-
cials to uphold the Constitution, as they swore to do upon entering office, by exercising their own rights to free speech.

Ironically, the very agency that employs Ms. Van Dyke has undergone its own recent self-censorship. What were formerly referred to as “hate groups” are now referred to by the hate groups’ own terms, such as “white supremacist” or “black separatist” groups in order that the agency appear to represent the entire commonwealth and remain unbiased in their work. By erasing the word *hate* from their discourse, the censors at the PHRC are legitimizing the groups that are most comfortable speaking out about race, among other things.

As is the case in many small, racially homogenous towns across the commonwealth and nation, there seems to be a tacit understanding that only activists, racist and anti-racist, are allowed to talk about hate, racism, and whiteness. The exception in these communities is perhaps those who are already “othered” by being non-white (see example above). The prevailing local ideology of who does and does not have a racialized identity is based on the Euro(white)-centric markedness or difference model; whites are not marked and have no racial identities, and all non-whites are marked and have racial identities.

### B. Consequences of Censorship

There are local consequences for censorship. As mentioned earlier, hate activists identify silent communities as those ripe for hate recruitment. When communities refuse to speak out about hate incidents, they deny the public, including residents, business owners, and potential investors, a truer sense of the impact of hate. Refraining from discussing hate activity can also potentially undermine small successes in combating hate. Accessing progress and touting successes fall victim to the censorship strategy, too.

Equally troubling is the belief that those who speak out against hate are the ones who motivate hate sympathizers to become active. In the summer of 2002, three members of the Kootenai County (ID) Task Force on Human Relations traveled across the state of Pennsylvania, stopping at five different communities to address what to do when hate comes to town. Marshall Mend, Norm Gissel, and Tony Stewart spoke in Boyertown, to a crowd of approximately 50 people. One of the persons in attendance was Roy Frankhouser, Jr., the aforementioned leader of the Keystone Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. During the comment period, a white man asked the three human rights activists why they had come to Boyertown, and didn’t they know that if they hadn’t come, there would be no (visible) presence from hate group members. This represents the perspective that anti-hate speech
antagonizes those who would publicly express their hate in symbolic or physical practices.

C. National Consequences of Censorship

The choice by white people to refrain from speaking out in response to hate and racism moves beyond the local and affects the national when the discursive void is filled by white hate activists who are quite comfortable talking about the experiences of whites in America. They become the dominant participants in the discourse on whiteness and white racialized identities. The extent to which this white racial discourse is framed in terms of victim narratives is material for another paper. Whether it’s coming from internet discussions on Stormfront or literature from National Alliance or the National Socialist Movement, the idea is propagated that the future of Aryans and whites is in peril. Especially frightening is the seepage of such conceptions of white peril into the more mainstream hatemongering discourse that can find the president of the United States, in the words of Glenn Beck, to be someone “who has a deep-seated hatred for white people or the white culture” (Peterson, 2009).

But the inability to talk about hate in general and racism in particular can have far-reaching consequences. As one former hate activist described it to me, “Underlying all this supposed advancement is yet another circle of animosity and resentment that, barring public discourse, can only one day break out in violence” (D. Caines [this is his chosen pseudonym], personal communication, January 2, 2008). In Caines’ view, muting different racial experiences under the mantle of “tolerance” will just create more tension that will result in violence unless these different racial experiences are publicly addressed. Of course the argument has been made; the violence has begun, in the form of the symbolic violence of the everyday language of white racism, documented so well by Hill (2008). Part of white linguistic ideology concerns who can talk about race. Hill recognizes silence as part of white racist discourse, though not in the way it is referred to here. This discourse on white identity controlled and manipulated by white supremacists while non-supremacist whites silence themselves is consequential for examining the construction of white racialized identities and further developing an applied anthropology of hate.

IV. Lessons Learned: Getting Personal

The Conflict Resolution Task Force and the Boyertown Area Unity Coalition were organizations peopled by extraordinarily committed, professional, compassionate, and kind individuals. I was fortunate and privileged
enough to work actively with many of them as a volunteer and occasional leader of these organizations. As a local community member serving with these organizations, I was at times identified as a point person and interviewed by the media. I had a minor public profile. One day, in the spring of 2005, I received a call from a representative of a state agency asking whether I was sitting down. She told me that my and my partner’s personal information had been posted on Bill White’s hate website, Overthrow.com. I had reached a turning point. Because I was the mother of two young children and just beginning my university teaching career, I decided to step down from my somewhat public, anti-hate activist role. I, too, chose self-censorship. More than anything, this particular event threw into stark relief for me the privileges I unknowingly experienced as a white, heterosexual, practicing Christian woman. My empathy for friends who were victims of hate changed; I became more compassionate and understanding, but discovered I was much less brave. I looked for an “out” and ultimately found it by melding my experiences in community activism with my academic background in anthropology.

V. APPROACHING HATE AS A PRACTICE

The successful collaborations with individuals representing different interests and agencies inspired me to develop what I consider to be an applied anthropology course, “Hate Across Cultures.” I have taught the class a total of four times at two different universities and have been impressed with the interest in the course expressed by students, faculty, and administrators. We begin with a global look at hate, and then narrow the focus to the United States, to Pennsylvania, and ultimately to southeastern Pennsylvania.

As an anthropologist, and not in opposition to, but perhaps in triangulation with, psychological and legal definitions of hate, I propose addressing hate as a cultural practice. Influenced by sociologist Kathleen Blee’s (2002) work demonstrating that hate activity can occur in the absence of a fully developed ideology of hate, and by linguistic anthropologists Marjorie and Charles Goodwin’s work on the socially-situated nature of emotions that recognizes that “affect is lodged within embodied sequences of actions” (2001, p. 243), I take hate to be socially and culturally situated practices intended to elevate the actor and to minimize or dehumanize the recipient.

The emotional component of hate cannot be denied. It affects the class I teach in many ways. First, hate, as an emotion, may not be a cultural universal. Do all cultures have hate? Second, hate as an emotion is not a precursor for hate activity. Third, emotions are being examined as situated
activities, located in the social world. Finally, the emotional response to hate activity by anti-racists, and, more relevant to this section, my students, can be prohibitive; for emotions can and do complicate social scientific discussions about dismantling organized hate and decreasing hate activity. Students in classes on hate appreciate having a way to examine hate from a social scientific perspective that allows them to get beyond their own emotional responses to the subject material.

In her research, Blee (2002) found that women in organized hate groups engage in hate activity without having a fully developed ideology of hate beliefs. Hate, it seems, is something to do. It’s a practice, and a cultural one at that. This distinction has implications for how a community is to respond to hate. I recall one telephone conversation I had with someone who, in my estimation, is quite passionate about and genuine in the quest to eliminate hate and prejudice. There had been recent reports of vandalism and theft at several sites, including two churches. Graffiti at these sites included a swastika and racial epithets. While discussing these reports, the other person repeatedly stated that it sounded as if the crimes were committed by “angry people” who “act out.” Although I don’t dismiss the hypothesis, I do question the limited focus. If hate is an emotion, linked to anger, frustration, feelings of inadequacy, the focus of our attempts to combat it is on the individual who has the feelings and commits the acts. If we include the implications associated with hate as a practice, then we also must address the impact of hate or bias acts upon the community. Those who are victimized by such acts must be considered as well.

Goodwin and Goodwin (2001) argue that emotions are socially situated practices, and that “the relevant unit for the analysis of emotion is not the individual, or the semantic system of a language, but instead the sequential organization of the action” (p. 239). Even when we regard hate as an emotion, the Goodwins’ work demonstrates that emotion does not lie in the body, but in the course of interaction in which it is made manifest. Emotions are experienced in socially situated practices. This notion directs us to expand analyses of hate to go beyond interviews, life histories, and psychological analyses to think creatively about methodologically and ethically challenging approaches that capture hate as emergent phenomena in naturally occurring human interaction.

VI. TEACHING HATE CLASS

I teach at Kutztown University, one of fourteen schools in the Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education. The university is located in Berks County and in a historically Pennsylvania German community. Nearly 98% of the 4,500 residents of the borough of Kutztown are white.
The University has more than twice the population of the borough with approximately 11,000 full and part-time students. Of the students, 86% identify as white. The borough and the university have different demographic characteristics. Kutztown University actively recruits non-white students and first-generation students and boasts a Multicultural Center, a Women’s Center, and a GLBTQ Center.

I first taught what is known as “Hate Class” in the spring of 2007. This spring (2011) I am teaching it for the fourth time, and the class has become a permanent addition to the Kutztown University curriculum. Sixteen students were enrolled that first semester, and the current class is capped at 20 students and filled shortly after registration began. Students want to take this course. It is not, however, an easy course to teach or to take.

The assigned readings come from a diversity of disciplines, and I have made good use of the *Journal of Hate Studies*. There are three assigned monographs (Blee, 2002; Levin & Nolan, 2011; Neiwert, 2004) and numerous articles and chapters from edited texts. In my opinion, LaFont’s (2009) analysis of LGBT-hate in Jamaica is a particularly powerful example of what an anthropology of hate might look like. Students respond well to Blazak’s (2004) work on women’s roles in assisting men out of organized hate groups. I find that Coloroso’s (2007) proposition that bullying is on the same continuum as genocide induces great classroom discussion. We watch several films and documentaries, and students tend to be thoroughly engaged by *Two Towns of Jasper* (Dow & Williams, 2003). There are (too frequently) opportunities to bring in local, regional, national, and international news stories for discussion as well. Of local interest is the recent sentencing of the young men convicted of the 2008 hate crime murder of undocumented immigrant Luis Ramirez in Shenandoah, Pennsylvania.

Earlier I identified forms of silence as “censorship.” Silence is relevant in the classroom, too. Because of the relatively small class size, class discussion is possible and sometimes extraordinary. At other times, there are long, uncomfortable moments of silence. I allow those silences for students to be comfortable or become uncomfortable in them. Most students do not have a well-developed vocabulary for talking about heterosexism or anti-Semitism, for example. They are given the opportunity to develop this vocabulary not just through the readings and the documentaries, but through a series of 10 two-to-three-page response papers that address a topic from the readings. I find that these writing assignments allow students to start developing their own voice in a dialogue with me. My comments on papers for this class are more contemplative and deliberate than those on papers for other classes. As the semester progresses, I begin to ask students whether they are willing to read their papers aloud to the class. At this point, the dialogue expands to include the classroom community. Toward the end of
the semester, I ask the students to review their response papers in the order in which they were written, so that they can reflexively encounter the development of their own ideas and opinions.

The semester is 15 weeks long, so the students are able to opt out of writing a response paper several times a semester. Some students need to take a break from the material, when it hits too close to home or when they have difficulty responding. We have also, unfortunately, been able to follow nationally-known hate cases as they have occurred during a semester.

The class is not, however, “all hate, all the time.” I invite guest speakers to come speak to the class. These speakers have included human relations experts, survivors of hate, school officials, and representatives from law enforcement. The students have an overwhelmingly positive response to these guest lectures, as they see that there are individuals and agencies that are responsible for decreasing hate and bias activity in the commonwealth and in their area. Students are positively affected by the guest lecturers, who speak of their experiences as victims, activists, and professionals. The guest lecturers encourage students to get involved locally, identifying steps students can take to combat hate and decrease intolerance of individuals and populations who are “othered.” These guest lecturers also inspire hope and optimism when it seems the course material suggests reasons for despair and pessimism. Students become optimistic regarding the future, and some, who have since graduated, have pursued careers that enable them to join the effort to reduce hate and bias activity. Other students find hope in the experiences of those once victimized by hate. This is especially significant for students who have been targeted by perpetrators of hate in the past. Similarly to Dan Savage’s “It Gets Better” project, these encounters with victims allow students to see “the happiness, potential, and positivity their lives will reach” (Smith, 2010, para. 2). Indeed, students who have since graduated have contacted me to let me know how the class has influenced decisions they have made regarding their careers and community involvement.

VII. RESEARCHING THE IMPACT OF HATE

My experiences as an activist and an educator have led me to propose ethnographic research on hate activity. This is a departure for me in that the majority of my research has been in the field of language obsolescence. As an anthropologist trained in ethnographic methods, I would like to merge my vocation and my profession. I have listened to what others have said. One human relations expert tells communities they must ask, “Why here, why now?” when hate comes to town. The Anti-Defamation League requires communities and school districts participating in the No Place for
Hate® program to complete “self-assessments.” Another human relations consultant argues that cultural problems are different from racial problems. Victims say that the perpetrators of hate are ignorant. All of these voices from the field support the need for ethnographic research that addresses the community context, the historical context, and the practices and beliefs that allow for hate to be encouraged or discouraged.

I have recently submitted a grant to begin a pilot study, “Community Identity in Response to Hate and Bias Activity.” The primary goal of this pilot study is to explore and identify the ideas of community membership, identity, and sense of place expressed in a local town prior to, during, and after the occurrence of bias and hate incidents. A secondary goal is to apply the results of the research to assist other Pennsylvania communities in becoming proactive by preventing hate and bias activity and enabling people to respond more productively to hate and bias activity when it does occur. Using participant-observation, interviews, and historical documents as data, I plan to examine both public and private expressions of bias that reveal local understandings of what types of people are “allowed” to be members of the community in question. This is a formulation of the classic focus of anthropological inquiry: the identification of “the other.”

This research will be a collaborative effort, allowing student researchers the opportunity to gain anthropological insight on the aftermath of hate and its consequences for a community. By collaborating with students and conducting ethnographic research in two different communities, I hope to acquire data that will shed light on how best to address a given community’s needs prior to and in response to acts of hate. By applying the research to solve practical problems, I hope to return once again to activism. By telling one community’s story, I hope to redress the censorship of the past.

VIII. CONCLUSION: APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY OF HATE

An anthropology of hate is long overdue. Stern’s (2004) call for the involvement of anthropologists in the development of the field of hate studies has not been heeded sufficiently. Some of the problem has been a matter of kind, and not a matter of degree. Research into inequality, discrimination, and subjugation have been fundamental to the development of anthropology as practiced in the United States, beginning with Franz Boas, a founding father of American anthropology. Though most of the cultural anthropology of the mid 20th century can be characterized as the chronicling of non-Western cultures, the last quarter of the 20th century saw a surge in research on underrepresented peoples in Western societies, on the systemic forces of economic and social injustices as they are experienced
locally, and on the hegemonic power of discourse to construct and perpetuate inequality.

What would an anthropology of hate look like? Anthropology is a four-field discipline, including cultural anthropology, linguistic anthropology, archaeology, and biological anthropology. A biological anthropology of hate might address the impact of hate practices on the health and nutrition of a given population, or the genetic implications of genocide. An archaeology of hate might examine the material record for hate practices through history. A linguistic anthropology of hate might examine contemporary discourse to address the symbolic capital of hate speech and its circulation among groups that “other” and within groups that are “othered.” A cultural anthropology of hate might focus on the intersection of local, national, and transnational processes of hate within specific communities to uncover how hate is perpetuated and transmitted. My hope would be that the findings from an anthropology of hate, no matter the subfield, would be applied to solve the problems that arise from hate practices. Three recent and noteworthy contributions to what could be considered a nascent anthropology of hate might be Jane Hill’s (2008) *The Everyday Language of White Racism*; David A. B. Murray’s (2009) edited collection, *Homophobias: Lust and Loathing Across Time and Space*; and the *Journal of Linguistic Anthropology*’s forthcoming theme issue, “Racializing Discourses.”

In addition to increasing research on whiteness and the discursive perpetuation of white racism (Hill, 2008), we must begin to address the specific problem of hate in small communities in the U.S. If talking about whiteness automatically begins to deconstruct its hegemonic power, then talking about racism should automatically begin to deconstruct its hegemonic power. The threat to the privileged in small, white communities like the one identified in this paper is that by talking about hate, community members acknowledge its presence in their collective history. A hidden danger of talking about hate, rather than white racism or whiteness, is its evasive power. It is much easier to be anti-hate than to be anti-racist. To be anti-hate requires one to be in opposition to those who engage in easily identifiable hate practices and speech. To be anti-racist requires one to be in opposition to practices that are so embedded within the privileged community that they are nearly invisible to those who claim to resist them.

The town I write about has made progress over the years and is committed to teaching the consequences of hate to its children through education and community programs. People are beginning to learn how to speak about hate, race, and racism with more insight and ease, though other forms of explicit discrimination and deep prejudices remain. As for myself, a white anthropologist, I must reflect and ask: Am I empowered to un-censor
myself because the issue is hate and not whiteness? Hate and not heterosexuality? Hate and not citizenship? Framing anti-racist activism in terms of hate gets more people on board, but it minimizes their responsibility, and indeed, their complicity in the underlying story of white racism.

NOTE

Most of the acts of hate and bias addressed in this paper are racist acts perpetrated by whites against (perceived) African Americans. This is not to diminish hate and bias activities directed toward people based on actual or perceived religion, age, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, physical disability, marital status, or housing status.

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From Hate to Collective Violence: Research and Practical Implications

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ABSTRACT

This paper deals with the question of how hate leads to collective physical violence: Why is it that people who are filled with hateful emotions sometimes use violent action but mostly do not? By themselves, underly- ing emotions such as hate are not sufficient conditions for physical violence. However, emotions are not irrelevant for the emergence of violence. My main argument is that situational interaction sequences create emotional dynamics that make collective actors overcome their inhibition threshold and act violently. Insights into the micro-timing of interaction sequences prior to violence are therefore crucial. As social movement demonstrations have recently become reconstructable in great detail, they are especially promising for analyzing the connection of micro-timings to collective violence. If we are able to identify sequences of micro-interactions and emotional dynamics leading to violence, we might be able to avoid violence by interrupting decisive sequences.

Keywords: violence, hate, micro-sociology, emotions, contentious politics

I. INTRODUCTION

Even if conflicts occur broadly over a variety of situations, cultures and countries, violent action—certainly one of the most radical ways to express hate—is rare. There are many occasions on which people feel hate toward others and are therefore motivated to use violence, but normally they do not (Collins, 2008; Klusemann, 2009). While violence is an available resource for any person at any time (Eckert & Willems, 2002, p. 1475), the choice to use violence depends on a wide range of alternative options of action. In this paper, I claim that the emotion of hate does not necessarily result in violent action. However, emotions are crucial in explaining the emergence of collective violence: I suggest that certain micro-interactional sequences produce specific emotional dynamics that can lead to collective violence.

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As I will show in this paper, interactional sequences are needed for translating hate into violent action, since they produce emotional dynamics that allow for actors to overcome their inhibition threshold for violence. Following Randall Collins’ (2008, 2009) *micro-sociology of violent confrontations*, I state that these specific micro-situational sequences are required, in addition to structural and motivational factors, in order for hate to lead to violent action. A large body of studies suggests that certain situational trigger conditions can bring even peacefully motivated actors to use violent means (Collins, 2008; Gilcher-Holtey, 1995; Klusemann, 2009; Marx, 1998; Stott & Reicher, 1998). I claim that the sequence of micro-interactions producing these emotional dynamics should be put at the center of attention when analyzing the emergence of violence. Several event courses in contentious politics (Tarrow & Tilly, 2007) and several event sequences and escalation courses (Eckert & Willems, 2002) recur repeatedly. We can find these sequences in connection with civil wars, police arrests, and massacres (Collins, 2008; Klusemann, 2009), and even in generally peaceful social movement demonstrations (Nassauer, 2010). Despite this central role of interaction sequences, emotional dynamics produced by interactions are key in understanding the emergence of violent action (Collins, 2008; Klusemann, 2009); they determine whether violence emerges and in which ways it does (Collins, 2008, p. 20). In addition to studying emotions in specific situations of violence, I suggest that we can complement Collins’ approach by focusing on cognitive and interactional aspects.

I aim to show that sociological, psychological and political research on various topics—on violence, hate, social movements, contentious politics, and collective behavior—can be combined to study the connection of hate and violence. As situational interaction sequences can translate hate into physical violence, their avoidance can have practical implications for preventing the emergence of several forms of collective violence.

In this paper, I will first conceptualize hate and discuss the connection of emotions to rational decision-making. Subsequently, a working concept of violence will be elucidated: Violence is a physical action aiming to injure or kill another person. In the second part, empirical examples will illustrate micro-interaction sequences that are recurrent in violently ending events. These sequences and their connection to violence will be explained by a combination of three theoretical approaches: Collins’ (2008, 2009) *micro-sociology of violent confrontations*, Tilly’s (2003) contentious politics approach, and Blumer’s (1986) *symbolical interactionism*. Lastly, I will come back to the emotion of hate to draw conclusions on the connection between hate and physical violence.
II. CONCEPTUALIZING HATE AND VIOLENCE

A. Hate—Concepts of Emotions and Rational Decision-making

In the following sections I will define the concept of emotions by distinguishing them from moods, affects, and feelings. I will position hate within the field of emotions and discuss the rationality of emotionally motivated actions.

1. Positioning Hate in the Field of Emotions

To conceptualize hate, first of all it is necessary to distinguish among several concepts commonly labeled as emotions—affects, emotions, moods, and feelings. These concepts are often used interchangeably and their definitions are still controversial. While affects are generally a shorter and more intense emotional state, a mood is a longer-term, less intense emotional state that is not related to a specific object. Emotions in the proper psychological definition are shorter and more intense than moods and are related to an object. Feelings, on the other hand, are often defined as the consciousness of emotions (Batson, Shaw & Oleson, 1992).

In sociology, we can find different distinctions of forms of emotions. Jasper (1998), for example, distinguishes among emotions that are quicker to appear, shorter to last, and reactive, like urges and reflex emotions; longer lasting forms of emotions, which he calls “affective emotions”; and moods and others emotions in between these two groups.

In this paper, I will use a more basic distinction between reflex emotions, which are more immediate and object-related, and lasting emotions, such as moods and moral emotions, which are longer lasting and less object-related. Reflex emotions include the often so-called “basic emotions” (for a discussion on basic emotions, see Ekman, 1999), such as fear and anger; lasting emotions include trust and respect, love and hate.

Hate is an emotion usually understood to be one of the strongest forms of aversion a person can have. It can be defined as the willingness to endure costs in order to harm and express a violent dislike toward others (Cameron, 2009, p. 7). It is a longer lasting and less object-related form of anger—one of the main human emotions, next to fear, sadness, surprise, disgust, and happiness (Ekman, 2003; Klusemann, 2009). The emotion of hate can produce aggression, which refers to the potential to use violent action (Imbusch, 2002).

Hate is frequently assumed to be the underlying emotion that causes violence. In fact, since the late 1970s, the U.S. legislative system has even
recognized the existence of so-called hate crimes, a subset of criminal behavior defined with regard to the perpetrator’s motivation (Jenness, 2003). Hate crimes are, for example, attacks on persons motivated by the victim’s race, gender, or sexuality.

Apart from such lasting emotions, reflex emotions are of crucial importance for the emergence of violence in face-to-face settings (Jasper, 1998). As violence requires at least two actors, face-to-face interactions precede almost every violent situation. Lasting emotions, such as hate, might be underlying causes of violence, but as we will see below, they might be less decisive in terms of causing violence in direct interactions.

2. Emotions and Rational Decision-making

In order to discuss the connection between hate and violent action, it is crucial to understand the extent to which emotionally motivated actions are rational. For centuries, scholars, politicians, and the public have discussed the role of emotions in our daily choices and actions: Do humans act rationally or irrationally? Do negative emotions cause people to do irrational things that they would never have done in a rational state of mind? When reflecting on emotions, the common argument suggests that people are generally good, acting based on rational calculations. Every now and then, however, they make irrational affect-guided choices that lead to deviant behavior, such as physical violence. In this regard, all emotions, not only hate, have frequently been identified with irrationality (Goodwin & Jasper, 2006). Moreover, they have been associated with causing morally negative and deviant behavior.

This identification of emotions with irrational action can be found in a number of approaches in the social sciences, particularly in relation to studies of collective behavior. Whether Le Bon characterized collective action as irrational and affect-guided, or whether resource mobilization theory and political process theory characterized collective action as unemotional and rational—either way, emotions were assumed to be irrational (Goodwin & Jasper, 2006). This assumption has recently been disputed by social science researchers. The clear-cut line between rational cognition and irrational emotion became increasingly fuzzy, as researchers assume that cognitions and feelings are strongly connected (Melucci, 1995, p. 45).

Emotions are increasingly viewed as being “a fundamental part of rational action, not a diversion from it” (Jasper, 2006, p. 28). Therefore, emotions and cognitions can hardly be divided in the way scholars did it for decades; much less can they be contrasted. In psychological research emotions have three common functions (Schneider & Dittrich, 1990): the release of actions, the regulation of the endurance and intensity of actions,
and social communication (for a discussion of the four psychological traditions reflecting on the emergence and function of emotions, see Allen, 2005). Apart from these functions, emotions are not only part of our reactions to situations; they also shape our goals (Jasper, 1998, p. 398). These goals and the resulting actions are not automatically irrational simply because emotions are involved in the decision-making process. Since emotions and cognition lead people to make choices, both can lead to seemingly irrational actions people might later evaluate as mistakes (Jasper, 1998). However, the choices themselves may have been made rationally. Hence, when emotions are involved in decision making, resulting action, like violence, is not necessarily irrational; nor can it be labeled as purely affect-guided. As we will see below, cognitive interpretations do play a role in leading from hate to violence.

B. The Social Phenomenon of Violence

1. The Concept of Violence

Certainly, violent action is one of the most radical actions to express hate. No society, religion, or culture is free of violence (Imbusch, 2002). Yet, no conclusive answer as to the causes of the multiple forms of violence exists. We are dealing with one of the most elusive and at the same time most complex social phenomena in social sciences (Hagan & Heitmeyer, 2002, p. 15).

As the term violence can be imprecise, it is difficult to compare different actions that are commonly referred to as violence, for example a brawl, psychological violence, and state terror. How can we define and categorize violence if the term is applied so broadly?

First, as Imbusch (2002) emphasizes, violence is not to be confused with concepts of aggression or power. Power can be exercised by violence, but this does not have to be the case. Aggression is a psychological term, referring only to the potential to use violence (Imbusch, 2002). In this regard, Rucht (2002, p. 461) notes that the understanding of violence depends strongly on the respective culture. We can assume that the historical context is equally important.

According to Imbusch (2002), various types and dimensions of violence can be categorized. Types of violence are individual, collective, and state violence. Dimensions of violence range from metaphorical violence, to direct physical violence, to cultural-symbolical violence, to structural, institutional, or ritualized violence (Imbusch, 2002).

While some researchers highlight aspects of individual violence
(Gould, 2003), others focus on symbolical violence (Eder, 1998), institutional violence (Grimm, 2002), or violence in the civilization process (Elias, 1976; Sofsky, 1996). Depending on the concept of violence, explanations range from structural factors (Gurr, 1972; Graham & Gurr, 1969), to narratives (Rydgen, 2007; Lammont & Molnár, 2002), emotional dynamics (Collins, 2008; Klusemann, 2009), or struggles over social ranks (Gould, 2003).

In this paper, I will propose a quite narrow definition of violence, which refers only to physical violence between persons; violence is a physical action aiming to injure or kill another person. I will refer only to collective physical violence in this paper, either by state or by non-state actors. Such a definition, which is close to a quotidian understanding by referring to physical and visible violence, can be useful, as it allows us to avoid blurry concepts and explanations (Rucht, 2002).

Since most societies provide different normative disaffirmations regarding different types of violence, the inhibition threshold for using physical violence against persons is usually higher than the inhibition threshold for using symbolical violence or violence against objects. Hence, I claim that the emergence of physical violence is even more unlikely and therefore particularly interesting.

2. The Unlikeliness of Violence

Although conflicts occur broadly in a variety of situations, cultures, and countries, violent incidents are rare, as “violence breaks with ordinary reality” (Collins, 2008, p. 130). Even though everybody could use violence at any time (Eckert & Willems, 2002, p. 1475), actors have so many alternative options of action that they usually choose another action. Thus, violence is used by only a few people and only in rare situations (Collins, 2008, p. 14). This finding is interesting for further research, as violence is not a common reaction; rather, people have to overcome an inhibition threshold first to be capable of violence. One example underlining the high inhibition threshold for violence is the study of S. L. A. Marshall on the performance of U.S. troops in World War II (Collins, 2008). The study revealed that only 15% of frontline troops actually fired their guns in combat. If soldiers did fire, most of their gunshots were ineffective. People are generally more likely to shoot the greater the physical distance from the enemy, or if a superior is standing next to them. Although his results are doubted by some researchers, Collins showed that the numbers of the study were supported by follow-up studies. This suggests that even in the military, actors try to avoid violence in most situations. On one hand, we could argue that the inhibition threshold for using violence in combat might be higher than it is in other forms of violence, as actors know that they are
likely to kill someone. On the other hand, we could argue that the inhibition threshold might be lower, as soldiers are physically trained, mentally prepared, and, by the nature of their profession, requested to use violence, whereas civilians, for example protesters, are not.

Generally, people tend to avoid violence even in situations where they threaten to use it. They also try to use violence near people who might settle the dispute, limiting the duration and thereby possible consequences right away (Collins, 2008). Therefore, violent interactions are often very short and many brawls end with the first punch.

Even if violence is not necessarily used when conflicts are present, hate has frequently been discussed in terms of favoring its emergence. In this regard, several violence studies highlight, for example, the importance of hate narratives in ethnic conflict (Eder, Giesen, Schmidtke, & Tambini, 2002; Kaufmann, 2006; Lammont & Molnár, 2002; Rydgren, 2007). By comprehensively integrating macro- as well as micro-structural influences on situational interactions, hate narrative explanations give much insight on the escalation of ethnic conflict (Eder, Giesen, Schmidtke, & Tambini, 2002). However, I claim that more immediate micro-situational trigger effects are needed to translate these hate narratives, and hate in general, into direct physical violence. Not every actor experiencing hateful feelings toward someone or something will use violent means. Violence is not a common reaction when emotions of hate are present. Actors might be motivated and armed—meaning motives as well as resources to use violence are given. Still, violence is not necessarily used (Klusemann, 2009, p. 8), if an inhibition threshold of certain emotions in a confrontational situation (see Collins’ (2008) concept of confrontational tension and fear) is not overcome by additional conditions.

III. FROM HATE TO VIOLENCE

After having conceptualized hate and violence, in the following section I will elaborate upon my argument that emotional dynamics, produced by micro-interactional sequences, lead to violence. It is therefore useful to discuss empirical examples of lethal violence and my own preliminary findings on non-lethal violence. While the context and consequences of both forms of violence are very different, nevertheless, we find similar patterns leading to violence. Subsequently, these examples can be tied back to theory to come to a conclusion on the connection between hate and violence.

A. Empirical Examples - Pathways to Violence

A large number of empirical studies (Collins, 2008; Gilcher-Holtey,
1995; Klusemann, 2009; Marx, 1998) support the assumption that underlying emotions alone do not automatically lead to violence. At the same time, background variables—such as gender, class, ethnicity, or culture—cannot explain the emergence of violence (Collins, 2009). Moreover, the classical social science approaches, explaining violence by resource mobilization, political opportunity structure, or relative deprivation, cannot conclusively account for the emergence of forms of unplanned collective violence (Nassauer, 2010).

In this regard, research on protest policing—the way in which the police handle protest (Della Porta & Reiter, 1998, p. 1)—gives vital insights on the emergence and impact of different police strategies (Della Prota & Reiter, 1998; Earl, 2006; Gillham & Noakes, 2007; McCarthy & McPhail, 2005). Protest policing strategies are important for the police conduct at demonstrations and therefore also influence interactions and the possible emergence of violence. However, violence emerges at some protests where the police use a certain strategy (negotiated management, escalated force, or, recently, strategic incapacitation [see Gilham & Noakes, 2007]), but not at all of them. Nor does violence emerge only when one of these strategies is used. Thus, I assume that the protest policing strategy is not the only explanatory factor for violence in demonstrations.

At the same time, we can find certain pathways in several event courses leading to violence. I argue that these interaction sequences lead to emotional dynamics that can allow actors to overcome their inhibition threshold and use violence.

1. Patterns in Lethal Violence

In his study on the 1995 Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia-and-Herzegovina, Stefan Klusemann (2009) shows how the different phases of conflict escalation and the immediate interaction between General Mladic, commander of the Bosnian-Serb Army troops, and Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans, commander of the Dutch peacekeeping forces in Srebrenica, led to a specific local emotional dynamic that caused violence. In this conflict, hate narratives and ethnic motivations to kill were long present. However, confrontational tension and fear needed to be overcome and emotional dominance established before one side actually used physical violence.

With several examples, Collins (2008) illustrates how the establishment of emotional dominance by one side prior to violent action gives way to physical dominance. Several empirical examples of soldiers’ actions in war situations show how, after the building up of tension and frustration on one side, a sudden move to action takes place; the enemy is caught and becomes emotionally weak. The side that has built up tension moves to a
frenzied rush of violence (Collins, 2008, p. 88). Examples in point are the massacres perpetrated by U.S. troops in Vietnam, particularly in the villages of Ha Na and My Lai (Collins, 2008). The troops entered the villages believing them to be an enemy base. During the approach to the village, tension and fear rose. Once the troops arrived in the village, no enemy troops could be found—all soldiers had already left and only civilians, mostly women and children, remained. Confronted with the obviously inferior enemy, the troops got into an emotional rush, killing all civilians they found—in the village of My Lai 300 to 400 persons were killed—and ultimately destroying the whole village. Collins also states that the reports suggest that at this point the troops felt panic—they all described strong psychological symptoms of fear and panic. Retrospectively, they could not believe that it was they who had carried out such violence. But due to the immediate micro-situation, they felt total domination over a weak victim and entered into a violent rush. Once taken by this rush, they got even more charged up while the victim became even more passive and helpless. Both moods reinforced each other in this specific pathway to violence (Collins, 2008, p. 102).

The situational dynamic in this example, which leads into a tunnel of frenzied violence, is what Collins (2008) calls *forward panic*: Two sides confront each other over a long period in which tension builds up. At a certain turning point, the tense confrontation changes to the overwhelming advantage of one side and the weakness of the other side. This leads to a “hot rush,” “piling on” (a one-sided attack of many against few), and an “overkill” (repeated beating) (Collins, 2008, p. 89). Forward panics can be found in violent crime, police arrests, and war situations, as in the example from Vietnam.

2. Patterns in Non-lethal Violence

Which exact interactions bring actors to establish this sort of emotional dominance prior to violence? Which conditions are needed to do so, given that violence is such a rare phenomenon and so difficult to carry out? To analyze conditions leading from hate to violence in greater detail, I propose to look at event courses preceding collective physical violence at social movement demonstrations.

Social movements are generally the peaceful form of contentious claim-making (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007). In contrast to lethal violence, violence is not integral to this form of contentious action; thus it happens unplanned and very rarely. However, two arguments speak for comparing social movements with the above-mentioned studies and for analyzing patterns leading to violence in demonstrations.
First, it is remarkable that violence does occur even at demonstrations of generally peaceful social movements, as several additional obstacles to exist. Violence is much more irrational and more unlikely to take place in demonstrations than in other circumstances of contentious politics. From an empirical point of view, there are far fewer violent protests than peaceful ones; in France in the 1990s, for example, only 5% of all demonstrations ended violently (Fillieule & Jobard, 1998, p. 70), and in the U.S. from 1970 to 2000, only 2% of the protests show injury or property damage (McAdam, Sampson, Weffer-Elizondo, & MacIndoe, 2005, p. 9). Graham and Gurr (1969, p. 789) also comment that the organizational form of groups allows for a better control over actions at modern protests and thereby allows an exhibition of force without using physical violence. Protesters have alternatives, of which violence is usually the last and most desperate one. It is also the option of action that leads to the fewest cases of success for the group (Graham & Gurr, 1969). The fact that violence is even more unlikely to take place in this setting, and that the inhibition threshold might therefore be even higher, makes social movement demonstrations particularly interesting.

Secondly, we are capable of analyzing the micro-timing prior to violence in greater detail than in other forms of violence, for example war-related events. Demonstrations are social phenomena where visual footage is more easily and extensively available, due to high media coverage and copious reports by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the police. The recent video revolution makes it possible to focus more closely on micro-interactions and to identify specific sequences.

For my analysis of event courses, I capitalize on this new source of data. I rely on visual data, reports from governments, NGOs, the police and observers, police radio traffic protocols, and reports of participants. I reconstructed demonstration courses in western European countries and the U.S. to analyze their connection to violence. In the following section I present preliminary findings from this analysis.

When analyzing social movements, scholars found that sequences of whole protest cycles are visible (Minkoff, 1997; Tarrow, 1994). At the same time, as I will show, specific event sequences can also be found within a protest. I claim that these micro-timings are crucial in producing violence in a demonstration with generally peacefully motivated protesters and police forces.

When we look at several demonstrations (such as the Night of the Barricades, Paris, 1968; the WTO protests in Seattle, 1999; and the G8 protests in Genoa, 2001 and Rostock, 2007) of the left social movement family (see Della Porta, 1995), certain factors coincide at the beginning of the event: Masses of people are present, and fear and tension exist in expecting vio-
lence. An extract of an interview with an Italian police officer on duty at the 2001 G8 protests in Genoa illustrates the expectancy of violence, the spread of rumors, and the almost panic-like fear prior to the police operation:

The tension among us was sky high: for the whole foregoing week we had been told that the demonstrators would have pistols, and would be throwing infected blood and ball bearings covered in acid at us. On the Friday evening after that lad’s death [protester Carlo Giuliani, who was shot by an Italian police officer] they told us, that a carabiniere had died too. (Della Porta & Reiter, 2006, p. 26)

Several of these demonstrations include extraordinary stress for the participants. For instance, police forces have to cope with very long shifts, insufficient sleep and food, insufficient knowledge of the area or of the course of action of the operation, and being clearly outnumbered (GdP, 2007; ARC, 2010).

Additionally, we find strikingly similar micro-interaction sequences within several demonstration courses (Nassauer, 2010). For example, police see how protesters destroy objects or build barricades and do not understand why no order is given to make arrests. They constantly hear threatening news from their colleagues over the police radio; in the example of November 30, 1999, at the WTO protests in Seattle, bad news for the police units followed in quick succession over the police radio traffic. Announcements gave information about protesters preparing for civil disobedience, about platoons being threatened, outnumbered, attacked, or announcing their withdrawal, for example “about 200 protesters shut down intersection. Taking fencing down. No police presence. Delegates in area. Unknown status,” or a “large number of protesters on bus, do not have personnel to hold line” (ACR, 2010). Thereupon these units are, for example, sent into other parts of the city with little knowledge of their task or the general police strategy, and without any knowledge of the area, as police union reports on the operations in Rostock state (GdP, 2007). One of the few things they believe to know for certain is that they are in a threatening situation. Unable to communicate with other units because the police radio traffic is interrupted (Della Porta & Reiter, 2006; GdP, 2007), they are suddenly confronted with protesters of the so-called black block (see McCarthy & McPhail, 2005, p. 14) and cannot get any assessment of the general situation from police coordination (ARC, 2010; Della Porta & Reiter, 2006, p. 179). The visual footage I analyzed shows that these units are very likely to use violence when the police-protesters line breaks up—especially on easy targets and when chasing protesters.

In the several demonstration courses we likewise observe a long period
in which protesters seem to dominate the situation, and the police suddenly become active and respond with a massive use of force. As in a *forward panic*, the police are suddenly moved to action and when using violence especially target isolated groups, as a large body of video recordings and scientific reconstructions show (Bobbi & Busse, 2002; Della Porta & Reiter, 2006, p. 26; ARC, 2000a): They beat up individuals who have fallen down and attack bystanders, such as shop owners or the press. Just as in Collins’s (2008) examples, we see that crowd violence actually happens when the crowd breaks up into smaller groups. When one individual falls down, he or she is commonly attacked by three to six opponents, becomes passive, and stops resisting (Collins, 2009). This is the point at which most violence—and the most harmful violence—takes place.

This chain is one possible micro-interactional sequence that is likely to produce police violence in demonstrations. However, according to my observations, we find this situation to be strikingly similar in several demonstrations that end violently. We find similar patterns for violence by protesters.

Two aspects are particularly interesting in these examples. First, we see that interactions are unintended and chained. We see that generally peaceful actors make ad-hoc decisions in what are, for them, extraordinary situations. I showed that the course of events was often neither structurally determined nor individually or collectively intended, for example by actors motivated by hate or other hostile attitudes. In these event sequences, chained uncoordinated decisions and reactions collide. Situational decisions of the movement and situational police reactions create unplanned situations of interaction that, as I argue here, lead to violence. In several examples, the police did not act upon clearly defined rules; rather, decisions were made due to situational interactions (Della Porta & Reiter, 2006, p. 22; Gilcher-Holtey, 1995; ARC, 2000a). The same accounts for the actions of protesters. Therefore, I suggest that uncoordinated reactions lead to recurrent patterns of interaction sequences that cause violence. The patterns we find in social movement demonstrations are similar to the above-described forms of lethal collective violence. In both cases, micro-timing is crucial (Collins, 2009, p. 575).

Second, it is remarkable that we can observe many demonstrations where a large number of protesters from the *black block* attend, who sometimes have already collected stones to engage in violence against objects and who might look as they were motivated by hate. Simultaneously, the police use repressive tactics that seem to heat up the situation even more. Still, these demonstrations do not necessarily lead to any form of physical violence.

At the same time, we can see that those demonstrations that do end
violently show strikingly similar sequences of interactions between the
police and protesters within the event course and prior to violence. We can
assume that these immediate face-to-face interactions change the actors’
attitudes and emotions toward the situation and toward each other.

B. Theoretical Explanations - A Micro-sociology of Violence

1. Toward a Theoretical Framework on Violence

I claim that we can connect three theoretical approaches to explain
these events: The importance of interactions (Tarrow & Tilly, 2007) can be
linked with the relevance of situations and their interpretations (Blumer,
1968) to show how situational interaction dynamics can lead to violence, by
allowing actors to overcome confrontational tension and fear (Collins,
2008). I will first briefly explain the basic arguments of these theories to
subsequently combine them and discuss the benefits of this theoretical
approach.

Based on the above-stated insights, I join Collins (2008) in assuming
that background conditions—and here I include long-lasting emotions—
might be necessary but certainly not sufficient conditions for a violent out-
come. In contrast, situational factors are always necessary and sometimes
even sufficient conditions for the emergence of violence. We see that
micro-situational factors can keep violently motivated people from using
violence and bring peacefully motivated people to use violence and even to
kill (Klusemann, 2009). Hence, background conditions have to pass situa-
tional turning points in order to lead to violent action.

Collins (1993, pp. 204 ff) assumes that people generally act due to
bounded rationality—calculations of loss and gain that are limited by the
actors’ “cognitive capacity in the face of complexity.” Their choices are
facilitated by deciding to take actions that might lead to the highest level of
positive emotions. Violence requires specific emotional conditions, which
emerge in interaction: In these interactions one side becomes passive and
emotionally weak. The other side becomes emotionally stronger in this spe-
cific local situation and turns to emotional dominance (Collins, 2008;
Klusemann, 2009). This side overcomes confrontational emotions and uses
violence.

However, this is not to be understood as a strict behavioral approach in
the sense of Le Bon (2006), explaining violence by affects (here defined in
the common sense understanding, as shorter and more intense emotional
states) and reactions. I suggest that, drawing on Blumer (1968), we can
understand the micro-sociology of violent confrontations from a symbolical
interactionist perspective, meaning that the cognitive interpretation of the
situation plays a crucial role. Thereby we can suppose that sometimes seemingly irrational actors carry out their actions due to bounded rationality (compare Stark, 1999), by chained interactions with other actors and their spontaneous interpretations of specific micro-situations. This means that people reflect due to bounded rationality in a circle of action, communication (also non-verbal), and interpretation. Based on these interpretations, micro-interactions can sometimes lead to unforeseeable results (Blumer, 1968), including violence.

These chained interactions are visible in the findings of my behavioral observations of visual data and of evaluation reports on police operations at demonstrations. Reports frequently mention a chain of successive actions, reactions, and interpretations within specific situations. They report not deliberate consequences of actions, as actors did not fully understand the significance of “complex, at times chaotic series of incidences” (ARC, 2000b, p. 4). Reports often suggest that due to complex interactions, a certain unintended dynamic of its own was inherent in the events (ARC, 2000a, p. 14; SPD, 1999, p. 1).

This theoretical combination of the micro-sociology of violent confrontations, the contentious politics approach, and symbolical interactionism implies several benefits. First, we can bridge the gap between the affect-guided assumption of the sociology of masses and the rational approach advocated by most social movement research. When using violence, people do not rationally plan or calculate their actions in advance. However, neither do they just react in an affective way. They act due to bounded rationality and their assumption about what might bring them a higher level of positive emotions. We can therefore assume that situational interaction is crucial to lead to violence. Emotions, which emerge in these interaction sequences, are nevertheless crucial in producing violence.

Furthermore, I claim that this approach can explain that violence emerges without being caused solely by structural factors, discontent, rational calculations, or available resources. Neither is violence caused solely by motivations and lasting emotions, such as hate. Rather, it is a product of emotional dynamics, produced through specific sequences of micro-interactions.

Also, this theoretical framework can explain why violence emerges at some events where hate-filled individuals are present, but not at all of them, even if, for example in social movements, organizing groups (and therewith mostly also motivations and resources) and structural conditions remain the same. Moreover, the approach can account for the fact that the sequences of micro-interactions that take place prior to different forms of collective violence are so much alike. Lastly, it can explain why people generally try to
avoid violence, but make use of it even in situations in which there seems to be no rational gain.

2. Hate and Other Emotions in the Emergence of Violence

By having conceptualized emotions, hate, and violence and having shown empirical examples and possible theoretical explanations, we saw that emotional dynamics produced by interaction sequences can lead to violence. Hence, we see that emotions do play a role in leading to violence. Coming back to our initial discussion, we can now debate: Which emotions are produced by situational interactions? Which role does hate play in comparison with other emotions in the emergence of collective violence?

Typically, we would assume that, for example, soldiers need a certain motivation, mood, or emotion to be able to kill, considering the high inhibition threshold. We would assume reflex emotions as anger, or lasting emotions as hate toward the enemy troops, to be main motivations. However, Collins' (2008) analysis of reflex emotions of soldiers, based on their faces and body postures on pictures, shows that surprisingly, only 6% of the soldiers show the emotion of anger. At the same time, one-third of the soldiers show strong or mild fear, and one-third show tension and concentration. Anger is very rare and is shown either by prisoners, or where muscular force is at work (e.g., to hinder a group of protesters from entering a site). “There is probably more anger in civilian life than in actual combat,” Collins (2008, p. 70) concludes. Tension and fear are the primary emotions to be found in pictures of combat situations. Therefore, Collins (2009, p. 2) claims it to be a common cliché that anger is directly linked to violent behavior. Expressing anger is even far from actual fighting. In ethnic conflict, for example, hate narratives are often operating in the background, causing an antagonistic relationship between two ethnic groups. Yet violence occurs only if actions follow a certain pattern (see Collins, 2008, p. 115). The victims of ethnic violence are not picked due to their higher economic success, or other jealousy, but because group A perceives group B as strong and threatening. However, group A might attack because in an immediate local situation, it assumes that group B can safely be attacked (Collins, 2008, p. 121). Pictures of police arrests, as well as interviews with soldiers in combat, show the same: The dominant emotion experienced and expressed by body and face is fear (Collins, 2008; 2009). With regard to the example of hate crimes, Collins (2009, p. 572) assumes even racists need a micro-situational advantage that allows the release of violent action. Lasting emotions and motivations favor a hostile and antagonistic relationship, but they cannot replace the micro-situational trigger conditions that establish certain emotional dynamics through face-to-face interactions. Hence,
neither the lasting emotion of hate, nor the reflex emotion of anger, is sufficient to cause violence; tension and fear are much closer connected to the immediate emergence of violence.

Coming back to preliminary findings of my analysis discussed above, we see that fear is also visible in the emergence of violence at demonstrations. Evaluation reports of police departments, government committees, or the police union on police operations at demonstrations, such as the WTO protests in Seattle in 1999 (see ARC, 2000a; 2000b; SPD, 1999), or the G8 protests in Rostock in 2007 (see GdP, 2007), assume that perceived decisions of the operational police command and bad equipment and support led the officers in the field to feel let down. When looking at police reports and police radio protocols during demonstrations, we see how the hesitation of the operational command to stop protesters from, for example, destroying shop windows and the unavailability of backup in situations where a platoon was “losing it” (ACR, 2010) led officers to feel abandoned and thereby increased tension (GdP, 2007). As the operational command in Seattle became overburdened and was neither able to decide where to deploy new troops for backup, nor able to communicate sufficiently with all units, platoons frequently had to make operational decisions by themselves (SPD, 1999, p. 6) in assessment of the chaotic situation they confronted. Several reports use the word “panic” to describe the psychological state officers were in prior to using violence. In preparation for the Seattle WTO protests in 1999, police documents record an atmosphere of “concern, if not panic” (ARC, 2000a, p. 9) that increased as the summit got closer. Evaluation committees conclude that we know retrospectively that the various threats police feared during the operation did not materialize. However, at the time and on the spot, police had “legitimate reason to be seriously concerned for their personal safety” and to fear that they were in “serious danger” (ARC, 2000b, p. 4). This level of panic, which was illustrated by the statement of the Italian police officer above, also becomes evident in police radio communication and exaggerated crowd estimations by the police in Seattle (ARC, 2000a, p.12).

In conclusion, we would generally assume that violence emerges in demonstrations because protesters feel anger and hate toward the state and the police, or that the police feel anger and hate toward protestors engaging in protest, civil disobedience, or rioting. Certainly these emotions toward the other group might be present in demonstrations of social movements and favor the context for the emergence of physical violence. Nevertheless, empirical evidence leads us to assume that emotions such as fear and tension are much more closely linked to the use of violence than the reflex emotion of anger or the lasting emotion of hate.
IV. Conclusion

In this paper I discussed the role of hate in the emergence of collective violence. Using mainly preliminary findings of my analysis of violence at social movement demonstrations and relevant findings from other authors, I showed that neither an underlying social conflict nor hate and other lasting emotions by themselves are sufficient conditions for the emergence of physical violence. I emphasized that emotions do, however, play a role in leading to violence; situational interaction sequences create emotional dynamics that allow for collective actors to overcome their inhibition threshold and act violently.

My argument was buttressed by examples of ethnic violence, war incidents, and social movement demonstrations. With preliminary findings from my analysis of demonstration courses, I pointed out that decisions made by police and protesters resulted from their limited understanding of a complex and exceptional situation, leading to a chain of uncoordinated interactions. I also showed that hate is an important underlying emotion for the emergence of violence, as it creates an antagonistic relationship. Reflex emotions, however, play a more crucial role in face-to-face interactions that precede violent actions. While we would assume anger to be a main emotion in these face-to-face settings, tension and fear were shown to be much more important for leading to violence.

In conclusion, I showed that the timing of micro-situations and specific sequences of interactions that produce certain dynamics of reflex emotions are more relevant in producing violence than lasting emotions, such as hate. Nevertheless, we can assume that the context of hate can make tension, fear, and thus violence more likely in specific situations.

In combining aspects of the works of Collins (2008, 2009), Tilly and Tarrow (2007), and Blumer (1968), I suggested that we can explain these recurring patterns of violence. People act due to bounded rationality and choose their actions according to their spontaneous interpretations of the situation and to their calculation as to which action might bring them more positive emotions. Even if people act in an emotional situation, they do not necessarily act irrationally.

Which practical guidelines can we draw from these insights? This micro-sociological approach to the analysis of violence might provide valuable new possibilities for preventing collective violence. The proposed analysis can determine certain visible and tangible conditions, combinations of conditions, and sequences, that lead to violence in the course of a demonstration. Once we acquired a more profound understanding, certain interactional sequences could be interrupted and thereby violence might be avoided.
Certainly, the fight against feelings of hate and anger is useful and necessary, as these emotions are underlying causes of conflict and violence. However, knowledge of the immediate situational dynamics that might actually translate hate into physical violence is also of crucial importance.

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Genocidal Religion

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ABSTRACT

There is no more egregious hateful behavior than that of genocide. There is no more uncomfortable thought than that of religion as a participating factor in the perpetration of genocide, though religious studies scholars come late to any discussion of genocide. This paper, an initial foray into a much longer and more in-depth book-length project, and whose author is desirous of collegial feedback (sjacobs@bama.ua.edu), is a preliminary conversation addressing four precipitating factors: (1) tribalism, (2) religious exclusivism, (3) privileged access to the divine, and (4) a particularistic and parochial reading of sacred texts. It will also attempt, by way of conclusion, to offer possible practical and realistic suggestions to reverse this nexus between genocide and religion.

It is my strong contention that religion in both its institutional forms and its intellectual formulations has played a truly significant if underexplored role in all genocides, past and present, but, it is to be hoped, not in the future. That is to say, that there are aspects of religions and religious communities as they have evolved and developed that have lent themselves, sadly and tragically, to the work of genocide. Examples: Can we truly speak about the Holocaust/Shoah without examining 2,000 years of religious-theological antisemitism beneath the umbrella of both Roman Catholic and Protestant Christianity? Can we truly speak about the Armenian Genocide without examining the Muslim identity of the perpetrators and the Christian identity of the victims? Can we truly speak about the Rwandan Genocide without examining the role of the Roman Catholic Church and a group known as the “Belgian White Fathers” and the so-called “Hamitic Theory or Hypothesis,” in which, referencing Ham, the son of Noah in the Hebrew Bible, this 19th century pseudo-theory argued that the “Hamitic race” was superior to other so-called “Negroid populations” in sub-Saharan Africa, ultimately resulting in distinctions being made among Hutu and Tutsi and Twa that would lay the foundation for the later genocide? Or the fact that some Roman Catholic priests and nuns and Seventh-Day Adventist pastors were found guilty of being genocidaires by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)? Additional examples could be supplied. Thus, the question that haunts is a relatively simple yet equally horrifying one, something about which we would rather not think, talk, and/or
research, but one that must be asked nonetheless: Is there something inherent in the construction of both a religion and the community of its adherents—especially but not exclusively the monotheistic traditions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—that lends itself all too easily to genocide? And, if so, what is it, and, equally as important, are there things that can be done, steps that can be taken, to break and ultimately destroy the genocidal cycle of violence? (A somewhat different perspective from that of the author is that of Günther Schlee in his 2010 book How Enemies Are Made: Towards a Theory of Ethnic and Religious Conflict. Schlee develops a decision-making and competition theory—resource rivalry—under which different types of group identities are preferred. He does not, however, address the question of inherency in the development of religions and religious communities.)

Before proceeding further, I begin, for purposes of this initial exploration into the darkest side of collective human behavior, with two definitions that grew out of an advanced seminar I teach at The University of Alabama entitled “Religion and Genocide.” The first is that of religion and the second that of genocide.

The operating definition of religion is “a system of communal beliefs and practices encouraging moral/ethical and ritual/ceremonial behaviors for the betterment of both the individual and the community, and addressing questions of profound meaning and possibly including those of deity or deities.”

The operating definition of genocide is “a systematic physical and/or cultural destruction of a victim group or groups, in war or peace, defined as such by a perpetrator group or groups and sanctioned by the state.”

Unpacking each of these definitions, I note the following: The “best-kept secret” in the academic study of religion is, quite simply, that there is no one universally accepted definition of religion in the Academy—and even more so in the larger society! (I am here reminded of the pointed cliché: “One person’s religion is another person’s cult—and the reverse!”) Hence the following points are relevant to this paper:

#1: Religion, no matter its specific manifestation, is a system, that is, an organized progression of thoughts and behaviors that continues to “make sense” on intellectual, emotional, physical, and spiritual levels to its adherents, no matter how much or how little it is understood by outsiders.

#2: Religions, while initially promulgated either by individuals or small groups, ultimately and rather quickly evolve into communal multi-generational enterprises for their very survival, and may, therefore, be characterized quite easily as “historical religions” (i.e., those which have survived the lives of their founder or founders—e.g. Judaism, Christianity,
Islam) or “new religious movements” (NRMs, i.e., those whose founder or founders are still alive—e.g. The Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity or “Unification Church” founded by the Rev. Sun Myung Moon).

#3: Essential to any religious community is a set of behaviors that we may characterize as moral/ethical, and that consists of a series of guidelines in three arenas: (1) how the members are to behave toward each other (almost always positive); (2) how the members are to behave toward those who are not (or not yet) members of the community (usually a mix of positive and negative behaviors); and (3) how the members are to behave toward their God or gods, and, if appropriate, toward other heavenly entities (almost always positive). (N.B.: As regards genocide specifically, the question of the “other”—that is, how one relates to the person or persons who are outsiders—remains central to their understanding of themselves. Behaviors that outsiders would regard as negative are almost never so construed by the members themselves; indeed, they are almost always viewed positively.)

#4: If Socrates (469-399 BCE) is correct in suggesting that “the unexamined life is not worth living,” then it is of the very essence of the world’s religions that they are attempts put before the human community to make meaningful sense of the human journey with all of its twists and turns, peaks and valleys, joys and sorrows. Those who commit themselves to specific religious communities, therefore, do so because their religions do truly make sense to them, that is, answer the “haunting questions” that disturb them (e.g., Is there a God or gods? What is the meaning of Life itself? What is the purpose of my own existence? What happens when we die? Is there life after death? Why is there evil? etc.) and celebrate their own lives’ journeys (birth, growth, maturation, decay, and death).

#5: With the possible exception of the religions of Buddhism, where “God-talk” is neither required nor essential, and Confucianism, which may also be viewed as a religious philosophy or way of life, the religions of the world are intimately intertwined with either a singular Deity or many deities, communications with whom are usually achieved through authoritative spokespersons understood to have a much closer relationship to the divine than the vast majority of the membership. In some communities, the divine-human connection is hereditary; in others, doors are opened through prayer, fasting, the study and mastery of sacred texts, and/or extraordinarily affirmed moral/ethical behaviors, and so on and so forth, for any members to achieve this high status of divine partnership (some are gender-specific, males or females only; others not). One primary function of this partnership, however it manifests itself, is to legitimate both the moral/ethical and ritual/ceremonial behaviors of the religious community—and, at times, the
larger society (e.g., in wartime through the use of religious chaplaincies)—as regards its internal cohesion and whatever threats it perceives and to which it responds from outsiders. (This function has particular relevance to the exploration of genocide as discussed below.)

As regards genocide, the following points are equally significant in attempting to explore the relationship between these two fully human phenomena:

#1: Genocides are systematic behaviors, rational and organized, the result of careful planning to achieve specific ends and that fully make sense to their perpetrators, though often far less so to their victims. A good example would be the Holocaust/Shoah, which fully made sense to Adolf Hitler, and evidently to both his leadership and his followership, but especially not at all to those highly socially integrated Jews, many intermarried with non-Jews, who could trace their historic residence in Germany back generations. (Tragically, the more successfully they were integrated into German and other societies, the more difficulties such Jews experienced in trying to cope with and survive the experience of the konzentrationslagers, the concentration camps; the arbeitslagers, the work camps; and the vernichtungslagers, the extermination camps. See, e.g., Cohen, 1953, and Des Pres, 1980).

#2: Genocide is not only the physical destruction—murder—of all or some of the members of a victim group; it is the destruction of the cultural output of the group as well—that is, everything it has created by and through which it identifies itself to itself and by which others also identify its members. Sacred and other texts and publications (e.g., works of fiction, culturally specific newspapers, plays and paintings, sculptures, etc.), ritual and other objects, artistic endeavors, languages (e.g., in the case of the Jews, Hebrew, Yiddish, and Ladino [a lesser-known and lesser-practiced cognate of Mediterranean, rather than Germanic/Russian, Jews]), distinctive clothing (e.g. Jewish Hasidic garments and/or headcoverings), specific and sometimes easily identifiable behaviors, all constitute the culture and cultural output of all groups, and the very “stuff” that genocidal perpetrators desire to eliminate. A particularly tragic example is the Communist shutdown of Yiddish language publishing houses and restrictive synagogal gatherings and celebrations under Stalin.

#3: Central to genocidal behavior is the necessity of defining the victim group, that is, “Who is the enemy who is to be destroyed?” It is no accident that, once in power, the Nazis took to heart Hitler’s fantasy of the Jews as civilization’s enemies, and, two years after his assumption of power (January 30, 1933), defined Jews as “anyone with three Jewish grandparents; someone with two Jewish grandparents who belonged to the Jewish community on September 15, 1935, or joined thereafter; was married to a
Jew or Jewess on September 15, 1935, or married one thereafter; was the offspring of a marriage or extramarital liaison with a Jew on or after September 15, 1935,” and further translated those words in the November 15, 1935 “Laws for the Protection of German Blood and Honor” into even harsher realities.

#4: Finally, genocide is a state-sanctioned exercise. That is to say, in order to achieve the desired ends, it goes through a process of conversation by all those responsible for such decision-making and decision-implementing before it can be carried out. Such conversations usually occur in secrecy at the highest levels behind closed doors, and, only later, when prosecution for genocidal crimes becomes the order of the day, are the documentary records revealed. An excellent example of this would be the so-called “Memorandum of the Ten Commandments of the Committee of Union and Progress,” outlining the strategy for the implementation of the Armenian Genocide (www.armenian-genocide.org, n.d.). (It is somewhat tragically ironic, however, that the infamous Wannsee Protokol of January 1942, which put ink to paper with the stated agenda of realizing the annihilation/extermination of Europe’s Jews, followed genocidal practices that were already in effect; thousands of Jews had already been murdered by the time of the meeting and the recording of its conversations.)

Having now set the appropriate frames of reference for my argument—that of religion and genocide and their interrelationship within the context of such horrific behaviors—I come to the heart of this paper: the four precipitating factors evident in all genocides, both historical and contemporary. Although I am not in any way positing the idea or conclusion that religion is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for the perpetration of genocide, I do very much want to suggest that it is one very powerful and potent factor upon which the genocidaires are able to draw to accomplish their ends.

The first precipitating religious factor very much in evidence in all genocides I have taken to calling tribalism, a term that also resonates in the fields of anthropology, social psychology, and sociology. All groups, no matter their identity—be they political, social, economic, ethnic, national, or religious—functionally speaking, act as if the world itself were a binary place—“us” and “them,” “us” or “them,” “us” versus “them”—in escalating perspective. And while group boundaries may often prove themselves porous and other times hardened, in the development of social groupings one factor stands out: the superiority of the so-called “in-group” as it perceives itself, coupled with the very real and evident inferiority of the so-called “out-group” as it is perceived by them. “Our group is better, more humane, more civilized, more moral, more learned, more devout,” what have you. “Your group is less devout, less moral, less civilized, less
learned,” and so forth. A good example would be the genocidal practices foisted on the Native American populations during the periods of westward expansion in this country by the white and largely Christian populations, among whom such epithets as “savages” (denoting a lack of civilizational propriety) were all too common. And certainly the Western and, again, Christian colonialist incursions onto the African continent shared such understandings of the resident populations. Turning to the European continent, in the tragic 2,000-year relationship between Jews and Christians, one cannot avoid the descriptive term *triumphalist supercessionism* regarding that peculiar religio-theological understanding that with the birth, ministry, and death of the Christ, Judaic religious development ceased, and that, prior to the Holocaust/Shoah, Jews practiced an inferior religious tradition and were themselves devoid of positive moral characteristics. Thus, British historian Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975), author of the magisterial twelve-volume *A Study of History* (1934-1961), would refer to Judaism as a “fossil religion” (Schectman, 2010); and the story, apocryphal or not, has been told of Hitler’s meeting with German Christian clergy regarding the Nazi agenda of Jewish extermination, and exclaiming, “Why do you criticize me? I am only putting into practice that which you have advocated for the last 2,000 years!” Even today, if one delves into the worst excesses of religious literatures including sacred texts, here focusing on the three monotheistic faiths, one reads of the “superiority” of Islam over Judaism and Christianity, and reflected, according to some readings, in the Qur’an itself; Christianity over Judaism and Islam; and Judaism over both. In the evolution and development of religious traditions and communities, *tribalistic superiority* is very much in evidence, and, in the context of genocide, can become foundational and easily drawn upon by those intending to perpetrate genocide on the out-groups, as the above examples testify. That Muslims perpetrate horrible deeds upon Christians and Jews, Christians upon Native Americans and Jews, and fundamentalist Orthodox Jews upon Muslims in Israel, is too much in evidence today and yesterday to be cavalierly dismissed.

A cautionary note: It is far too easy, however, to reject such persons committing such genocidal and other violent behaviors as “non-religious” or not truly religious and violating the sacred norms of their own communities. Thus, the Muslims who destroyed the Twin Towers on 9/11 were not really “good” Muslims, the Christians who savaged Native Americans in the United States and Jews in Germany were not really “good” Christians, and the Jews who have destroyed the olive trees of Arab Muslims or harassed and worse those under Israeli military occupation or nearby settlement outposts are not really “good” Jews. This is simply not accurate. Such Muslims, Christians, and Jews share a superiority-inferiority reading
of their own religious traditions, communities, theologies, and sacred texts, all of which serve to legitimate their deeds, and translate their understandings into the kinds of behaviors the majority of humanity seemingly abhor, but which may very well be derived from accurately reading their traditions, however much we choose to reject them. This leads us to the second precipitating factor:

Taken to conclusion, hardening the boundaries of religious communities leads to a notion of religious exclusivism, a notion in which all religious communities have engaged, and which then becomes a tool upon which political, military and religious genocidaires can draw as they further divide their societies and plot the extermination/annihilation of those who fall outside the universe of moral obligation—what Holocaust/Shoah scholar Richard L. Rubenstein has labeled “surplus populations.” Only Muslims are worthy of Allah’s embrace; Jewish men, women and children are not, at least according to the governing documents of both Hamas and the Palestine Liberation Organization. Only Christians—and not all Christians!—merit the potential of salvation and access to God’s heavenly realm; Muslim men, women, and children, and Jewish men, women, and children do not, at least according to rather literalist readings and understandings of certain passages of the New Testament and later commentaries. Only Jews are the true recipients of God’s love; “gentiles,” however defined, are not, and therefore are worthy of destruction, at least according to the Israeli Orthodox Rabbi Yitzhak Shapira, author of Torat Ha-Melech (The King’s Torah, 2010) for example. This brings us to the third precipitating factor.

Religious traditions whose members see themselves as directly connected to their God or gods equally understand themselves as having privileged access to the divine, often to the point of exclusivity. That is to say, they see their particularistic ways of connection as superior to those of people who are not members of their communities. Their prayers, their rituals, their sacred texts, their moral-ethical behaviors are the sanctified superior ways in which to affirm their relationship to God or gods, and while others outside their communities may also have opportunities to engage the divine, theirs is a poorer or lesser second. Allah speaks directly and more powerfully to Muslims than to others. “No one goes to the Father except through me” (John 14:6), according to the New Testament and Christianity. Judaic formulaic prayers reference the “God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,” with whom Judaism and Jews share a special and unique relationship. Thus, religions and religious communities simply do not exist in positive relationship to others who do not share their orientations, values, perspectives and the like as equals, and, in so doing, open themselves up to that superiority-inferiority continuum upon which genocidaires are able to draw because their own populations have already been so conditioned by words...
emanating from the pulpits and texts already so sanctified. The Qur’an is a superior text that connects the Muslim to Allah, and, the Hebrew Bible of the Jews and Christians as we now have it, according to some, is *not* the original text, but a disguised and edited version with an agenda of Jewish (and Christian) superiority over Islam and Muslims. The Hebrew Bible of the Jews transparently affirms the truth of the Christ, and only Jewish obduracy presents the Jews from seeing and acknowledging him, and, thus, the Christian reading of those texts is the “correct”—and only—one. The Torah of the Jews, according to some, is the *only* text that presents the “God of Israel” as He truly is; all other texts and understandings are decidedly inferior and, therefore, incorrect. This brings us to the fourth and final precipitating factor:

All religious traditions have sacred texts by which they connect themselves to their God or gods, connect themselves to each other, disconnect themselves from others, and provide the foundational bases both for their ritual-ceremonial behaviors and their moral-ethical behaviors. Historically and to a far lesser degree contemporarily, all were originally oral texts offered through shamans, priests, and/or other sacred individuals and so regarded by their communities as being in closer communication and relationship with their deities. Over time, and often due to the exigencies of history, oral texts and traditions were written down, and thus developed a fixity that required certain authoritative spokespersons to explicate correct understandings, even going so far as to exclusivize those who could correctly read, understand, and interpret these texts for their own communities, which remains true today. By extension and implication, however, these same communities developed a wariness of outsiders, especially when it came to their texts. Non-Muslims, non-Christians, non-Jews, and so forth could not approach authoritative understandings, and, therefore, could not raise questions that critically challenged the texts themselves and thereby lessened the authority of their spokespersons. Ironically, as the world evolved more and more to a higher literacy standard, some religious communities equally dismissed those within their own communities who challenged such authoritative readings. Here, one cannot help but think of biblical scholars who were put to death for their different readings and/or translations, or, if not executed, shunned by their communities that have a long religious history of rejecting such alternatives. One thinks of British scholar William Tyndale (1494-1536), whose translation of the Christian Bible directly from the Hebrew and Greek led to charges of heresy, threatened the authority of the Roman Catholic Church, and led to his being burned at the stake. Or of French priest Father Richard Simon (1638-1712), author of *A Critical History of the Old Testament* (1682), who died somewhat ignominiously in 1712. Or Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786), who
experienced a somewhat similar fate in the Jewish community in Germany for translating the Hebrew Bible into German. Thus, privileging their own sacred texts and the readings that those in power had of them *and no other readings* also signaled the exclusive nature of their relationship with their God or gods and further provided a way not only for the *genocidaires* to bring them willingly into the realm of the perpetrators, but, in such cases, to also become complicit players in the work of genocide and provide a false patina of legitimation and authority for the grisly and murderous work at hand.

Thus, these four precipitating factors—(1) tribalism, (2) religious exclusivism, (3) privileged access to the divine, and (4) a particularistic and parochial reading of sacred texts—*by their very nature* contain within themselves seeds of genocidal potentiality all too easily and readily adaptable to the work of genocide by those who would trade upon them and use them for the extermination and annihilation of others. Among the world’s religious communities today, even with our increasing knowledge of both the genocides of the past and the genocides of the present, there is seemingly little recognition of the role these factors have played in genocides, even as they are all with us today. Thus we now turn to an even more pragmatic concern: What, if anything, can be done to reverse, lessen, or even disentangle the impact of these factors to somehow remove religion from the genocides of the future?

One can teach only those who come to learn, and one can preach only to those who truly come to listen. Because these four precipitating factors address the community of religions, it is to religious communities that we must turn if we are to involve them not only in their recognition, acknowledgment, and affirmation of past complicities and, worse, in the perpetration of genocide, but in their future alleviations as well. Religious persons and communities, like other persons and communities, are either parts of the problem of genocides or parts of the solutions.

In examining several texts addressing the problem of genocide prevention (Evans, 2008; Hamburg, 2008; Heidenrich, 2001; Hirsch, 2002; Waxman, 2009), only one, Heidenrich’s (2001) *How to Prevent Genocide*, contained a discussion of “The Faith Behind Genocide” (pp. 21-48). *None* of the authors were scholars of religious studies trained in that discipline: Gareth Evans was an Australian politician from the Labor Party, president and CEO of the International Crisis Group, and, most recently, chancellor of the Australian National University. David Hamburg, a physician and Stanford University professor, was president of the Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and, later, president of the Carnegie Corporation. John Heidenrich was a senior security analyst at the Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) with a BA in political science and
an MA in public administration. Herbert Hirsch is a professor of political science at the L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs, Virginia Commonwealth University. Matthew Waxman is an adjunct senior fellow for law and foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. Thus, manifesting little or no professional expertise in the discipline, it is little wonder that, collectively, they (and others) have ignored this aspect of genocidal behavior. (This observation is in no way intended to dismiss their important work out of hand; nor does it imply a lack of significance of the very real and practical suggestions they offer to address this ongoing horrific tragedy of the human community.)

Where, then, do we begin? To the degree to which the human community affirms that genocide is among the primary threats to the future of humanity—along with nuclear annihilation, which we may, perhaps, label “omnicide” or “specieicide”—then the appropriate responses are to begin to chart courses of action that may lead to its elimination. Thus, the following are offered as beginning points of much larger conversations, with an eye focused on turning them into concrete action plans.

#1: For the religious communities of the world, there must be an initial acknowledgement and recognition that one’s own religion, to a greater or lesser degree, is a “player” in the work of genocide. And the place to begin such conversations is the Parliament of the World’s Religions, whose next scheduled gathering is in 2014 (place to be determined; the 2009 gathering took place in Melbourne, Australia). According to its website (http://www.parliametofreligions.org, n.d.), its mission is “to cultivate harmony among the world’s religious and spiritual communities and foster their engagement with the world and its guiding institutions in order to achieve a just, peaceful and sustainable world” (“Our Mission”). Yet, a quick search of its materials finds genocide more associated with the Holocaust/Shoah than a phenomenon in and of itself, and no recognition whatsoever of the role the religious communities have themselves played in the perpetration of genocide. Because its gatherings represent, by and large, the totality and diversity of the world’s religious communities composed of committed activists in a true spirit of dialogical encounters, placing the elimination of genocide among its own foremost priorities would speak loudly to the world’s religious persons. Further, returning to their own home religious communities, such persons potentially have the ability not only to become a vanguard international anti-genocide community, but also to energize their own parochial communities to address this issue. Whatever materials are developed in the course of their own deliberations and conversations would themselves well serve as starting points for local conversations regarding ways to combat genocide.

#2: With acknowledgement comes education within the broadest pos-
sible frameworks, from initial parochial educational environments through advanced seminary and other locales. But such anti-genocide education is far more than a mastery of one’s own religion: It is also the committed dissemination of education in psychology, social psychology, and sociology so as to make the members of the world’s religious communities much more fully aware of what it means to be a human being, how human beings function in group settings, and how groups themselves function not only with regard to their own internal cohesiveness, but also in their orientations and behaviors regarding groups external to them. It is also a re-thought process of ethical and behavioral education designed to ask difficult questions about one’s own group and its history and theology, past and present, and the responsibilities shared by all human communities, especially religious communities, to, ultimately, create a world human community if our species is to survive.

Addressing the four precipitating factors discussed earlier:

#3 (#1): Religious communities are equally tribalistic communities as are all other kinds of communities. No more; no less. Transparent recognition of that which unites them in their ongoing quest for a meaningful existence, while lending itself to a supposed perceived superiority, need not do so. The very diversity of the human species—how both individuals and groups, affected by history, culture, geography, physical differentiations, and the like, results in different responses to the problems and difficulties that afflict us all—must be re-thought, re-seen, and re-experienced as a positive, lending itself to the necessary anti-genocide process of consensus building. Muslims drawing upon the Qur’an and Qur’anic traditions, Christians drawing up the Old and New Testaments and their traditions, Jews drawing upon the Torah/Hebrew Bible and their traditions, and other religious communities as well, committed to such anti-genocide work and all learning from one another, constitute a well of strength that has remained largely untapped.

#4 (#2): Exclusivism speaks of superiority-inferiority. Yet, if truth be told, religious communal boundaries, both historically and contemporarily, are far more porous than was and is perhaps initially realized. The majority of all such groups and communities throughout history have welcomed outsiders, those not born into their constituencies. Some have made the journey more difficult; others less so. But all have created vehicles by which outsiders can become insiders, and while there is a darker history of former religionists in one community’s negativizing their former co-religionists and the religion and religious community itself, that need not remain the case, most especially in anti-genocide work. Objectively speaking, regardless of one’s sacred traditions and sacred texts, no one religious group is superior to another, just as no one religious group is inferior to another. All
are what they are: attempts to explore the mystery of life itself from first breath to last, to find meaning in the journey, to answer questions that often come unbidden to human consciousness as the result of human experience, and, if appropriate, to encounter the divine. In anti-genocide work, the greatest strength is to draw upon all to eliminate this scourge of human existence.

#5 (#3): Although psychologically meaningful and self-validating, privileging access to the Divine or divines through one’s sacred texts, sacred rituals, and sacred ceremonials, and too often denying such access to other individuals and communities as a means of enhancing one’s own faith in the eyes of one’s fellow adherents, limits the God or gods by enclosing them in humanly confining ghettos of rather poor human construction. If the various religious communities truly take themselves seriously, among their commonalities is their understanding of deities as beyond human. For the monotheistic traditions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, Yhwh/God/Allah is beyond the totality of human understanding. Indeed, the very languages by which these traditions attempt to concretize their understandings are themselves acts of human—not Divine—limitation. And such is equally the case among the other religious traditions of the world. Whatever else humanity is and may be, it cannot fully contain the Divine, no matter how hard it tries to do so. Thus, the notion of divine exclusivity as practiced by the various human communities is a false idea, the very reverse of which is true: It is we humans who are fully and truly limited in our faltering attempts to grasp that which we so weakly perceive as the infinite, limited not only by intellectual constraints, but by the physicality of our finitude as well. For one religious group to so regard itself as being in possession of such exclusive access not only does itself a disservice, but, equally so, does a disserve to the God or gods it affirms as infinitely superior to everything human. Thus, all such religious communities must be challenged to creatively come up with ways in which outsiders can access the divine while still maintaining their own inherent integrity.

#6 (#4): Using the model of what I and others (Knight, 2000; Moore, 2004) have come to regard as the “midrashic mode” of reading sacred texts, that is, a decidedly non-literalist but far more expansive manner of reading, opens doors to all religious communities to engage in dialogical encounters more than they have done in the past. Reading one’s sacred texts in the physical presence of another who is decidedly outside one’s own religious community provides a startlingly different venue that opens eyes across the table as to how such words have been read and understood by both those who affirm their very sacrality and those who do not. The affirmer, as a result, is challenged to truly attempt to gain a deeper understanding of the meaning of the words and how those words are perceived by outsiders. The
outsider is equally challenged to further fully understand how those words are perceived by a sacred community not one’s own. Both readers are challenged morally and ethically to address how words seemingly innocent within the context of one’s own religious community become hurtful or hateful when staring into the eyes of another. The aforementioned example of John 14:6—“No one goes to the Father except through me [Jesus]”—is one such example. For Christians, such a sacred text is an affirmation of solidarity, binding the individual Christian to both the group and the Christ. For Jews and Muslims, it represents an exclusivity that denies the older religious community its covenantal efficacy; and for the latter it closes doors to a religious tradition that accords Jesus prophetic status while affirming the singularity of a God affirmed by all three. The late French-Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas and German-Catholic theologian Johannes Baptist Metz, both dramatically influenced by the Holocaust/Shoah, have equally advocated reading both the Hebrew Bible and New Testament in the presence of the other (i.e. Jews and Christians). In the United States, such work has preliminarily begun (see Fredriksen & Reinhartz, 2002; Greeley & Neusner, 1996; Holmgren & Schaalman, 1995; Knowles, Menn, Pawlikowski, & Sandoval, 2000; Linafelt, 2002). Such new ways of reading present opportunities to further the anti-genocide work advocated by showing the dialogical partners and communities how their own sacred texts have played a tragically destructive part in legitimating genocide against others, and, in the process, raises the question of what can be done to halt the process. It also contains the potential to enlist energized religious communities to no longer be part of the problem, but part of the solution. It, too, like the other preliminary suggestions offered, is understood to be a beginning point for conversations about genocide and anti-genocide that have yet to take place.

The very topic of this paper—that the world’s religious communities have for far too long been unrecognized players in genocide except in very limited understandings by non-religious studies scholars (e.g. the role of the Roman Catholic Church in the Rwandan Genocide; the Serbian Orthodox Church in the Bosnian Genocide), and that such involvements have come from particularistic and parochial ways of understanding one’s own religion, religious community, and most especially others who are part of neither—is uncomfortable to research, and to write, think, and read about, as well as to discuss. Yet the scourge of genocide has afflicted the human community, as the examples given testify, and with the participation of such communities. That religion continues to play this kind of role today in the Darfur region of Sudan is a continuing stain on civilization and a present-day example, in part, of the divide between populations of Muslims and Christians (see Madut Jok, 2007). The current upheavals throughout the
Middle East have already led some to query whether that region will all too soon become the next staging ground for genocide. (Two of the six scholars participating in the March 2, 2011 panel at Clark University, Worchester, MA, on “Popular Protests, New Media, & Change in the Middle East”—Taner Akcam and Khatchig Mouradian—are affiliated with the Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies.) If “justice delayed is justice denied,” as British politician William Gladstone is reported to have declared, then failing to examine both the role religious communities have played in the perpetration of genocide and what steps may potentially be taken given the ability of religious communities to mobilize their adherents for those things they deem worthy of their efforts is a clear-cut case of justice delayed and denied. The victims of genocide demand nothing less than the reverse.

REFERENCES


‘The Antidote to Hate Is Success’:
An Interview With Izzeldin Abuelaish

Joanie Eppinga

Izzeldin Abuelaish, often referred to as “the Gaza doctor,” grew up in a refugee camp in the Gaza Strip. He overcame poverty and many other obstacles, and was accepted to medical school in Cairo. He became an internationally recognized expert on issues of fertility and worked in an Israeli hospital. Dr. Abuelaish married and had eight children. Shortly after his wife died from leukemia, he was with seven of his eight children in their home in Gaza on January 16, 2009 when their home was hit by a mortar during Israeli shelling. Three of Dr. Abuelaish’s daughters and his niece were killed instantly, and another daughter was profoundly wounded. Despite his great pain, he held to the belief that hate is not an appropriate response to war. Today Dr. Abuelaish, who has been nominated for the Pulitzer Peace Prize, has started a foundation called Daughters for Life (www.daughtersforlife.com), which works to educate young women from the Middle East in an attempt to promote peace. In addition, he has written a book entitled I Shall Not Hate: A Gaza Doctor’s Journey on the Road to Peace and Human Dignity (Random House Canada, 2010), in which he recounts his life story and his philosophy. Journal editor Joanie Eppinga spoke with Dr. Abuelaish at the Gonzaga University Institute for Hate Studies’ Conference on Hate Studies in Spokane, Washington, on April 7, 2011.

EPPINGA: What gives you hope?

ABUELAISH: What gives me hope? My life. As long as I’m living, I have hope. I was asked at a conference in Poland, “What is life?” I answered, “Life is hope.” As long as I am breathing, there is hope. As long as I am moving, there is hope. Meeting with people gives hope. Engagement. What we see on a daily basis gives hope. Every day, where I go, it strengthens my belief in the presence of hope. So I fully believe in the presence of hope, and we must not give up; we only lose hope once we are dead. As a medical doctor, we can’t lose hope; as long as the patient is still alive, though maybe in a critical situation, but still alive. We teach patients: Today there is no treatment, but the hope of tomorrow is to find a treatment. The students who come to the university to study—why? They have hope to succeed. The patient who goes to the medical doctor for the hope of recovery—it’s life. It’s life. We bring our children for the hope to change, to do something against hate. This conference, which has been held here in the hope to do something against hate. Hope is in every action of our life.

EPPINGA: Have you always had this attitude?

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ABUELAISH: Of course. Always we must have this, and always I have it. It encourages me. It energizes me. Because, you know, with hope, you succeed. And success begets success.

EPPINGA: Yes. But many people who have experienced such a crippling blow as you have would be broken by it.

ABUELAISH: But we are lucky that we are human beings. And this is the difference between human beings and animals and other creatures in this world: that we have choices. We have choices in life between this and that—to carry this with the pain, with the suffering, or to be collapsed and destroyed. So it helped me, my life experience, my profession as a medical doctor, and most important, my faith. And that’s what I say to everyone: To have faith. Whatever is your faith—to have that faith, it helps.

EPPINGA: What would you say to people who don’t have that faith, who weren’t raised with it or don’t feel it?

ABUELAISH: Those people who don’t have faith, what are they called, atheists—they believe in something. There is something there. There is belief in certain values. What can be done to spread those values? Kindness, dignity, humanity, responsibility—all of those good values. That’s religion, in an indirect way. Religion is kindness. Religion is a relationship between the people and God. But the relationship between people and other people is affected by their kindness, how they deal with each other. That’s religion. Religion is a way of dealing with each other. The one who believes, to be religious, he’s a good person to others, he deals with respect and kindness to others. So that’s the faith.

EPPINGA: You wrote in your book that we need to inoculate children against hatred.

ABUELAISH: In medicine, it’s important to prevent, not to treat. Prevention is more important. If we succeed to prevent, it is cost-effective, cost-efficient, and important; and that’s why immunization against certain communicable diseases is effective to save a lot of our resources. So prevention, I stress it; it’s vital, and we want to inoculate our children before the microbe and the toxin invade their bodies with this hate and violence.

EPPINGA: That’s clear on a physical level, but how do we do that on an emotional level, on a mental level?

ABUELAISH: Education. Educate the people about what religion is. What do we want from life? What’s our mission in life?
To be good to each other.

How can we be good to each other? It’s important for the researchers, like the ones at this conference, to study hate. What are the determinants of hate?

Fear is a big piece.

What are the causes of fear?

Insecurity.

Why are we feeling insecure?

We fear we won’t have enough.

Ask five times backwards. Why fear? Why insecurity? Lack or shortage of resources. Ask again. Why is there a lack of resources?

Because we don’t share.

Lack of sharing. So now the solution starts here. How can we allocate and distribute resources equally? When we don’t, there is injustice. So that is the issue. That’s the diagnostic tree. It starts here. So hate is a consequence of something before. It’s a symptom.

Do you think it’s your understanding of that process that gives you compassion?

Of course. If you have a child, God bless them, one day your son is coming to you from the school, complaining, suffering, he did something wrong, he has a problem with the teacher, or he had a test and didn’t do well. You must find out the reason. Maybe the night before he didn’t sleep well. He has problems, he has, he has, he has . . . many things. Don’t take his failure as the end result. There is something wrong [that] happened to him, because this child who is usually successful, doing a great job—just this time he didn’t do well. So we must ask ourselves: “Why? What made him . . .?” And that’s important—no one was born with hate. So that’s why we want to focus as early as possible on the children to immunize them before they are spoiled and start to be poisoned with hate. Our life is shaped by the environment in which we live. Environmental factors and lifestyle have a major impact in shaping our life and our behaviors. So if you want to deal with and change the behavior, look for the environment and the lifestyle.
Eppinga: So would you say the main way we can affect our children and steer them toward love is through our own behavior?

Abuelaish: We as parents must lead by example. We must practice with others, to show them. How can my child be tolerant if I am intolerant with his mother, with him, with the neighbors? I must practice it on a daily basis, to show the love, to show the caring, the sharing with others, connection with others. What is justice, in simple terms? Justice is to like for others what I like for myself. To put myself in the shoes of others.

Eppinga: That’s easy to understand conceptually. Do you always feel it?

Abuelaish: Yes, of course. I feel it, and I practice it. It’s important not just to feel. Feeling is good, to be moved. But if this feeling is not accompanied by action and by practice, what is the value of that?

Eppinga: Did you not have a moment during your crisis of wanting vengeance?

Abuelaish: I don’t allow this feeling, or this way of thinking, to come to my mind, because it has no place. I can say to you, those ideas are frustrated and they will never approach me. They would say, “Oh, it’s not going to work there.” They’ll find someone else to work and invest in. For me, they are not there. I have a shield against that. I built that shield.

Eppinga: How did you build that shield?

Abuelaish: I built that shield through being rational; through thinking, using my mind. I know what I want in my life. Also, my life experience gave me a lot to learn to build that shield. Many factors, they came together, that this shield [exists], that hate could find no way. It will be killed in front of that shield.

Eppinga: Do you have a specific spiritual discipline that you practice?

Abuelaish: I am a Muslim; I have the faith. I am close to God; I believe everything from God is for good, and God knows, and we don’t know. So that is what I practice. As long as I am close to God, God is close to me. I pray. My weakest point is I am an emotional person. I feel the feelings of others. To see a child suffering . . . my tears are so close.

Eppinga: You see that as a weakness?

Abuelaish: No, it is a strength! It’s the strength of not accepting it. Why is
the child suffering? I feel angry about it. What can I do to direct my energy in a positive way to change the situation? And that’s what is needed from all of us, to feel the anger, to feel the outrage, to feel upset, to speak louder, to tell others—that is what is needed, not to feel emotionally and to be so sad—and to do nothing.

**EPPINGA:** So we teach our children though education, we teach our children through the way we live—is there anything else?

**ABUELAISH:** To connect to each other. To explain to them and to take them to see what we call “the other.” To explain to them that others are not different from you—they are similar. We are complementing, we are not competing.

**EPPINGA:** You seem to feel that women have a special role in building the future.

**ABUELAISH:** Of course. In my life personally, I am in debt to my mother, to my wife, to my daughters. As you know, behind every successful man, there is a woman! We belong to others, all of us. Mothers feed us love, care, sacrifice, sharing. Who is the most sacrificing person on earth? The mother. To give the heart, to give the time. She is sacrificing the time. In her deep sleep, when she is in bad need, she is the one to wake up to take care of the child, to breastfeed. When the child is sick, she is the one who gives the medication, keeps track of the times; the mother is the one who prepares the food, and she is the last to eat. These are the values we want. To give the mother the role to be equal, so that what she gets is equal to what she gives. She gives a lot, beyond limits. Can we expand that, not just to take from her, but also, what can we give her? When you give to the women, it will be reflected on us, will have a positive impact on us. So mothers, and women, are key—the key players in any change. Any country’s development is not measured by GDP; it is measured by women’s role, not just women’s status. Even here in the States you are still struggling for your rights, but what’s your role here in the States as a woman? It’s not equal to the man. Your role is far, far beyond. We don’t want to have equal. We want each person to practice his or her role according to his or her potential. We are not competing; we are complementing each other. We want the good for all. It’s important to understand that it’s woman’s role, not just woman’s status and woman’s rights; and woman’s rights, it’s not coming in a fragmented way, a divided way. Every now and then we get this right here, another right there. . . Once we are born we have rights! The same rights! It’s not coming in phases. Rights are rights. But more important is the role. So how can we encourage the woman’s role in decision making, in shaping our life?
The woman is the school. *The woman is the school.* If you equip this school with good means, what do you think the student will be? She will produce highly skilled, successful students. So that is what we want: to equip mothers and women with the means to be real players, decision makers, to have full potential, and to practice the right role in their life.

**Eppinga:** Do you see women as being just as valuable as men in the intellectual realm?

**Abuelaish:** Of course. In all aspects. What is the difference? They have proved by evidence-based practices and successes to be not less than anyone else in doing any job.

**Eppinga:** If men and women are equal intellectually, and women have this strong nurturing role, what is the role of men?

**Abuelaish:** To support their family and not be threatened by women—to support them and to be working. We want the good for our children. We have one goal to achieve. Let us work together to achieve that goal.

**Eppinga:** Do you have anything to say about the way people talk about or to each other?

**Abuelaish:** Political discourse can lead to hate. Once there is political discourse, there is misunderstanding, manipulation. Politics leads to hate. It leads to conflict, violence. . . because the interest here is completely different—it’s political interest. The agenda of the politicians is mostly different from the agenda of the people on the ground. Who are the grassroots paying the price?—The people. The impact of violence, conflict, and war on people will be hate. Who are on the ground fighting?—The people. Who are killed?—The people. Who are suffering?—The people. Who are injected with this poison? The people themselves. How can we settle this? It’s the role of the leaders. Their role is to be risk-takers, challenging, honest. Honesty is a very rare commodity among leaders. Their main goal is to do what serves the people and to avoid conflict, violence, and war.

**Eppinga:** Do you think war is ever justified?

**Abuelaish:** I don’t. I don’t like war. Especially with what is happening in this world, we must not justify war. We must avoid it and prevent it from the start. With any disease, if you start from the beginning and treat it, it is not going to be complicated. With diabetes, if you control it, the lifestyle and everything, not to reach the moment with gangrene and do amputation, so we must not reach that point, and it’s the role of the politicians. War will
increase hate. We must do as much as we can to avoid, to prevent [it]. Fear, lack of resources will lead to war. Insecurity will lead to war. Many want to dominate and oppress others. This must be stopped.

**EPPINGA:** What is the main thing you want people to know?

**ABUELAISH:** Life is what we make it. Always has been, always will be.

**EPPINGA:** Do you say this even to the person who was born with nothing?

**ABUELAISH:** Of course. Our hands—what our hands bring to us, what our hands did for us. I want people to know that nothing is impossible; but it’s important to take responsibility. Don’t say, “I am far from the danger.” We are connected as one. We must protect outside if we are to protect ourselves. We are living and riding in the same boat. Geographically today, I may be far away from the rest. Today it may be 2,000 kilometers, but tomorrow it may be 1,000; it’s far; things are changing; look at what is happening in the Middle East. It is far, maybe, but it may be approaching other places. It will spread. So we must not think, “We are safe.” My safety comes from your safety. My security is your security. We are linked, and we must start reaching out.

**EPPINGA:** Do you have anything else you’d like to say about hatred?

**ABUELAISH:** About hatred, I can say: I tell people to give themselves the time—four seconds!—before adopting it as an approach. Think of the consequences before you will regret and before it becomes irreversible. The antidote to hate is success. The one who you want to hate is not thinking of you at all, and you are wasted, you are consumed by this hate, which is a fire, a poison. So don’t collapse. Don’t give up. You have suffered, maybe, from the one you hated. Don’t be another victim of hate. How many times do you want to be a victim? Say to yourself, “No! I will never. The one whom I thought I had to hate, I will challenge him, to tell him that I am stronger. I am standing steadfast. I will send him, on a daily basis, messages of success, that I am succeeding.”
In Memoriam: Eva Lassman

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Shalom! This is the way Eva Lassman always began and often ended her talks, indicating that Shalom means both “hello” and “peace.” This volume of the Journal of Hate Studies is dedicated to the memory of Eva Lassman, Holocaust survivor and honorary board member of the Institute for Hate Studies, who died February 9, 2011.

Eva was born in Lodz, Poland and was in her early twenties when Hitler conquered Poland. After being confined to the Warsaw Ghetto, she was transported to three different concentrations camps and lost her entire family. Following liberation, Eva married another survivor, Walter (Zev) Lassman. Although they wanted to stay in Poland, antisemitism remained high and they left to escape continuing prejudice and hatred. Eva and Walter resided in a displaced persons’ camp in Germany until 1949, at which time they immigrated to Spokane with two small children under the sponsorship of the Spokane Jewish community. Despite language barriers and knowing no one in Spokane, they made a wonderful life for their family, which included three brilliant sons, Richard, Joel, and Sylvan.

Eva loved Spokane and contributed much to our community. Although silent about her experiences as a Holocaust survivor until the 1980s, she was always a strong supporter of human rights and social justice. Eva’s message regarding the need to combat hate through education has been told to people of all ages, broadcast on radio, and recorded in documentaries. Eva compared hate to cancer, indicating that one could become consumed by hate. She was a strong voice against hate, relating her experiences to everyday events, such as bullying and violence in our schools and communities. Multiple articles have been written about Eva, and numerous students, from middle school to university doctoral students, have interviewed her.

Although Eva had every reason to hate her captors and the murderers of her family and friends, she decided to speak up about the perils of hate. She often said that we don’t have to be in love with everyone, but we do have to respect and stand up for each other. Eva was a strong advocate for peace and the moral legacy that we are our brothers’ keepers. Over the course of the past 30 years, Eva presented her testimony to numerous schools, to faith-based organizations, and at community events. She often ended her presentations with Pastor Martin Niemöller’s famous quote:
When the Nazis came for the communists,
I remained silent; I was not a communist.

When they locked up the social democrats,
I remained silent; I was not a social democrat.
When they came for the trade unionists,
I did not speak out; I was not a trade unionist.

When they came for the Jews,
I remained silent; I was not a Jew.

When they came for me,
there was no one left to speak out.

- Niemöller

Niemöller was a German pastor who described the inactivity of German intellectuals following the Nazi rise to power and the destruction of chosen targets, group after group. This quote is a wake-up call for all of us to stand up for what is right.

The board members of the Institute learned profound lessons about love from Eva’s heartfelt presentations about hate. As poignant as theory and conceptual frameworks are, there is nothing like lived experience to make meaning of the most unfathomable events. Eva brought the concept of resilience to life by sharing her testimony of surviving the worst possible forms of hate and demonstrating her ability to forgive and overcome obstacles in pursuit of a meaningful and fulfilling life. As an honorary member of the Institute, she brought a practical voice of reason to academia. She worked with us on many projects and always added a loving presence to our meetings. She was the first and last one to ask us whether the work of the Institute was making a difference on our campus in terms of combating hate.

Thankfully, Eva was honored many times over when she was alive. She received an Honorary Doctor of Laws from Gonzaga University, The Carl Maxey Racial Justice Award from the YWCA, a commendation from Whitworth University, and The Take Action Against Hate Award from The Institute for Hate Studies (Eva was the first to be honored at the annual dinner for this award), as well as community recognition for her work.

Eva was a regional and national treasure. She has touched the lives of so many people in our community and brought personal meaning to The Institute for Hate Studies and Gonzaga University. She will be forever remembered for her kindness, acceptance, and forgiveness. Eva is a hero, and those who were lucky enough to know her are better people for having known her.

Shalom.